The History of Western Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
I took a bit of a hiatus from this book and other history of philosophy books with the intention of reading everything written by Plato and then I would move on to Aristotle, then Augustine, then the next, etc., etc. Reading primary works alongside the histories. I've read a lot of Plato, but not every word and am now simply trying to clean up my "current reading list" on Goodreads. I want to finish the two history books and move on to another subject. I have a complete works of Plato that I'll get to someday.
Ch. XIX Aristotle's Metaphysics
In studying Philosophers one must study both who the influences of the philosopher were and who they influenced.
Russell criticizes many whom Aristotle influenced but puts the blame more on those individuals than on Aristotle, noting that any ancient philosopher would have wound up being saddled with criticism if Aristotle had been replaced by any other ancient philosopher as the one who became dogmatic in the hands of later philosophers.
"He came at the end of the creative period in Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced any philosopher who could be regarded as approximately his equal" (Russell, 159).
Aristotle became a bedrock in Church theology and since the 17th century, "almost every serious intellectual advance has had to begin with an attack on some Aristotelian doctrine" (Russell, 160).
Aristotle was born circa 384 BC in Thrace. At 18 he became a pupil to Plato. In 343 BC he became the tutor to Alexander the Great.
Aristotle lived in Athens until the death of Alexander. He fled the city when the Athenians rebelled against Alexander's successors and died a year later.
Russell suggest that neither Augustine nor Alexander had much of an impact on each other.
Aristotle is very different to his predecessors, writing as a professor and not an inspired teacher. There is no Bacchic enthusiasm in Aristotle.
Aristotle's metaphysics is a combination of Plato and common sense.
Aristotle believed universals cannot exist by themselves but must exist in particular things.
Russell claims that Aristotle's theory of universals is not clear, but it was an advancement in human thought.
For Aristotle, a universal is something that can be predicated to many subjects, i.e. man, dog, cat. An individual is a particular thing, Chris, Gallifrey, Porch Kitty.
Aristotle's metaphysics also emphasizes "essences". This is what you are by your very nature, a property of which you cannot lose without ceasing to be yourself.
Both individual things and species of things have an essence.
Aristotle has an important distinction between form and matter. The form is what gives boundaries to the matter to make whatever you are observing a thing. The form gives unity to the matter. The unity has a teleological aspect to it in Aristotle.
"The form of a thing, we are told, is its essence and primary substance" (Russell, 166).
There is a scale of actuality and potentiality in Aristotle. That which has more form has more actuality.
The soul is the form of the body in Aristotle.
In Aristotle, God is pure form and pure actuality. There is no potentiality; thus, no change. God is immutable.
Three types of substances in Aristotle:
1) The sensible and the perishable (plants and animals)
2) The sensible but not perishable (heavenly bodies)
3) The non-sensible and non-perishable (God and man's rational soul)
Aristotle argues that God exists from the argument of First Cause
Aristatle has an eternal, most good God that men must love. But like Spinoza's God, Aristotle's God cannot love men.
Four Causes in Aristotle
1) Material - the Matter
2) Formal - the essence
3) Efficient - the agent that brings the change (only modern cause)
4) Final - the end goal (teleological)
"The unmoved mover may be regarded as a final cause: it supplies a purpose for change, which is essentially an evolution towards likeness with God" (Russell, 169).
God is the final (teleological) cause of all activity.
For Aristotle, the soul was the final cause of the body. He taught against the transmigration of souls, believed asking whether the soul and body were one was as meaningless a question as to whether the wax and the shape given to it by a stamp were one and believed that mind and soul were different.
Aristotle differentiates between mind and soul, granting the mind a higher place than soul.
The mind is implanted in the soul and incapable of being destroyed.
The mind can be immortal even if the rest of the soul is not.
The soul gives form to the body by making it a unit.
"It seems, from these passages, that individuality--what distinguishes one man from another--is
connected with the body and the irrational soul, while the rational soul or mind is divine and
impersonal." (Russell, 172).
The irrational part of us separates from each other but the rational part unites us. Aristotle taught that the rational mind takes part in the divine which is immortal. It is our duty and goal to take part in as much divine immortality as possible but if we were to achieve this wholly we would become part of the divine immortality and cease to be an individual.
Russell admits that there are other ways of interpreting Aristotle but believes his interpretation is the "most natural".
Showing posts with label Spinoza. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spinoza. Show all posts
Monday, September 16, 2019
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
Some things I liked stylistically in Hopscotch
As I've stated earlier in this blog, reading Hopscotch was quite difficult and since I've only read it in the 'traditional' way and still have to hopscotch through it, I'm withholding my final judgment until then. After hopscotching through it I'm also going to do some research to help me understand some of the more difficult parts. Some of it is lost on me. For instance, I'm really unsure of how baby Rocamador died and am hoping that some of the 'extra chapters' reveal the answer. Second, chapter 34 was the most insanely frustrating chapter of a book I've ever read, but after the fourth reading I sort of figured it out.
But, here are some of the things I really liked from a pure style standpoint in the book. The following short list has just some of the things I labeled as "Good Imagery, Wording & Style". There is a whole lot more that could be added but these stood out to me at the time of reading.
1) [We] "used to get together to talk to a blind seer, a stimulating paradox" (Cortázar, 6). I just liked the 'blind seer' paradox and it being pointed out. Somehow the pointing out of the paradoxical nature of it wasn't overkill or stating the obvious.
2) Those that search, those “who go out at night with noting in mind, the motives of a destroyer of compasses” (Cortázar, 7). I like the idea of those who are searching with an openness in their head aren't really searching in the normal sense, but looking to smash the conventional ways of searching for that which I know not what.
3) “As if it were some sort of mean and sticky vengeance” (Cortázar, 10). I just really liked the sentence a lot. 'Mean and sticky vengeance' just hopped off the page and gave me a visual and tactile image in my head.
4) “Happiness must have been something else, something sadder perhaps than this peace, this pleasure, a mood of unicorn…” (Cortázar, 13). Again, I just really enjoyed this phrase, 'a mood of unicorn' denotes something like a childlike happiness, but also the realization that it, like the unicorn was a myth.
5) In my own writing, I've often had characters or scenarios where alcohol has played a part. I've always struggled with writing that because I don't want to give it a technical feel or a celebratory feel unless it's right for the current story. But in a couple of passages, Cortázar was able to once again make a great visual in my head that connected the story with some experiences that I'd like to incorporate into my own work:
[Gregorovius] “was at that vodka level where the night began to become magnanimous and everything promised him fidelity and hope… With his wits ajar Gregorovius managed to make out the corner where Ronald and Wong were selecting and passing records” (Cortázar, 43-44). I really liked that first sentence and how it showed what alcohol can do. Of course the night did not turn out how Gregorovius thought it would, as is often the case when vodka levels get to that point because the vodka level often rises and surpasses that point too and begins to careen downwards in spiral fashion rather quickly in the opposite direction of hope.
Then later, towards Babs: “Sh, darling, stop crying, the girl has really tied one on, even her soul smells of cognac” (Cortázar, 198). In this sentence, I'm not really sure who the narrator is, but 'even her soul smells of cognac' gave me as the reader, a knowledge of Babs' current state.
But, here are some of the things I really liked from a pure style standpoint in the book. The following short list has just some of the things I labeled as "Good Imagery, Wording & Style". There is a whole lot more that could be added but these stood out to me at the time of reading.
1) [We] "used to get together to talk to a blind seer, a stimulating paradox" (Cortázar, 6). I just liked the 'blind seer' paradox and it being pointed out. Somehow the pointing out of the paradoxical nature of it wasn't overkill or stating the obvious.
2) Those that search, those “who go out at night with noting in mind, the motives of a destroyer of compasses” (Cortázar, 7). I like the idea of those who are searching with an openness in their head aren't really searching in the normal sense, but looking to smash the conventional ways of searching for that which I know not what.
3) “As if it were some sort of mean and sticky vengeance” (Cortázar, 10). I just really liked the sentence a lot. 'Mean and sticky vengeance' just hopped off the page and gave me a visual and tactile image in my head.
4) “Happiness must have been something else, something sadder perhaps than this peace, this pleasure, a mood of unicorn…” (Cortázar, 13). Again, I just really enjoyed this phrase, 'a mood of unicorn' denotes something like a childlike happiness, but also the realization that it, like the unicorn was a myth.
5) In my own writing, I've often had characters or scenarios where alcohol has played a part. I've always struggled with writing that because I don't want to give it a technical feel or a celebratory feel unless it's right for the current story. But in a couple of passages, Cortázar was able to once again make a great visual in my head that connected the story with some experiences that I'd like to incorporate into my own work:
[Gregorovius] “was at that vodka level where the night began to become magnanimous and everything promised him fidelity and hope… With his wits ajar Gregorovius managed to make out the corner where Ronald and Wong were selecting and passing records” (Cortázar, 43-44). I really liked that first sentence and how it showed what alcohol can do. Of course the night did not turn out how Gregorovius thought it would, as is often the case when vodka levels get to that point because the vodka level often rises and surpasses that point too and begins to careen downwards in spiral fashion rather quickly in the opposite direction of hope.
Then later, towards Babs: “Sh, darling, stop crying, the girl has really tied one on, even her soul smells of cognac” (Cortázar, 198). In this sentence, I'm not really sure who the narrator is, but 'even her soul smells of cognac' gave me as the reader, a knowledge of Babs' current state.
6) When La Maga & Horacio parts ways he feels he cannot
chase back after her. He tells himself, “Go home and read Spinoza. La Maga
doesn’t know who Spinoza is…She will never suspect that she has condemned me to
read Spinoza” (Cortázar, 96). I loved this sentence so much because of my feelings on having to read Spinoza back in college. To be condemned to read Spinoza is a perfect way of putting what it was like to have to read Spinoza for me all those years ago.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Class Notes on Spinoza and Leibniz
(Originally written February 27, 2006 in Book 22)
Class Notes: Spinoza
God
-has infinite attributes through which his essence can be conceived, but only two of them are knowable by man: mind and body
- mind and body are different but not of different substances
- god is substances. substance has infinite attributes, those attributes have infinite modes of being
-double aspect monism (one substance, two attributes)
-self=the two attributes of god (mind and body) united
Spinoza = 1 Substance (god)
Descartes = 2 Substances (mind and body)
Linehan - a set of (very high) of created substances. This tiny sub molecular substances form together to create a physical object or possibly could the elements be the smallest "substance" and that everything that is, is created by the combining of them. This set number of substances combined in various ways combine with other combinations that combine again, again and so forth to form complex objects like human beings.
Leibniz (1646-1716)
Leibniz accused Newton (and vice-versa) of stealing his invention of Calculus.
Leibniz was an overall genius.
Leibniz was a Christian (pious Lutheran)
Sought to unify the Christian Church and all of Europe to a single state.
Epistemology - distinguishes between two types of truth:
1) Truths of reason (a priori). True in all possible worlds.
2) Truths of fact (a posteriori). True in this world and other possible worlds, but not all.
Primary truths (first truths)
-They fall into both categories
Primary truths of fact
ex. "I exist", "something other than me exists"
True proposition: one whose predicate is contained in the subject, "a triangle is three-sided", "Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC"
Leibniz: 2 Sources of Knowledge
1) Senses
- Gives us fluctuating data
- Perceive regularities, not necessities
2) Innate ideas
- From the mind's reflecting on its own operations
Examples: unity, plurality
- Equality, differences, etc.
- "Natural inclinations"
- Contra Locke (mind is not tabula rasa)
- Mind is like "veined marble"
Class Notes: Spinoza
God
-has infinite attributes through which his essence can be conceived, but only two of them are knowable by man: mind and body
- mind and body are different but not of different substances
- god is substances. substance has infinite attributes, those attributes have infinite modes of being
-double aspect monism (one substance, two attributes)
-self=the two attributes of god (mind and body) united
Spinoza = 1 Substance (god)
Descartes = 2 Substances (mind and body)
Linehan - a set of (very high) of created substances. This tiny sub molecular substances form together to create a physical object or possibly could the elements be the smallest "substance" and that everything that is, is created by the combining of them. This set number of substances combined in various ways combine with other combinations that combine again, again and so forth to form complex objects like human beings.
Leibniz (1646-1716)
Leibniz accused Newton (and vice-versa) of stealing his invention of Calculus.
Leibniz was an overall genius.
Leibniz was a Christian (pious Lutheran)
Sought to unify the Christian Church and all of Europe to a single state.
Epistemology - distinguishes between two types of truth:
1) Truths of reason (a priori). True in all possible worlds.
2) Truths of fact (a posteriori). True in this world and other possible worlds, but not all.
Primary truths (first truths)
-They fall into both categories
Primary truths of fact
ex. "I exist", "something other than me exists"
True proposition: one whose predicate is contained in the subject, "a triangle is three-sided", "Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC"
Leibniz: 2 Sources of Knowledge
1) Senses
- Gives us fluctuating data
- Perceive regularities, not necessities
2) Innate ideas
- From the mind's reflecting on its own operations
Examples: unity, plurality
- Equality, differences, etc.
- "Natural inclinations"
- Contra Locke (mind is not tabula rasa)
- Mind is like "veined marble"
Monday, July 16, 2007
Mixed Opinions and Maxims B
(Originally written July 16, 2007 in Book 25)
Mixed Opinions and Maxims (continued)
157: Sharpest Criticism
We criticize those who picture our ideal the sharpest
168: Praise of Aphorisms
Aphorisms never lose their savor and are unaffected by time
200: Original
Truly original minds do not see things that are new, but see what is old as new. Those who see the new first normally do so by accident
201 Philosopher's Error
The philosopher believes the value of his work lies in the whole structure, but in reality it is valuable because it can be torn down and rebuilt better. A philosophy is most valuable as building material.
206: Why scholars are nobler than artists
Science requires a sobriety and a simplicity that poetry does not. The scholar must willingly submit to a loss of posthumous fame and therefore is nobler than a poet.
251: In parting
How a soul moves away from another, not how two come together, show how much they belong together.
298: Virtue has not been invented by the Germans
The nobility and lack of envy of Goethe, the noble hermit resignation of Beethoven, the charm and grace of Mozart's heart, the manliness of Handel, and confidence and transfigurement of inner life of Bach do not find it necessary to renounce splendor and success. If these are not German qualities, "it at least shows for what Germans should strive and what they can attain" (157).
309: Siding against oneself
Siding against oneself is unforgivable by our adherents because it is rejection of their love.
325: Opinions
People are nothing without general convictions and public opinions. But the exceptional person rises above this and opinions cease to become public.
341: Loving the monster
Monsters love monsters as apprentices cannot
346: Being Misunderstood
When one is misunderstood completely he must realize it is impossible to remove completely a single misunderstanding. If he does not realize this he will waste all of his energy on defending himself.
404: How duty acquires splendor
"The means for changing your iron duty to gold in everyone's eyes is this: always keep a little more than you promise" (158).
405: Prayer to man
Forgive us our virtues, thus one should pray to man.
408: The journey to Hades
I have spoken to the dead. 8 Men do I always keep my eyes upon: Epicurus and Montaigne, Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and Rousseau, Pascal and Schopenhauer. These men, though dead appear to me lusting for life. Eternal aliveness is what counts.
Mixed Opinions and Maxims (continued)
157: Sharpest Criticism
We criticize those who picture our ideal the sharpest
168: Praise of Aphorisms
Aphorisms never lose their savor and are unaffected by time
200: Original
Truly original minds do not see things that are new, but see what is old as new. Those who see the new first normally do so by accident
201 Philosopher's Error
The philosopher believes the value of his work lies in the whole structure, but in reality it is valuable because it can be torn down and rebuilt better. A philosophy is most valuable as building material.
206: Why scholars are nobler than artists
Science requires a sobriety and a simplicity that poetry does not. The scholar must willingly submit to a loss of posthumous fame and therefore is nobler than a poet.
251: In parting
How a soul moves away from another, not how two come together, show how much they belong together.
298: Virtue has not been invented by the Germans
The nobility and lack of envy of Goethe, the noble hermit resignation of Beethoven, the charm and grace of Mozart's heart, the manliness of Handel, and confidence and transfigurement of inner life of Bach do not find it necessary to renounce splendor and success. If these are not German qualities, "it at least shows for what Germans should strive and what they can attain" (157).
309: Siding against oneself
Siding against oneself is unforgivable by our adherents because it is rejection of their love.
325: Opinions
People are nothing without general convictions and public opinions. But the exceptional person rises above this and opinions cease to become public.
341: Loving the monster
Monsters love monsters as apprentices cannot
346: Being Misunderstood
When one is misunderstood completely he must realize it is impossible to remove completely a single misunderstanding. If he does not realize this he will waste all of his energy on defending himself.
404: How duty acquires splendor
"The means for changing your iron duty to gold in everyone's eyes is this: always keep a little more than you promise" (158).
405: Prayer to man
Forgive us our virtues, thus one should pray to man.
408: The journey to Hades
I have spoken to the dead. 8 Men do I always keep my eyes upon: Epicurus and Montaigne, Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and Rousseau, Pascal and Schopenhauer. These men, though dead appear to me lusting for life. Eternal aliveness is what counts.
