(Originally Written December 27, 2007 in the Journal)
God give me the strength of mind to pursue this topic to its fullest. Grant me the wisdom needed in discovering your Truth. God give me the desire to seek you in every topic.
"Of the Standard of Taste"
By David Hume
(Continued)
There is a difference between sentiment and judgment.
All sentiments are right and true. Only one judgment is right and true.
A sentiment does not represent what exists in the object, only the feelings aroused in the sentiment holder.
Beauty does not exist in the object. "It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty".
To search out the real beauty is a fruitless activity. It is like seeking out the real sweet or the real bitter.
Common sense demands that there is no true beauty or no right taste; but, common sense also demands that people who prefer a finger painting to the Mona Lisa have wrong sentiments.
When something is pleasing but does not conform to the accepted rules of the medium it is pleasing in spite of its non-conformity, not because of it.
Homer pleased Athens and Rome. He pleased Paris and London in Hume's day. He pleases New York and D.C. today. Authority and prejudice may give temporary vogue to lesser, current authors, but they will diminish in time. Only great works are timeless.
[Thus, is beauty gauged on time?]
While there can be a variance of taste and sentiment, there must also be certain general principles of approbation or blame.
Beauty and deformity are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to sentiment. However, it must be admitted that certain qualities in objects are predisposed to arousing these sentiments.
The delicacy of taste is the ability to discern all of these qualities. Those who posses this trait are more qualified to have their taste made into a standard of taste. (i.e. Sancho's taste for wine in Don Quixote).
Practice is how one acquires this delicacy of taste.
"Every work of art has also a certain end or purpose for which it is to be deemed more or less perfect, as it is more or less fitted to attain this end".
The principles of taste in men are universal and nearly or entirely the same in all men. But, few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art or to establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty.
Key points:
1. Beauty exists in the mind of the observer, not in the object itself.
2. To seek Absolute Beauty is fruitless.
3. Taste is subjective because it is based on our sentiments. Only those who have been finely tuned to observing every part of what is beautiful are qualified to give sound judgment on works of art.
4. Those things that possess universal qualities that arouse the sentiment of beauty are timeless and culturally universal. Things that are merely agreeable in a given time and place are not necessarily beautiful.
5. "Every work of art has also a certain end or purpose". Art has a function. It relays a message. It can be judged as more perfect or less perfect on how effective it is in achieving its designed end.
1. Is this true?
2. If it is, who gives it the purpose?
Showing posts with label Hume. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hume. Show all posts
Thursday, December 27, 2007
Tuesday, December 25, 2007
Aesthetics - What is Beauty? What is Art?
(Originally Written on December 25, 2007 in the Journal)
Aesthetics - What is Beauty? What is Art?
Part I: What is Beauty?
Questions for consideration:
1) Is beauty subjective, objective, or a combination thereof?
2) What is taste?
Part II: Explore different mediums, define art (as a language?)
Research Topics
Immanuel Kant
David Hume
Ludwig Wittgenstein
John Dewey
Leo Tolstoy
Plato
Nelson Goodman
Arthur C. Danto
Martin Heidegger
Jerrold Levinson
Terry Eagleton
Michel Foucault
Friedrich Nietzsche
Aristotle
Edmund Burke
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Topics: mediums, perception of art, why create?
"Of the Standard of Taste"
By: David Hume
It is useful for us to seek a "standard of taste".
A standard of taste is "a rule by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled".
Aesthetics - What is Beauty? What is Art?
Part I: What is Beauty?
Questions for consideration:
1) Is beauty subjective, objective, or a combination thereof?
2) What is taste?
Part II: Explore different mediums, define art (as a language?)
Research Topics
Immanuel Kant
David Hume
Ludwig Wittgenstein
John Dewey
Leo Tolstoy
Plato
Nelson Goodman
Arthur C. Danto
Martin Heidegger
Jerrold Levinson
Terry Eagleton
Michel Foucault
Friedrich Nietzsche
Aristotle
Edmund Burke
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Topics: mediums, perception of art, why create?
"Of the Standard of Taste"
By: David Hume
It is useful for us to seek a "standard of taste".
A standard of taste is "a rule by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled".
Sunday, August 26, 2007
Beyond Good & Evil 248-256
(Originally written August 26, 2007 in Notebook 18)
Beyond Good & Evil
Friedrich Nietzsche
248
There are two types of genius:
1) That which wants to beget (man)
2) That which wants to give birth (woman)
These two types of peoples and genius search for one another looking to combine (as with man and woman) but, as with man and woman they often misunderstand one another.
249
"What is best in us we do not know - we cannot know" (Nietzsche 375).
250
Europe owes many things to the Jews, both good and bad.
Above all Europe owes the grand style of morality, infinite demands, infinite meanings; these we owe to the Jews and it is both the best and worst they have offered.
Nietzsche seeks to initiate a revolution process. He uses the Jews as a model on how to do so while disagreeing with the values they have set.
251
The Jews are the strongest and purest race in all of Europe. They prevail in hardships and change when they wish to.
The Jews have a faith that stands unembarrassed in the presence of modern ideas.
The Jews, if they wished, could take over all of Europe.
But rather than conquering the Jews wish only to be admitted and assimilated into a nation's culture.
The task which Nietzsche is serious about is the cultivation of a new caste that will rule Europe.
252
The English are unphilosophic as a race. Bacon is an attack on the philosophical spirit. Hobbes, Hume and Locke have amounted to a debasement of the value of philosophy.
His characteristic of an unphilosophical race is to cling to Christianity. The English need Christianity for its discipline, its power to moralize and its power to humanize.
The English person lacks a musical sense. The movements of their bodies and souls completely lack rhythm and dance.
253
There are truths that are recognized by mediocre minds at best.
The spirit of respectable, albeit mediocre, English minds like Darwin, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer is becoming fashionable in middle Europe.
These mediocre minds are necessary at times. For they are knowledgeable, but the higher man is a man who "can"
The disparity between 'know' and 'can' is great. In fact, a high mind must be able to do something starkly new and innovative. Their focus on new and can may demand that he not know as much.
254
The French are a semi-successful blending of the North and South cultures.
255
We must rise above the good and evil, and as the sun sets on the moral world it becomes hospitable and profound enough for fugitives.
256
"Europe wants to become one" (Nietzsche, 386).
Beyond Good & Evil
Friedrich Nietzsche
248
There are two types of genius:
1) That which wants to beget (man)
2) That which wants to give birth (woman)
These two types of peoples and genius search for one another looking to combine (as with man and woman) but, as with man and woman they often misunderstand one another.
249
"What is best in us we do not know - we cannot know" (Nietzsche 375).
250
Europe owes many things to the Jews, both good and bad.
Above all Europe owes the grand style of morality, infinite demands, infinite meanings; these we owe to the Jews and it is both the best and worst they have offered.
Nietzsche seeks to initiate a revolution process. He uses the Jews as a model on how to do so while disagreeing with the values they have set.
251
The Jews are the strongest and purest race in all of Europe. They prevail in hardships and change when they wish to.
The Jews have a faith that stands unembarrassed in the presence of modern ideas.
The Jews, if they wished, could take over all of Europe.
But rather than conquering the Jews wish only to be admitted and assimilated into a nation's culture.
The task which Nietzsche is serious about is the cultivation of a new caste that will rule Europe.
252
The English are unphilosophic as a race. Bacon is an attack on the philosophical spirit. Hobbes, Hume and Locke have amounted to a debasement of the value of philosophy.
His characteristic of an unphilosophical race is to cling to Christianity. The English need Christianity for its discipline, its power to moralize and its power to humanize.
The English person lacks a musical sense. The movements of their bodies and souls completely lack rhythm and dance.
253
There are truths that are recognized by mediocre minds at best.
The spirit of respectable, albeit mediocre, English minds like Darwin, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer is becoming fashionable in middle Europe.
These mediocre minds are necessary at times. For they are knowledgeable, but the higher man is a man who "can"
The disparity between 'know' and 'can' is great. In fact, a high mind must be able to do something starkly new and innovative. Their focus on new and can may demand that he not know as much.
254
The French are a semi-successful blending of the North and South cultures.
255
We must rise above the good and evil, and as the sun sets on the moral world it becomes hospitable and profound enough for fugitives.
256
"Europe wants to become one" (Nietzsche, 386).
Thursday, May 3, 2007
Double Effect
(Originally written May 3, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
God is pure actuality. There are no privations in his actions. An action is good or bad based on the four causes of actions. All four causes contributes to status of an action.
Actions
Object - formal cause
Circumstances - Material Cause
Purpose/Goal - Final Cause
Intention - Efficient Cause
Intention is a mental act. Purpose is a physical outcome.
The Double Effect Theory
Double Effect:
- not the ends justify themes
- not evil subsequent to the good
It is unavoidable second effect stemming from the same cause
Key note: Cause and Effect are not separate instances. They are one event.
Causality is normally defined as "event a causes event b".
Hume criticizes causality because you never see the causation. This is true, but meaningless.
Causation is rightly defined as an actualization of a potential.
Double effect is two effects at the same time.
The crucial difference between double effect and consequentialist theories is that Aquinas holds that one should never do evil to bring what good whereas consequentialist theories come only to bring about good consequences regardless of the action.
Question: Why does God permit evil in the world?
Answer: Double Effect
God -> Creation -> The Best
(Double Effect) Evil
This theory does not put evil in a positive light. It keeps evil as bad, not a disguised good.
Class Notes
God is pure actuality. There are no privations in his actions. An action is good or bad based on the four causes of actions. All four causes contributes to status of an action.
Actions
Object - formal cause
Circumstances - Material Cause
Purpose/Goal - Final Cause
Intention - Efficient Cause
Intention is a mental act. Purpose is a physical outcome.
The Double Effect Theory
Double Effect:
- not the ends justify themes
- not evil subsequent to the good
It is unavoidable second effect stemming from the same cause
Key note: Cause and Effect are not separate instances. They are one event.
Causality is normally defined as "event a causes event b".
Hume criticizes causality because you never see the causation. This is true, but meaningless.
Causation is rightly defined as an actualization of a potential.
Double effect is two effects at the same time.
The crucial difference between double effect and consequentialist theories is that Aquinas holds that one should never do evil to bring what good whereas consequentialist theories come only to bring about good consequences regardless of the action.
Question: Why does God permit evil in the world?
Answer: Double Effect
God -> Creation -> The Best
(Double Effect) Evil
This theory does not put evil in a positive light. It keeps evil as bad, not a disguised good.
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Salvation in Christianity
(Originally written April 22, 2007 in Book 15)
A Tapestry of Faiths
Win Corduan
Is Christianity alone true?
By asking if a religion is true we ask if it is as a whole true, not if it contains some truth.
Pluralism asserts that all truth claims made by all religions are equal.
Hick claims that those Christians who maintain exclusivist theologies must revise their thinking.
Hick's pluralism is however, completely wrongheaded. No religion teaches that it is one way of relating to the Real.
Most, if not all, religions make exclusive claims. This is another point where Hick's theory does not accurately describe religions.
Hick's theory is either false or arbitrary if it is based on data from religion it is obviously false. If it is not then it is simply arbitrary.
Hick also demands that religions, especially Christianity, rewrite themselves to fit his theory. This is absurd.
Rather than an aggressive form of pluralism like Hick's, William P. Alston postulates a more subtle form:
1) Christians basing their beliefs on their mystical experience of God are justified in holding there beliefs.
2) Adherents of different religions basing their beliefs on their mystical experience are justified in holding their beliefs.
3) There is no way of adjudicating between different belief systems.
4) All persons are entitled to their beliefs since their system is coherent and productive.
Alston's theory hinges on mystical experience alone. He ignores any other type of evidence.
There are two component in accepting a belief system as true:
1) Accepting the beliefs as true
2) Justification of the belief system
Some ways of justifying religious beliefs:
1) They are self-evident
2) based on experience
3) superiority of teaching, etc., etc.
Christians can find confirmation for the beliefs in:
1) General revelation and natural theology
2) Fundamental rationality of Christian beliefs (Plantinga's "warrant" or "proper function")
3) Historical and archeological evidence
4) Inner witness of the Holy Spirit
5) Experience of when God manifested himself
Mainly, Christians have grounds for their beliefs that correspond to reality.
Christianity as a belief system based on the New Testament must be either false or exclusively true.
To deny pluralism one must show that it is rational to believe that Christianity is exclusively true.
Establishing Grounds for Answers
The problem of evil has been posed as a loving God is incompatible with the circumstances of this world since the time of Hume. But, Marilyn McCord Adams made the excellent point that: "It does the atheologian no good to argue for the falsity of Christianity on the ground that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, pleasure-maximizer is incompatible with a world such as ours, because Christians never believed that God was a pleasure-maximizer anyway" (Corduan, 156).
Christian theology must be firmly rooted and wholly based in Biblical revelation. One cannot abstract a specific principle and build from there (a common mistake).
Who is Definitely Saved?
In Old Testament theology those who are the people of God are saved by faith in God. These include the chosen people, converts to the chosen people (i.e. Ruth) and those who helped form the chosen people.
New Testament theology demands personal knowledge of the gospel as a prerequisite to salvation: How can we accept what he does not know?
In addition to knowing the Gospel, one must accept it as true and place trust in the atoning work of Christ.
The New Testament stress the need for missionary work.
The notion of implicit faith in Christ as a way of salvation is oxymoronic. Implicit faith makes as much sense as unfelt pain or inaudible speech.
However, all of these seemingly incoherent expressions are made coherent by mediation. Inaudible speech is made coherent by the usage of sign language. Sign language mediates the speech.
The sacrificial cultus of pre-Christ Jews was the meditation for implicit faith.
Who is Perhaps Saved Before Christ?
