Monday, March 19, 2007

Teleological, Analogical and Models in Religious Language

(Originally written March 19, 2007 in Book 25)

Class notes

The Teleological Argument

Transcendental Logic

Given a phenomena 'X'
What are the conditions that make X possible?
Unless there is Y, there cannot be X

Given the fact that all things act for an end
What are the conditions that make it possible for all things to act for an end?
Unless there were an intelligent being that directs all things to their end, ti would not be possible.

Aristotle's Four Questions and their answers

1) What is its purpose? Final Cause (Telos)
2) What is it made of? Material Cause
3) What is its shape (form)? Formal Cause
4) Who or what made it? Efficient Cause

Substance - the total thing with all of its attributes (Aristotelian, not Cartesian)

Paley's Argument from analogy

The watch did not grow there.
It did not just happen.
Because of its complexity and purposiveness we know that it was made by a human being.

The very properties that lead us to infer that the watch was made by a watchmaker lead us to infer the universe was made by a universe-maker.

Inductive Analogy

Set A consists of member {a, b, c, d, e...}
All these members share property X
"F" is also a member of set A
Therefore, F probably has property X

In the General sample you want a "high negative analogy"

But when the General sample is extended to one particular thing you want a "high positive analogy".

The teleological argument of Paley depends on the universe being as much like a clock as possible.

Criticism of Paley's Argument

Hume:

-Even if the analogy holds, it doesn't prove the existence of God
- Even if there is a strong analogy between the watch and the universe we have not ruled out the possibility that it could have come about by chance

Post-Humean Versions

- tend to become disjunctions rather than analogy
- which is the better explanation: the universe came by chance or by purpose?

Stuart Hackett

Teleological argument from the "Macroscopic point of view"
From a conspicuous adaptation to an intelligent creator

examples:

1) The fitness of the inorganic material world to be an environment for both the production and maintenance of organic life. Chance is not a sufficient explanation because chance is tied to the consistent make-up of the inorganic material.

2) The internal adaptedness of organic beings, both in their structure of specialized functions and in their general orientation for self-maintenance or subservience to some other form of organic life. Chance is ruled out as a proximate cause. Chance would postal minute, non-advantageous changes.

3) The intelligibility of the world and its instrumentality in the realization of humanly provisioned ends. Chance ruled out because minds are not the logical outcome of our evolutionary process. Minds are so transcendent that they cannot have arisen from matter.

4) The temporal progressiveness of the cosmic progress through levels of matter, life and mind, in an order of increasing valuation significance.

Anthropic Principle

What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the condition necessary for our presence as observers. (Weak Version)

The universe would have had to passed some very tiny probabilities of window in order to be observed. (Strong version)

Generation of Carbon Post- Big Bang

- Needs to combine three helium nuclei
- May not exceed three helium nuclei
- If it becomes four it becomes oxygen and then "boom", nothing is left

The universe seems to have moved in a deliberate direction. Therefore, it seems more plausible that the universe arose from a creator and not from chance.

Ramsey: Qualified Disclosure Models

Ramsey built his religious language out of an empirical setting and tests it by its empirical adequacy.

Disclosure-Commitment Situations

There are two aspects to the kind of experiences that are religious in nature:
1) An empirical situation that evokes discernment
2) A total commitment to what is discerned

The empirical situations that evoke discernment are the experiential grounding for the meaning of religious language.

Discernment situations:

Ramsey holds that metaphors and odd words have the disclosure poor to make the "ice break" or the "light down".

The literary and logical oddity of "I-Religion" or tautologies like "I am I", "Duty for duty's sake" or "love for love's sake" do not render them meaningless.

To Ramsey there is more in empirical language and situations than meets the eye.

Commitment Situations:

Not every disclosure situation provides religious disclosure.

Religious disclosure evokes a total commitment.

Total commitment is a total commitment to the whole universe, not a total commitment to a part of the universe or a partial commitment to the whole universe.

Ramsey holds religious experience to be one in which one responds to a discernment situation with a total commitment.

Religious Language: Qualified Models

Since religious experience in and of itself is odd, religious language will in turn be odd.

The Meaning and Use of Models

A disclosure model does not seek to describe anything. It enables us to articulate what we once could not express.

Language about God is not declarative; it is evocative.

The Qualification of Models

Ramsey calls qualifiers "words which multiply models without end and with subtle changes" (279).

Models and qualifiers create what Wittgenstien calls family resemblances.

Ramsey develops three groups of qualified models:
1) The negative attributes of God - i.e. God is immutable
2) One word positive attributes of God - i.e. perfection
3) Two-word positive attributes of God - i.e. first cause or infinitely good

Ramsey holds the term "God" to be an integrative term, bringing together the separate discernment-commitment disclosures into a unified whole.