Monday, March 26, 2007
Class notes on God as a causal agent
(Originally written March 26, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
Objections to God as a direct causal agent
1. Laws of nature cannot be violated; miracles are a violation
2. If miracles can occur, God would be changeable
3. Miracles are correctives to our understanding of the laws of nature, not violations of the laws
4. Miracles are not rationally believed in
5. Providence violates the the simplicity of God
6. God is eternal, how can an infinite God contain a finite attribute?
7. If God has to intervene in what he created to fix it it implies a defect in his creation
8. Miracles can be explained by natural occurrences; we just don't understand them
9. Miracles are always a result of natural causes
10. How can a non-physical being directly cause a physical change
11. If God is directly intervening in the world, and there is evil in the world, then God is not good.
12. Anomalies in nature do not prove direct intervention
13. Miracles intervene in human freedom
14. Every actualization of a potential through an immediate contingent cause; therefore, a remote cause is not necessary
15. If God governed directly it would destroy the perfection of the causal order
16. If God is outside of time but his causal action would have to be inside of time
Divine Providence and Miracles
Is God a direct causal agent in the world?
Views of God's interaction:
Classical theology
Deist
Neo-Thomism (primary cause working through secondary causes)
Kenotic God (limiting his power willingly)
Existential theology
Linguistic theology
Process theology
Neo-Thomism and Divine Providence
God as an end for everything
Action <- Man <- God
Miracles
- an effect in the physical world that surpasses all known human powers and beyond natural powers
Objection to miracles
- Principle of uniformity
Spinoza:
1. Miracles are a violation of natural laws
2. Natural laws are immutable
3. It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated
4. Therefore, miracles are impossible
Hume, Kant and Flew all argued agains miracles based on the principle of uniformity
God can't do anything against nature
Evidence for miracles is scarce and unpredictable by nature
God cannot violate the law of nature because the law of nature stems from God. So any violation of the law of nature is a violation of God's personal nature.
What is a secondary cause?
Could quantum mechanics explain God's intervening in human/natural affairs?
God effects the secondary cause (quantum mechanics) in effecting the probability at the molecular level.
Problems with this is that new technology is discovered accounting for previously unexplainable events.
Antony Flew
Science:
- Laws from observation
- Limited to this method by definition
Unexplained events are either miracles (outside of science) or anomaly (inside of science)
No unexplained event can ever be considered a miracle. At worst it is a not yet explained anomaly.
Are miracles possible?
Are miracles knowable?
Are miracles recognizable?
Hume critiqued miracles on the basis of whether they are knowable. Flew critiqued miracles on rather they are recognizable.
Superseding Miracles - where the laws of nature are superseded, direct action by God
Constellation Miracle - no law of nature is violated, but many circumstances come together in such away that they could have occurred by accident is less probable than it occurring by divine intervention
Reasonable presumption - reasonableness of a presumption
Worldview
If you do not have a worldview favorable to theism then you will not be convinced of miracles existing.
Circumstances, reasonable presumption and whether or not divine agency is the best explanation for the event all play a part in regarding something as a miracle.
Class Notes
Objections to God as a direct causal agent
1. Laws of nature cannot be violated; miracles are a violation
2. If miracles can occur, God would be changeable
3. Miracles are correctives to our understanding of the laws of nature, not violations of the laws
4. Miracles are not rationally believed in
5. Providence violates the the simplicity of God
6. God is eternal, how can an infinite God contain a finite attribute?
7. If God has to intervene in what he created to fix it it implies a defect in his creation
8. Miracles can be explained by natural occurrences; we just don't understand them
9. Miracles are always a result of natural causes
10. How can a non-physical being directly cause a physical change
11. If God is directly intervening in the world, and there is evil in the world, then God is not good.
12. Anomalies in nature do not prove direct intervention
13. Miracles intervene in human freedom
14. Every actualization of a potential through an immediate contingent cause; therefore, a remote cause is not necessary
15. If God governed directly it would destroy the perfection of the causal order
16. If God is outside of time but his causal action would have to be inside of time
Divine Providence and Miracles
Is God a direct causal agent in the world?
Views of God's interaction:
Classical theology
Deist
Neo-Thomism (primary cause working through secondary causes)
Kenotic God (limiting his power willingly)
Existential theology
Linguistic theology
Process theology
Neo-Thomism and Divine Providence
God as an end for everything
Action <- Man <- God
Miracles
- an effect in the physical world that surpasses all known human powers and beyond natural powers
Objection to miracles
- Principle of uniformity
Spinoza:
1. Miracles are a violation of natural laws
2. Natural laws are immutable
3. It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated
4. Therefore, miracles are impossible
Hume, Kant and Flew all argued agains miracles based on the principle of uniformity
God can't do anything against nature
Evidence for miracles is scarce and unpredictable by nature
God cannot violate the law of nature because the law of nature stems from God. So any violation of the law of nature is a violation of God's personal nature.
What is a secondary cause?
Could quantum mechanics explain God's intervening in human/natural affairs?
God effects the secondary cause (quantum mechanics) in effecting the probability at the molecular level.
Problems with this is that new technology is discovered accounting for previously unexplainable events.
Antony Flew
Science:
- Laws from observation
- Limited to this method by definition
Unexplained events are either miracles (outside of science) or anomaly (inside of science)
No unexplained event can ever be considered a miracle. At worst it is a not yet explained anomaly.
Are miracles possible?
Are miracles knowable?
Are miracles recognizable?
Hume critiqued miracles on the basis of whether they are knowable. Flew critiqued miracles on rather they are recognizable.
Superseding Miracles - where the laws of nature are superseded, direct action by God
Constellation Miracle - no law of nature is violated, but many circumstances come together in such away that they could have occurred by accident is less probable than it occurring by divine intervention
Reasonable presumption - reasonableness of a presumption
Worldview
If you do not have a worldview favorable to theism then you will not be convinced of miracles existing.
Circumstances, reasonable presumption and whether or not divine agency is the best explanation for the event all play a part in regarding something as a miracle.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Geisler/Corduan - Problem of Evil
(Originally written March 13, 2007 in Book 25)
Part 4: God & Evil
14: The nature of the problem of Evil
Nearly every religion attempts to deal with the reality and causes of evil in the world.
The problem of evil arises out of the nature of theism.
There are a number of dimensions to the problem of evil: metaphysical, physical and moral
An inconsistency differs from a contradiction. In a contradiction there are two statements in which one is true and one is false. In an inconsistency one or both statements could be false, but on the surface both cannot be true.
The inconsistency version of the problem of Evil
1) God is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent Being, in accordance with His nature He would abolish all evil
2) Evil exists
Either 1 or 2 could be false, both could be false but both cannot be true.
A way to solve an inconsistency is to show that it is a paradox. Thus, the inconsistency of 1 & 2 can be made into a paradox like this:
1) God is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, in accordance with His nature He would abolish all evil
2) Evil exists
3) God expressed his omnipotent and omnibenevolent nature by creating free beings who are solely responsible for evil.
But this solution may not satisfy men. Someone might still want to know why God created free beings. This way of dealing with the problem of evil is the problem of theodicy (the justification of God).
Non theistic solutions to the Problem of Evil
Illusionism's Answer to Evil
A theist cannot deny the reality of evil. A pantheist can claim that nothing is really evil, but only appears evil, but a theist may not.
Evil is everything that frustrates human aspirations and expectations.
Many people influenced by Eastern thought deny the reality of evil.
Frederic Spiegelburg follows the Indian sage Aurobindo in claiming that pain is not a matter of fact, but a perspective. Once one comes to the truth there is no longer a problem of evil because there is no evil.
Alan Watts accuses Westerners of being unwilling to recognize individual finitude and subsequently looking for a solution in the acts of free individual. He sees good and evil as relative distinctions that do not obtain with ultimate reality.
Problems with illusionism
1) Illusionism does not account for the origin of the illusion
2) It does not explain the apparent reality of the illusion
3) Denying the reality of evil does not remove the presence of reality
4) Illusionism is a theory that is ruined by a brutal gang of facts
"It is more likely that the illusionist is being deceived about evil than that all persons are being deceived by evil" (298).
Sadism's answer to evil
Elie Wiesel postulated that God is sadistic and created the world to watch suffering.
Harold S. Kushner in "When Bad Things Happen to Good People" states we ought to forgive God for not making a better world.
Objections to Sadism
1) God is all-good in theism
2) God as a term seems inappropriate for a sadistic being
3) The universe cannot be ultimately evil because evil presupposes good
4) It seems absurd that there is a being responsible for creating and destroying what he creates (Charles Hartshorne)
Finitism's Answer to Evil
David Hume and subsequent thinkers have proposed that God is finite in power or love (or both).
Finitism is represented by process thinkers today. Charles Hartshorne believes that the worst falsehood known is the traditional concept of omnipotence.
Others claim that God is not essentially limited, but instead limits Himself.
Bruce R. Reichenbach claims that God is sovereign in authority and power, but willingly limits Himself.
Objections to Finitism
1) Only an infinite cause explains the existence of things. A finite God could not be the cause of all existence
2) A finite God is not worthy of worship
3) A finite God cannot guarantee an outcome in the struggle of good and evil.
"A finite god is metaphysically impossible, religiously unworthy and ethically demoralizing for people in their struggle against evil" (300).
If there is no infinite God there can be no final solution to the problem of evil.
Determinism's answer to evil
God was forced to create the world as it is.
This view is normally pantheistic, but some theists who hold creation flows necessarily, not willingly from God also hold it.
Benedict Spinoza believed that the world as we have it is the necessary and most perfect product possible of the necessary and most perfect Being possible.
Objection to Determinism:
1) Creation flows from God's will freely, not necessarily (Revelation 4:11, Ephesians 1:11) That is, He was free not to create
2) God has no need to create
3) The necessary Being does not necessarily need to do anything other than exist
4) Even if God had to create it does not follow he had to create an imperfect world
Finitude does not necessitate evil, it only makes it possible
Impossibilism's Answer to evil
It may be impossible for even an infinite God to foreknow future free events. God could have created free beings not knowing they would bring evil into the world with their freedom.
God cannot control free beings without negating their freedom. Even an infinite God cannot do what is contradictory.
Objection to impossibilism
1) A Calvinist might draw a different conclusion that God foreknows and beings are still free
2) There can be no such thing as truly free (unforeseeable) acts by human beings because that limits God
3) Foreknowledge does not imply fore-determination
4) God is timeless, he does not foresee anything. He sees everything eternally now.
5) Just because an event is determined does not mean that it cannot be freely chosen
6) It makes no sense to speak of something in the future being true
7) God knows the choices and the eventually chosen act
Solutions to the Problem of Evil open to Theism
There are two sets of alternatives to the solution of the problem of evil open to theists:
1) Hypothetical
2) Actual
The hypothetical alternatives for theism
1) God could have decided not to create anything at all
- A God who knew that creation would become corrupt should not have created at all
- No solution to the problem of evil will be satisfactory without addressing this possibility that was open to God
2) God could have created only beings who are not free
- Could God have made an amoral world?
- The nature of God only necessitates that if he does, he must do it best, not that he do
3) God could have created beings who are free to sin, but do not actually sin
- Many have argued that freedom without sin is a contradiction
Objections to this:
1) There is no logical connection between freedom and sin
2) Freedom without sin is not a contradiction in Heaven
4) God could have created beings who are free but must sin
- God pronounces that sin is inevitable, but each sin is not
- Forced freedom though is completely incoherent
5) God could have created beings who were free and who would sin
- This alternative is what theists claim God chose to create
The Actual Alternatives for Theism
Theists must defend the way God chose to create (That he chose to create beings who were free not to sin but inevitably would choose to do so)
1) A theist need not prove three things to answer the problem of evil
He does not have to show that this is the best of all possible worlds, but only that there could be no better world or non-world
He does not have to show how God can achieve the highest perfection out of a world with evil in it.
He does not need to definitively prove that this world is the best of all possible solutions.
2) A theistic solution to evil must meet three conditions:
1) It must be at least possible
2) Offer evidence that it is capable of achievement
3) Present a way that is verifiable/falsifiable
The apparent dilemma facing theism
It seems that the proportions: What God does must be his best and the world is not best eliminates any theistic solution to the problem of evil
God must do his best. It is axiomatic that anything less than doing his best would be evil for GOd.
The theist must show that what God produces is the best possible.
Heaven is actually an argument against this world being the best of all possible worlds.
The way out of this dilemma is to claim that this is not the best of all possible worlds, but the best possible way to get to the best of all possible worlds (heaven)
Only an infinitely wise and good God can guarantee heaven as an outcome
The Dimensions of the Problem of Evil
Three aspects to the problem of evil:
1) Metaphysical
2) Moral
3) Physical
The Metaphysical Aspect of Evil
1) God is the author of everything in the world
2) Evil is something in the world
3) Therefore, God is the author of evil
Theists would not want to reject either of the premises. Denying the first would lead to dualism. Denying the second just seems contrary to experience
Theistic reply:
1) God is the author of everything
2) Evil is not a thing (substance)
3) Therefore, God is not necessarily the author of evil
To deny evil is not a real entity is not to deny the reality of evil. Evil is real. It is a real privation in things.
The Moral Aspect of the Problem of Evil
Pierre Bayle postulated the moral problem of evil in the 17th century.
1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, since evil is not destroyed either:
a) God is omnipotent and malevolent
b) God is benevolent and impotent
c) God is both malevolent and impotent
d) There is no God
Another way of stating it:
1) God is responsible for making everyone, including human freedom
2) Human freedom brought about moral evil
3) Therefore, God is responsible for what brought about moral evil
The Physical Aspect of the Problem of Evil
Not all evil is clearly a result of human freedom
Albert Camus offered the physical problem of evil
1) Either one must join the doc and fight the plague or else join the priest and not fight the plague
2) Not to fight the plague is anti-humanitarian
3) To fight the plague is to fight against God who sent it
4) Therefore if humanitarianism is right, theism is wrong
Theists would deny premise 3
Part 4: God & Evil
14: The nature of the problem of Evil
Nearly every religion attempts to deal with the reality and causes of evil in the world.
The problem of evil arises out of the nature of theism.
There are a number of dimensions to the problem of evil: metaphysical, physical and moral
An inconsistency differs from a contradiction. In a contradiction there are two statements in which one is true and one is false. In an inconsistency one or both statements could be false, but on the surface both cannot be true.
The inconsistency version of the problem of Evil
1) God is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent Being, in accordance with His nature He would abolish all evil
2) Evil exists
Either 1 or 2 could be false, both could be false but both cannot be true.
A way to solve an inconsistency is to show that it is a paradox. Thus, the inconsistency of 1 & 2 can be made into a paradox like this:
1) God is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, in accordance with His nature He would abolish all evil
2) Evil exists
3) God expressed his omnipotent and omnibenevolent nature by creating free beings who are solely responsible for evil.
But this solution may not satisfy men. Someone might still want to know why God created free beings. This way of dealing with the problem of evil is the problem of theodicy (the justification of God).
Non theistic solutions to the Problem of Evil
Illusionism's Answer to Evil
A theist cannot deny the reality of evil. A pantheist can claim that nothing is really evil, but only appears evil, but a theist may not.
Evil is everything that frustrates human aspirations and expectations.
Many people influenced by Eastern thought deny the reality of evil.
Frederic Spiegelburg follows the Indian sage Aurobindo in claiming that pain is not a matter of fact, but a perspective. Once one comes to the truth there is no longer a problem of evil because there is no evil.
Alan Watts accuses Westerners of being unwilling to recognize individual finitude and subsequently looking for a solution in the acts of free individual. He sees good and evil as relative distinctions that do not obtain with ultimate reality.
Problems with illusionism
1) Illusionism does not account for the origin of the illusion
2) It does not explain the apparent reality of the illusion
3) Denying the reality of evil does not remove the presence of reality
4) Illusionism is a theory that is ruined by a brutal gang of facts
"It is more likely that the illusionist is being deceived about evil than that all persons are being deceived by evil" (298).
Sadism's answer to evil
Elie Wiesel postulated that God is sadistic and created the world to watch suffering.
Harold S. Kushner in "When Bad Things Happen to Good People" states we ought to forgive God for not making a better world.
Objections to Sadism
1) God is all-good in theism
2) God as a term seems inappropriate for a sadistic being
3) The universe cannot be ultimately evil because evil presupposes good
4) It seems absurd that there is a being responsible for creating and destroying what he creates (Charles Hartshorne)
Finitism's Answer to Evil
David Hume and subsequent thinkers have proposed that God is finite in power or love (or both).
Finitism is represented by process thinkers today. Charles Hartshorne believes that the worst falsehood known is the traditional concept of omnipotence.
Others claim that God is not essentially limited, but instead limits Himself.
Bruce R. Reichenbach claims that God is sovereign in authority and power, but willingly limits Himself.
Objections to Finitism
1) Only an infinite cause explains the existence of things. A finite God could not be the cause of all existence
2) A finite God is not worthy of worship
3) A finite God cannot guarantee an outcome in the struggle of good and evil.
"A finite god is metaphysically impossible, religiously unworthy and ethically demoralizing for people in their struggle against evil" (300).