In the Old Testament the people of Israel are those who were saved. In the New Testament explicit faith in Christ and his atonement is the criterion for salvation.
To expand either of these criterions require that it is Biblically revealed, not what is merely fair or consistent.
Idolatry, under no circumstances can serve as the mediator in implicit faith. Thus, idolators are not saved.
C.S. Lewis claims that prayers made to false gods in earnest are heard by the true God. But, Lewis cannot substantiate this theory with Biblical evidence.
One argument for idolatry as a mediating device for implicit faith is the relationship of Abram and Melchizedek.
Melchizedek was the priest of El Elyon (God Most Hight) and Abram paid him a tithe for his blessing.
Clark Pinnock makes the claim that El Elyon and YHWH are equivalent. Corduan contends that rather than being equivalent deities, El Elyon and YHWH are identical, two names for the same deity.
This argument (Cordon's) makes sense because Hebrews 7's treatment of Melchizedek as the forerunner of Christ. If Melchizedek were some pagan priest, Hebrews 7 would make no sense.
Melchizedek and others (like Jethro, Moses' father-in-law) are saved by their implicit faith in Christ as mediated by their explicit faith in the God of original monotheism who is identical to the God of Old Testament Israel.
Who is perhaps saved after Christ?
The Jews were no longer saved by being a member of the chosen people because they rejected Christ. Thus, even if Gentiles were worshippers of the original monotheistic God and equivalent to Jews they are no longer saved.
In the New Testament men who worshipped the God of original monotheism were granted the opportunity to have explicit faith in Christ:
1) The Ethiopian Eunuch (Acts 8:26-40)
2) Cornelius, the Roman Centurion (Acts 10)
3) The "God-fearing Greeks" (Acts 17:4)
4) Apollos (Acts 18:24-28)
5) The disciples of John the Baptist (Acts 19:1-6)
"Natural revelation does not save, but it provides the opportunity for the saving message to be sent to those who respond to it" (Corduan, 168).
Thomas Aquinas believed in this, "God will send the message" theory. Robertson McQuilken and Oliver Buswell also advocate this position.
Epistemologically - Is Christianity alone true?
Metaphysically: Do the effects of Christ's atonement extend only to those who believe in Him?
Yes! But, there is a small amount of room for implicit faith in pre-Christ times.
Ethically: Is a human being required to express faith in Christ in order to be eligible for salvation? Yes.
Subjectively: Is an implicit faith in Christ expressed in actions as valid as an explicit faith? Yes, only in pre-Christ times.
Theologically: Does God's saving love extend to those who do not know of Christ? Yes, but only within the further plan of God.
Socially: Are those who never heard of the gospel without hope of salvation? Yes, but God reaches out in the New Testament to those without limited with natural revelation and why would he stop this practice?
A Tapestry of Faiths
Win Corduan
Is Christianity alone true?
By asking if a religion is true we ask if it is as a whole true, not if it contains some truth.
Pluralism asserts that all truth claims made by all religions are equal.
Hick claims that those Christians who maintain exclusivist theologies must revise their thinking.
Hick's pluralism is however, completely wrongheaded. No religion teaches that it is one way of relating to the Real.
Most, if not all, religions make exclusive claims. This is another point where Hick's theory does not accurately describe religions.
Hick's theory is either false or arbitrary if it is based on data from religion it is obviously false. If it is not then it is simply arbitrary.
Hick also demands that religions, especially Christianity, rewrite themselves to fit his theory. This is absurd.
Rather than an aggressive form of pluralism like Hick's, William P. Alston postulates a more subtle form:
1) Christians basing their beliefs on their mystical experience of God are justified in holding there beliefs.
2) Adherents of different religions basing their beliefs on their mystical experience are justified in holding their beliefs.
3) There is no way of adjudicating between different belief systems.
4) All persons are entitled to their beliefs since their system is coherent and productive.
Alston's theory hinges on mystical experience alone. He ignores any other type of evidence.
There are two component in accepting a belief system as true:
1) Accepting the beliefs as true
2) Justification of the belief system
Some ways of justifying religious beliefs:
1) They are self-evident
2) based on experience
3) superiority of teaching, etc., etc.
Christians can find confirmation for the beliefs in:
1) General revelation and natural theology
2) Fundamental rationality of Christian beliefs (Plantinga's "warrant" or "proper function")
3) Historical and archeological evidence
4) Inner witness of the Holy Spirit
5) Experience of when God manifested himself
Mainly, Christians have grounds for their beliefs that correspond to reality.
Christianity as a belief system based on the New Testament must be either false or exclusively true.
To deny pluralism one must show that it is rational to believe that Christianity is exclusively true.
Establishing Grounds for Answers
The problem of evil has been posed as a loving God is incompatible with the circumstances of this world since the time of Hume. But, Marilyn McCord Adams made the excellent point that: "It does the atheologian no good to argue for the falsity of Christianity on the ground that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, pleasure-maximizer is incompatible with a world such as ours, because Christians never believed that God was a pleasure-maximizer anyway" (Corduan, 156).
Christian theology must be firmly rooted and wholly based in Biblical revelation. One cannot abstract a specific principle and build from there (a common mistake).
Who is Definitely Saved?
In Old Testament theology those who are the people of God are saved by faith in God. These include the chosen people, converts to the chosen people (i.e. Ruth) and those who helped form the chosen people.
New Testament theology demands personal knowledge of the gospel as a prerequisite to salvation: How can we accept what he does not know?
In addition to knowing the Gospel, one must accept it as true and place trust in the atoning work of Christ.
The New Testament stress the need for missionary work.
The notion of implicit faith in Christ as a way of salvation is oxymoronic. Implicit faith makes as much sense as unfelt pain or inaudible speech.
However, all of these seemingly incoherent expressions are made coherent by mediation. Inaudible speech is made coherent by the usage of sign language. Sign language mediates the speech.
The sacrificial cultus of pre-Christ Jews was the meditation for implicit faith.
Who is Perhaps Saved Before Christ?
In the Old Testament the people of Israel are those who were saved. In the New Testament explicit faith in Christ and his atonement is the criterion for salvation.
To expand either of these criterions require that it is Biblically revealed, not what is merely fair or consistent.
Idolatry, under no circumstances can serve as the mediator in implicit faith. Thus, idolators are not saved.
C.S. Lewis claims that prayers made to false gods in earnest are heard by the true God. But, Lewis cannot substantiate this theory with Biblical evidence.
One argument for idolatry as a mediating device for implicit faith is the relationship of Abram and Melchizedek.
Melchizedek was the priest of El Elyon (God Most Hight) and Abram paid him a tithe for his blessing.
Clark Pinnock makes the claim that El Elyon and YHWH are equivalent. Corduan contends that rather than being equivalent deities, El Elyon and YHWH are identical, two names for the same deity.
This argument (Cordon's) makes sense because Hebrews 7's treatment of Melchizedek as the forerunner of Christ. If Melchizedek were some pagan priest, Hebrews 7 would make no sense.
Melchizedek and others (like Jethro, Moses' father-in-law) are saved by their implicit faith in Christ as mediated by their explicit faith in the God of original monotheism who is identical to the God of Old Testament Israel.
Who is perhaps saved after Christ?
The Jews were no longer saved by being a member of the chosen people because they rejected Christ. Thus, even if Gentiles were worshippers of the original monotheistic God and equivalent to Jews they are no longer saved.
In the New Testament men who worshipped the God of original monotheism were granted the opportunity to have explicit faith in Christ:
1) The Ethiopian Eunuch (Acts 8:26-40)
2) Cornelius, the Roman Centurion (Acts 10)
3) The "God-fearing Greeks" (Acts 17:4)
4) Apollos (Acts 18:24-28)
5) The disciples of John the Baptist (Acts 19:1-6)
"Natural revelation does not save, but it provides the opportunity for the saving message to be sent to those who respond to it" (Corduan, 168).
Thomas Aquinas believed in this, "God will send the message" theory. Robertson McQuilken and Oliver Buswell also advocate this position.
Epistemologically - Is Christianity alone true?
Metaphysically: Do the effects of Christ's atonement extend only to those who believe in Him?
Yes! But, there is a small amount of room for implicit faith in pre-Christ times.
Ethically: Is a human being required to express faith in Christ in order to be eligible for salvation? Yes.
Subjectively: Is an implicit faith in Christ expressed in actions as valid as an explicit faith? Yes, only in pre-Christ times.
Theologically: Does God's saving love extend to those who do not know of Christ? Yes, but only within the further plan of God.
Socially: Are those who never heard of the gospel without hope of salvation? Yes, but God reaches out in the New Testament to those without limited with natural revelation and why would he stop this practice?
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Religious language: Hume and Logical Positivists
(Originally written April 10, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
Problem of religious language
Equivocal - a term means separate things
Univocal - a term means the same thing
Problems with equivocal language is that if it means something other than what we are familiar with than we are speaking meaninglessly.
Problem with univocal language is that how can a finite term be applied to an infinite concept of God?
David Hume
How do words get their meaning?
- Sensory impression
How do I know the meaning of the word "house"? I have seen a house.
How do I know the meaning of the word "blue"? I have seen blue things.
The sensory impression gives meaning to the word describing it
Hume's Fork:
Metaphysics: any term that can not be grounded in experience is utterly meaningless and nonsense. Consign it to the flames.
In order for a word to be meaningful it must be based on an antecedent sensory impression. The problem with this thesis of Hume's is there isn't a single word in this thesis that is based on an antecedent sensory impression.
Vienna Circle
Moritz Schlick (leader): in order for philosophy to make progress it must model itself after the natural sciences and become empirically verifiable.
- Rudolf Carnap, Karl Popper, Kurt Gödel
The Vienna Circle created the philosophy of logical positivism by expanding Humean notions.
Instead of focusing on words/terms they focused on propositions.
A proposition is meaningful if it meets the principle of verifiability.
Principle of verifiability - a sentence is meaningful if they are a) not analytic and b) in principle verifiable.
Under logical positivism metaphysics was rendered (by them) as meaningless and nonsense.
Ethical language is also nonsense. It is purely emotive.
Religions or theological concepts are also nonsense.
In a sense the logical positivists are atheistic, but the atheist would deny God's existence and the logical positivist would state that any denial of the existence of God is as meaningless as any affirmation of God.
The problem with logical positivism is that its basis (the verifiability principle) is not verifiable on its own grounds.
A. J. Ayer claimed that the principle and thought structures are meaningful despite not meeting their criteria.
Strong verifiability principle: a statement is meaningful if it is derived from an observation statement.
Observation -> Proposition
Weak Verification principle: an observation statement can be inferred from a statement
Proposition -> inference -> observation
Class Notes
Problem of religious language
Equivocal - a term means separate things
Univocal - a term means the same thing
Problems with equivocal language is that if it means something other than what we are familiar with than we are speaking meaninglessly.
Problem with univocal language is that how can a finite term be applied to an infinite concept of God?
David Hume
How do words get their meaning?
- Sensory impression
How do I know the meaning of the word "house"? I have seen a house.
How do I know the meaning of the word "blue"? I have seen blue things.
The sensory impression gives meaning to the word describing it
Hume's Fork:
Metaphysics: any term that can not be grounded in experience is utterly meaningless and nonsense. Consign it to the flames.
In order for a word to be meaningful it must be based on an antecedent sensory impression. The problem with this thesis of Hume's is there isn't a single word in this thesis that is based on an antecedent sensory impression.
Vienna Circle
Moritz Schlick (leader): in order for philosophy to make progress it must model itself after the natural sciences and become empirically verifiable.
- Rudolf Carnap, Karl Popper, Kurt Gödel
The Vienna Circle created the philosophy of logical positivism by expanding Humean notions.
Instead of focusing on words/terms they focused on propositions.
A proposition is meaningful if it meets the principle of verifiability.
Principle of verifiability - a sentence is meaningful if they are a) not analytic and b) in principle verifiable.
Under logical positivism metaphysics was rendered (by them) as meaningless and nonsense.
Ethical language is also nonsense. It is purely emotive.
Religions or theological concepts are also nonsense.
In a sense the logical positivists are atheistic, but the atheist would deny God's existence and the logical positivist would state that any denial of the existence of God is as meaningless as any affirmation of God.
The problem with logical positivism is that its basis (the verifiability principle) is not verifiable on its own grounds.
A. J. Ayer claimed that the principle and thought structures are meaningful despite not meeting their criteria.
Strong verifiability principle: a statement is meaningful if it is derived from an observation statement.
Observation -> Proposition
Weak Verification principle: an observation statement can be inferred from a statement
Proposition -> inference -> observation
Monday, March 26, 2007
Class notes on God as a causal agent
(Originally written March 26, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
Objections to God as a direct causal agent
1. Laws of nature cannot be violated; miracles are a violation
2. If miracles can occur, God would be changeable
3. Miracles are correctives to our understanding of the laws of nature, not violations of the laws
4. Miracles are not rationally believed in
5. Providence violates the the simplicity of God
6. God is eternal, how can an infinite God contain a finite attribute?
7. If God has to intervene in what he created to fix it it implies a defect in his creation
8. Miracles can be explained by natural occurrences; we just don't understand them
9. Miracles are always a result of natural causes
10. How can a non-physical being directly cause a physical change
11. If God is directly intervening in the world, and there is evil in the world, then God is not good.
12. Anomalies in nature do not prove direct intervention
13. Miracles intervene in human freedom
14. Every actualization of a potential through an immediate contingent cause; therefore, a remote cause is not necessary
15. If God governed directly it would destroy the perfection of the causal order
16. If God is outside of time but his causal action would have to be inside of time
Divine Providence and Miracles
Is God a direct causal agent in the world?