The term "God" functions like the term "I" in everyday language.

The Adequacy of Models: Empirical Fit

Models help to articulate theology in a reliable way when:
1) They arise in a moment of insight or disclosure
2) It empirically fits, it is able to incorporate diverse phenomena consistently

Evaluation of Ramsey's View

Ramsey's master model of God, a combination of many individual models, answers the problem of empirically grounded God-talk.

Without an analogy built on the ontological similarity of Creator and creature, God-talk is purely equivocal.

Only metaphysical analogy can save qualified models from equivocation.

Ferré Metaphysical Models

Ferré builds a metaphysical synthesis based on the religious model, which is subject to truth tests.

The Nature and Function of Models

To Ferré, a model y is that "which provides epistemological vividness or immediacy to a theory by offering as an interpretation of the abstract or unfamiliar theory-structure that both fits the logical form of the theory and is well-known" (283).

Models are similar to metaphors in two ways:
1) Their language is literally false
2) They have a point nonetheless

Ferré divides models threefold:
1) Type - the degree of concreteness the model has
2) Scope - degree of inclusiveness the model has
3) Status - how important the model is

Ferré holds there are three functions for models:
1) Suggest point-by-point resemblance
2) Serve heuristic value
3) Fulfill the holistic desire of man to have an explanatory model of his experience

Models in Religions Language

A scientific mode can separate reality and the observer, whereas a theological model cannot

Scientific models are judged on how helpful they are

Theological models must be judged on truth and falsity

Theological models draw upon a different set of facts than scientific models.

Ferré holds the religious imagery of the Scriptures, the creeds, and traditions of the believing community to be a "metaphysical model"

God-Language is not literal, it is anthropomorphic

The theistic model incorporates data from other areas of knowledge, but religious imagery is always the core.

Testing Religious Models

Ferré denies that religious language is purely non cognitive while admitting it serves many non-cognitive functions.

No metaphysical model (world view) should be adopted arbitrarily

There are three strata in one's total account of things:
1) Preverbal metaphysical model of symbol (taken from the imagery of Scripture)
2) Set of propositions that attempt to express this metaphysical model in a cognitive way
3) A range of functions (cognitive and non-cognitive, verbal and nonverbal) that constitute the religious language game.

Only the second strata is applicable to the truth tests

Ferry offers five truth tests for the truth of total synthesis built on religious models:
1) Consistency - it must be non-contradictory
2) Coherence - consistency must be external as well as internal
3) Applicability - masut be relatable to individual experience
4) Adequacy - must be applicable to all domains of feeling and perception
5) Effectiveness - the synthesis must be a useable instrument for coping with the total environment of human experiences

A metaphysical synthesis is adequate (according to Ferré) only if it is capable of putting all experience into a whole, pervasive and adequate pattern.

Ferré notes that nay falsification of a metaphysical position is like an erosion, not an explosion.

Ferré states that:
1) Christianity has been effective in the past, but there is doubt about its effectiveness in the present and future.
2) Few would dispute the applicability of love and reverence. But this is only a minimal test.
3) Adequacy is a complex test involving many levels that Christianity appears to meet fairly well.
4) No clear contradictions have been demonstrated in Christianity but the proposed solutions have not gained universal acceptance.
5) Christianity has a "striking internal coherence" but the external coherence is not as obvious. There are almost certainly some empirical statements in Scripture that are false (i.e. the sun standing still for Joshua)

Evaluation of Ferré's Metaphysical Model

Ferré is not in the univocal camp. No literal descriptions of God, anthropomorphic Bible, etc.

Ferré denied the analogical intrinsic causal connection of the Thomists but his concentration on truth statements suggests he does not mean to make religious language equivocal.

Ferré would need to rethink his stance on analogy to save his theory from equivocation.

Recent Trends Retreating from models

Much of contemporary religious language has been shaped by Hume, the logical positivists and young Wittgenstein

Gill: Mediation and Metaphor

Jerry H. Gill attempts to build a holistic comprehension of humanity and human knowledge, instead of a purely cognitive or empirical basis.

He held that:
1) Religious language is linguistically constituted, we cannot know religious reality apart from it being covered to us in words and concepts
2) Religious language is social activity. Many uses are more important than descriptive.
3) Religious language is meaningful with significant, not absolute precision
4) Religious language is primarily metaphorical

Gill's Proposal Evaluated

Analogy must be grounded in metaphysical reality, but Gill denies this ontological link.

Gill has made a strong analysis of the function of religious language but has forfeited any guard against it being equivocal.

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