If there is no infinite God there can be no final solution to the problem of evil.
Determinism's answer to evil
God was forced to create the world as it is.
This view is normally pantheistic, but some theists who hold creation flows necessarily, not willingly from God also hold it.
Benedict Spinoza believed that the world as we have it is the necessary and most perfect product possible of the necessary and most perfect Being possible.
Objection to Determinism:
1) Creation flows from God's will freely, not necessarily (Revelation 4:11, Ephesians 1:11) That is, He was free not to create
2) God has no need to create
3) The necessary Being does not necessarily need to do anything other than exist
4) Even if God had to create it does not follow he had to create an imperfect world
Finitude does not necessitate evil, it only makes it possible
Impossibilism's Answer to evil
It may be impossible for even an infinite God to foreknow future free events. God could have created free beings not knowing they would bring evil into the world with their freedom.
God cannot control free beings without negating their freedom. Even an infinite God cannot do what is contradictory.
Objection to impossibilism
1) A Calvinist might draw a different conclusion that God foreknows and beings are still free
2) There can be no such thing as truly free (unforeseeable) acts by human beings because that limits God
3) Foreknowledge does not imply fore-determination
4) God is timeless, he does not foresee anything. He sees everything eternally now.
5) Just because an event is determined does not mean that it cannot be freely chosen
6) It makes no sense to speak of something in the future being true
7) God knows the choices and the eventually chosen act
Solutions to the Problem of Evil open to Theism
There are two sets of alternatives to the solution of the problem of evil open to theists:
1) Hypothetical
2) Actual
The hypothetical alternatives for theism
1) God could have decided not to create anything at all
- A God who knew that creation would become corrupt should not have created at all
- No solution to the problem of evil will be satisfactory without addressing this possibility that was open to God
2) God could have created only beings who are not free
- Could God have made an amoral world?
- The nature of God only necessitates that if he does, he must do it best, not that he do
3) God could have created beings who are free to sin, but do not actually sin
- Many have argued that freedom without sin is a contradiction
Objections to this:
1) There is no logical connection between freedom and sin
2) Freedom without sin is not a contradiction in Heaven
4) God could have created beings who are free but must sin
- God pronounces that sin is inevitable, but each sin is not
- Forced freedom though is completely incoherent
5) God could have created beings who were free and who would sin
- This alternative is what theists claim God chose to create
The Actual Alternatives for Theism
Theists must defend the way God chose to create (That he chose to create beings who were free not to sin but inevitably would choose to do so)
1) A theist need not prove three things to answer the problem of evil
He does not have to show that this is the best of all possible worlds, but only that there could be no better world or non-world
He does not have to show how God can achieve the highest perfection out of a world with evil in it.
He does not need to definitively prove that this world is the best of all possible solutions.
2) A theistic solution to evil must meet three conditions:
1) It must be at least possible
2) Offer evidence that it is capable of achievement
3) Present a way that is verifiable/falsifiable
The apparent dilemma facing theism
It seems that the proportions: What God does must be his best and the world is not best eliminates any theistic solution to the problem of evil
God must do his best. It is axiomatic that anything less than doing his best would be evil for GOd.
The theist must show that what God produces is the best possible.
Heaven is actually an argument against this world being the best of all possible worlds.
The way out of this dilemma is to claim that this is not the best of all possible worlds, but the best possible way to get to the best of all possible worlds (heaven)
Only an infinitely wise and good God can guarantee heaven as an outcome
The Dimensions of the Problem of Evil
Three aspects to the problem of evil:
1) Metaphysical
2) Moral
3) Physical
The Metaphysical Aspect of Evil
1) God is the author of everything in the world
2) Evil is something in the world
3) Therefore, God is the author of evil
Theists would not want to reject either of the premises. Denying the first would lead to dualism. Denying the second just seems contrary to experience
Theistic reply:
1) God is the author of everything
2) Evil is not a thing (substance)
3) Therefore, God is not necessarily the author of evil
To deny evil is not a real entity is not to deny the reality of evil. Evil is real. It is a real privation in things.
The Moral Aspect of the Problem of Evil
Pierre Bayle postulated the moral problem of evil in the 17th century.
1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, since evil is not destroyed either:
a) God is omnipotent and malevolent
b) God is benevolent and impotent
c) God is both malevolent and impotent
d) There is no God
Another way of stating it:
1) God is responsible for making everyone, including human freedom
2) Human freedom brought about moral evil
3) Therefore, God is responsible for what brought about moral evil
The Physical Aspect of the Problem of Evil
Not all evil is clearly a result of human freedom
Albert Camus offered the physical problem of evil
1) Either one must join the doc and fight the plague or else join the priest and not fight the plague
2) Not to fight the plague is anti-humanitarian
3) To fight the plague is to fight against God who sent it
4) Therefore if humanitarianism is right, theism is wrong
Theists would deny premise 3
Wednesday, March 7, 2007
Ontological Arguments and Objections
(Originally written March 7, 2007 in Book 13)
Anselm's Debate with Gaunilo
Gaunilo objected to Anselm's argument on a few grounds:
1. It is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must exist outside the mind.
2. If God's non-existence were really inconceivable then no one could doubt his existence.
3. We cannot even form the concept of the most perfect being possible.
4. The existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of a perfect Being anymore than the existence of a perfect island can be inferred from the idea of a perfect island.
5. God's nonexistence is no more inconceivable than my own nonexistence. I can conceive of my own nonexistence so I can conceive of God's nonexistence too.
6. God's existence must be proved before we can discuss his essence. Otherwise there is no basis for saying he is the most perfect Being possible.
Anselm's replies:
1. The argument only applies to an absolute perfect Being.
2. God's nonexistence is affirmable, but not conceivable.
3. We do understand the word because of 6 facts:
- It is a common word
- It is a familiar word
- Our faith and conscience provide content for it
- Conceptions do not have to be in terms of sensible images
- God can be understood indirectly
- Those who deny that they can have a conception of God must have a conception of what they cannot conceive
4. The idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything, especially being; whereas, the idea of anything else can lack being.
5. If it is possible for a necessary being a necessary being must exist. It's nonexistence is inconceivable.
6. We can compare ideal characteristics prior to ascertaining their reality.
Anselm charged Gaunilo with misunderstanding the argument as:
1. God is the greatest of all Beings
2. It is greater to exist in reality then merely in the understanding.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
Anselm states this argument confuses the greatest actual Being with the greatest possible being.
Aquinas' objection to the ontological argument
Aquinas understood Anselm to mean:
1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived
2. What exists actually and mentally is greater than that with exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually.
Aquinas had 3 objections to the argument:
1. Not everyone understands the term "God" to mean that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Even if everyone did understand that the term God meant this, it does not follow that God exists actually.
3. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident, but not self-evident to us.
Descartes' formulation of the Ontological Argument
Descartes' argument (2nd form)
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature of that concept.
2. Existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent.
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
"If God by definition cannot exist, then he must exist" (128).
Descartes' argument (1st form)
1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive of something is true.
2. We clearly and distinctly perceive that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being necessitates the existence of that Being.
3. Therefore, it is true that an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack existence.
Descartes qualified his argument in three ways:
1. This argument applies only to an absolutely perfect or necessary being.
2. It is not necessary for anyone to think of God, but if and when he does he must conceive of God as necessarily existing.
3. To conceive of God as a necessary Being is not imaginary, but necessary. The concept of a necessary being must be what it is and cannot be any other way. Thus, the concept of a necessary Being cannot be the product of one's imagination.
The debate between Caters and Descartes
Caters the priest agreed with Thomas Aquinas in that he felt the Ontological Argument proved only a conceptual and not a real existence of God.
Caters contended that the words "existent lion" is conceptually necessary, but it does not prove that a lion exists.
Descartes stated that Aquinas refuted an argument that stated existence is concluded from the meaning of God, not his own argument.
Other reactions to Descartes' proofs
Other 17th century philosophers reacted negatively to Descartes' arguments. They restated his argument this way.
1. If it is not contradictory that God exists, then it is certain that He exists.
2. It is not contradictory that God exists.
3. Therefore, it is certain that God exists.
They objected to Descartes' argument in two ways:
1. The minor premise can be doubted or denied.
2. Descartes admitted that his idea of God was inadequate and thus unclear. By Descartes definition of truth as "clear and distinct" then it is untrue.
Descartes' replies:
1. God's nonexistence is noncontradictory in either of two senses of the word:
- Whatever does not disagree with human thought (God is noncontradictory)
- What cannot be known by the human mind (no one could know anything, thus God's existence is noncontradictory)
2. Even if our concept of God is inadequate it does not follow that it is contradictory. God's necessary existence is a clear concept, thus the argument is unaffected by lack of clarity in other aspects of God's nature.
The debate between Gassendi and Descartes.
Pierre Gassendi, a skeptic, contended that Descartes confused existence with a property. He argued with 7 points:
1. The essence of a thing can be thought of apart from its existence.
2. Existence is not a property.
3. Essence and existence can be distinguished only in thought, not in reality.
4. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as we are to think of Pegasus as not existing.
5. We need demonstration that God exists, not merely the assumption that it does.
6. Descartes did not really prove that nonexistence is incompatible with God.
Descartes replied to Gassendi with four points:
1. Existence is a property in that it is attributable to something. Necessary existence is a necessary property of a necessary being.
2. We cannot compare the existence of that which is contingent to the existence of what is necessary.
3. It is not begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent.
4. God's existence and essence are inseparable.
Leibniz's Consideration of the Ontological Argument
Leibniz held that the ontological argument was valid but sensed that it was necessary to demonstrate the concept of God was not contradictory.
He stated
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exists.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.
To support his minor premise Leibniz argued that:
1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limitations.
2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities (they differ in kind).
3. Whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it.
4. Therefore, it is possible for on Being (God) to possess all possible perfections.
Three objections to Leibniz's arg.
1. It assumes that some qualities are essentially positive and others negative, but this may not be the case.
2. Leibniz assumes that some qualities are intrinsically simple, but Wittgenstein showed that what is simple in one conceptual system may be complex in another.
3. It depends on the principle of the actual identity which is conceptually indiscernible.
Spinoza's Ontological Proof
Like Descartes, Spinoza held that God was mathematically demonstrable.
Spinoza's argument:
1. There must be a cause for everything, either for its existence or for its nonexistence.
2. A necessary Being (God) necessarily exists, unless there is an adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
3. There is no adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being, necessarily exists.
One may object to Spinoza's insistence that there must be a cause for nothing because it appears contradictory.
Spinoza's second form:
1. Something necessarily exists.
2. This necessary existence is either finite or infinite.
3. It is possible for this necessary existence to be infinite.
4. There must be a cause as to why this is not an infinite existence.
5. No finite existence can hinder this being (an infinite existence).
6. Therefore, this must be an infinite existence
Spinoza's arguments borrow from the premise that something exists from the cosmological argument.
Spinoza's God is not the theistic God of Leibniz or Anselm, it is a pantheistic God.
The Objections of Hume and Kant
Hume's Objection:
1. Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradictory
2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
3. Whatever we conceive to exist we can conceive as nonexistent
4. There is no being whose existence implies a contradiction
5. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.
Hume argues that no argument for God is rationally inescapable because it always contains premises that are logically deniable.
Kant's critique of the Ontological proof
Kant objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary Being (that which cannot be).
He also contended that necessity applied only to propositions, not existence.
Also, what is logically possible is not always ontologically possible.
Existence (Kant held) is not a predicate of a thing. It is not a perfection.
Supposed Causes of the Ontological Mistake
Opponents of the Ontological argument have blamed many sources of the ontological 'mistake'
1) Platonic Philosophy - Platonic epistemology holds that one can directly and intuitively know essences.
2) Metaphysical thinking - some argue that "is" or "exists" is only logical, not ontological.
3) Confusion of cause and reason - Causes need something outside of itself where a reason can be itself (Schopenhauer)
4) Use of a proper name - the use of a proper name implies existence (Russell)
5) The use of the English conditional. Alvin Plantinga claimed that "If Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" does not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. Likewise, "If God exists, then he Necessarily exists" does not imply "God exists" There may be no God at all.
Linehan - Unfair analogy!
"IF Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" may not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. But there is a bachelor. Likewise, "If God exists, then he necessarily exists" may not imply "God exists" But, there is a necessary existence which must be filled by a necessary Existent, which is God.
Findlay's Ontological Disproof of God.
The ontological argument has been widely rejected in modern times.
J. N. Findlay used the ontological proof against itself:
1. God must be thought of as a necessary Being, for anything else short of this would be unworthy of worship.
2. But existential necessary propositions cannot be true for necessity is merely a logical characteristic of propositions, not of reality.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A simpler, proper form of this argument:
1. The only way a necessary Being could exist is to exist necessarily.
2. The proposition "God exists necessarily" is an existentially necessary proposition.
3. No existentially necessary propositions can be true.
4. Therefore, the proposition "God exists necessarily" cannot be true.
A theist can object to this in 4 ways:
1. Change the proposition "God exists necessarily" to "God exists". Then holding the proposition "God exists" as a logically necessary proposition to hold.
2. Deny that necessity applied to existential propositions makes them untrue. (Existentially necessary propositions can be true). Examples of existentially necessary propositions: "I am I". "There is an infinite number of prime numbers". "Square circles do not exist".
3. "God necessarily exists" is a special case (Anselm and Descartes).
4. Findlay's statement "there are no existentially necessary propositions" is an existentially necessary proposition.
Hartshorne's Restatement of the Ontological Proof.
Charles Hartshorne is one of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument and states it like this:
1. The existence of a necessary being is either:
a) Impossible, and there is no example of it
b) Possible, but there is no example of it
c) Possible, and there is an example of it
2. Possible, but there is no example of it is meaningless because a necessary Being cannot be a possible being.
3. Impossible, and there is no example of it is not eliminated by the ontological argument, but the meaningfulness of the term 'necessary Being' is a justifiable assumption that may be defeated on other grounds.
Hartshorne's Argument:
1. All thought must refer to something beyond itself which is at least possible
2. The necessary existence of a necessary Being is at least possible.
3. With a necessary Being an "at-least-possible" existence is indistinguishable from a "possible and actual" existence. A necessary Being cannot have a "merely possible" existence.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being necessarily has both a possible and an actual existence.
Hartshorne's view of God is neither theistic and pantheistic. It is panentheistic.
Hartshorne states, "Either God is a meaningless term or there exists a divine Being" (141).
All versions of the ontological argument contain the implicit premise that what is rationally inescapable is the real.
Malcolm's restatement of the ontological proof
Malcolm believes that Kant invalidated Anselm's first form, but the second form is immune to all criticism.
Malcolm's restatement of Anselm's 2nd form:
1. The existence of a necessary being must be either:
a) a necessary existence
b) an impossible existence
c) a possible existence
2. The existence of a necessary Being is not an impossible existence
a) No one has ever shown the concept of a necessary being to be contradictory
b) there is a basis in human experience for "a greater than which cannot be thought"
c) Leibniz's attempt to prove that there is no contradiction fails. We cannot show that there cannot be one.
3. The existence of a necessary Being cannot be a possible being because:
a) it is contradictory to the very nature of a necessary being
b) a possible being is dependent, a necessary Being is independent
4. Therefore, A necessary Being Necessarily exists
Plantinga's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Plantinga argues that God could exist without his existence being a necessary one. His existence could be logically contingent but not ontologically so.
Planting states that it is logically possible that God never existed at all. It is logically possible that nothing ever existent including God.
All that proponents of the ontological argument have to do invalidate Plantinga's objections too.
Planting offers an ontological argument that is very cosmological. It has left the a priori realm and moved into the a posteriori realm.
Planting uses modal logic in his argument:
1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a world "W" and an essence "E" such that "E" is exemplified in "W" and "E" entails the property "has maximal greatness in W"
5. For any object X, if X, exemplifies E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
7. If W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified.
8. What is impossible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10 Therefore, the being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.
Plantinga's argument is tight and compelling. It avoids many of the traditional criticism of the ontological argument. However there are a few criticisms:
1. The use of modal logic assumes existence of an actual world. Thus, it is a posteriori, not a priori.
2. Defining a perfect being in theistic terms is gratuitous.
3. The essence E is supposed by Plantinga to havre a real existence.
The ontological argument to be valid must assume that something exists and thus it rests on a cosmological principle.
The ontological argument has not proven God exists by itself. It has in fact yielded four types of God and a possible atheistic conception:
1. Leibniz & Descartes - theistic God
2. Spinoza - pantheistic God
3. Hartshorne - panentheistic God
4. Henle - polytheistic gods
5. Atheism - the universe is necessary, but does not include God
Anselm's Debate with Gaunilo
Gaunilo objected to Anselm's argument on a few grounds:
1. It is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must exist outside the mind.
2. If God's non-existence were really inconceivable then no one could doubt his existence.
3. We cannot even form the concept of the most perfect being possible.
4. The existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of a perfect Being anymore than the existence of a perfect island can be inferred from the idea of a perfect island.
5. God's nonexistence is no more inconceivable than my own nonexistence. I can conceive of my own nonexistence so I can conceive of God's nonexistence too.