Views of God's interaction:
Classical theology
Deist
Neo-Thomism (primary cause working through secondary causes)
Kenotic God (limiting his power willingly)
Existential theology
Linguistic theology
Process theology
Neo-Thomism and Divine Providence
God as an end for everything
Action <- Man <- God
Miracles
- an effect in the physical world that surpasses all known human powers and beyond natural powers
Objection to miracles
- Principle of uniformity
Spinoza:
1. Miracles are a violation of natural laws
2. Natural laws are immutable
3. It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated
4. Therefore, miracles are impossible
Hume, Kant and Flew all argued agains miracles based on the principle of uniformity
God can't do anything against nature
Evidence for miracles is scarce and unpredictable by nature
God cannot violate the law of nature because the law of nature stems from God. So any violation of the law of nature is a violation of God's personal nature.
What is a secondary cause?
Could quantum mechanics explain God's intervening in human/natural affairs?
God effects the secondary cause (quantum mechanics) in effecting the probability at the molecular level.
Problems with this is that new technology is discovered accounting for previously unexplainable events.
Antony Flew
Science:
- Laws from observation
- Limited to this method by definition
Unexplained events are either miracles (outside of science) or anomaly (inside of science)
No unexplained event can ever be considered a miracle. At worst it is a not yet explained anomaly.
Are miracles possible?
Are miracles knowable?
Are miracles recognizable?
Hume critiqued miracles on the basis of whether they are knowable. Flew critiqued miracles on rather they are recognizable.
Superseding Miracles - where the laws of nature are superseded, direct action by God
Constellation Miracle - no law of nature is violated, but many circumstances come together in such away that they could have occurred by accident is less probable than it occurring by divine intervention
Reasonable presumption - reasonableness of a presumption
Worldview
If you do not have a worldview favorable to theism then you will not be convinced of miracles existing.
Circumstances, reasonable presumption and whether or not divine agency is the best explanation for the event all play a part in regarding something as a miracle.
Class Notes
Objections to God as a direct causal agent
1. Laws of nature cannot be violated; miracles are a violation
2. If miracles can occur, God would be changeable
3. Miracles are correctives to our understanding of the laws of nature, not violations of the laws
4. Miracles are not rationally believed in
5. Providence violates the the simplicity of God
6. God is eternal, how can an infinite God contain a finite attribute?
7. If God has to intervene in what he created to fix it it implies a defect in his creation
8. Miracles can be explained by natural occurrences; we just don't understand them
9. Miracles are always a result of natural causes
10. How can a non-physical being directly cause a physical change
11. If God is directly intervening in the world, and there is evil in the world, then God is not good.
12. Anomalies in nature do not prove direct intervention
13. Miracles intervene in human freedom
14. Every actualization of a potential through an immediate contingent cause; therefore, a remote cause is not necessary
15. If God governed directly it would destroy the perfection of the causal order
16. If God is outside of time but his causal action would have to be inside of time
Divine Providence and Miracles
Is God a direct causal agent in the world?
Views of God's interaction:
Classical theology
Deist
Neo-Thomism (primary cause working through secondary causes)
Kenotic God (limiting his power willingly)
Existential theology
Linguistic theology
Process theology
Neo-Thomism and Divine Providence
God as an end for everything
Action <- Man <- God
Miracles
- an effect in the physical world that surpasses all known human powers and beyond natural powers
Objection to miracles
- Principle of uniformity
Spinoza:
1. Miracles are a violation of natural laws
2. Natural laws are immutable
3. It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated
4. Therefore, miracles are impossible
Hume, Kant and Flew all argued agains miracles based on the principle of uniformity
God can't do anything against nature
Evidence for miracles is scarce and unpredictable by nature
God cannot violate the law of nature because the law of nature stems from God. So any violation of the law of nature is a violation of God's personal nature.
What is a secondary cause?
Could quantum mechanics explain God's intervening in human/natural affairs?
God effects the secondary cause (quantum mechanics) in effecting the probability at the molecular level.
Problems with this is that new technology is discovered accounting for previously unexplainable events.
Antony Flew
Science:
- Laws from observation
- Limited to this method by definition
Unexplained events are either miracles (outside of science) or anomaly (inside of science)
No unexplained event can ever be considered a miracle. At worst it is a not yet explained anomaly.
Are miracles possible?
Are miracles knowable?
Are miracles recognizable?
Hume critiqued miracles on the basis of whether they are knowable. Flew critiqued miracles on rather they are recognizable.
Superseding Miracles - where the laws of nature are superseded, direct action by God
Constellation Miracle - no law of nature is violated, but many circumstances come together in such away that they could have occurred by accident is less probable than it occurring by divine intervention
Reasonable presumption - reasonableness of a presumption
Worldview
If you do not have a worldview favorable to theism then you will not be convinced of miracles existing.
Circumstances, reasonable presumption and whether or not divine agency is the best explanation for the event all play a part in regarding something as a miracle.
Monday, March 19, 2007
Allegorical & Contemporary Language Problems
(Originally written March 19, 2007 in Book 13)
Analogical Predication: The Only Alternative
If terms cannot be applied to God in a univocal or an equivocal sense, they must be applied analogically.
The analogical way of speaking about God helps to solve Parmenides' paradox because being is not taken as univocal. Being is analogical and thus things essentially differ in being.
Being cannot be univocal because it would mean that everything that hath being would be one. Being cannot be equivocal because whatever hath being hath being and what else cannot hath being or they are one. Therefore, Being must analogical.
God does not have properties at all. "God is the perfections that his creatures only have by causal participation" (263).
Univocal Concepts but Analogical Predication
Scotus was correct that any concept applied to men and God must be univocally understood. Aquinas was correct in stating that concepts must be analogically affirmed of God.
The attribute of man and God are same but the application of that attribute differs in God and man.
Whatever concept is understood of God must be understood univocally, but must be predicated (attributed to) of God must be predicated analogically.
Finite Concepts and Finite Predications
Aquinas held God is one in reality, but many things logically.
We cannot know the substance of God, but we can predicate many things about God substantively.
While there is an infinite difference in perfection between Creator and creatures, there is not a total dissimilarity. Thus, concepts are univocally understood.
A creature must bear some similarity to its creator.
The Causal Basis for Analogy Between God and Creatures
Analogy is based on intrinsic causality.
Analogy is based on efficient causality.
Analogy is based on essential causality. God is the cause of the very being of the world, not only its beginning.
Analogy is not based on material causality. God is the cause of the existence of matter, but he is not material. God is the cause of all perfections in the world, but not the imperfection resulting from the limiting conditions of a material world.
Analogy is based on principal, not instrumental causality.
God is the principal, intrinsic, essential and efficient cause of the being and perfection of the world.
Objections and Responses
1) Why select some, but not all qualities drawn from the world and apply them to God?
- Only some things flow from God's efficient, principal, essential and intrinsic causality.
2) Words are divorced from their finite mode or conditions are devoid of meaning.
- The univocal concept of the words remains the same while the way in which they are predicated charges.
-Terms applied to God are not made meaningless only extended without limitations
3) Analogy rests on the assumption that causality provides without limitations.
-If something is caused it must be caused by something. God cannot give what he does not have. Thus if God does not have existence He cannot give existence.
4) Any analogous predication of God as a "First cause" involves an infinite regress of meaning to identify the univocal element.
-The only way to predicate something of a finite being and an infinite being must be analogous because if it is univocal it predicates it equivocally. An infinite being cannot have the same mode as a finite being. It must be predicated analogously.
5) Even assuming the metaphysical assumption that there is a similarity among beings, that ontology is not univocally expressible.
-This is not a mere theistic. It is the only alternative to monism.
6) Since Wittgenstein the distinction between equivocal and univocal is obsolete, and thus, the notion of analogy is obsolete.
7) A general theory of analogy does not work.
This is not an analogical theory, but rather a metaphysical scheme in which language fits. This metaphysical scheme is rooted in reality and thus, the language is so rooted.
13. Model Religious Language
The Background of the Contemporary Language Problem
Hume is the source of the contemporary problems of religious language.
Hume: Two kinds of propositions
There are only two kinds of meaningful statements:
1. Statements expressing elation of ideas
- true by definition
- not informative about the real world
2. Statements about matters of fact
Kant called he former analytic and the latter synthetic.
Wittgenstein: Linguistic Silence
Wittgenstein held that what was mystical (religious experience) cannot be expressed in words.
He held that we are to eliminate religious language, not religious experience.
Ayer: Religious Language and Verification
In Language, Truth and Logic A. J. Ayer attempted to eliminate all metaphysics and theology.
He held that no statement can be meaningful unless it is tautological or empirically verifiable.
But Ayer's principle of verifiability is neither tautological nor verifiable and thus, meaningless on his grounds.
Ayer was neither atheistic nor agnostic. He was non-cognitivistic. He held that no cognitively meaningful statement can be made about a transcendent reality.
2/15/07 - 3/19/07
Analogical Predication: The Only Alternative
If terms cannot be applied to God in a univocal or an equivocal sense, they must be applied analogically.
The analogical way of speaking about God helps to solve Parmenides' paradox because being is not taken as univocal. Being is analogical and thus things essentially differ in being.
Being cannot be univocal because it would mean that everything that hath being would be one. Being cannot be equivocal because whatever hath being hath being and what else cannot hath being or they are one. Therefore, Being must analogical.
God does not have properties at all. "God is the perfections that his creatures only have by causal participation" (263).
Univocal Concepts but Analogical Predication
Scotus was correct that any concept applied to men and God must be univocally understood. Aquinas was correct in stating that concepts must be analogically affirmed of God.
The attribute of man and God are same but the application of that attribute differs in God and man.
Whatever concept is understood of God must be understood univocally, but must be predicated (attributed to) of God must be predicated analogically.
Finite Concepts and Finite Predications
Aquinas held God is one in reality, but many things logically.
We cannot know the substance of God, but we can predicate many things about God substantively.
While there is an infinite difference in perfection between Creator and creatures, there is not a total dissimilarity. Thus, concepts are univocally understood.
A creature must bear some similarity to its creator.
The Causal Basis for Analogy Between God and Creatures
Analogy is based on intrinsic causality.
Analogy is based on efficient causality.
Analogy is based on essential causality. God is the cause of the very being of the world, not only its beginning.
Analogy is not based on material causality. God is the cause of the existence of matter, but he is not material. God is the cause of all perfections in the world, but not the imperfection resulting from the limiting conditions of a material world.
Analogy is based on principal, not instrumental causality.
God is the principal, intrinsic, essential and efficient cause of the being and perfection of the world.
Objections and Responses
1) Why select some, but not all qualities drawn from the world and apply them to God?
- Only some things flow from God's efficient, principal, essential and intrinsic causality.
2) Words are divorced from their finite mode or conditions are devoid of meaning.
- The univocal concept of the words remains the same while the way in which they are predicated charges.
-Terms applied to God are not made meaningless only extended without limitations
3) Analogy rests on the assumption that causality provides without limitations.
-If something is caused it must be caused by something. God cannot give what he does not have. Thus if God does not have existence He cannot give existence.
4) Any analogous predication of God as a "First cause" involves an infinite regress of meaning to identify the univocal element.
-The only way to predicate something of a finite being and an infinite being must be analogous because if it is univocal it predicates it equivocally. An infinite being cannot have the same mode as a finite being. It must be predicated analogously.
5) Even assuming the metaphysical assumption that there is a similarity among beings, that ontology is not univocally expressible.
-This is not a mere theistic. It is the only alternative to monism.
6) Since Wittgenstein the distinction between equivocal and univocal is obsolete, and thus, the notion of analogy is obsolete.
7) A general theory of analogy does not work.
This is not an analogical theory, but rather a metaphysical scheme in which language fits. This metaphysical scheme is rooted in reality and thus, the language is so rooted.
13. Model Religious Language
The Background of the Contemporary Language Problem
Hume is the source of the contemporary problems of religious language.
Hume: Two kinds of propositions
There are only two kinds of meaningful statements:
1. Statements expressing elation of ideas
- true by definition
- not informative about the real world
2. Statements about matters of fact
Kant called he former analytic and the latter synthetic.
Wittgenstein: Linguistic Silence
Wittgenstein held that what was mystical (religious experience) cannot be expressed in words.
He held that we are to eliminate religious language, not religious experience.
Ayer: Religious Language and Verification
In Language, Truth and Logic A. J. Ayer attempted to eliminate all metaphysics and theology.
He held that no statement can be meaningful unless it is tautological or empirically verifiable.
But Ayer's principle of verifiability is neither tautological nor verifiable and thus, meaningless on his grounds.
Ayer was neither atheistic nor agnostic. He was non-cognitivistic. He held that no cognitively meaningful statement can be made about a transcendent reality.
2/15/07 - 3/19/07
Teleological, Analogical and Models in Religious Language
(Originally written March 19, 2007 in Book 25)
Class notes
The Teleological Argument
Transcendental Logic
Given a phenomena 'X'
What are the conditions that make X possible?
Unless there is Y, there cannot be X
Given the fact that all things act for an end
What are the conditions that make it possible for all things to act for an end?
Unless there were an intelligent being that directs all things to their end, ti would not be possible.
Aristotle's Four Questions and their answers
1) What is its purpose? Final Cause (Telos)
2) What is it made of? Material Cause
3) What is its shape (form)? Formal Cause
4) Who or what made it? Efficient Cause
Substance - the total thing with all of its attributes (Aristotelian, not Cartesian)
Paley's Argument from analogy
The watch did not grow there.
It did not just happen.
Because of its complexity and purposiveness we know that it was made by a human being.
The very properties that lead us to infer that the watch was made by a watchmaker lead us to infer the universe was made by a universe-maker.
Inductive Analogy
Set A consists of member {a, b, c, d, e...}
All these members share property X
"F" is also a member of set A
Therefore, F probably has property X
In the General sample you want a "high negative analogy"
But when the General sample is extended to one particular thing you want a "high positive analogy".