6. God's existence must be proved before we can discuss his essence. Otherwise there is no basis for saying he is the most perfect Being possible.
Anselm's replies:
1. The argument only applies to an absolute perfect Being.
2. God's nonexistence is affirmable, but not conceivable.
3. We do understand the word because of 6 facts:
- It is a common word
- It is a familiar word
- Our faith and conscience provide content for it
- Conceptions do not have to be in terms of sensible images
- God can be understood indirectly
- Those who deny that they can have a conception of God must have a conception of what they cannot conceive
4. The idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything, especially being; whereas, the idea of anything else can lack being.
5. If it is possible for a necessary being a necessary being must exist. It's nonexistence is inconceivable.
6. We can compare ideal characteristics prior to ascertaining their reality.
Anselm charged Gaunilo with misunderstanding the argument as:
1. God is the greatest of all Beings
2. It is greater to exist in reality then merely in the understanding.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
Anselm states this argument confuses the greatest actual Being with the greatest possible being.
Aquinas' objection to the ontological argument
Aquinas understood Anselm to mean:
1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived
2. What exists actually and mentally is greater than that with exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually.
Aquinas had 3 objections to the argument:
1. Not everyone understands the term "God" to mean that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Even if everyone did understand that the term God meant this, it does not follow that God exists actually.
3. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident, but not self-evident to us.
Descartes' formulation of the Ontological Argument
Descartes' argument (2nd form)
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature of that concept.
2. Existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent.
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
"If God by definition cannot exist, then he must exist" (128).
Descartes' argument (1st form)
1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive of something is true.
2. We clearly and distinctly perceive that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being necessitates the existence of that Being.
3. Therefore, it is true that an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack existence.
Descartes qualified his argument in three ways:
1. This argument applies only to an absolutely perfect or necessary being.
2. It is not necessary for anyone to think of God, but if and when he does he must conceive of God as necessarily existing.
3. To conceive of God as a necessary Being is not imaginary, but necessary. The concept of a necessary being must be what it is and cannot be any other way. Thus, the concept of a necessary Being cannot be the product of one's imagination.
The debate between Caters and Descartes
Caters the priest agreed with Thomas Aquinas in that he felt the Ontological Argument proved only a conceptual and not a real existence of God.
Caters contended that the words "existent lion" is conceptually necessary, but it does not prove that a lion exists.
Descartes stated that Aquinas refuted an argument that stated existence is concluded from the meaning of God, not his own argument.
Other reactions to Descartes' proofs
Other 17th century philosophers reacted negatively to Descartes' arguments. They restated his argument this way.
1. If it is not contradictory that God exists, then it is certain that He exists.
2. It is not contradictory that God exists.
3. Therefore, it is certain that God exists.
They objected to Descartes' argument in two ways:
1. The minor premise can be doubted or denied.
2. Descartes admitted that his idea of God was inadequate and thus unclear. By Descartes definition of truth as "clear and distinct" then it is untrue.
Descartes' replies:
1. God's nonexistence is noncontradictory in either of two senses of the word:
- Whatever does not disagree with human thought (God is noncontradictory)
- What cannot be known by the human mind (no one could know anything, thus God's existence is noncontradictory)
2. Even if our concept of God is inadequate it does not follow that it is contradictory. God's necessary existence is a clear concept, thus the argument is unaffected by lack of clarity in other aspects of God's nature.
The debate between Gassendi and Descartes.
Pierre Gassendi, a skeptic, contended that Descartes confused existence with a property. He argued with 7 points:
1. The essence of a thing can be thought of apart from its existence.
2. Existence is not a property.
3. Essence and existence can be distinguished only in thought, not in reality.
4. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as we are to think of Pegasus as not existing.
5. We need demonstration that God exists, not merely the assumption that it does.
6. Descartes did not really prove that nonexistence is incompatible with God.
Descartes replied to Gassendi with four points:
1. Existence is a property in that it is attributable to something. Necessary existence is a necessary property of a necessary being.
2. We cannot compare the existence of that which is contingent to the existence of what is necessary.
3. It is not begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent.
4. God's existence and essence are inseparable.
Leibniz's Consideration of the Ontological Argument
Leibniz held that the ontological argument was valid but sensed that it was necessary to demonstrate the concept of God was not contradictory.
He stated
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exists.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.
To support his minor premise Leibniz argued that:
1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limitations.
2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities (they differ in kind).
3. Whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it.
4. Therefore, it is possible for on Being (God) to possess all possible perfections.
Three objections to Leibniz's arg.
1. It assumes that some qualities are essentially positive and others negative, but this may not be the case.
2. Leibniz assumes that some qualities are intrinsically simple, but Wittgenstein showed that what is simple in one conceptual system may be complex in another.
3. It depends on the principle of the actual identity which is conceptually indiscernible.
Spinoza's Ontological Proof
Like Descartes, Spinoza held that God was mathematically demonstrable.
Spinoza's argument:
1. There must be a cause for everything, either for its existence or for its nonexistence.
2. A necessary Being (God) necessarily exists, unless there is an adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
3. There is no adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being, necessarily exists.
One may object to Spinoza's insistence that there must be a cause for nothing because it appears contradictory.
Spinoza's second form:
1. Something necessarily exists.
2. This necessary existence is either finite or infinite.
3. It is possible for this necessary existence to be infinite.
4. There must be a cause as to why this is not an infinite existence.
5. No finite existence can hinder this being (an infinite existence).
6. Therefore, this must be an infinite existence
Spinoza's arguments borrow from the premise that something exists from the cosmological argument.
Spinoza's God is not the theistic God of Leibniz or Anselm, it is a pantheistic God.
The Objections of Hume and Kant
Hume's Objection:
1. Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradictory
2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
3. Whatever we conceive to exist we can conceive as nonexistent
4. There is no being whose existence implies a contradiction
5. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.
Hume argues that no argument for God is rationally inescapable because it always contains premises that are logically deniable.
Kant's critique of the Ontological proof
Kant objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary Being (that which cannot be).
He also contended that necessity applied only to propositions, not existence.
Also, what is logically possible is not always ontologically possible.
Existence (Kant held) is not a predicate of a thing. It is not a perfection.
Supposed Causes of the Ontological Mistake
Opponents of the Ontological argument have blamed many sources of the ontological 'mistake'
1) Platonic Philosophy - Platonic epistemology holds that one can directly and intuitively know essences.
2) Metaphysical thinking - some argue that "is" or "exists" is only logical, not ontological.
3) Confusion of cause and reason - Causes need something outside of itself where a reason can be itself (Schopenhauer)
4) Use of a proper name - the use of a proper name implies existence (Russell)
5) The use of the English conditional. Alvin Plantinga claimed that "If Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" does not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. Likewise, "If God exists, then he Necessarily exists" does not imply "God exists" There may be no God at all.
Linehan - Unfair analogy!
"IF Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" may not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. But there is a bachelor. Likewise, "If God exists, then he necessarily exists" may not imply "God exists" But, there is a necessary existence which must be filled by a necessary Existent, which is God.
Findlay's Ontological Disproof of God.
The ontological argument has been widely rejected in modern times.
J. N. Findlay used the ontological proof against itself:
1. God must be thought of as a necessary Being, for anything else short of this would be unworthy of worship.
2. But existential necessary propositions cannot be true for necessity is merely a logical characteristic of propositions, not of reality.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A simpler, proper form of this argument:
1. The only way a necessary Being could exist is to exist necessarily.
2. The proposition "God exists necessarily" is an existentially necessary proposition.
3. No existentially necessary propositions can be true.
4. Therefore, the proposition "God exists necessarily" cannot be true.
A theist can object to this in 4 ways:
1. Change the proposition "God exists necessarily" to "God exists". Then holding the proposition "God exists" as a logically necessary proposition to hold.
2. Deny that necessity applied to existential propositions makes them untrue. (Existentially necessary propositions can be true). Examples of existentially necessary propositions: "I am I". "There is an infinite number of prime numbers". "Square circles do not exist".
3. "God necessarily exists" is a special case (Anselm and Descartes).
4. Findlay's statement "there are no existentially necessary propositions" is an existentially necessary proposition.
Hartshorne's Restatement of the Ontological Proof.
Charles Hartshorne is one of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument and states it like this:
1. The existence of a necessary being is either:
a) Impossible, and there is no example of it
b) Possible, but there is no example of it
c) Possible, and there is an example of it
2. Possible, but there is no example of it is meaningless because a necessary Being cannot be a possible being.
3. Impossible, and there is no example of it is not eliminated by the ontological argument, but the meaningfulness of the term 'necessary Being' is a justifiable assumption that may be defeated on other grounds.
Hartshorne's Argument:
1. All thought must refer to something beyond itself which is at least possible
2. The necessary existence of a necessary Being is at least possible.
3. With a necessary Being an "at-least-possible" existence is indistinguishable from a "possible and actual" existence. A necessary Being cannot have a "merely possible" existence.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being necessarily has both a possible and an actual existence.
Hartshorne's view of God is neither theistic and pantheistic. It is panentheistic.
Hartshorne states, "Either God is a meaningless term or there exists a divine Being" (141).
All versions of the ontological argument contain the implicit premise that what is rationally inescapable is the real.
Malcolm's restatement of the ontological proof
Malcolm believes that Kant invalidated Anselm's first form, but the second form is immune to all criticism.
Malcolm's restatement of Anselm's 2nd form:
1. The existence of a necessary being must be either:
a) a necessary existence
b) an impossible existence
c) a possible existence
2. The existence of a necessary Being is not an impossible existence
a) No one has ever shown the concept of a necessary being to be contradictory
b) there is a basis in human experience for "a greater than which cannot be thought"
c) Leibniz's attempt to prove that there is no contradiction fails. We cannot show that there cannot be one.
3. The existence of a necessary Being cannot be a possible being because:
a) it is contradictory to the very nature of a necessary being
b) a possible being is dependent, a necessary Being is independent
4. Therefore, A necessary Being Necessarily exists
Plantinga's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Plantinga argues that God could exist without his existence being a necessary one. His existence could be logically contingent but not ontologically so.
Planting states that it is logically possible that God never existed at all. It is logically possible that nothing ever existent including God.
All that proponents of the ontological argument have to do invalidate Plantinga's objections too.
Planting offers an ontological argument that is very cosmological. It has left the a priori realm and moved into the a posteriori realm.
Planting uses modal logic in his argument:
1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a world "W" and an essence "E" such that "E" is exemplified in "W" and "E" entails the property "has maximal greatness in W"
5. For any object X, if X, exemplifies E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
7. If W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified.
8. What is impossible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10 Therefore, the being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.
Plantinga's argument is tight and compelling. It avoids many of the traditional criticism of the ontological argument. However there are a few criticisms:
1. The use of modal logic assumes existence of an actual world. Thus, it is a posteriori, not a priori.
2. Defining a perfect being in theistic terms is gratuitous.
3. The essence E is supposed by Plantinga to havre a real existence.
The ontological argument to be valid must assume that something exists and thus it rests on a cosmological principle.
The ontological argument has not proven God exists by itself. It has in fact yielded four types of God and a possible atheistic conception:
1. Leibniz & Descartes - theistic God
2. Spinoza - pantheistic God
3. Hartshorne - panentheistic God
4. Henle - polytheistic gods
5. Atheism - the universe is necessary, but does not include God
Sunday, December 3, 2006
Intellectual Virtues - Zagzebski
(Originally written December 3, 2006 in Book 12)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
4: The two components of intellectual virtues
Each virtue is definable only in terms of its corresponding motivation.
4.1 The motivation for knowledge and reliable success
A distinction between moral and intellectual virtues can be made on their motivational basis.
Intellectual virtues are motivated by motivation for knowledge.
4.1.1 The motivation for knowledge
Hobbes and Spinoza connected the intellectual virtues with the passions and connected them all with a single motivation: self-preservation or power.
The motivation for knowledge is not a basic motive, it is a form of the motivation for power (Hobbes).
Hobbes states that cognitive virtues/vices arise from differences in motivation.
Deficiency in the desire for truth leads to cognitive vices like dogmatism (Ralph Waldo Emerson).
Hobbes implies that excess in desire for truth also leads to cognitive vices.
John Dewey believes that we ought to cultivate attitudes to foster better motivation to think more effectively.
Hilary Kornblith and Laurence BonJour introduced a motivational element into the notion of epistemic responsibility. Kornbluth stated, "An epistemically responsible agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have his beliefs produced by processes which lead to true beliefs, his actions are guided by these desires" (Zagzebski, 174).
James Montmarquet connected a large set of intellectual virtues with the desire for truth.
Montmarquet calls the desire for truth "epistemic conscientiousness" and claims that some intellectual virtues are out of this desire.
4.1.2 The success component of the intellectual virtues.
Ok, it's 2:30 am. I have a 1500-2000 word essay due at 9:00 am on pgs. 232-282. I'm on page 176. I'm screwed. I had such an emotional drain. I lost my wedding ring and then we spent hours looking for it. Thank God somebody found it.
Contemporary epistemology has focused extensively on the concept of a truth conducive belief-forming process.
There is a weak connection between motive and success. John Dewey made notice of it.
Intellectual virtues arise from and serve the motivation to know the truth and are crucial in activities like the arts, crafts and games.
The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues and the distinction between intellectual and practical virtues are both artificial.
Amelie Rarty pointed out that the utility and success of intellectual virtues depend on their becoming habits, but habits can become pathological and idiotic.
The motivation for intellectual virtue involves a desire for possessing true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs.
The reliabilist theory of truth-conduciveness focuses on it as a function of the number of true beliefs and on the proportion of true to false beliefs.
Zagzebski points out that processes that put forth a high percentage of false beliefs can still be truth-conducive if that process leads to a new way of discovering truth.
Self-correction is essential in Zagzebski's truth-conduciveness theory.
C.S. Pierce claims that the Scientific Method operates under a truth-conducive theory similar to Zagzebski's model.
4.1.3 Montmarquet on the virtues and truth conduciveness
Are intellectual virtues knowledge conducive?
"The motivation to know leads to the motivation to act in intellectually virtuous ways" (Zagzebski, 185).
Montmarquet objects to [the motion that intellectual virtues are truth conducive and intellectual vices are not] because:
1) Some intellectual virtues may not be truth conducive even though they would be desired by persons who love the truth
2) Some intellectual virtues not only seem to fail to lead to truth but aren't associated with the desire for truth
3) The history of ideas does not fit with this
4) some vices may arise out of desire for knowledge
5) Some intellectual vices appear to be truth conducive
I'm going to skip to what I need right now. Pg. 187-231 need to be read still.
pg 232 - This is a quick, not through reading
6. The definition of Deontic Concepts
Acts and beliefs arise from moral and intellectual traits
An act is right because it is the sort of act a virtuous person might do according to pure virtue-theory.
6.1 Right acts, justified beliefs
"A right act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, might do in like circumstances. A wrong act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would not do in like circumstances. A moral duty is what a person who is virtuously motivated and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would do in like circumstances. That is to say, some thing is a duty if and only if it is wrong not to do it" (Zagzebski, 235)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
4: The two components of intellectual virtues
Each virtue is definable only in terms of its corresponding motivation.
4.1 The motivation for knowledge and reliable success
A distinction between moral and intellectual virtues can be made on their motivational basis.
Intellectual virtues are motivated by motivation for knowledge.
4.1.1 The motivation for knowledge
Hobbes and Spinoza connected the intellectual virtues with the passions and connected them all with a single motivation: self-preservation or power.
The motivation for knowledge is not a basic motive, it is a form of the motivation for power (Hobbes).
Hobbes states that cognitive virtues/vices arise from differences in motivation.
Deficiency in the desire for truth leads to cognitive vices like dogmatism (Ralph Waldo Emerson).
Hobbes implies that excess in desire for truth also leads to cognitive vices.
John Dewey believes that we ought to cultivate attitudes to foster better motivation to think more effectively.
Hilary Kornblith and Laurence BonJour introduced a motivational element into the notion of epistemic responsibility. Kornbluth stated, "An epistemically responsible agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have his beliefs produced by processes which lead to true beliefs, his actions are guided by these desires" (Zagzebski, 174).
James Montmarquet connected a large set of intellectual virtues with the desire for truth.
Montmarquet calls the desire for truth "epistemic conscientiousness" and claims that some intellectual virtues are out of this desire.
4.1.2 The success component of the intellectual virtues.
Ok, it's 2:30 am. I have a 1500-2000 word essay due at 9:00 am on pgs. 232-282. I'm on page 176. I'm screwed. I had such an emotional drain. I lost my wedding ring and then we spent hours looking for it. Thank God somebody found it.
Contemporary epistemology has focused extensively on the concept of a truth conducive belief-forming process.
There is a weak connection between motive and success. John Dewey made notice of it.
Intellectual virtues arise from and serve the motivation to know the truth and are crucial in activities like the arts, crafts and games.
The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues and the distinction between intellectual and practical virtues are both artificial.
Amelie Rarty pointed out that the utility and success of intellectual virtues depend on their becoming habits, but habits can become pathological and idiotic.
The motivation for intellectual virtue involves a desire for possessing true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs.
The reliabilist theory of truth-conduciveness focuses on it as a function of the number of true beliefs and on the proportion of true to false beliefs.
Zagzebski points out that processes that put forth a high percentage of false beliefs can still be truth-conducive if that process leads to a new way of discovering truth.
Self-correction is essential in Zagzebski's truth-conduciveness theory.
C.S. Pierce claims that the Scientific Method operates under a truth-conducive theory similar to Zagzebski's model.
4.1.3 Montmarquet on the virtues and truth conduciveness
Are intellectual virtues knowledge conducive?
"The motivation to know leads to the motivation to act in intellectually virtuous ways" (Zagzebski, 185).
Montmarquet objects to [the motion that intellectual virtues are truth conducive and intellectual vices are not] because:
1) Some intellectual virtues may not be truth conducive even though they would be desired by persons who love the truth
2) Some intellectual virtues not only seem to fail to lead to truth but aren't associated with the desire for truth
3) The history of ideas does not fit with this
4) some vices may arise out of desire for knowledge
5) Some intellectual vices appear to be truth conducive
I'm going to skip to what I need right now. Pg. 187-231 need to be read still.
pg 232 - This is a quick, not through reading
6. The definition of Deontic Concepts
Acts and beliefs arise from moral and intellectual traits
An act is right because it is the sort of act a virtuous person might do according to pure virtue-theory.
6.1 Right acts, justified beliefs
"A right act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, might do in like circumstances. A wrong act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would not do in like circumstances. A moral duty is what a person who is virtuously motivated and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would do in like circumstances. That is to say, some thing is a duty if and only if it is wrong not to do it" (Zagzebski, 235)
Virtues of the Mind - Ch. 3
(Originally written December 3, 2006 in Book 12)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
3. Intellectual and Moral Virtues
3.1 Aristotle's distinction between intellectual and moral virtues
The human cognitive and feeling processes are regarded as distinct and relatively autonomous by Western Philosophers.
Many Western Philosophers have aimed for what Michael Stocker calls a "purified view of the intellect" despite Philosophers like Hume and James showing the connection between feelings/emotions and cognition.
Few philosophers have openly denied Aristotle's division of feelings and cognition.
Spinoza was an exception, he connected the passions and virtue via the ideas of God. No one have unified intellectual and moral virtue like Spinoza.
David Hume insisted that the difference between moral and intellectual virtues was merely verbal. But, Hume's notion of virtue was broader than most other philosophers.
Zagzebski holds that Aristotle's distinction between virtues and other capacities is an important one; but, his division of moral and intellectual virtue is not an important one.
Aristotle divides intellectual virtues into two classes:
1) Art (techne) - theoretical knowledge
2) Practical wisdom (phronesis) - practical knowledge
Aristotle links the two different types of virtues to the two parts of the soul.
The thinking part of the soul commands and the feelings part obeys.
Pascal saw being full of faults as being an evil, but it was worse to be full of faults and unwilling to recognize it.
Self-love weakens the love of truth and leads to self-deception, hypocrisy and other intellectual vices.
"Feelings are involved in intellectual virtues, and intellectual virtues are involved in handling feelings" (Zagzebski, 148).
In addition to distinguishing intellectual virtues from moral ones on the ground that intellectual virtues regulate feelings (an inadequate argument), Aristotle distinguishes them on the basis of how they are acquired.
He holds that intellectual virtues can be taught, whereas moral virtues can only be acquired by practice and training.
Zagzebski holds that both intellectual and moral virtues are learned in stages.
Young people do not possess virtues or vices. We do not start with vice and work up to a virtue.
William James held that it is bad to be too doubtful and too uncritical in holding a belief. He held that the virtue lies in the mean between the two.
Intellectual akrasia (weakness) is higher than a vice. It exists when one knows the good, but does not intellectually actualize it.
Above akrasia is intellectual self-control. This is not a virtue, but it is knowing the bad and not doing it.
Intellectual and moral states (higher to lower)
1) Virtue
2) Self-Control
3) Akrasia
4) Vice
Zagzebski hold that the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is a real one. She argues that because a person can possess intellectual virtues but no moral virtues (and vice-versa) the distinction is real and not linguistic as Hume and Spinoza held.
Both intellectual and moral virtues are acquired in the same fashion. They both require training and imitation.
Both involve feelings and require one to act virtuously. Both have the states virtue, self-control, akrasia and vice.
3.2 Some connections between intellectual and moral virtues
Zagzebski argues that no-one has offered adequate reason to think moral and intellectual virtues differ any more than one moral virtue differs from another.
The two types of virtue are similar in their natures, similarly acquired and are intimately connected in their operation.
There are logical and causal connections between moral and intellectual virtues.
Moral virtues logically entail some intellectual virtues.
Moral vices can causally inhibit the acquisition of intellectual virtues.
Intellectual failures can be caused by moral failures.
Some virtues have both an intellectual and moral form (i.e. trust and autonomy)
Francis Bacon and John Locke associate intellectual failings with the passions and moral vices.
Francis Bacon states that human understanding is infused by desire and emotion.
Bacon states that there are four types of error in belief formation (he calls the errors 'idols')
1) Idols of the tribe: "The human understanding is like an uneven mirror that cannot truly reflect the rays from objects, but distorts and corrupts the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it (aphorism 41)" (Zagzebski, 164).
2) Idols of the cave: these come from every individual's particularisms, from education, habits and chance
3) Idols of the marketplace: language dictates reason, when reason ought to dictate language. Sometimes language can make philosophy sophistical and inactive.
4) Idols of the theater: errors of this sort come from the fashions of the day. These trends in theology and philosophy can be used to make theory better than truth
Locke's explanation of error comes from his classification of types of men:
1) Those who do not think independently
2) Those who use passion instead of reason as a substitute
3) Those who follow reason, but only seek one source for information and tat source corroborates their opinions
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
3. Intellectual and Moral Virtues
3.1 Aristotle's distinction between intellectual and moral virtues
The human cognitive and feeling processes are regarded as distinct and relatively autonomous by Western Philosophers.
Many Western Philosophers have aimed for what Michael Stocker calls a "purified view of the intellect" despite Philosophers like Hume and James showing the connection between feelings/emotions and cognition.
Few philosophers have openly denied Aristotle's division of feelings and cognition.
Spinoza was an exception, he connected the passions and virtue via the ideas of God. No one have unified intellectual and moral virtue like Spinoza.
David Hume insisted that the difference between moral and intellectual virtues was merely verbal. But, Hume's notion of virtue was broader than most other philosophers.
Zagzebski holds that Aristotle's distinction between virtues and other capacities is an important one; but, his division of moral and intellectual virtue is not an important one.
Aristotle divides intellectual virtues into two classes:
1) Art (techne) - theoretical knowledge
2) Practical wisdom (phronesis) - practical knowledge
Aristotle links the two different types of virtues to the two parts of the soul.
The thinking part of the soul commands and the feelings part obeys.
Pascal saw being full of faults as being an evil, but it was worse to be full of faults and unwilling to recognize it.
Self-love weakens the love of truth and leads to self-deception, hypocrisy and other intellectual vices.
"Feelings are involved in intellectual virtues, and intellectual virtues are involved in handling feelings" (Zagzebski, 148).
In addition to distinguishing intellectual virtues from moral ones on the ground that intellectual virtues regulate feelings (an inadequate argument), Aristotle distinguishes them on the basis of how they are acquired.
He holds that intellectual virtues can be taught, whereas moral virtues can only be acquired by practice and training.
Zagzebski holds that both intellectual and moral virtues are learned in stages.
Young people do not possess virtues or vices. We do not start with vice and work up to a virtue.
William James held that it is bad to be too doubtful and too uncritical in holding a belief. He held that the virtue lies in the mean between the two.
Intellectual akrasia (weakness) is higher than a vice. It exists when one knows the good, but does not intellectually actualize it.
Above akrasia is intellectual self-control. This is not a virtue, but it is knowing the bad and not doing it.
Intellectual and moral states (higher to lower)
1) Virtue
2) Self-Control
3) Akrasia
4) Vice
Zagzebski hold that the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is a real one. She argues that because a person can possess intellectual virtues but no moral virtues (and vice-versa) the distinction is real and not linguistic as Hume and Spinoza held.
Both intellectual and moral virtues are acquired in the same fashion. They both require training and imitation.
Both involve feelings and require one to act virtuously. Both have the states virtue, self-control, akrasia and vice.
3.2 Some connections between intellectual and moral virtues
Zagzebski argues that no-one has offered adequate reason to think moral and intellectual virtues differ any more than one moral virtue differs from another.
The two types of virtue are similar in their natures, similarly acquired and are intimately connected in their operation.
There are logical and causal connections between moral and intellectual virtues.
Moral virtues logically entail some intellectual virtues.
Moral vices can causally inhibit the acquisition of intellectual virtues.
Intellectual failures can be caused by moral failures.
Some virtues have both an intellectual and moral form (i.e. trust and autonomy)
Francis Bacon and John Locke associate intellectual failings with the passions and moral vices.
Francis Bacon states that human understanding is infused by desire and emotion.
Bacon states that there are four types of error in belief formation (he calls the errors 'idols')
1) Idols of the tribe: "The human understanding is like an uneven mirror that cannot truly reflect the rays from objects, but distorts and corrupts the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it (aphorism 41)" (Zagzebski, 164).
2) Idols of the cave: these come from every individual's particularisms, from education, habits and chance
3) Idols of the marketplace: language dictates reason, when reason ought to dictate language. Sometimes language can make philosophy sophistical and inactive.
4) Idols of the theater: errors of this sort come from the fashions of the day. These trends in theology and philosophy can be used to make theory better than truth
Locke's explanation of error comes from his classification of types of men:
1) Those who do not think independently
2) Those who use passion instead of reason as a substitute
3) Those who follow reason, but only seek one source for information and tat source corroborates their opinions
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Virtues of the Mind - 2.1-5
(Originally written November 26, 2006 in Book 8)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
2.1
Internists often try to relativize epistemic justification. A justification in internalism is one that justifies an individual's belief
2.2 The neglect of understanding and wisdom
Arguments against contemporary epistemology have shown that it is favorable to adapting a virtue epistemology.
Some philosophers have complained that contemporary epistemology is insufficiently attentive to the social aspects of cognitive activity.
Virtue is more adaptable to social context than reliabilist positions like reliable belief-forming mechanism (Goldman) or belief forming faculty (Sosa).
Aristotle understand the acquisition of virtue as fundamentally social.
Jonathon Kvanvig objects to the focus on one belief in one person in epistemology. If it is impossible to abstract a single belief from a core of beliefs, a belief-based epistemological theory appears less attractive.
Contemporary epistemology is concerned with amassing the most propositional knowledge as possible.
In post-Aristotelian ancient philosophy and modern philosophy certitude has been favored over wisdom. Wisdom was the focus of Plato, Aristotle, the Middle Age philosophies by the latter two, Spinoza and Locke.
Propositional knowledge was secondary to wisdom and understanding in Greek philosophy. Plato (according to Julius Moravcsik) sees propositional knowledge as a derivative of the process of understanding.
Moravcsik maintains that the increasing complexity of modern social and scientific theories has created a need to return to the concept of understanding in epistemology.
Gai Fine holds that Plato's focus on understanding in his epistemology leads to a less atomistic approach in epistemology.
Understanding ought to be a major point in epistemology. It has been ignored for too long
A belief-based epistemology is incapable of explaining the nature of understanding involving the comprehension of structures of reality, rather than its propositional structure.
Wisdom, like understanding has been neglected in modern epistemology.
Wisdom is tough to define, but whatever it is, it is qualitatively different than the accumulation of propositional knowledge.
Wisdom is not a property of propositional beliefs or a matter of relations between propositional beliefs.
Wisdom is concerned with grasping reality as a whole.
3. More reasons to try a virtue approach: the relations between believing and feeling
The advantages of virtue-based epistemology have been shown from:
1) Ethics and corresponding epistemic theories
2) Problems within epistemology
Now, 3) Philosophy of mind
"The treatment of belief as a psychic state independent of non-cognitive states is happily nearing its demise" (Zagzebski, 51).
Stephen Stich argues that the concept of belief is a useless figment of folk psychology.
Psychic states conventionally assigned to epistemologists are not that distinct from psychic states assigned to ethicists.
Many philosophers tend to think of the influence of feeling as an embarrassment, a defect, that needs to be eliminated.
William James held feelings in high regards, stating that belief is more allied to the emotions than anything else.
James defined belief as "the sense of reality". Hume defined belief as to believe is to have a vivid impression.
Without going as fas as James or Hume we can find supporting evidence that vividness of conception is causally connected with belief.
Belief comes in degrees. Belief is closely connected with states like wanting, hoping and expecting.
Wanting and hoping are emotive states, whereas belief and expecting are usually not considered emotive. But, are the emotive states truly distinguishable from cognitive states?
Emotion is either a component of belief or has a direct causal relationship with belief.
It is a widely held false notion that a belief influenced by desire makes it a belief acquired independent of facts.
If beliefs and emotions are intimately connected then we should be motivated to search for connections between moral and intellectual values.
4. An objection to modeling evaluation in epistemology on ethics: the dispute over the voluntariness of belief
The widespread assumption that human actions are voluntary, whereas cognitive activity is involuntary could completely undermine the connection of theoretical ethics and normative epistemology.
Believing is thought to be involuntary and this is the strongest argument against evaluating beliefs like moral evaluation.
Beliefs often seem to be the outcome of instinctive processes.
If beliefs are involuntary, then it is inappropriate to evaluate them from a moral standpoint.
It is wrong to blame a person for a belief if it is involuntary.
4.1 The irrelevance of the objection to virtue theory
Since belief is not the focal point of virtue epistemology, the voluntary or involuntary nature of a belief is less important than a person's disposition to virtue or vice.
The question is then: are our intellectual virtues and vices as voluntary as our moral virtues and vices?
Intellectual courage, perseverance, honesty and sincerity appear to be voluntary. But perceptiveness, insight and ability to form theories appear to be less voluntary and based on natural ability.
But, the intellectual virtues based on natural ability are at least as voluntary to the moral virtues of generosity or the vice of envy.
4.2 The voluntariness of belief
The difference between acts and beliefs is less great than what is thought.
Hume is one of the strongest adherents of involuntary belief. James and Descartes are voluntary belief supporters.
The Cartesian position is that the Will, not the intellect assists in one's belief.
Pascal held that the will is one of the chief organs in belief.
Modern cognitive voluntarism theories come from Murray Clarke, Christopher Hookway, Jonathon Cohen and Lorraine Code.
Zagzebski hold that beliefs are like acts in that they arrange themselves on a continuum of degrees of voluntariness.
Perceptual beliefs which are on the low end of the scale of voluntariness should not be used as paradigm cases for human rationality and justification any more than sneezing or scratching an itch should be used as paradigm cases for moral evaluation
4.3 Moral and Epistemic Luck
Sometimes we blame or praise a person more than is deserved because of moral luck or moral unluckiness.
The Kantian attempt to ground moral evaluation in something free of luck is problematic.
Moral luck is relevant to virtue-based epistemology in two ways:
1. It makes the attempt to model epistemology after ethics easier
2. The rejection of the Kantian position that our moral status is completely within our control takes away one of the motivations for wanting the Kantian theory in the first place
A virtue-based epistemology, because it focuses on inner traits, does not have to pay much attention to moral luck.
Even though few, if any, beliefs are objects of direct choice, they are as voluntary as many acts or omissions of acts for which we are responsible.
5. Conclusion to Part I: Why center epistemology on the virtues?
Be open-minded to see the outcome!
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
2.1
Internists often try to relativize epistemic justification. A justification in internalism is one that justifies an individual's belief
2.2 The neglect of understanding and wisdom
Arguments against contemporary epistemology have shown that it is favorable to adapting a virtue epistemology.
Some philosophers have complained that contemporary epistemology is insufficiently attentive to the social aspects of cognitive activity.
Virtue is more adaptable to social context than reliabilist positions like reliable belief-forming mechanism (Goldman) or belief forming faculty (Sosa).
Aristotle understand the acquisition of virtue as fundamentally social.
Jonathon Kvanvig objects to the focus on one belief in one person in epistemology. If it is impossible to abstract a single belief from a core of beliefs, a belief-based epistemological theory appears less attractive.
Contemporary epistemology is concerned with amassing the most propositional knowledge as possible.
In post-Aristotelian ancient philosophy and modern philosophy certitude has been favored over wisdom. Wisdom was the focus of Plato, Aristotle, the Middle Age philosophies by the latter two, Spinoza and Locke.
Propositional knowledge was secondary to wisdom and understanding in Greek philosophy. Plato (according to Julius Moravcsik) sees propositional knowledge as a derivative of the process of understanding.
Moravcsik maintains that the increasing complexity of modern social and scientific theories has created a need to return to the concept of understanding in epistemology.
Gai Fine holds that Plato's focus on understanding in his epistemology leads to a less atomistic approach in epistemology.
Understanding ought to be a major point in epistemology. It has been ignored for too long
A belief-based epistemology is incapable of explaining the nature of understanding involving the comprehension of structures of reality, rather than its propositional structure.