The teleological argument of Paley depends on the universe being as much like a clock as possible.
Criticism of Paley's Argument
Hume:
-Even if the analogy holds, it doesn't prove the existence of God
- Even if there is a strong analogy between the watch and the universe we have not ruled out the possibility that it could have come about by chance
Post-Humean Versions
- tend to become disjunctions rather than analogy
- which is the better explanation: the universe came by chance or by purpose?
Stuart Hackett
Teleological argument from the "Macroscopic point of view"
From a conspicuous adaptation to an intelligent creator
examples:
1) The fitness of the inorganic material world to be an environment for both the production and maintenance of organic life. Chance is not a sufficient explanation because chance is tied to the consistent make-up of the inorganic material.
2) The internal adaptedness of organic beings, both in their structure of specialized functions and in their general orientation for self-maintenance or subservience to some other form of organic life. Chance is ruled out as a proximate cause. Chance would postal minute, non-advantageous changes.
3) The intelligibility of the world and its instrumentality in the realization of humanly provisioned ends. Chance ruled out because minds are not the logical outcome of our evolutionary process. Minds are so transcendent that they cannot have arisen from matter.
4) The temporal progressiveness of the cosmic progress through levels of matter, life and mind, in an order of increasing valuation significance.
Anthropic Principle
What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the condition necessary for our presence as observers. (Weak Version)
The universe would have had to passed some very tiny probabilities of window in order to be observed. (Strong version)
Generation of Carbon Post- Big Bang
- Needs to combine three helium nuclei
- May not exceed three helium nuclei
- If it becomes four it becomes oxygen and then "boom", nothing is left
The universe seems to have moved in a deliberate direction. Therefore, it seems more plausible that the universe arose from a creator and not from chance.
Ramsey: Qualified Disclosure Models
Ramsey built his religious language out of an empirical setting and tests it by its empirical adequacy.
Disclosure-Commitment Situations
There are two aspects to the kind of experiences that are religious in nature:
1) An empirical situation that evokes discernment
2) A total commitment to what is discerned
The empirical situations that evoke discernment are the experiential grounding for the meaning of religious language.
Discernment situations:
Ramsey holds that metaphors and odd words have the disclosure poor to make the "ice break" or the "light down".
The literary and logical oddity of "I-Religion" or tautologies like "I am I", "Duty for duty's sake" or "love for love's sake" do not render them meaningless.
To Ramsey there is more in empirical language and situations than meets the eye.
Commitment Situations:
Not every disclosure situation provides religious disclosure.
Religious disclosure evokes a total commitment.
Total commitment is a total commitment to the whole universe, not a total commitment to a part of the universe or a partial commitment to the whole universe.
Ramsey holds religious experience to be one in which one responds to a discernment situation with a total commitment.
Religious Language: Qualified Models
Since religious experience in and of itself is odd, religious language will in turn be odd.
The Meaning and Use of Models
A disclosure model does not seek to describe anything. It enables us to articulate what we once could not express.
Language about God is not declarative; it is evocative.
The Qualification of Models
Ramsey calls qualifiers "words which multiply models without end and with subtle changes" (279).
Models and qualifiers create what Wittgenstien calls family resemblances.
Ramsey develops three groups of qualified models:
1) The negative attributes of God - i.e. God is immutable
2) One word positive attributes of God - i.e. perfection
3) Two-word positive attributes of God - i.e. first cause or infinitely good
Ramsey holds the term "God" to be an integrative term, bringing together the separate discernment-commitment disclosures into a unified whole.
The term "God" functions like the term "I" in everyday language.
The Adequacy of Models: Empirical Fit
Models help to articulate theology in a reliable way when:
1) They arise in a moment of insight or disclosure
2) It empirically fits, it is able to incorporate diverse phenomena consistently
Evaluation of Ramsey's View
Ramsey's master model of God, a combination of many individual models, answers the problem of empirically grounded God-talk.
Without an analogy built on the ontological similarity of Creator and creature, God-talk is purely equivocal.
Only metaphysical analogy can save qualified models from equivocation.
Ferré Metaphysical Models
Ferré builds a metaphysical synthesis based on the religious model, which is subject to truth tests.
The Nature and Function of Models
To Ferré, a model y is that "which provides epistemological vividness or immediacy to a theory by offering as an interpretation of the abstract or unfamiliar theory-structure that both fits the logical form of the theory and is well-known" (283).
Models are similar to metaphors in two ways:
1) Their language is literally false
2) They have a point nonetheless
Ferré divides models threefold:
1) Type - the degree of concreteness the model has
2) Scope - degree of inclusiveness the model has
3) Status - how important the model is
Ferré holds there are three functions for models:
1) Suggest point-by-point resemblance
2) Serve heuristic value
3) Fulfill the holistic desire of man to have an explanatory model of his experience
Models in Religions Language
A scientific mode can separate reality and the observer, whereas a theological model cannot
Scientific models are judged on how helpful they are
Theological models must be judged on truth and falsity
Theological models draw upon a different set of facts than scientific models.
Ferré holds the religious imagery of the Scriptures, the creeds, and traditions of the believing community to be a "metaphysical model"
God-Language is not literal, it is anthropomorphic
The theistic model incorporates data from other areas of knowledge, but religious imagery is always the core.
Testing Religious Models
Ferré denies that religious language is purely non cognitive while admitting it serves many non-cognitive functions.
No metaphysical model (world view) should be adopted arbitrarily
There are three strata in one's total account of things:
1) Preverbal metaphysical model of symbol (taken from the imagery of Scripture)
2) Set of propositions that attempt to express this metaphysical model in a cognitive way
3) A range of functions (cognitive and non-cognitive, verbal and nonverbal) that constitute the religious language game.
Only the second strata is applicable to the truth tests
Ferry offers five truth tests for the truth of total synthesis built on religious models:
1) Consistency - it must be non-contradictory
2) Coherence - consistency must be external as well as internal
3) Applicability - masut be relatable to individual experience
4) Adequacy - must be applicable to all domains of feeling and perception
5) Effectiveness - the synthesis must be a useable instrument for coping with the total environment of human experiences
A metaphysical synthesis is adequate (according to Ferré) only if it is capable of putting all experience into a whole, pervasive and adequate pattern.
Ferré notes that nay falsification of a metaphysical position is like an erosion, not an explosion.
Ferré states that:
1) Christianity has been effective in the past, but there is doubt about its effectiveness in the present and future.
2) Few would dispute the applicability of love and reverence. But this is only a minimal test.
3) Adequacy is a complex test involving many levels that Christianity appears to meet fairly well.
4) No clear contradictions have been demonstrated in Christianity but the proposed solutions have not gained universal acceptance.
5) Christianity has a "striking internal coherence" but the external coherence is not as obvious. There are almost certainly some empirical statements in Scripture that are false (i.e. the sun standing still for Joshua)
Evaluation of Ferré's Metaphysical Model
Ferré is not in the univocal camp. No literal descriptions of God, anthropomorphic Bible, etc.
Ferré denied the analogical intrinsic causal connection of the Thomists but his concentration on truth statements suggests he does not mean to make religious language equivocal.
Ferré would need to rethink his stance on analogy to save his theory from equivocation.
Recent Trends Retreating from models
Much of contemporary religious language has been shaped by Hume, the logical positivists and young Wittgenstein
Gill: Mediation and Metaphor
Jerry H. Gill attempts to build a holistic comprehension of humanity and human knowledge, instead of a purely cognitive or empirical basis.
He held that:
1) Religious language is linguistically constituted, we cannot know religious reality apart from it being covered to us in words and concepts
2) Religious language is social activity. Many uses are more important than descriptive.
3) Religious language is meaningful with significant, not absolute precision
4) Religious language is primarily metaphorical
Gill's Proposal Evaluated
Analogy must be grounded in metaphysical reality, but Gill denies this ontological link.
Gill has made a strong analysis of the function of religious language but has forfeited any guard against it being equivocal.
Class notes
The Teleological Argument
Transcendental Logic
Given a phenomena 'X'
What are the conditions that make X possible?
Unless there is Y, there cannot be X
Given the fact that all things act for an end
What are the conditions that make it possible for all things to act for an end?
Unless there were an intelligent being that directs all things to their end, ti would not be possible.
Aristotle's Four Questions and their answers
1) What is its purpose? Final Cause (Telos)
2) What is it made of? Material Cause
3) What is its shape (form)? Formal Cause
4) Who or what made it? Efficient Cause
Substance - the total thing with all of its attributes (Aristotelian, not Cartesian)
Paley's Argument from analogy
The watch did not grow there.
It did not just happen.
Because of its complexity and purposiveness we know that it was made by a human being.
The very properties that lead us to infer that the watch was made by a watchmaker lead us to infer the universe was made by a universe-maker.
Inductive Analogy
Set A consists of member {a, b, c, d, e...}
All these members share property X
"F" is also a member of set A
Therefore, F probably has property X
In the General sample you want a "high negative analogy"
But when the General sample is extended to one particular thing you want a "high positive analogy".
The teleological argument of Paley depends on the universe being as much like a clock as possible.
Criticism of Paley's Argument
Hume:
-Even if the analogy holds, it doesn't prove the existence of God
- Even if there is a strong analogy between the watch and the universe we have not ruled out the possibility that it could have come about by chance
Post-Humean Versions
- tend to become disjunctions rather than analogy
- which is the better explanation: the universe came by chance or by purpose?
Stuart Hackett
Teleological argument from the "Macroscopic point of view"
From a conspicuous adaptation to an intelligent creator
examples:
1) The fitness of the inorganic material world to be an environment for both the production and maintenance of organic life. Chance is not a sufficient explanation because chance is tied to the consistent make-up of the inorganic material.
2) The internal adaptedness of organic beings, both in their structure of specialized functions and in their general orientation for self-maintenance or subservience to some other form of organic life. Chance is ruled out as a proximate cause. Chance would postal minute, non-advantageous changes.
3) The intelligibility of the world and its instrumentality in the realization of humanly provisioned ends. Chance ruled out because minds are not the logical outcome of our evolutionary process. Minds are so transcendent that they cannot have arisen from matter.
4) The temporal progressiveness of the cosmic progress through levels of matter, life and mind, in an order of increasing valuation significance.
Anthropic Principle
What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the condition necessary for our presence as observers. (Weak Version)
The universe would have had to passed some very tiny probabilities of window in order to be observed. (Strong version)
Generation of Carbon Post- Big Bang
- Needs to combine three helium nuclei
- May not exceed three helium nuclei
- If it becomes four it becomes oxygen and then "boom", nothing is left
The universe seems to have moved in a deliberate direction. Therefore, it seems more plausible that the universe arose from a creator and not from chance.
Ramsey: Qualified Disclosure Models
Ramsey built his religious language out of an empirical setting and tests it by its empirical adequacy.
Disclosure-Commitment Situations
There are two aspects to the kind of experiences that are religious in nature:
1) An empirical situation that evokes discernment
2) A total commitment to what is discerned
The empirical situations that evoke discernment are the experiential grounding for the meaning of religious language.
Discernment situations:
Ramsey holds that metaphors and odd words have the disclosure poor to make the "ice break" or the "light down".
The literary and logical oddity of "I-Religion" or tautologies like "I am I", "Duty for duty's sake" or "love for love's sake" do not render them meaningless.
To Ramsey there is more in empirical language and situations than meets the eye.
Commitment Situations:
Not every disclosure situation provides religious disclosure.
Religious disclosure evokes a total commitment.
Total commitment is a total commitment to the whole universe, not a total commitment to a part of the universe or a partial commitment to the whole universe.
Ramsey holds religious experience to be one in which one responds to a discernment situation with a total commitment.
Religious Language: Qualified Models
Since religious experience in and of itself is odd, religious language will in turn be odd.
The Meaning and Use of Models
A disclosure model does not seek to describe anything. It enables us to articulate what we once could not express.
Language about God is not declarative; it is evocative.
The Qualification of Models
Ramsey calls qualifiers "words which multiply models without end and with subtle changes" (279).
Models and qualifiers create what Wittgenstien calls family resemblances.
Ramsey develops three groups of qualified models:
1) The negative attributes of God - i.e. God is immutable
2) One word positive attributes of God - i.e. perfection
3) Two-word positive attributes of God - i.e. first cause or infinitely good
Ramsey holds the term "God" to be an integrative term, bringing together the separate discernment-commitment disclosures into a unified whole.
The term "God" functions like the term "I" in everyday language.
The Adequacy of Models: Empirical Fit
Models help to articulate theology in a reliable way when:
1) They arise in a moment of insight or disclosure
2) It empirically fits, it is able to incorporate diverse phenomena consistently
Evaluation of Ramsey's View
Ramsey's master model of God, a combination of many individual models, answers the problem of empirically grounded God-talk.
Without an analogy built on the ontological similarity of Creator and creature, God-talk is purely equivocal.
Only metaphysical analogy can save qualified models from equivocation.
Ferré Metaphysical Models
Ferré builds a metaphysical synthesis based on the religious model, which is subject to truth tests.
The Nature and Function of Models
To Ferré, a model y is that "which provides epistemological vividness or immediacy to a theory by offering as an interpretation of the abstract or unfamiliar theory-structure that both fits the logical form of the theory and is well-known" (283).
Models are similar to metaphors in two ways:
1) Their language is literally false
2) They have a point nonetheless
Ferré divides models threefold:
1) Type - the degree of concreteness the model has
2) Scope - degree of inclusiveness the model has
3) Status - how important the model is
Ferré holds there are three functions for models:
1) Suggest point-by-point resemblance
2) Serve heuristic value
3) Fulfill the holistic desire of man to have an explanatory model of his experience
Models in Religions Language
A scientific mode can separate reality and the observer, whereas a theological model cannot
Scientific models are judged on how helpful they are
Theological models must be judged on truth and falsity
Theological models draw upon a different set of facts than scientific models.