Wisdom, like understanding has been neglected in modern epistemology.
Wisdom is tough to define, but whatever it is, it is qualitatively different than the accumulation of propositional knowledge.
Wisdom is not a property of propositional beliefs or a matter of relations between propositional beliefs.
Wisdom is concerned with grasping reality as a whole.
3. More reasons to try a virtue approach: the relations between believing and feeling
The advantages of virtue-based epistemology have been shown from:
1) Ethics and corresponding epistemic theories
2) Problems within epistemology
Now, 3) Philosophy of mind
"The treatment of belief as a psychic state independent of non-cognitive states is happily nearing its demise" (Zagzebski, 51).
Stephen Stich argues that the concept of belief is a useless figment of folk psychology.
Psychic states conventionally assigned to epistemologists are not that distinct from psychic states assigned to ethicists.
Many philosophers tend to think of the influence of feeling as an embarrassment, a defect, that needs to be eliminated.
William James held feelings in high regards, stating that belief is more allied to the emotions than anything else.
James defined belief as "the sense of reality". Hume defined belief as to believe is to have a vivid impression.
Without going as fas as James or Hume we can find supporting evidence that vividness of conception is causally connected with belief.
Belief comes in degrees. Belief is closely connected with states like wanting, hoping and expecting.
Wanting and hoping are emotive states, whereas belief and expecting are usually not considered emotive. But, are the emotive states truly distinguishable from cognitive states?
Emotion is either a component of belief or has a direct causal relationship with belief.
It is a widely held false notion that a belief influenced by desire makes it a belief acquired independent of facts.
If beliefs and emotions are intimately connected then we should be motivated to search for connections between moral and intellectual values.
4. An objection to modeling evaluation in epistemology on ethics: the dispute over the voluntariness of belief
The widespread assumption that human actions are voluntary, whereas cognitive activity is involuntary could completely undermine the connection of theoretical ethics and normative epistemology.
Believing is thought to be involuntary and this is the strongest argument against evaluating beliefs like moral evaluation.
Beliefs often seem to be the outcome of instinctive processes.
If beliefs are involuntary, then it is inappropriate to evaluate them from a moral standpoint.
It is wrong to blame a person for a belief if it is involuntary.
4.1 The irrelevance of the objection to virtue theory
Since belief is not the focal point of virtue epistemology, the voluntary or involuntary nature of a belief is less important than a person's disposition to virtue or vice.
The question is then: are our intellectual virtues and vices as voluntary as our moral virtues and vices?
Intellectual courage, perseverance, honesty and sincerity appear to be voluntary. But perceptiveness, insight and ability to form theories appear to be less voluntary and based on natural ability.
But, the intellectual virtues based on natural ability are at least as voluntary to the moral virtues of generosity or the vice of envy.
4.2 The voluntariness of belief
The difference between acts and beliefs is less great than what is thought.
Hume is one of the strongest adherents of involuntary belief. James and Descartes are voluntary belief supporters.
The Cartesian position is that the Will, not the intellect assists in one's belief.
Pascal held that the will is one of the chief organs in belief.
Modern cognitive voluntarism theories come from Murray Clarke, Christopher Hookway, Jonathon Cohen and Lorraine Code.
Zagzebski hold that beliefs are like acts in that they arrange themselves on a continuum of degrees of voluntariness.
Perceptual beliefs which are on the low end of the scale of voluntariness should not be used as paradigm cases for human rationality and justification any more than sneezing or scratching an itch should be used as paradigm cases for moral evaluation
4.3 Moral and Epistemic Luck
Sometimes we blame or praise a person more than is deserved because of moral luck or moral unluckiness.
The Kantian attempt to ground moral evaluation in something free of luck is problematic.
Moral luck is relevant to virtue-based epistemology in two ways:
1. It makes the attempt to model epistemology after ethics easier
2. The rejection of the Kantian position that our moral status is completely within our control takes away one of the motivations for wanting the Kantian theory in the first place
A virtue-based epistemology, because it focuses on inner traits, does not have to pay much attention to moral luck.
Even though few, if any, beliefs are objects of direct choice, they are as voluntary as many acts or omissions of acts for which we are responsible.
5. Conclusion to Part I: Why center epistemology on the virtues?
Be open-minded to see the outcome!
Thursday, November 23, 2006
Virtues of the Mind - 1.1-2.1
(Originally written November 23, 2006 in Book 8)
Thanksgiving
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models (continued)
Deontological and reliabilist theories of epistemology are structurally similar to act-based ethical theories.
Ernest Sosa proposed that by focusing on intellectual virtues we can bypass the struggle between foundationalist and coherentists and the whole problem of proper cognitive structure.
Sosa is not a virtue theorist. He speaks about intellectual virtues in a consequentialist backdrop.
The only intellectual virtue that really gets any attention is phronesis (tactical wisdom). Phronesis gets attention because Aristotle connects it to the distinctively moral virtues.
Since Sosa introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into epistemic literature, virtue epistemology has become another name for reliablism. Plantinga's theory of proper function and related theories are prime examples.
Sosa and Greco define intellectual virtue in terms of its propensity to achieve a certain consequence.
Aristotle's intellectual virtues include: sophia (theoretical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom), and nous (insight or understanding). Hobbes includes good wit and discretion. Spinoza's primary intellectual virtue is understanding.
Zagzebski holds that virtue-based epistemology is well suited to analyze justification and knowledge.
Lorraine Code stresses a socialized approach to epistemology, connecting epistemology and moral theory. She shows an epistemological importance to human nature, not just a purely cognitive importance.
Code argues for a "responsiblist epistemology", emphasizing the active nature of the knower: A knower/believer has a choice of cognitive structuring, and is then accountable for these choices.
Code denounces reliabilism because she feels it makes knowers too passive. "A reliable knower could simply be an accurate, and relatively passive, recorder of experience" (Zagzebski, 12).
Code still only structures her epistemological theory on deontological and consequentialist ethics, not virtue-theory.
James Montmarquet takes epistemic virtue in the classical sense and connects epistemic works with moral virtue literature.
Montmarquet labels virtues of impartiality:
-openness to the ideas of others
-willingness to exchange ideas
-lack of jealousy
-lack of personal bias
-a lively sense of one's own fallibility
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual sobriety:
- sober-minded inquiry, not won't to embrace what is not really warranted.
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual courage:
-the willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held beliefs
-perseverance in the face of opposition from others
-determination to see a project through to completion
Montmarquet holds that any one desiring the truth must have these traits. But he holds that the intellectual virtues, even if they are not conductive and that some epistemic virtues function as regulators of the desire for truth.
Montmarquet's approach is vaguely Aristotelian. His epistemology is belief-based. Montmarquet does not connect his theory with aretaic moral theory.
Alvin Goldman accepts a form of virtue epistemology that is similar to Sosa. He explicitly links justification to intellectual virtue.
Zagzebski states that, while many epistemic theories recognize the desirability of an epistemological theory based on a carefully developed virtue theory, none have fully articulated a theory.
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories
The mark of a virtue theory is that the primary object of evaluation is inner traits of a person, rather than acts of that person.
"To describe a good person is to describe that person's virtues, and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible neither to the performance of acts independently identified as right nor to a moral virtue than a disposition to act in the right way" (Zagzebski, 15).
There is more and less to a disposition to act in a right way to moral virtues.
A virtue includes a disposition to:
1) Characteristic emotions
2) Desires
3) Motives
4) Attitudes
There is less to moral virtues then the disposition to act right because a virtuous person does not invariably act in a way that can be fully captured by any independent set of normative criteria.
Agent-focused virtue theories focus on the agent and her traits as a way of determining what is right, but do not maintain that what is right is right because it is what a virtuous person would do. What a virtuous person would do is the best criterion for what is right. Zagzebski calls this weak virtue-theory.
Pure virtue-theory treats act-evaluation as a derivative from the character of an agent. An act is right because it is what a virtuous person might do.
Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) was probably the first major attempt in recent philosophy to show the advantages of virtue ethics over act-based ethics.
Anscombe argues that the principal notions of modern moral discourse (right, wrong, obligation and moral duty) lack content, but concepts of virtue (justice, chastity, courage and truth) are conceptually rich.
Anscombe also argues that right, wrong, obligation and duty are legal concepts and worthless without judge and jury. Since ethics is not rooted in theism (as it was when God was judge and jury) they are worthless terms.
Anscombe argues that we should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which doesn't hold to a blanket concept of wrong or a concept of duty.
The idea that there can be no exhaustive set of rules for how to act in every situation is showing more and more philosophers that a virtue-based theory of ethics is advantageous to cover all bases.
Virtue theory ethics can better explain the moral value of personal goods like love and friendship.
Duty-based ethics does not clearly show that their hierarchical approach is correct.
Another reason for favoring virtue-based ethics is that some virtues are not reducible to specific acts or disposition.
Modern epistemology is belief-based. A positively evaluated belief is called justified.
Legalistic language makes very little sense in epistemology. What does it mean to be epistemically guilty?
Linehan - does this notion give better fuel for virtue-based epistemology or does it glorify the ignorance of epistemology in ordinary people? One should not be swayed by the ignorance or fervor of the masses.
Wisdom is the unification of propositional and other types of knowledge. Knowledge can be misused but wisdom cannot be. Wisdom unifies knowledge and desires and values.
The focus on belief in epistemology has led to the neglect of wisdom. Also, a belief-based theory cannot explain the connection between wisdom and moral goodness.
Consequentialism is an externalist moral theory. A good is something that is produced.
Externalist moral theories face all sorts of problems. Reliabilism, which is structurally similar to consequentialism, faces similar problems.
Reliabilism's epistemic goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false ones. It is quantitative.
In Reliabilism, an accumulation of propositional knowledge is the goal, regardless of how that knowledge is gained. It can be done ignorantly or in a vicious manner.
Because of the difficulties faced by reliabilism and its basis of consequentialism, it is a good idea to search for an alternative ethical mode for epistemology.
Act-based ethics label right as merely not-wrong. Right means permissible. Virtue ethics focus on praiseworthiness.
Belief based epistemology see justification as analogous to epistemic blamelessness. It isn't really praiseworthy.
Virtue theory can evaluate virtue, vice and their intermediate states; whereas act-based/belief-based can only offer black and white cases
2. Difficulties in contemporary epistemology
Contemporary epistemology is too atomistic and the value of understanding has been neglected.
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification
For centuries, maybe as far back as Plato, knowledge has been considered to be a justified true belief. Then Gettier screwed everything up.
Justification has been the primary focus of Anlgo-American philosophers in epistemology.
Justification is a hot topic in epistemology, but it is a very vague and ambiguous term used in connection with countless theories.
Planting claims that:
1) The traditional view of justification originated with Locke and Descartes and identifies justification with a component of knowledge and to true belief and to performing one's epistemic duty.
2) The traditional view is incoherent equivocation and responsible for the externalist and internalist impasse
3) The remedy to the impasse is to dissolve the connections between justification and epistemic duty and justification and warrant.
Planting too readily connects moral and deontological concepts. Then by arguing against deontology he denounces internalism.
But, Zagzebski feels Plantinga's historical and conceptual points fail to make a convincing argument against internalism
William Alston goes further than Plantinga. He identifies six candidates for necessary conditions for justification:
1) Must be based on adequate ground
2) what justices a belief must probabalize it
3) a justification must be cognitively accessible to the subject
4) A justified belief must fit into a coherent system of beliefs
5) It must satisfy certain higher-level conditions
6) The believer must satisfy intellectual obligations in forming and maintaining the belief
Alston holds that justification cannot bear all the conceptual weight that has been given to it.
Alston points out that the issue between externalists and internists cannot be resolved because justification is in such different context in these two theories.
Thanksgiving
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models (continued)
Deontological and reliabilist theories of epistemology are structurally similar to act-based ethical theories.
Ernest Sosa proposed that by focusing on intellectual virtues we can bypass the struggle between foundationalist and coherentists and the whole problem of proper cognitive structure.
Sosa is not a virtue theorist. He speaks about intellectual virtues in a consequentialist backdrop.
The only intellectual virtue that really gets any attention is phronesis (tactical wisdom). Phronesis gets attention because Aristotle connects it to the distinctively moral virtues.
Since Sosa introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into epistemic literature, virtue epistemology has become another name for reliablism. Plantinga's theory of proper function and related theories are prime examples.
Sosa and Greco define intellectual virtue in terms of its propensity to achieve a certain consequence.
Aristotle's intellectual virtues include: sophia (theoretical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom), and nous (insight or understanding). Hobbes includes good wit and discretion. Spinoza's primary intellectual virtue is understanding.
Zagzebski holds that virtue-based epistemology is well suited to analyze justification and knowledge.
Lorraine Code stresses a socialized approach to epistemology, connecting epistemology and moral theory. She shows an epistemological importance to human nature, not just a purely cognitive importance.
Code argues for a "responsiblist epistemology", emphasizing the active nature of the knower: A knower/believer has a choice of cognitive structuring, and is then accountable for these choices.
Code denounces reliabilism because she feels it makes knowers too passive. "A reliable knower could simply be an accurate, and relatively passive, recorder of experience" (Zagzebski, 12).
Code still only structures her epistemological theory on deontological and consequentialist ethics, not virtue-theory.
James Montmarquet takes epistemic virtue in the classical sense and connects epistemic works with moral virtue literature.
Montmarquet labels virtues of impartiality:
-openness to the ideas of others
-willingness to exchange ideas
-lack of jealousy
-lack of personal bias
-a lively sense of one's own fallibility
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual sobriety:
- sober-minded inquiry, not won't to embrace what is not really warranted.
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual courage:
-the willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held beliefs
-perseverance in the face of opposition from others
-determination to see a project through to completion
Montmarquet holds that any one desiring the truth must have these traits. But he holds that the intellectual virtues, even if they are not conductive and that some epistemic virtues function as regulators of the desire for truth.
Montmarquet's approach is vaguely Aristotelian. His epistemology is belief-based. Montmarquet does not connect his theory with aretaic moral theory.
Alvin Goldman accepts a form of virtue epistemology that is similar to Sosa. He explicitly links justification to intellectual virtue.
Zagzebski states that, while many epistemic theories recognize the desirability of an epistemological theory based on a carefully developed virtue theory, none have fully articulated a theory.
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories
The mark of a virtue theory is that the primary object of evaluation is inner traits of a person, rather than acts of that person.
"To describe a good person is to describe that person's virtues, and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible neither to the performance of acts independently identified as right nor to a moral virtue than a disposition to act in the right way" (Zagzebski, 15).
There is more and less to a disposition to act in a right way to moral virtues.
A virtue includes a disposition to:
1) Characteristic emotions
2) Desires
3) Motives
4) Attitudes
There is less to moral virtues then the disposition to act right because a virtuous person does not invariably act in a way that can be fully captured by any independent set of normative criteria.
Agent-focused virtue theories focus on the agent and her traits as a way of determining what is right, but do not maintain that what is right is right because it is what a virtuous person would do. What a virtuous person would do is the best criterion for what is right. Zagzebski calls this weak virtue-theory.
Pure virtue-theory treats act-evaluation as a derivative from the character of an agent. An act is right because it is what a virtuous person might do.
Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) was probably the first major attempt in recent philosophy to show the advantages of virtue ethics over act-based ethics.
Anscombe argues that the principal notions of modern moral discourse (right, wrong, obligation and moral duty) lack content, but concepts of virtue (justice, chastity, courage and truth) are conceptually rich.
Anscombe also argues that right, wrong, obligation and duty are legal concepts and worthless without judge and jury. Since ethics is not rooted in theism (as it was when God was judge and jury) they are worthless terms.
Anscombe argues that we should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which doesn't hold to a blanket concept of wrong or a concept of duty.
The idea that there can be no exhaustive set of rules for how to act in every situation is showing more and more philosophers that a virtue-based theory of ethics is advantageous to cover all bases.
Virtue theory ethics can better explain the moral value of personal goods like love and friendship.
Duty-based ethics does not clearly show that their hierarchical approach is correct.
Another reason for favoring virtue-based ethics is that some virtues are not reducible to specific acts or disposition.
Modern epistemology is belief-based. A positively evaluated belief is called justified.
Legalistic language makes very little sense in epistemology. What does it mean to be epistemically guilty?
Linehan - does this notion give better fuel for virtue-based epistemology or does it glorify the ignorance of epistemology in ordinary people? One should not be swayed by the ignorance or fervor of the masses.
Wisdom is the unification of propositional and other types of knowledge. Knowledge can be misused but wisdom cannot be. Wisdom unifies knowledge and desires and values.
The focus on belief in epistemology has led to the neglect of wisdom. Also, a belief-based theory cannot explain the connection between wisdom and moral goodness.
Consequentialism is an externalist moral theory. A good is something that is produced.
Externalist moral theories face all sorts of problems. Reliabilism, which is structurally similar to consequentialism, faces similar problems.
Reliabilism's epistemic goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false ones. It is quantitative.
In Reliabilism, an accumulation of propositional knowledge is the goal, regardless of how that knowledge is gained. It can be done ignorantly or in a vicious manner.