Ferré holds the religious imagery of the Scriptures, the creeds, and traditions of the believing community to be a "metaphysical model"
God-Language is not literal, it is anthropomorphic
The theistic model incorporates data from other areas of knowledge, but religious imagery is always the core.
Testing Religious Models
Ferré denies that religious language is purely non cognitive while admitting it serves many non-cognitive functions.
No metaphysical model (world view) should be adopted arbitrarily
There are three strata in one's total account of things:
1) Preverbal metaphysical model of symbol (taken from the imagery of Scripture)
2) Set of propositions that attempt to express this metaphysical model in a cognitive way
3) A range of functions (cognitive and non-cognitive, verbal and nonverbal) that constitute the religious language game.
Only the second strata is applicable to the truth tests
Ferry offers five truth tests for the truth of total synthesis built on religious models:
1) Consistency - it must be non-contradictory
2) Coherence - consistency must be external as well as internal
3) Applicability - masut be relatable to individual experience
4) Adequacy - must be applicable to all domains of feeling and perception
5) Effectiveness - the synthesis must be a useable instrument for coping with the total environment of human experiences
A metaphysical synthesis is adequate (according to Ferré) only if it is capable of putting all experience into a whole, pervasive and adequate pattern.
Ferré notes that nay falsification of a metaphysical position is like an erosion, not an explosion.
Ferré states that:
1) Christianity has been effective in the past, but there is doubt about its effectiveness in the present and future.
2) Few would dispute the applicability of love and reverence. But this is only a minimal test.
3) Adequacy is a complex test involving many levels that Christianity appears to meet fairly well.
4) No clear contradictions have been demonstrated in Christianity but the proposed solutions have not gained universal acceptance.
5) Christianity has a "striking internal coherence" but the external coherence is not as obvious. There are almost certainly some empirical statements in Scripture that are false (i.e. the sun standing still for Joshua)
Evaluation of Ferré's Metaphysical Model
Ferré is not in the univocal camp. No literal descriptions of God, anthropomorphic Bible, etc.
Ferré denied the analogical intrinsic causal connection of the Thomists but his concentration on truth statements suggests he does not mean to make religious language equivocal.
Ferré would need to rethink his stance on analogy to save his theory from equivocation.
Recent Trends Retreating from models
Much of contemporary religious language has been shaped by Hume, the logical positivists and young Wittgenstein
Gill: Mediation and Metaphor
Jerry H. Gill attempts to build a holistic comprehension of humanity and human knowledge, instead of a purely cognitive or empirical basis.
He held that:
1) Religious language is linguistically constituted, we cannot know religious reality apart from it being covered to us in words and concepts
2) Religious language is social activity. Many uses are more important than descriptive.
3) Religious language is meaningful with significant, not absolute precision
4) Religious language is primarily metaphorical
Gill's Proposal Evaluated
Analogy must be grounded in metaphysical reality, but Gill denies this ontological link.
Gill has made a strong analysis of the function of religious language but has forfeited any guard against it being equivocal.
Thursday, March 15, 2007
Cosmological Argument Reconsidered
(Originally written March 15, 2007 in Book 13)
An infinite cause has infinite causal power so if there are two such beings they would cancel each other out.
The Bible holds that God is the creator and sustainer of all things and that He is both one and supreme as well as infinite and eternal. The God of the Bible is identical to the God of the cosmological argument.
The Cosmological Argument Reconsidered
Major objection and responses
1. Only a finite cause need be inferred from finite effects.
response: premise 5
2. The words "necessary being" have no consistent meaning. (In this case: "uncaused cause")
response: "Uncaused" is a negative term meaning that the cause is not limited by anything. "Cause as used is an existential cause of everything.
3. There is no way to establish the principle of causality.
response: This argument is based on metaphysical necessity, not empirical observation so even if Hume's epistemological atomism were true it would not deter from this argument.
4. Theistic arguments convince a few, usually only those who like reasoning.
response: This argument is not purely abstract reasoning, rather it is an ontological insight, analysis and inference based on the concrete realities of the experience of finite beings.
5. An infinite series is possible.
response: (premise three) it is not possible. Existence cannot arise from non-existence. An actual infinite series of real finite beings is impossible.
6. The cosmological argument depends on the invalid ontological argument.
response: This argument begins with he premise, "something exists" and thus is not dependent on the ontological argument.
7. Existential statements are not logically necessary.
response: This is self-defeating as it is an existential statement.
8. What is rationally necessary is not ontologically necessary.
response: This argument holds what is existentially undeniable is true, not what is rationally inescapable is true. It is interested in real necessity, not rational necessity.
9. The Cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions.
response: The world was not created in time. Time is a created thing. Eternity is prior to time in a causal way, not a temporal way. Not everything needs a cause, only finite things need a cause.
10. The conclusion of the argument does not prove a theistic God.
response: It cannot be multiple Gods because there cannot be more than one unlimited being. It cannot be identical with the material universe because the universe is limited and the first Cause is unlimited. It cannot be the panentheistic God because God must be pure actuality and have no potentiality. It cannot be the God of pantheism because pantheism is contrary to our experience as real finite beings. If God is actuality it cannot change. The pantheistic God is everything. There is change. Thus either God is potentiality or not pantheistic. God is not potentiality. Thus, God is not pantheistic.
11. There is an equivocation on the word "cause" in the argument.
response: Cause means neither finite or infinite cause, but a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of something else.
12. The universe as a whole does not need a cause; only the parts do.
response: The sum of a all dependent beings does not make an independent being. The universe is a composed thing at potentiality and actuality (existence). Potentiality cannot actualize itself, thus actuality outside of the universe must actualize its potential.
13. The universe is mutually dependent and does not need a cause beyond it.
response: Mutual dependency is a vicious circle with at least one self-caused cause, which is absurd.
14. There is no need for a here-and-now cause of existence.
response: Whatever is causing something to exist in causing it to exist right now.
15. The actualization-potency or contingent-necessity are arbitrarily imposed on experience.
response: The model of dependency is not derived from isolated facts but from undeniable experience. "The existentially undeniable of experience of contingency is not an arbitrary model superimposed on experience" (206).
16. The cosmological argument commits some modal fallacies.
response: The existential cosmological argument holds that all things that do exist need a cause for their present existence, not all things that could not exist need a single cause to produce their existence. God is a necessary Being because ontologically he cannot not-be, not because the argument necessarily demonstrates his being.
An infinite cause has infinite causal power so if there are two such beings they would cancel each other out.
The Bible holds that God is the creator and sustainer of all things and that He is both one and supreme as well as infinite and eternal. The God of the Bible is identical to the God of the cosmological argument.
The Cosmological Argument Reconsidered
Major objection and responses
1. Only a finite cause need be inferred from finite effects.
response: premise 5
2. The words "necessary being" have no consistent meaning. (In this case: "uncaused cause")
response: "Uncaused" is a negative term meaning that the cause is not limited by anything. "Cause as used is an existential cause of everything.
3. There is no way to establish the principle of causality.
response: This argument is based on metaphysical necessity, not empirical observation so even if Hume's epistemological atomism were true it would not deter from this argument.
4. Theistic arguments convince a few, usually only those who like reasoning.
response: This argument is not purely abstract reasoning, rather it is an ontological insight, analysis and inference based on the concrete realities of the experience of finite beings.
5. An infinite series is possible.
response: (premise three) it is not possible. Existence cannot arise from non-existence. An actual infinite series of real finite beings is impossible.
6. The cosmological argument depends on the invalid ontological argument.
response: This argument begins with he premise, "something exists" and thus is not dependent on the ontological argument.
7. Existential statements are not logically necessary.
response: This is self-defeating as it is an existential statement.
8. What is rationally necessary is not ontologically necessary.
response: This argument holds what is existentially undeniable is true, not what is rationally inescapable is true. It is interested in real necessity, not rational necessity.
9. The Cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions.
response: The world was not created in time. Time is a created thing. Eternity is prior to time in a causal way, not a temporal way. Not everything needs a cause, only finite things need a cause.
10. The conclusion of the argument does not prove a theistic God.
response: It cannot be multiple Gods because there cannot be more than one unlimited being. It cannot be identical with the material universe because the universe is limited and the first Cause is unlimited. It cannot be the panentheistic God because God must be pure actuality and have no potentiality. It cannot be the God of pantheism because pantheism is contrary to our experience as real finite beings. If God is actuality it cannot change. The pantheistic God is everything. There is change. Thus either God is potentiality or not pantheistic. God is not potentiality. Thus, God is not pantheistic.
11. There is an equivocation on the word "cause" in the argument.
response: Cause means neither finite or infinite cause, but a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of something else.
12. The universe as a whole does not need a cause; only the parts do.
response: The sum of a all dependent beings does not make an independent being. The universe is a composed thing at potentiality and actuality (existence). Potentiality cannot actualize itself, thus actuality outside of the universe must actualize its potential.
13. The universe is mutually dependent and does not need a cause beyond it.
response: Mutual dependency is a vicious circle with at least one self-caused cause, which is absurd.
14. There is no need for a here-and-now cause of existence.
response: Whatever is causing something to exist in causing it to exist right now.
15. The actualization-potency or contingent-necessity are arbitrarily imposed on experience.
response: The model of dependency is not derived from isolated facts but from undeniable experience. "The existentially undeniable of experience of contingency is not an arbitrary model superimposed on experience" (206).
16. The cosmological argument commits some modal fallacies.
response: The existential cosmological argument holds that all things that do exist need a cause for their present existence, not all things that could not exist need a single cause to produce their existence. God is a necessary Being because ontologically he cannot not-be, not because the argument necessarily demonstrates his being.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Cosmological Arguments and Rebuttals
(Originally written March 13, 2007 in Book 13)
Al-Farabi's Necessary Existence Argument
Arabian and Jewish forms of the cosmological argument later influenced Christian arguments
The Islamic Philosopher Al-Farabi distinguished between existence and essence. He argued:
1) There exists beings whose essence is distinct from their existence. These are possible beings.
2) These beings have existence only accidentally. It is not part of their very essence to exist. It is logically possible that they might not have existed.
3) Anything that exists accidentally (not essentially) must have derived their existence from another.
4) There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of existence.
5) Therefore, there must be a first cause of existence whose essence and existence are identical. This being must be a necessary being because the First Cause cannot be a mere possible being since all possible beings do not explain their own existence.
Avicenna's First Cause Argument
1) There are possible beings
2) Whatever possible beings exist have a cause for their being
3) There cannot be an infinite series of being.
4) Therefore, there must be a first cause for all possible things.
5) This first Cause must be a necessary Being because that which is the cause of all possible beings cannot itself be a possible being.
6) Whatever is essentially One can create immediately only one effect (intelligence)
7) Thinking is creating and God necessarily thinks, since he is a necessary being
8) Therefore, there is an necessary emanation from God of ten intelligences (Angels) that control the various spheres of the universe and the last of which (called Agent Intellect) forms the four elements of the cosmos and by which the human mind (possible intellect) is informed of all truth.
Avicenna's God was a necessary being who created 10 gods who created everything else.
The Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) argued for a first mover, a first Cause and a Necessary Being.
He argued that "I AM" implied absolute existence which applied to God alone.
Thomas Aquinas: Five Ways to Prove God's Existence
Aquinas' arguments were not entirely new
1) Maimonides had arguments similar to the first three
2) Al-Farabi and Avicenna had the first two
3) Anselm had an argument similar to the 4th argument
4) Aquinas' 5th argument was similar to Thierry of Chartes and William of Conches' adaptation of Plato's Timaeus argument
Aquinas was much more Aristotelian in his thought than any of his Christian predecessors.
He argued from:
1) Motion
2) Efficient Causality
3) Possibility and necessity
4) Gradation (perfection)
5) to a First Cause
Duns Scotus: Argument from Producibility
John Duns Scotus modified Aquinas' argument in two ways:
1) He began with the producibility of being, not merely from produced beings
2) He amplified the argument against an invite regress of dependent causes
Duns Scotus' arg.
1) Some being is produced
a) This is learned via experience
b) This is true independent of experience
c) It would be true even if God had not willed to create anything
2) What is produced is producible either by itself, by nothing or by something else
3) No being can produce itself
4) Something cannot be caused by nothing
5) Therefore, being is producible only by some being that is productive
6) There cannot be an infinite regress of productive beings, each producing the being of the one following it because
a) this is an essentially related series of causes, not an accidentally related one
-where the primary cause is more nearly perfect than the secondary one
-where the secondary cause depends on the primary one for its very causality
-where the cause must be simultaneously present to the effect
b) An infinite series of essentially related causes is impossible because:
-if the whole series is dependent for its causalities then there must be something beyond the series that counts for the causality in the series
-If the infinite series were causing the effect, then there would have to be an infinite number of causes simultaneously causing a single effect, and this is impossible
-where ever there are prior causes there must be a prime cause
-higher causes are more nearly perfect than lower causes and this implies a perfect cause at the head of all other less-than-perfect causes
-an infinite regress of causes implies imperfection. But an imperfect series implies something perfect beyond the series as ground for the imperfect
7) Therefore, there must be a first productive cause of all producible beings
8) This first Cause of all producible beings must be one because:
-It is perfect in knowledge and there cannot be two beings that know everything perfectly
-It is perfect in will, hence it loves itself more completely than anything else
-It is infinitely good and there cannot be two as such because one would be more than infinitely good which is impossible
-It is infinite in power. If there were two that were infinite in power than there would be two primary causes of the same effect, and this is impossible
-Absolutely infinite cannot be excelled in perfection because there cannot be anything more perfect than that which is wholly perfect
-There cannot be two necessary beings because one would possess what the other lacked and if it lacked any perfection it would not be necessary
-Omnipotent will cannot be in two beings because then one could render the other impotent
Ockham's Reservations about the Cosmological Argument
William of Ockham (1290-1350) raised three objections to the cosmological argument:
1) He denied that an essentially related infinite series was impossible
2) He argued that efficient causes are only known via experience. (Causality is "that whose existence or presence is followed by something")
3) He denied that one could prove that there was only one God in the absolute sense of the word. Christian theists insist that the unity of God refers to the "most perfect" Being possible. But the proposition "God exists" is not self evident because a self-evident proposition cannot be doubted and "God exists" is doubted. Since God's unity rests on the proposition "God exists" and it is impossible to know via experience and it is not self-evident there is no way to demonstrate that God is absolutely one.