Because of the difficulties faced by reliabilism and its basis of consequentialism, it is a good idea to search for an alternative ethical mode for epistemology.
Act-based ethics label right as merely not-wrong. Right means permissible. Virtue ethics focus on praiseworthiness.
Belief based epistemology see justification as analogous to epistemic blamelessness. It isn't really praiseworthy.
Virtue theory can evaluate virtue, vice and their intermediate states; whereas act-based/belief-based can only offer black and white cases
2. Difficulties in contemporary epistemology
Contemporary epistemology is too atomistic and the value of understanding has been neglected.
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification
For centuries, maybe as far back as Plato, knowledge has been considered to be a justified true belief. Then Gettier screwed everything up.
Justification has been the primary focus of Anlgo-American philosophers in epistemology.
Justification is a hot topic in epistemology, but it is a very vague and ambiguous term used in connection with countless theories.
Planting claims that:
1) The traditional view of justification originated with Locke and Descartes and identifies justification with a component of knowledge and to true belief and to performing one's epistemic duty.
2) The traditional view is incoherent equivocation and responsible for the externalist and internalist impasse
3) The remedy to the impasse is to dissolve the connections between justification and epistemic duty and justification and warrant.
Planting too readily connects moral and deontological concepts. Then by arguing against deontology he denounces internalism.
But, Zagzebski feels Plantinga's historical and conceptual points fail to make a convincing argument against internalism
William Alston goes further than Plantinga. He identifies six candidates for necessary conditions for justification:
1) Must be based on adequate ground
2) what justices a belief must probabalize it
3) a justification must be cognitively accessible to the subject
4) A justified belief must fit into a coherent system of beliefs
5) It must satisfy certain higher-level conditions
6) The believer must satisfy intellectual obligations in forming and maintaining the belief
Alston holds that justification cannot bear all the conceptual weight that has been given to it.
Alston points out that the issue between externalists and internists cannot be resolved because justification is in such different context in these two theories.
Saturday, September 2, 2006
Introductory Epistemology (B)
(Originally written September 2, 2006 in Book 6)
Fanatics, bigots, mystics and dogmatists all claim to know more than they really do.
Skeptics claim to know less than they really do.
Popular science reading leads us to skepticism. Drunkenness, drug usage, religious and emotional experience leads us to dogmatism.
Linehan - It's offensive to equate religion to drunkenness. It's simply inflammatory.
"Truth is somewhere in the middle: we can know far more than the skeptic says [and] far less than the dogmatists or the mystic says" (Polman, 10).
Cardinal Mercier states that if we have knowledge it must meet three criterion of truth:
1) Internal
2) Objective
3) Immediate
Internal - one's own mind must find sufficient reason for adhering to testimony of authority
Objective - certitude cannot consist of purely subjective feeling, objective knowledge must produce a feeling that is adequate to reason
Immediate - certitude must rest on immediate criterion, lest we fall into an infinite regress
Descartes believed that bad ideas infected our good ones. We must sort the good beliefs from the bad ones. Once we throw the bad beliefs away we are left with a stockpile of good ones. But how are we to sort good from bad? We are in the wheel. By using common sense, science and logic we can sort the beliefs, but that leaves skepticism a strong foothold.
We must distinguish two pairs of questions:
1) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
2) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?
If you can answer question 1) you should be able to answer question 2). But, if you know the answer to 2) then you have hope of answering question 1). The skeptic says you cannot answer question 1) until you answer question 2) but you cannot answer question 2) until first answering question 1). Thus, you cannot know anything. Methodists believe they have the answers to 2) and can figure out the answers to 1). Particularists believe they have the answers to 10 and can figure out the answers to 2).
Hume and Locke were methodists. Empiricism is methodism.
There are two objections to empiricism:
1) The criterion is very broad and is arbitrary.
2) It destroys too much knowledge. All you can know is sensations.
Thomas Ried, a Scottish philosopher disagreed with Hume. He was a particularist. G.E. Moore was a particularist.
Thus, there are three views:
1) Skepticism - you cannot know any answers
2) Methodism - you know the answer to 2)
3) Particularism - you know the answer to 1)
Chisholm was a particularist. He agrees with Spinoza that "in order to know there is no need to know that we know, much less that we know that we know" (Polman, 13). He admits that people have hallucinations and thus our senses can deceive us. He denies though that this leads to the notion that our senses deceive us all the time. (The same can be said of memories).
St. Augustine stated that it is reasonable to trust the senses over distrusting them. As long as everything seems normal or as the way things should be the senses are trustworthy. The same can be said of memory.
To answer the puzzle of dialectus, Chisholm suggests that we start with particular cases of knowledge and generalize from them a criterion of goodness. (Particulars are known and then we develop a method to discern criterion or methods).
The theory of evidence presupposes an objective right and wrong.
Right preference is the concept of one state of mind being epistemically preferable to another state of mind.
The concept of epistemic preferability is what Cardinal Mercier called an objective concept.
An objectively preferable state of mind is much different to a subjectively preferable state of mind.
The concept of epistemic preferability allows us to use the theory of evidence and state that "P" is beyond reasonable doubt "T" if "P" is objectively preferable to withholding "P" (Meaning not holding "p" or "not-p")
"A proposition is evident for a person if it is beyond reasonable doubt for that person and is such that his including it among the propositions upon which he bases his decisions is preferable to his not so including it" (Pojman, 14).
A proposition is acceptable if withholding it is not preferable to believing it. A proposition is unacceptable if withholding it is preferable to believing it.
Propositions that are not beyond reasonable doubt can still be accepted if they have "some presumption in their favor". The proposition, "I will be alive tomorrow" is such a proposition.
A proposition is certain when it is evident and there is no other proposition that is epistemically preferable.
"The concept of epistemic preferability can be axiomatized and made the basis of a system of epistemic logic exhibiting the relations among these and other concepts of the theory of evidence" (Pojman, 15).
Certainty applies to being certain at a given time for a specific man.
Leibniz held that there are two kinds of evident propositions:
1) First truths of fact
2) First truths of reason
First truths of fact are propositions that a person is aware of at a specific time, i.e. sensory perceptions, emotions, thoughts, etc. They are 'self-presenting'.
A man's being is self-presenting to him at a given time if he is in that state at the time and it is necessarily true that if he is in that state at the time, he is evident of it.
First truths of fact are truths that are evidence in and of themselves. St. Thomas Aquinas says, "the intellect knows that it possesses the truth by reflection on itself" (Pojman, 15).
First truths of reason are sometimes called 'a priori' or 'maxims' or 'axioms'. These are necessary propositions that by understanding it one cannot understand it without affirming that it is true.
A proposition is axiomatic for a given subject of a given time if:
1) The proposition is necessarily true
2) If it is necessarily true, the the proposition is evident.
A proposition is a priori if:
1) The proposition is axiomatic for the subject at that time
2) The proposition is evident to the man at the time that the proposition is entailed by a set of axiomatic propositions at that time.
Evident truths are certain, either directly or indirectly evident
By investigating instance of knowledge we can develop methods to ascertain the difference between knowledge that is good anthem that is bad. Because we are rational beings we assume that we can investigate instances of truth we can formulate criterion to get better, more or rule out knowledge. By doing this we satisfy Cardinal Mercier's criteria for his theory of certitude.
In dealing with the problem of the wheel, "few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the question" (Pojman, 17).
Fanatics, bigots, mystics and dogmatists all claim to know more than they really do.
Skeptics claim to know less than they really do.
Popular science reading leads us to skepticism. Drunkenness, drug usage, religious and emotional experience leads us to dogmatism.
Linehan - It's offensive to equate religion to drunkenness. It's simply inflammatory.
"Truth is somewhere in the middle: we can know far more than the skeptic says [and] far less than the dogmatists or the mystic says" (Polman, 10).
Cardinal Mercier states that if we have knowledge it must meet three criterion of truth:
1) Internal
2) Objective
3) Immediate
Internal - one's own mind must find sufficient reason for adhering to testimony of authority
Objective - certitude cannot consist of purely subjective feeling, objective knowledge must produce a feeling that is adequate to reason
Immediate - certitude must rest on immediate criterion, lest we fall into an infinite regress
Descartes believed that bad ideas infected our good ones. We must sort the good beliefs from the bad ones. Once we throw the bad beliefs away we are left with a stockpile of good ones. But how are we to sort good from bad? We are in the wheel. By using common sense, science and logic we can sort the beliefs, but that leaves skepticism a strong foothold.
We must distinguish two pairs of questions:
1) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
2) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?
If you can answer question 1) you should be able to answer question 2). But, if you know the answer to 2) then you have hope of answering question 1). The skeptic says you cannot answer question 1) until you answer question 2) but you cannot answer question 2) until first answering question 1). Thus, you cannot know anything. Methodists believe they have the answers to 2) and can figure out the answers to 1). Particularists believe they have the answers to 10 and can figure out the answers to 2).
Hume and Locke were methodists. Empiricism is methodism.
There are two objections to empiricism:
1) The criterion is very broad and is arbitrary.
2) It destroys too much knowledge. All you can know is sensations.
Thomas Ried, a Scottish philosopher disagreed with Hume. He was a particularist. G.E. Moore was a particularist.
Thus, there are three views:
1) Skepticism - you cannot know any answers
2) Methodism - you know the answer to 2)
3) Particularism - you know the answer to 1)
Chisholm was a particularist. He agrees with Spinoza that "in order to know there is no need to know that we know, much less that we know that we know" (Polman, 13). He admits that people have hallucinations and thus our senses can deceive us. He denies though that this leads to the notion that our senses deceive us all the time. (The same can be said of memories).
St. Augustine stated that it is reasonable to trust the senses over distrusting them. As long as everything seems normal or as the way things should be the senses are trustworthy. The same can be said of memory.
To answer the puzzle of dialectus, Chisholm suggests that we start with particular cases of knowledge and generalize from them a criterion of goodness. (Particulars are known and then we develop a method to discern criterion or methods).
The theory of evidence presupposes an objective right and wrong.
Right preference is the concept of one state of mind being epistemically preferable to another state of mind.
The concept of epistemic preferability is what Cardinal Mercier called an objective concept.
An objectively preferable state of mind is much different to a subjectively preferable state of mind.
The concept of epistemic preferability allows us to use the theory of evidence and state that "P" is beyond reasonable doubt "T" if "P" is objectively preferable to withholding "P" (Meaning not holding "p" or "not-p")
"A proposition is evident for a person if it is beyond reasonable doubt for that person and is such that his including it among the propositions upon which he bases his decisions is preferable to his not so including it" (Pojman, 14).
A proposition is acceptable if withholding it is not preferable to believing it. A proposition is unacceptable if withholding it is preferable to believing it.
Propositions that are not beyond reasonable doubt can still be accepted if they have "some presumption in their favor". The proposition, "I will be alive tomorrow" is such a proposition.
A proposition is certain when it is evident and there is no other proposition that is epistemically preferable.
"The concept of epistemic preferability can be axiomatized and made the basis of a system of epistemic logic exhibiting the relations among these and other concepts of the theory of evidence" (Pojman, 15).
Certainty applies to being certain at a given time for a specific man.
Leibniz held that there are two kinds of evident propositions:
1) First truths of fact
2) First truths of reason
First truths of fact are propositions that a person is aware of at a specific time, i.e. sensory perceptions, emotions, thoughts, etc. They are 'self-presenting'.
A man's being is self-presenting to him at a given time if he is in that state at the time and it is necessarily true that if he is in that state at the time, he is evident of it.
First truths of fact are truths that are evidence in and of themselves. St. Thomas Aquinas says, "the intellect knows that it possesses the truth by reflection on itself" (Pojman, 15).
First truths of reason are sometimes called 'a priori' or 'maxims' or 'axioms'. These are necessary propositions that by understanding it one cannot understand it without affirming that it is true.
A proposition is axiomatic for a given subject of a given time if:
1) The proposition is necessarily true
2) If it is necessarily true, the the proposition is evident.
A proposition is a priori if:
1) The proposition is axiomatic for the subject at that time
2) The proposition is evident to the man at the time that the proposition is entailed by a set of axiomatic propositions at that time.
Evident truths are certain, either directly or indirectly evident
By investigating instance of knowledge we can develop methods to ascertain the difference between knowledge that is good anthem that is bad. Because we are rational beings we assume that we can investigate instances of truth we can formulate criterion to get better, more or rule out knowledge. By doing this we satisfy Cardinal Mercier's criteria for his theory of certitude.
In dealing with the problem of the wheel, "few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the question" (Pojman, 17).
Friday, September 1, 2006
Great Epistemological Traditions
(Originally Written September 1, 2006 in Epistemology)
The Great Epistemological Traditions:
1. Rationalism - Parmenides, Zeno, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant
2. Empiricism - Heraclitus, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Berkeley, Hume
Hume (1711-1776)
External objects (a fortiori)
A Fortiori argument - If "x", then how much more "y".
An a fortiori argument is to be used inductively
Hume argued that what we experience is a kind of constancy and a coherence.
He asked how can we know that the box in our mind correlates to anything in the real world?
Why can't our own mind form constancy and coherence? Are not dreams real to us?
The Law of Causality - every effect is necessarily connected to a cause
Hume argued against the law of causality in that you don't see the necessary connection, you see the event after event after event, etc.
Uniformity of nature
Two types of knowledge:
1) Relations of ideas - true by their nature
2) Matters of fact - empirically observed
The Great Epistemological Traditions:
1. Rationalism - Parmenides, Zeno, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant
2. Empiricism - Heraclitus, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Berkeley, Hume
Hume (1711-1776)
External objects (a fortiori)
A Fortiori argument - If "x", then how much more "y".
An a fortiori argument is to be used inductively
Hume argued that what we experience is a kind of constancy and a coherence.
He asked how can we know that the box in our mind correlates to anything in the real world?
Why can't our own mind form constancy and coherence? Are not dreams real to us?
The Law of Causality - every effect is necessarily connected to a cause
Hume argued against the law of causality in that you don't see the necessary connection, you see the event after event after event, etc.
Uniformity of nature
Two types of knowledge:
1) Relations of ideas - true by their nature
2) Matters of fact - empirically observed
Saturday, July 22, 2006
Metaphysics - Ch. 2 (B)
(Originally written July 22, 2006 in Book 6)
Metaphysics
Peter van Inwagen
Ch. 2 - Individuality
An individual thing is not a process. Processes start and end and happen. Individual things come into existence and go out of existence.
The Common Western metaphysic holds that the World consists of many individual things. Contrary to the Common Western metaphysic there are those who believe:
1) There are no individual things (nihilism)
2) There is one individual thing (monism)
3) There is more than one individual thing, but there are not many
Dualists believe that there are two types of things, not just two individual things: mental things and physical things. Some dualists hold that there are two things that are either good or evil, or order and disorder.
Nihilism believes in universals and the things that we see are not individual things, but modifications and collections.
Nihilists can also only believe in stuff and no individual things or collections or modifications.
Nihilism that bases its theory that individual things do not exist and only modifications of universals exist is not plausible. Nihilism that bases its theory that individual things do not exist and only collections exist is even less plausible. Nihilism that believes that individual things exist only as stuff is the most plausible but does not match up with modern physics.
Monism believes that there is only one individual thing. "Monists believe that there is only one thing that is at all like things that those who believe that there are many individual things" (van Inwagen, 20). Monists hold that only one non-universal thing can exist. Thus, monists basically hold that only these things exist:
1) Universals
2) Stuffs
3) Modifications
4) The One (the only individual thing)
5) Modifications of the One
6) Collections of modifications of the One
Some monists hold that what individual things (seemingly) are are actually various modifications of the One. (This is Spinoza's version).
Some monists hold that seemingly individual things are appearances and cannot be viewed as reality at all. This school of thought was held by the Absolute Idealists. (Berkeley held this version).
Berkeley believed that minds were actually individual things, so he couldn't be an Absolute Idealist or a true monist.
A third form of monism holds that seemingly individual things are actually how the One portraits itself to himself. The Sun (the One) presents itself to me (the One) in a certain way.
Linehan - Sexual gratification is thus only masturbation. The One is one horny bastard.
Some people stat that Hindus hold this third view.
Monism, while it has various forms believes that individuality is either illusionary at its lowest and not fully real at its best.
Why would anyone be a Monist?
Spinoza - "If a thing is not absolutely independent of everything else, then it must be a mere modification of something that is absolutely independent of everything else" (van Inwagen, 32).
Linehan - While I do not hold to monism or Spinoza at all, this is a very good argument.
When the One is called 'god' it becomes pantheism. Theism is a mean between pantheism (all is God) and atheism (nothing is God). Atheists do not believe in God, thus only the physical universe composes the world.
While theists and atheists disagree profoundly, they both reject pantheism (and monism).
Atheists reject monism on a number of levels:
1) Some hold that there are no independent beings
2) some hold that there are many independent things
Some monists accept monism simply because of a certain experience that has shown them individuality is only an illusion. These experiences do not come from senses (which indicate individual things) but from religious or mystical experience. Whatever triggers these experiences (chance, drugs or rigorous spiritual exercises) they end them with the feeling that one of the mot important pieces of knowledge is that individuality is an illusion. People who have these experiences call them ineffable, impossible to articulate or describe.
Linehan - at the end of chapter 2 I find myself questioning why I ever wished to embark on metaphysical studies. What good can come from questions without answers? I find myself slipping into a metaphysical madness. But, metaphysics and anything in philosophy (save for history) is similar to faith. Faith provides for me the knowledge of God (for me, knowledge is the comprehension of truth). Undoubtedly, truth exists. Just as sure as truth exists, I am incapable of comprehending it all. Thus, I am wholly incapable of comprehending all truth and thus, ill-equipped to handle or possess absolute knowledge. While I do not have absolute knowledge of God, I have enough partial knowledge to assert his existence as real. Faith then provides me with the assurance of God, which I cannot get from my own knowledge.
Metaphysics cannot provide concrete knowledge. Without the assurance of God's existence, provided by faith, anyone would be lost in metaphysical madness, entering endless dark alleys of speculation ultimately leaving him or her with nothing but hopeless skepticism. I will never produce concrete metaphysical facts, but I am assured that any questions I 'answer' will continue to point me towards God. What I cannot produce through metaphysics will undoubtedly be overcome through faith. Questions are a process (one of the many processes) that ultimately lead to God. The final question that they produce is (thankfully) an answerable one. Will you accept God's existence and the mercy he offers or will you deny God and His grace? As for me and my house, I will accept the Lord.
Metaphysics
Peter van Inwagen
Ch. 2 - Individuality
An individual thing is not a process. Processes start and end and happen. Individual things come into existence and go out of existence.
The Common Western metaphysic holds that the World consists of many individual things. Contrary to the Common Western metaphysic there are those who believe:
1) There are no individual things (nihilism)
2) There is one individual thing (monism)
3) There is more than one individual thing, but there are not many
Dualists believe that there are two types of things, not just two individual things: mental things and physical things. Some dualists hold that there are two things that are either good or evil, or order and disorder.
Nihilism believes in universals and the things that we see are not individual things, but modifications and collections.
Nihilists can also only believe in stuff and no individual things or collections or modifications.
Nihilism that bases its theory that individual things do not exist and only modifications of universals exist is not plausible. Nihilism that bases its theory that individual things do not exist and only collections exist is even less plausible. Nihilism that believes that individual things exist only as stuff is the most plausible but does not match up with modern physics.
Monism believes that there is only one individual thing. "Monists believe that there is only one thing that is at all like things that those who believe that there are many individual things" (van Inwagen, 20). Monists hold that only one non-universal thing can exist. Thus, monists basically hold that only these things exist:
1) Universals
2) Stuffs
3) Modifications
4) The One (the only individual thing)
5) Modifications of the One
6) Collections of modifications of the One
Some monists hold that what individual things (seemingly) are are actually various modifications of the One. (This is Spinoza's version).
Some monists hold that seemingly individual things are appearances and cannot be viewed as reality at all. This school of thought was held by the Absolute Idealists. (Berkeley held this version).
Berkeley believed that minds were actually individual things, so he couldn't be an Absolute Idealist or a true monist.
A third form of monism holds that seemingly individual things are actually how the One portraits itself to himself. The Sun (the One) presents itself to me (the One) in a certain way.
Linehan - Sexual gratification is thus only masturbation. The One is one horny bastard.
Some people stat that Hindus hold this third view.
Monism, while it has various forms believes that individuality is either illusionary at its lowest and not fully real at its best.
Why would anyone be a Monist?
Spinoza - "If a thing is not absolutely independent of everything else, then it must be a mere modification of something that is absolutely independent of everything else" (van Inwagen, 32).
Linehan - While I do not hold to monism or Spinoza at all, this is a very good argument.
When the One is called 'god' it becomes pantheism. Theism is a mean between pantheism (all is God) and atheism (nothing is God). Atheists do not believe in God, thus only the physical universe composes the world.
While theists and atheists disagree profoundly, they both reject pantheism (and monism).
Atheists reject monism on a number of levels:
1) Some hold that there are no independent beings
2) some hold that there are many independent things
Some monists accept monism simply because of a certain experience that has shown them individuality is only an illusion. These experiences do not come from senses (which indicate individual things) but from religious or mystical experience. Whatever triggers these experiences (chance, drugs or rigorous spiritual exercises) they end them with the feeling that one of the mot important pieces of knowledge is that individuality is an illusion. People who have these experiences call them ineffable, impossible to articulate or describe.
Linehan - at the end of chapter 2 I find myself questioning why I ever wished to embark on metaphysical studies. What good can come from questions without answers? I find myself slipping into a metaphysical madness. But, metaphysics and anything in philosophy (save for history) is similar to faith. Faith provides for me the knowledge of God (for me, knowledge is the comprehension of truth). Undoubtedly, truth exists. Just as sure as truth exists, I am incapable of comprehending it all. Thus, I am wholly incapable of comprehending all truth and thus, ill-equipped to handle or possess absolute knowledge. While I do not have absolute knowledge of God, I have enough partial knowledge to assert his existence as real. Faith then provides me with the assurance of God, which I cannot get from my own knowledge.
Metaphysics cannot provide concrete knowledge. Without the assurance of God's existence, provided by faith, anyone would be lost in metaphysical madness, entering endless dark alleys of speculation ultimately leaving him or her with nothing but hopeless skepticism. I will never produce concrete metaphysical facts, but I am assured that any questions I 'answer' will continue to point me towards God. What I cannot produce through metaphysics will undoubtedly be overcome through faith. Questions are a process (one of the many processes) that ultimately lead to God. The final question that they produce is (thankfully) an answerable one. Will you accept God's existence and the mercy he offers or will you deny God and His grace? As for me and my house, I will accept the Lord.
Sunday, July 16, 2006
Plotinus
(Originally Written July 16, 2006 in Book 4)
The History of Western Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
Chapter 30 - Plotinus
Plotinus (204-270 A.D.) founded Neoplatonism and was the last great philosopher of antiquity.
He lived during one of the most unstable periods of the Roman Empire. After he died the Empire was stabilized by the efforts of Diocletian and Constantine the Great.
He turned from the perpetual strife of the physical world and his philosophy was based on an other-worldly religious tone.
He believed in an eternal world of ideas as his heaven.
Christians adapted much of Plotinus' work into their theology.
Augustine believed that if Plotinus had lived later and changed a few words and phrases he would have been a Christian.
Dean Inge states that Aquinas "is nearer to Plotinus than to the real Aristotle" (Russell, 285).
Plotinus is pivotal to the influence of Middle Ages' Christianity and Catholic theology.
Russell's Caveat: Christianity has undergone many changes. It cannot be viewed as a homogenous system:
1) Synoptic Gospels are innocent of metaphysics.
2) American Christianity (modern) is akin to primitive Christianity.
Platonism is alien to modern American Christianity as American Christianity is much more concerned with life on earth and social progress. Platonic Christianity focuses on transcendental hope in a hopeless everyday world. It is not a dogmatic change, but a shift in emphasis. Without understanding this change, no one will understand the Christianity of the past.
In addition to his historical importance, Plotinus is the best representative of an important type of theory. A philosophical system can be judged on various criteria:
1) The first and most obvious is its truth
2) Beauty
3) Well expressed as how men will act in certain situations
Plotinus was a 'melancholy optimist'.
Plotinus is the best representation of a metaphysical theory born out of a resolve in the face of horrible physical circumstances.
"Among the men who have been unhappy in a mundane sense, but resolutely determined to find a higher happiness in the world of theory, Plotinus holds a very high place" (Russell, 286).
Plotinus clarified Plato's teachings. His arguments against materialism are good and his theory of the relation of soul and body is clearer than Plato or Aristotle.
His moral purity is impressive (like Spinoza's).
He explains things as clearly, consistently and simply as he can.
"Whatever one may think of him as a theoretical philosopher, it is impossible not to love him as a man" (Russell, 286).
Linehan - I hope that one day I will be thought of in a similar manner. Above all philosophy, humanity is by far more important. Theory cannot substitute for a man or woman.
Plotinus' life is known through the writings of Porphyry (a semite whose real name is Malchus).
He discovered patio-temporal appearance as being important.
Plotinus was born in Egypt, studied in Alexandria and studied under Ammonius Saccos (considered to be a founder of Neoplatonism).
He didn't write until he was 49, but then wrote voluminously. Porphyry edited his works. Porphyry was more Pythagorean than Plotinus and thus Neoplatonism became more supernatural than it would have if Plotinus' ideas had not been edited.
Plotinus treated the ancient philosophers with reverence, except for the atomists. He condemns the Stoics for their materialism and the Epicureans for every part of their philosophy. The influence of Parmenides is felt at a number of points.
The Plato in Plotinus' works is much better behaved then the Plato of real life.
The metaphysical of Plotinus begins with a holy trinity:
1) The One (supreme)
2) Spirit *Nous (intermediate)
3) Soul (lowest)
Unlike Christianity's Holy Trinity, the three are not equals.
The One is transcendent of all things. it is indefinable. "In regard to the One there is more truth in silence than in any words whatever" (Russell, 288).
The Spirit is what Plotinus calls 'nous'. Nous is normally translated as mind, but it does not suit here because it lacks the spiritual, religious intention that it had in the Greek language. Nous is the image of the One. Men understand this (as best they can) when they strip the body and self-will from their minds and reflect on the Nous.
Man reflects on the nous by cutting away everything else. Then reflection on the nous we see the light that shines on it and that light is shone by and is the One. Thus reflection on the Nous is reflection on the One itself.
Plotinus often experience ecstasy as an out of body experience.
The soul is inferior to the nous. But the soul is the author of all living things. It made the whole visible world.
Plotinus rejected the Gnostic view that the world (sensible) was evil, instead believing that it was merely less good than the intellectual world.
He rejected the Gnostic view of all things being evil other than man's soul. His arguments were later adopted by the theologian Origen.
He believed in reincarnation for the sake of justice. For example, if you killed your mother you would come back as a woman and be killed by your son.
Sin had to be punished, but it was punished naturally.
If sin is purged in life, eventually the soul and nous would become one, but still two.
Plotinus rejected Aristotle's claim that the soul is the form of the body. He also rejected the Stoic view as the soul being material in nature.
The soul entered the physical realm because it wished to create (replicate) something it saw in the nous. Since they are replications they are not as perfect, but genuinely still good.
The soul lives in union with other souls in the nous, but when it severs itself to create bodies it runs into trouble because it is now in contact with something lower than itself, a body. The soul unwittingly becomes chained to the body.
The physical world is a copy of the eternal world and the best that it could be.
Like Christians, Plotinus has trouble with creation happening without demanding something was lacking in the Creator which caused him to create.
Plotinus believed sin to be a consequence of free will.
He champions free will and without invalidating astrology, set bounds for it.
Plotinus' subjectivism (reflection via introspection) helped to stall outward inspection and ended scientific advancement for centuries.
As I come to the end of another book I can truly state that my philosophical progress is apparent to myself. I say this without meaning to appear arrogant but it is obvious to me. I am starting to make connections I previously did not make. Critical thought and questions are coming more rapidly.
I feel more comprehension of material. I don't have to reread passages to understand them as often. I am really starting to form concrete theories and opinions in my mind. I am enjoying myself more and more.
I don't have much more to say other than that I am excited to continue Russell's book. This notebook ended exactly as Book One of the History of Western Philosophy ended. That was nice. It will continue in notebook 5, page 1 with Book Two - "Catholic Philosophy".
Book 4 02/01/06 - 07/16/06
Chris Linehan
The History of Western Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
Chapter 30 - Plotinus
Plotinus (204-270 A.D.) founded Neoplatonism and was the last great philosopher of antiquity.
He lived during one of the most unstable periods of the Roman Empire. After he died the Empire was stabilized by the efforts of Diocletian and Constantine the Great.
He turned from the perpetual strife of the physical world and his philosophy was based on an other-worldly religious tone.
He believed in an eternal world of ideas as his heaven.
Christians adapted much of Plotinus' work into their theology.
Augustine believed that if Plotinus had lived later and changed a few words and phrases he would have been a Christian.
Dean Inge states that Aquinas "is nearer to Plotinus than to the real Aristotle" (Russell, 285).
Plotinus is pivotal to the influence of Middle Ages' Christianity and Catholic theology.
Russell's Caveat: Christianity has undergone many changes. It cannot be viewed as a homogenous system:
1) Synoptic Gospels are innocent of metaphysics.
2) American Christianity (modern) is akin to primitive Christianity.
Platonism is alien to modern American Christianity as American Christianity is much more concerned with life on earth and social progress. Platonic Christianity focuses on transcendental hope in a hopeless everyday world. It is not a dogmatic change, but a shift in emphasis. Without understanding this change, no one will understand the Christianity of the past.
In addition to his historical importance, Plotinus is the best representative of an important type of theory. A philosophical system can be judged on various criteria:
1) The first and most obvious is its truth
2) Beauty
3) Well expressed as how men will act in certain situations
Plotinus was a 'melancholy optimist'.
Plotinus is the best representation of a metaphysical theory born out of a resolve in the face of horrible physical circumstances.
"Among the men who have been unhappy in a mundane sense, but resolutely determined to find a higher happiness in the world of theory, Plotinus holds a very high place" (Russell, 286).
Plotinus clarified Plato's teachings. His arguments against materialism are good and his theory of the relation of soul and body is clearer than Plato or Aristotle.
His moral purity is impressive (like Spinoza's).
He explains things as clearly, consistently and simply as he can.
"Whatever one may think of him as a theoretical philosopher, it is impossible not to love him as a man" (Russell, 286).
Linehan - I hope that one day I will be thought of in a similar manner. Above all philosophy, humanity is by far more important. Theory cannot substitute for a man or woman.
Plotinus' life is known through the writings of Porphyry (a semite whose real name is Malchus).
He discovered patio-temporal appearance as being important.
Plotinus was born in Egypt, studied in Alexandria and studied under Ammonius Saccos (considered to be a founder of Neoplatonism).
He didn't write until he was 49, but then wrote voluminously. Porphyry edited his works. Porphyry was more Pythagorean than Plotinus and thus Neoplatonism became more supernatural than it would have if Plotinus' ideas had not been edited.
Plotinus treated the ancient philosophers with reverence, except for the atomists. He condemns the Stoics for their materialism and the Epicureans for every part of their philosophy. The influence of Parmenides is felt at a number of points.
The Plato in Plotinus' works is much better behaved then the Plato of real life.
The metaphysical of Plotinus begins with a holy trinity:
1) The One (supreme)
2) Spirit *Nous (intermediate)
3) Soul (lowest)
Unlike Christianity's Holy Trinity, the three are not equals.
The One is transcendent of all things. it is indefinable. "In regard to the One there is more truth in silence than in any words whatever" (Russell, 288).
The Spirit is what Plotinus calls 'nous'. Nous is normally translated as mind, but it does not suit here because it lacks the spiritual, religious intention that it had in the Greek language. Nous is the image of the One. Men understand this (as best they can) when they strip the body and self-will from their minds and reflect on the Nous.
Man reflects on the nous by cutting away everything else. Then reflection on the nous we see the light that shines on it and that light is shone by and is the One. Thus reflection on the Nous is reflection on the One itself.
Plotinus often experience ecstasy as an out of body experience.
The soul is inferior to the nous. But the soul is the author of all living things. It made the whole visible world.
Plotinus rejected the Gnostic view that the world (sensible) was evil, instead believing that it was merely less good than the intellectual world.
He rejected the Gnostic view of all things being evil other than man's soul. His arguments were later adopted by the theologian Origen.
He believed in reincarnation for the sake of justice. For example, if you killed your mother you would come back as a woman and be killed by your son.
Sin had to be punished, but it was punished naturally.
If sin is purged in life, eventually the soul and nous would become one, but still two.
Plotinus rejected Aristotle's claim that the soul is the form of the body. He also rejected the Stoic view as the soul being material in nature.
The soul entered the physical realm because it wished to create (replicate) something it saw in the nous. Since they are replications they are not as perfect, but genuinely still good.
The soul lives in union with other souls in the nous, but when it severs itself to create bodies it runs into trouble because it is now in contact with something lower than itself, a body. The soul unwittingly becomes chained to the body.
The physical world is a copy of the eternal world and the best that it could be.
Like Christians, Plotinus has trouble with creation happening without demanding something was lacking in the Creator which caused him to create.
Plotinus believed sin to be a consequence of free will.
He champions free will and without invalidating astrology, set bounds for it.
Plotinus' subjectivism (reflection via introspection) helped to stall outward inspection and ended scientific advancement for centuries.
As I come to the end of another book I can truly state that my philosophical progress is apparent to myself. I say this without meaning to appear arrogant but it is obvious to me. I am starting to make connections I previously did not make. Critical thought and questions are coming more rapidly.
I feel more comprehension of material. I don't have to reread passages to understand them as often. I am really starting to form concrete theories and opinions in my mind. I am enjoying myself more and more.
I don't have much more to say other than that I am excited to continue Russell's book. This notebook ended exactly as Book One of the History of Western Philosophy ended. That was nice. It will continue in notebook 5, page 1 with Book Two - "Catholic Philosophy".
Book 4 02/01/06 - 07/16/06
Chris Linehan
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