Descartes' A posteriori Proof for God
Descartes' Proof
1) I am doubting
2) If I am doubting, I am thinking
3) Doubt is an imperfect form of thinking
4) But if I know the imperfect, then I must be aware of the perfect
5) But my imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of perfection that I have
6) Only a perfect Mind is an adequate cause for the idea of perfection
7) Therefore, a perfect mind must exist as the cause of this perfection.
Both Augustine and Descartes have a posteriori arguments for the existence of God which is platonic and has an affinity for the ontological argument.
Leibniz: The argument from Sufficient Reason
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) provided the most influential form of the cosmological argument in modern times. He argued:
1. The entire world is changing
2. Whatever is changing lacks within itself the reason for its own existence.
3. There is a sufficient reason for its own existence.
4. Therefore, there must be a cause beyond this world for its existence.
5. This cause is either its own sufficient cause or beyond it.
6. There cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons.
7. Therefore, there must be a first Cause that is its own sufficient reason.
Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Leibniz's disciple offered the proof that became the pattern of the cosmological argument for the modern world.
1. The human soul exists.
2. Nothing exists without a sufficient reason why it exists.
3. The reason for our existence must be contained in ourselves or beyond ourselves.
4. The reason for our existence is not in ourselves.
5. The reason for our existence thus lies beyond ourselves.
6. One does not arrive at sufficient reason for his existence until he reaches a being that has its reason for existence within itself.
7. A being that has its reason for existence within itself is a necessary being.
8. Therefore, there must be a necessary being beyond us that is the sufficient reason for our existence.
9. It is logically impossible for a necessary being not to exist.
10. Therefore, this necessary being is identical with the self-existent God of Scripture.
Leibniz's argument (and Wolff's) rests on the principle of sufficient reason which posits itself as a self-evidently true analytic principle.
The argument is a posteriori, but not existential. The necessity of its conclusion is based on a conceptually certainty, not an existential (actual) certainty.
Hume's Skeptical Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument
David Hume (1711-1776) laid down the most fundamental arguments against the cosmological argument:
1) Only a finite cause need be inferred from finite effects
2) No propositions about existence can be logically necessary
3) The words "necessary being" have no consistent meaning. It is possible to think of anything of not existing, even God; and, what might not exist does not need to exist.
4) If "necessary being" means only imperishable, then the universe may be the necessary being.
5) An infinite series is possible. An eternal series cannot have a cause because causes imply priority in time, but nothing can be prior in time to an eternal series. Thus, an eternal series is possible.
6) There is no way to establish the principle of causality
7) The universe as a whole does not need a cause, only the parts do.
8) Theistic argument convince only those who like abstract reasoning.
Kant's Agnosticism on Theistic Argumentation
1) The cosmological argument depends on the invalid ontological argument
2) Existential statements are not necessary
3) A noumenal (real) cause cannot be derived from a phenomenal effect
4) What is logically necessary is not ontologically necessary
5) The cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions
6) The concept of a "necessary being" is not self-clarifying
7) An infinite regress is logically possible
Taylor's restatement of the cosmological argument:
1) The Universe as a whole does not explain its own existence
2) Whatever does not explain its own existence calls for an explanation beyond itself.
3) An infinite regress of reasons is impossible
4) Therefore, there must be a first self-sufficient (independent)_ cause of the whole universe
Taylor's conclusion is rationally inescapable, but it is Leibnizian in that it relies on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, it is open to similar criticisms.
Hackett's Arguments Based on Explanation
Samuel C. Hackett offered two arguments in the Leibnizian tradition.
The first conceptual argument:
1) The world order is possible only on the basis of several necessary conditions:
- There need to be objective a priori principles of knowledge
- There need to objective essences that define the properties of things in the world
- There needs to be a reason why of all the possible worlds this is the one that exists
2) These realities show all of the properties that are associated with the structuring activity of a mind
3) Therefore, these realities can be understood as the workings of an absolute mind.
4) Therefore, there exists an absolute mind as necessary condition to the logical possibility of this world.
His second, causal argument:
1) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
2) Something exists
3) Therefore, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
Hackett's arguments suffer from an unwarranted assumption that a sufficient cause must be an ultimate cause. A finite cause may suffice.
Ross' argument based on Explanation
James F. Ross provided two versions of the argument based on explanation
First:
1) If something is not the case, there must be an explanation for it not being so.
2) Considering the state of affairs, "God does not exist" cannot be the case.
3) Therefore, since "God dos not exist" cannot be the case, "God exists" must be the case. Thus, God exists.
Craig's Kalam Argument
William Lane Craig has produced an argument based on the need to posit an original cause for the universe. He has three premises:
1) Whatever beings to exist has a cause
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Premise 1 seems intuit, but is questionable and uneasy to prove via demonstration
Premise 2 is completely questionable.
The argument, if it stands, does not prove theism because it does not eliminate pantheism.
Teleological and moral arguments depend on the principle of sufficient reason and/or causality. Both of which are questionable.
The ontological argument depends on the cosmological argument because it is theoretically possible that nothing ever existed at all.
The cosmological argument (in Leibnizian form) is rationally inescapable only if the principle of sufficient reason is rationally inescapable. But the principle of sufficient reason is neither analytically or self-evidently true.
The cosmological arguments leaves the actual for the conceptual at call thing world contingent and stating a necessary Being is one whose non-existence is logically impossible. This opens it to Kant's criticism that it confuses the principle of existential causality with the principle of sufficient reason.
The Kalam argument does not prove a theistic God, but a God that could be pantheistic.
9: The Cosmological Argument Reevaluated
Most attempts to defend the cosmological argument in a non-Leibnizian way emanate from Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas did not base his argument on the principle of sufficient reason, but on existential causality.
The Leibnizian type argument is built on logical necessity, whereas the Thomistic argument is based on existential undeniability.
The Cosmological Argument Restated
1. Some limited, changing being(s) exist
2. The present existence of every limited, changing being is caused by another
3. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of being
4. Therefore, there is a first Cause of the present existence of these beings
5. The first cause must be infinite, necessary, eternal, simple, unchanging and one
6. The first uncaused cause is identical with the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
It is logically possible that nothing ever existed. That is, it is possible to conceive of the nonexistence of everything.
Linehan: But logic is an affirmation of existence, so to conceive of the nonexistence of everything is a logical inference and thus, self-defeating?
Any being that undergoes a change is a contingent being. Necessary Beings are immutable.
Whatever changes in existence must be composed of actuality and potentiality.
The fact that there is change is proof that there is potential and actualization of potential.
No potential actualizes itself.
There must be some actuality outside of composed beings (beings possessing potential and actuality) to explain why they exist.
Actuality is a thing's existence and its potentiality is its essence.
An efficient cause is a necessary and sufficient condition to account for the actualization of a potential.
An infinite regress is a series without a first or beginning cause.
A self-caused thing is impossible because it would have had to exist before it existed in order to cause itself.
A way out of this dilemma is to argue that the infinite regress is circular or mutually dependent.
But this argument is obviously circular and thus, fallacious.
To deny causality within an infinite regress is simply an attempt to explain away the need for an explanation (a real need) on ground for the ungrounded finite being.
A being that needs ground for his own existence cannot be the ground of another being that needs to be grounded. One contingent being cannot ground another contingent being.
There must be a first Cause of the existence of every finite thing that exists.
The first Cause is the efficient Cause.
The Frist Cause is an uncaused cause. It can neither be self-caused (impossible) or caused by another (thus negating its status as the first cause).
The uncaused cause must be an unlimited being. If caused things are limited, uncaused things must be unlimited.
An unlimited Being must be a Necessary Being because it can not be limited by contingency.
God is not a logically necessary Being, He is an ontologically necessary being.
The uncaused Being must be an eternal Being. If nothing ever existed (a logical possibility) then nothing would ever exist because nothing can cause itself.
The uncaused Cause must be a simple, undivided Being. The uncaused Cause is pure actuality with no potentiality.
The uncaused Cause of existence must be immutable. What is changeable possess potentiality, thus pure actuality is unchangeable.
An uncaused Cause must be one Being. There cannot be two pure actualities. Pure actuality is indivisible.
The pure actuality possess all of the perfections of being infinite. Thus, the uncaused cause is the source of all perfections.
Al-Farabi's Necessary Existence Argument
Arabian and Jewish forms of the cosmological argument later influenced Christian arguments
The Islamic Philosopher Al-Farabi distinguished between existence and essence. He argued:
1) There exists beings whose essence is distinct from their existence. These are possible beings.
2) These beings have existence only accidentally. It is not part of their very essence to exist. It is logically possible that they might not have existed.
3) Anything that exists accidentally (not essentially) must have derived their existence from another.
4) There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of existence.
5) Therefore, there must be a first cause of existence whose essence and existence are identical. This being must be a necessary being because the First Cause cannot be a mere possible being since all possible beings do not explain their own existence.
Avicenna's First Cause Argument
1) There are possible beings
2) Whatever possible beings exist have a cause for their being
3) There cannot be an infinite series of being.
4) Therefore, there must be a first cause for all possible things.
5) This first Cause must be a necessary Being because that which is the cause of all possible beings cannot itself be a possible being.
6) Whatever is essentially One can create immediately only one effect (intelligence)
7) Thinking is creating and God necessarily thinks, since he is a necessary being
8) Therefore, there is an necessary emanation from God of ten intelligences (Angels) that control the various spheres of the universe and the last of which (called Agent Intellect) forms the four elements of the cosmos and by which the human mind (possible intellect) is informed of all truth.
Avicenna's God was a necessary being who created 10 gods who created everything else.
The Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) argued for a first mover, a first Cause and a Necessary Being.
He argued that "I AM" implied absolute existence which applied to God alone.
Thomas Aquinas: Five Ways to Prove God's Existence
Aquinas' arguments were not entirely new
1) Maimonides had arguments similar to the first three
2) Al-Farabi and Avicenna had the first two
3) Anselm had an argument similar to the 4th argument
4) Aquinas' 5th argument was similar to Thierry of Chartes and William of Conches' adaptation of Plato's Timaeus argument
Aquinas was much more Aristotelian in his thought than any of his Christian predecessors.
He argued from:
1) Motion
2) Efficient Causality
3) Possibility and necessity
4) Gradation (perfection)
5) to a First Cause
Duns Scotus: Argument from Producibility
John Duns Scotus modified Aquinas' argument in two ways:
1) He began with the producibility of being, not merely from produced beings
2) He amplified the argument against an invite regress of dependent causes
Duns Scotus' arg.
1) Some being is produced
a) This is learned via experience
b) This is true independent of experience
c) It would be true even if God had not willed to create anything
2) What is produced is producible either by itself, by nothing or by something else
3) No being can produce itself
4) Something cannot be caused by nothing
5) Therefore, being is producible only by some being that is productive
6) There cannot be an infinite regress of productive beings, each producing the being of the one following it because
a) this is an essentially related series of causes, not an accidentally related one
-where the primary cause is more nearly perfect than the secondary one
-where the secondary cause depends on the primary one for its very causality
-where the cause must be simultaneously present to the effect
b) An infinite series of essentially related causes is impossible because:
-if the whole series is dependent for its causalities then there must be something beyond the series that counts for the causality in the series
-If the infinite series were causing the effect, then there would have to be an infinite number of causes simultaneously causing a single effect, and this is impossible
-where ever there are prior causes there must be a prime cause
-higher causes are more nearly perfect than lower causes and this implies a perfect cause at the head of all other less-than-perfect causes
-an infinite regress of causes implies imperfection. But an imperfect series implies something perfect beyond the series as ground for the imperfect
7) Therefore, there must be a first productive cause of all producible beings
8) This first Cause of all producible beings must be one because:
-It is perfect in knowledge and there cannot be two beings that know everything perfectly
-It is perfect in will, hence it loves itself more completely than anything else
-It is infinitely good and there cannot be two as such because one would be more than infinitely good which is impossible
-It is infinite in power. If there were two that were infinite in power than there would be two primary causes of the same effect, and this is impossible
-Absolutely infinite cannot be excelled in perfection because there cannot be anything more perfect than that which is wholly perfect
-There cannot be two necessary beings because one would possess what the other lacked and if it lacked any perfection it would not be necessary
-Omnipotent will cannot be in two beings because then one could render the other impotent
Ockham's Reservations about the Cosmological Argument
William of Ockham (1290-1350) raised three objections to the cosmological argument:
1) He denied that an essentially related infinite series was impossible
2) He argued that efficient causes are only known via experience. (Causality is "that whose existence or presence is followed by something")
3) He denied that one could prove that there was only one God in the absolute sense of the word. Christian theists insist that the unity of God refers to the "most perfect" Being possible. But the proposition "God exists" is not self evident because a self-evident proposition cannot be doubted and "God exists" is doubted. Since God's unity rests on the proposition "God exists" and it is impossible to know via experience and it is not self-evident there is no way to demonstrate that God is absolutely one.
Descartes' A posteriori Proof for God
Descartes' Proof
1) I am doubting
2) If I am doubting, I am thinking
3) Doubt is an imperfect form of thinking
4) But if I know the imperfect, then I must be aware of the perfect
5) But my imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of perfection that I have
6) Only a perfect Mind is an adequate cause for the idea of perfection
7) Therefore, a perfect mind must exist as the cause of this perfection.
Both Augustine and Descartes have a posteriori arguments for the existence of God which is platonic and has an affinity for the ontological argument.
Leibniz: The argument from Sufficient Reason
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) provided the most influential form of the cosmological argument in modern times. He argued:
1. The entire world is changing
2. Whatever is changing lacks within itself the reason for its own existence.
3. There is a sufficient reason for its own existence.
4. Therefore, there must be a cause beyond this world for its existence.
5. This cause is either its own sufficient cause or beyond it.
6. There cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons.
7. Therefore, there must be a first Cause that is its own sufficient reason.
Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Leibniz's disciple offered the proof that became the pattern of the cosmological argument for the modern world.
1. The human soul exists.
2. Nothing exists without a sufficient reason why it exists.
3. The reason for our existence must be contained in ourselves or beyond ourselves.
4. The reason for our existence is not in ourselves.
5. The reason for our existence thus lies beyond ourselves.
6. One does not arrive at sufficient reason for his existence until he reaches a being that has its reason for existence within itself.
7. A being that has its reason for existence within itself is a necessary being.
8. Therefore, there must be a necessary being beyond us that is the sufficient reason for our existence.
9. It is logically impossible for a necessary being not to exist.
10. Therefore, this necessary being is identical with the self-existent God of Scripture.
Leibniz's argument (and Wolff's) rests on the principle of sufficient reason which posits itself as a self-evidently true analytic principle.
The argument is a posteriori, but not existential. The necessity of its conclusion is based on a conceptually certainty, not an existential (actual) certainty.
Hume's Skeptical Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument
David Hume (1711-1776) laid down the most fundamental arguments against the cosmological argument:
1) Only a finite cause need be inferred from finite effects
2) No propositions about existence can be logically necessary
3) The words "necessary being" have no consistent meaning. It is possible to think of anything of not existing, even God; and, what might not exist does not need to exist.
4) If "necessary being" means only imperishable, then the universe may be the necessary being.
5) An infinite series is possible. An eternal series cannot have a cause because causes imply priority in time, but nothing can be prior in time to an eternal series. Thus, an eternal series is possible.
6) There is no way to establish the principle of causality
7) The universe as a whole does not need a cause, only the parts do.
8) Theistic argument convince only those who like abstract reasoning.
Kant's Agnosticism on Theistic Argumentation
1) The cosmological argument depends on the invalid ontological argument
2) Existential statements are not necessary
3) A noumenal (real) cause cannot be derived from a phenomenal effect
4) What is logically necessary is not ontologically necessary
5) The cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions
6) The concept of a "necessary being" is not self-clarifying
7) An infinite regress is logically possible
Taylor's restatement of the cosmological argument:
1) The Universe as a whole does not explain its own existence
2) Whatever does not explain its own existence calls for an explanation beyond itself.
3) An infinite regress of reasons is impossible
4) Therefore, there must be a first self-sufficient (independent)_ cause of the whole universe
Taylor's conclusion is rationally inescapable, but it is Leibnizian in that it relies on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, it is open to similar criticisms.
Hackett's Arguments Based on Explanation
Samuel C. Hackett offered two arguments in the Leibnizian tradition.
The first conceptual argument:
1) The world order is possible only on the basis of several necessary conditions:
- There need to be objective a priori principles of knowledge
- There need to objective essences that define the properties of things in the world
- There needs to be a reason why of all the possible worlds this is the one that exists
2) These realities show all of the properties that are associated with the structuring activity of a mind
3) Therefore, these realities can be understood as the workings of an absolute mind.
4) Therefore, there exists an absolute mind as necessary condition to the logical possibility of this world.
His second, causal argument:
1) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
2) Something exists
3) Therefore, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
Hackett's arguments suffer from an unwarranted assumption that a sufficient cause must be an ultimate cause. A finite cause may suffice.
Ross' argument based on Explanation
James F. Ross provided two versions of the argument based on explanation
First:
1) If something is not the case, there must be an explanation for it not being so.
2) Considering the state of affairs, "God does not exist" cannot be the case.
3) Therefore, since "God dos not exist" cannot be the case, "God exists" must be the case. Thus, God exists.
Craig's Kalam Argument
William Lane Craig has produced an argument based on the need to posit an original cause for the universe. He has three premises:
1) Whatever beings to exist has a cause
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Premise 1 seems intuit, but is questionable and uneasy to prove via demonstration
Premise 2 is completely questionable.
The argument, if it stands, does not prove theism because it does not eliminate pantheism.
Teleological and moral arguments depend on the principle of sufficient reason and/or causality. Both of which are questionable.
The ontological argument depends on the cosmological argument because it is theoretically possible that nothing ever existed at all.
The cosmological argument (in Leibnizian form) is rationally inescapable only if the principle of sufficient reason is rationally inescapable. But the principle of sufficient reason is neither analytically or self-evidently true.
The cosmological arguments leaves the actual for the conceptual at call thing world contingent and stating a necessary Being is one whose non-existence is logically impossible. This opens it to Kant's criticism that it confuses the principle of existential causality with the principle of sufficient reason.
The Kalam argument does not prove a theistic God, but a God that could be pantheistic.
9: The Cosmological Argument Reevaluated
Most attempts to defend the cosmological argument in a non-Leibnizian way emanate from Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas did not base his argument on the principle of sufficient reason, but on existential causality.
The Leibnizian type argument is built on logical necessity, whereas the Thomistic argument is based on existential undeniability.
The Cosmological Argument Restated
1. Some limited, changing being(s) exist
2. The present existence of every limited, changing being is caused by another
3. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of being
4. Therefore, there is a first Cause of the present existence of these beings
5. The first cause must be infinite, necessary, eternal, simple, unchanging and one
6. The first uncaused cause is identical with the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
It is logically possible that nothing ever existed. That is, it is possible to conceive of the nonexistence of everything.
Linehan: But logic is an affirmation of existence, so to conceive of the nonexistence of everything is a logical inference and thus, self-defeating?
Any being that undergoes a change is a contingent being. Necessary Beings are immutable.
Whatever changes in existence must be composed of actuality and potentiality.
The fact that there is change is proof that there is potential and actualization of potential.
No potential actualizes itself.
There must be some actuality outside of composed beings (beings possessing potential and actuality) to explain why they exist.
Actuality is a thing's existence and its potentiality is its essence.
An efficient cause is a necessary and sufficient condition to account for the actualization of a potential.
An infinite regress is a series without a first or beginning cause.
A self-caused thing is impossible because it would have had to exist before it existed in order to cause itself.
A way out of this dilemma is to argue that the infinite regress is circular or mutually dependent.
But this argument is obviously circular and thus, fallacious.
To deny causality within an infinite regress is simply an attempt to explain away the need for an explanation (a real need) on ground for the ungrounded finite being.
A being that needs ground for his own existence cannot be the ground of another being that needs to be grounded. One contingent being cannot ground another contingent being.
There must be a first Cause of the existence of every finite thing that exists.
The first Cause is the efficient Cause.
The Frist Cause is an uncaused cause. It can neither be self-caused (impossible) or caused by another (thus negating its status as the first cause).
The uncaused cause must be an unlimited being. If caused things are limited, uncaused things must be unlimited.
An unlimited Being must be a Necessary Being because it can not be limited by contingency.
God is not a logically necessary Being, He is an ontologically necessary being.
The uncaused Being must be an eternal Being. If nothing ever existed (a logical possibility) then nothing would ever exist because nothing can cause itself.
The uncaused Cause must be a simple, undivided Being. The uncaused Cause is pure actuality with no potentiality.
The uncaused Cause of existence must be immutable. What is changeable possess potentiality, thus pure actuality is unchangeable.
An uncaused Cause must be one Being. There cannot be two pure actualities. Pure actuality is indivisible.
The pure actuality possess all of the perfections of being infinite. Thus, the uncaused cause is the source of all perfections.
Geisler/Corduan - Problem of Evil
(Originally written March 13, 2007 in Book 25)
Part 4: God & Evil
14: The nature of the problem of Evil
Nearly every religion attempts to deal with the reality and causes of evil in the world.
The problem of evil arises out of the nature of theism.
There are a number of dimensions to the problem of evil: metaphysical, physical and moral
An inconsistency differs from a contradiction. In a contradiction there are two statements in which one is true and one is false. In an inconsistency one or both statements could be false, but on the surface both cannot be true.
The inconsistency version of the problem of Evil
1) God is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent Being, in accordance with His nature He would abolish all evil
2) Evil exists
Either 1 or 2 could be false, both could be false but both cannot be true.
A way to solve an inconsistency is to show that it is a paradox. Thus, the inconsistency of 1 & 2 can be made into a paradox like this:
1) God is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, in accordance with His nature He would abolish all evil
2) Evil exists
3) God expressed his omnipotent and omnibenevolent nature by creating free beings who are solely responsible for evil.
But this solution may not satisfy men. Someone might still want to know why God created free beings. This way of dealing with the problem of evil is the problem of theodicy (the justification of God).
Non theistic solutions to the Problem of Evil
Illusionism's Answer to Evil
A theist cannot deny the reality of evil. A pantheist can claim that nothing is really evil, but only appears evil, but a theist may not.
Evil is everything that frustrates human aspirations and expectations.
Many people influenced by Eastern thought deny the reality of evil.
Frederic Spiegelburg follows the Indian sage Aurobindo in claiming that pain is not a matter of fact, but a perspective. Once one comes to the truth there is no longer a problem of evil because there is no evil.
Alan Watts accuses Westerners of being unwilling to recognize individual finitude and subsequently looking for a solution in the acts of free individual. He sees good and evil as relative distinctions that do not obtain with ultimate reality.
Problems with illusionism
1) Illusionism does not account for the origin of the illusion
2) It does not explain the apparent reality of the illusion
3) Denying the reality of evil does not remove the presence of reality
4) Illusionism is a theory that is ruined by a brutal gang of facts
"It is more likely that the illusionist is being deceived about evil than that all persons are being deceived by evil" (298).
Sadism's answer to evil
Elie Wiesel postulated that God is sadistic and created the world to watch suffering.
Harold S. Kushner in "When Bad Things Happen to Good People" states we ought to forgive God for not making a better world.
Objections to Sadism
1) God is all-good in theism
2) God as a term seems inappropriate for a sadistic being
3) The universe cannot be ultimately evil because evil presupposes good
4) It seems absurd that there is a being responsible for creating and destroying what he creates (Charles Hartshorne)
Finitism's Answer to Evil
David Hume and subsequent thinkers have proposed that God is finite in power or love (or both).
Finitism is represented by process thinkers today. Charles Hartshorne believes that the worst falsehood known is the traditional concept of omnipotence.
Others claim that God is not essentially limited, but instead limits Himself.
Bruce R. Reichenbach claims that God is sovereign in authority and power, but willingly limits Himself.
Objections to Finitism
1) Only an infinite cause explains the existence of things. A finite God could not be the cause of all existence
2) A finite God is not worthy of worship
3) A finite God cannot guarantee an outcome in the struggle of good and evil.
"A finite god is metaphysically impossible, religiously unworthy and ethically demoralizing for people in their struggle against evil" (300).
If there is no infinite God there can be no final solution to the problem of evil.
Determinism's answer to evil
God was forced to create the world as it is.
This view is normally pantheistic, but some theists who hold creation flows necessarily, not willingly from God also hold it.
Benedict Spinoza believed that the world as we have it is the necessary and most perfect product possible of the necessary and most perfect Being possible.
Objection to Determinism:
1) Creation flows from God's will freely, not necessarily (Revelation 4:11, Ephesians 1:11) That is, He was free not to create
2) God has no need to create
3) The necessary Being does not necessarily need to do anything other than exist
4) Even if God had to create it does not follow he had to create an imperfect world
Finitude does not necessitate evil, it only makes it possible
Impossibilism's Answer to evil
It may be impossible for even an infinite God to foreknow future free events. God could have created free beings not knowing they would bring evil into the world with their freedom.
God cannot control free beings without negating their freedom. Even an infinite God cannot do what is contradictory.
Objection to impossibilism
1) A Calvinist might draw a different conclusion that God foreknows and beings are still free
2) There can be no such thing as truly free (unforeseeable) acts by human beings because that limits God
3) Foreknowledge does not imply fore-determination
4) God is timeless, he does not foresee anything. He sees everything eternally now.
5) Just because an event is determined does not mean that it cannot be freely chosen
6) It makes no sense to speak of something in the future being true
7) God knows the choices and the eventually chosen act
Solutions to the Problem of Evil open to Theism
There are two sets of alternatives to the solution of the problem of evil open to theists:
1) Hypothetical
2) Actual
The hypothetical alternatives for theism
1) God could have decided not to create anything at all
- A God who knew that creation would become corrupt should not have created at all
- No solution to the problem of evil will be satisfactory without addressing this possibility that was open to God
2) God could have created only beings who are not free
- Could God have made an amoral world?
- The nature of God only necessitates that if he does, he must do it best, not that he do
3) God could have created beings who are free to sin, but do not actually sin
- Many have argued that freedom without sin is a contradiction
Objections to this:
1) There is no logical connection between freedom and sin
2) Freedom without sin is not a contradiction in Heaven
4) God could have created beings who are free but must sin
- God pronounces that sin is inevitable, but each sin is not
- Forced freedom though is completely incoherent
5) God could have created beings who were free and who would sin
- This alternative is what theists claim God chose to create
The Actual Alternatives for Theism
Theists must defend the way God chose to create (That he chose to create beings who were free not to sin but inevitably would choose to do so)
1) A theist need not prove three things to answer the problem of evil
He does not have to show that this is the best of all possible worlds, but only that there could be no better world or non-world
He does not have to show how God can achieve the highest perfection out of a world with evil in it.
He does not need to definitively prove that this world is the best of all possible solutions.
2) A theistic solution to evil must meet three conditions:
1) It must be at least possible
2) Offer evidence that it is capable of achievement
3) Present a way that is verifiable/falsifiable
The apparent dilemma facing theism
It seems that the proportions: What God does must be his best and the world is not best eliminates any theistic solution to the problem of evil
God must do his best. It is axiomatic that anything less than doing his best would be evil for GOd.
The theist must show that what God produces is the best possible.
Heaven is actually an argument against this world being the best of all possible worlds.
The way out of this dilemma is to claim that this is not the best of all possible worlds, but the best possible way to get to the best of all possible worlds (heaven)
Only an infinitely wise and good God can guarantee heaven as an outcome
The Dimensions of the Problem of Evil
Three aspects to the problem of evil:
1) Metaphysical
2) Moral
3) Physical
The Metaphysical Aspect of Evil
1) God is the author of everything in the world
2) Evil is something in the world
3) Therefore, God is the author of evil
Theists would not want to reject either of the premises. Denying the first would lead to dualism. Denying the second just seems contrary to experience
Theistic reply:
1) God is the author of everything
2) Evil is not a thing (substance)
3) Therefore, God is not necessarily the author of evil
To deny evil is not a real entity is not to deny the reality of evil. Evil is real. It is a real privation in things.
The Moral Aspect of the Problem of Evil
Pierre Bayle postulated the moral problem of evil in the 17th century.
1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, since evil is not destroyed either:
a) God is omnipotent and malevolent
b) God is benevolent and impotent
c) God is both malevolent and impotent
d) There is no God
Another way of stating it:
1) God is responsible for making everyone, including human freedom
2) Human freedom brought about moral evil
3) Therefore, God is responsible for what brought about moral evil
The Physical Aspect of the Problem of Evil
Not all evil is clearly a result of human freedom
Albert Camus offered the physical problem of evil
1) Either one must join the doc and fight the plague or else join the priest and not fight the plague
2) Not to fight the plague is anti-humanitarian
3) To fight the plague is to fight against God who sent it
4) Therefore if humanitarianism is right, theism is wrong
Theists would deny premise 3
Part 4: God & Evil
14: The nature of the problem of Evil
Nearly every religion attempts to deal with the reality and causes of evil in the world.
The problem of evil arises out of the nature of theism.
There are a number of dimensions to the problem of evil: metaphysical, physical and moral
An inconsistency differs from a contradiction. In a contradiction there are two statements in which one is true and one is false. In an inconsistency one or both statements could be false, but on the surface both cannot be true.
The inconsistency version of the problem of Evil
1) God is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent Being, in accordance with His nature He would abolish all evil
2) Evil exists
Either 1 or 2 could be false, both could be false but both cannot be true.
A way to solve an inconsistency is to show that it is a paradox. Thus, the inconsistency of 1 & 2 can be made into a paradox like this:
1) God is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, in accordance with His nature He would abolish all evil
2) Evil exists
3) God expressed his omnipotent and omnibenevolent nature by creating free beings who are solely responsible for evil.
But this solution may not satisfy men. Someone might still want to know why God created free beings. This way of dealing with the problem of evil is the problem of theodicy (the justification of God).
Non theistic solutions to the Problem of Evil
Illusionism's Answer to Evil
A theist cannot deny the reality of evil. A pantheist can claim that nothing is really evil, but only appears evil, but a theist may not.
Evil is everything that frustrates human aspirations and expectations.
Many people influenced by Eastern thought deny the reality of evil.
Frederic Spiegelburg follows the Indian sage Aurobindo in claiming that pain is not a matter of fact, but a perspective. Once one comes to the truth there is no longer a problem of evil because there is no evil.
Alan Watts accuses Westerners of being unwilling to recognize individual finitude and subsequently looking for a solution in the acts of free individual. He sees good and evil as relative distinctions that do not obtain with ultimate reality.
Problems with illusionism
1) Illusionism does not account for the origin of the illusion
2) It does not explain the apparent reality of the illusion
3) Denying the reality of evil does not remove the presence of reality
4) Illusionism is a theory that is ruined by a brutal gang of facts
"It is more likely that the illusionist is being deceived about evil than that all persons are being deceived by evil" (298).
Sadism's answer to evil
Elie Wiesel postulated that God is sadistic and created the world to watch suffering.
Harold S. Kushner in "When Bad Things Happen to Good People" states we ought to forgive God for not making a better world.
Objections to Sadism
1) God is all-good in theism
2) God as a term seems inappropriate for a sadistic being
3) The universe cannot be ultimately evil because evil presupposes good
4) It seems absurd that there is a being responsible for creating and destroying what he creates (Charles Hartshorne)
Finitism's Answer to Evil
David Hume and subsequent thinkers have proposed that God is finite in power or love (or both).
Finitism is represented by process thinkers today. Charles Hartshorne believes that the worst falsehood known is the traditional concept of omnipotence.
Others claim that God is not essentially limited, but instead limits Himself.
Bruce R. Reichenbach claims that God is sovereign in authority and power, but willingly limits Himself.
Objections to Finitism
1) Only an infinite cause explains the existence of things. A finite God could not be the cause of all existence
2) A finite God is not worthy of worship
3) A finite God cannot guarantee an outcome in the struggle of good and evil.
"A finite god is metaphysically impossible, religiously unworthy and ethically demoralizing for people in their struggle against evil" (300).
If there is no infinite God there can be no final solution to the problem of evil.
Determinism's answer to evil
God was forced to create the world as it is.
This view is normally pantheistic, but some theists who hold creation flows necessarily, not willingly from God also hold it.
Benedict Spinoza believed that the world as we have it is the necessary and most perfect product possible of the necessary and most perfect Being possible.
Objection to Determinism:
1) Creation flows from God's will freely, not necessarily (Revelation 4:11, Ephesians 1:11) That is, He was free not to create
2) God has no need to create
3) The necessary Being does not necessarily need to do anything other than exist
4) Even if God had to create it does not follow he had to create an imperfect world
Finitude does not necessitate evil, it only makes it possible
Impossibilism's Answer to evil
It may be impossible for even an infinite God to foreknow future free events. God could have created free beings not knowing they would bring evil into the world with their freedom.
God cannot control free beings without negating their freedom. Even an infinite God cannot do what is contradictory.
Objection to impossibilism
1) A Calvinist might draw a different conclusion that God foreknows and beings are still free
2) There can be no such thing as truly free (unforeseeable) acts by human beings because that limits God
3) Foreknowledge does not imply fore-determination
4) God is timeless, he does not foresee anything. He sees everything eternally now.
5) Just because an event is determined does not mean that it cannot be freely chosen
6) It makes no sense to speak of something in the future being true
7) God knows the choices and the eventually chosen act
Solutions to the Problem of Evil open to Theism
There are two sets of alternatives to the solution of the problem of evil open to theists:
1) Hypothetical
2) Actual
The hypothetical alternatives for theism
1) God could have decided not to create anything at all
- A God who knew that creation would become corrupt should not have created at all
- No solution to the problem of evil will be satisfactory without addressing this possibility that was open to God
2) God could have created only beings who are not free
- Could God have made an amoral world?
- The nature of God only necessitates that if he does, he must do it best, not that he do
3) God could have created beings who are free to sin, but do not actually sin
- Many have argued that freedom without sin is a contradiction
Objections to this:
1) There is no logical connection between freedom and sin
2) Freedom without sin is not a contradiction in Heaven
4) God could have created beings who are free but must sin
- God pronounces that sin is inevitable, but each sin is not
- Forced freedom though is completely incoherent
5) God could have created beings who were free and who would sin
- This alternative is what theists claim God chose to create
The Actual Alternatives for Theism
Theists must defend the way God chose to create (That he chose to create beings who were free not to sin but inevitably would choose to do so)
1) A theist need not prove three things to answer the problem of evil
He does not have to show that this is the best of all possible worlds, but only that there could be no better world or non-world
He does not have to show how God can achieve the highest perfection out of a world with evil in it.
He does not need to definitively prove that this world is the best of all possible solutions.
2) A theistic solution to evil must meet three conditions:
1) It must be at least possible
2) Offer evidence that it is capable of achievement
3) Present a way that is verifiable/falsifiable
The apparent dilemma facing theism
It seems that the proportions: What God does must be his best and the world is not best eliminates any theistic solution to the problem of evil
God must do his best. It is axiomatic that anything less than doing his best would be evil for GOd.
The theist must show that what God produces is the best possible.
Heaven is actually an argument against this world being the best of all possible worlds.
The way out of this dilemma is to claim that this is not the best of all possible worlds, but the best possible way to get to the best of all possible worlds (heaven)
Only an infinitely wise and good God can guarantee heaven as an outcome
The Dimensions of the Problem of Evil
Three aspects to the problem of evil:
1) Metaphysical
2) Moral
3) Physical
The Metaphysical Aspect of Evil
1) God is the author of everything in the world
2) Evil is something in the world
3) Therefore, God is the author of evil
Theists would not want to reject either of the premises. Denying the first would lead to dualism. Denying the second just seems contrary to experience
Theistic reply:
1) God is the author of everything
2) Evil is not a thing (substance)
3) Therefore, God is not necessarily the author of evil
To deny evil is not a real entity is not to deny the reality of evil. Evil is real. It is a real privation in things.
The Moral Aspect of the Problem of Evil
Pierre Bayle postulated the moral problem of evil in the 17th century.
1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, since evil is not destroyed either:
a) God is omnipotent and malevolent
b) God is benevolent and impotent
c) God is both malevolent and impotent
d) There is no God
Another way of stating it:
1) God is responsible for making everyone, including human freedom
2) Human freedom brought about moral evil
3) Therefore, God is responsible for what brought about moral evil
The Physical Aspect of the Problem of Evil
Not all evil is clearly a result of human freedom
Albert Camus offered the physical problem of evil
1) Either one must join the doc and fight the plague or else join the priest and not fight the plague
2) Not to fight the plague is anti-humanitarian
3) To fight the plague is to fight against God who sent it
4) Therefore if humanitarianism is right, theism is wrong
Theists would deny premise 3
Wednesday, March 7, 2007
Ontological Arguments and Objections
(Originally written March 7, 2007 in Book 13)
Anselm's Debate with Gaunilo
Gaunilo objected to Anselm's argument on a few grounds:
1. It is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must exist outside the mind.
2. If God's non-existence were really inconceivable then no one could doubt his existence.
3. We cannot even form the concept of the most perfect being possible.
4. The existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of a perfect Being anymore than the existence of a perfect island can be inferred from the idea of a perfect island.
5. God's nonexistence is no more inconceivable than my own nonexistence. I can conceive of my own nonexistence so I can conceive of God's nonexistence too.
6. God's existence must be proved before we can discuss his essence. Otherwise there is no basis for saying he is the most perfect Being possible.
Anselm's replies:
1. The argument only applies to an absolute perfect Being.
2. God's nonexistence is affirmable, but not conceivable.
3. We do understand the word because of 6 facts:
- It is a common word
- It is a familiar word
- Our faith and conscience provide content for it
- Conceptions do not have to be in terms of sensible images
- God can be understood indirectly
- Those who deny that they can have a conception of God must have a conception of what they cannot conceive
4. The idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything, especially being; whereas, the idea of anything else can lack being.
5. If it is possible for a necessary being a necessary being must exist. It's nonexistence is inconceivable.
6. We can compare ideal characteristics prior to ascertaining their reality.
Anselm charged Gaunilo with misunderstanding the argument as:
1. God is the greatest of all Beings
2. It is greater to exist in reality then merely in the understanding.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
Anselm states this argument confuses the greatest actual Being with the greatest possible being.
Aquinas' objection to the ontological argument
Aquinas understood Anselm to mean:
1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived
2. What exists actually and mentally is greater than that with exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually.
Aquinas had 3 objections to the argument:
1. Not everyone understands the term "God" to mean that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Even if everyone did understand that the term God meant this, it does not follow that God exists actually.
3. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident, but not self-evident to us.
Descartes' formulation of the Ontological Argument
Descartes' argument (2nd form)
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature of that concept.
2. Existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent.
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
"If God by definition cannot exist, then he must exist" (128).
Descartes' argument (1st form)
1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive of something is true.
2. We clearly and distinctly perceive that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being necessitates the existence of that Being.
3. Therefore, it is true that an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack existence.
Descartes qualified his argument in three ways:
1. This argument applies only to an absolutely perfect or necessary being.
2. It is not necessary for anyone to think of God, but if and when he does he must conceive of God as necessarily existing.
3. To conceive of God as a necessary Being is not imaginary, but necessary. The concept of a necessary being must be what it is and cannot be any other way. Thus, the concept of a necessary Being cannot be the product of one's imagination.
The debate between Caters and Descartes
Caters the priest agreed with Thomas Aquinas in that he felt the Ontological Argument proved only a conceptual and not a real existence of God.
Caters contended that the words "existent lion" is conceptually necessary, but it does not prove that a lion exists.
Descartes stated that Aquinas refuted an argument that stated existence is concluded from the meaning of God, not his own argument.
Other reactions to Descartes' proofs
Other 17th century philosophers reacted negatively to Descartes' arguments. They restated his argument this way.
1. If it is not contradictory that God exists, then it is certain that He exists.
2. It is not contradictory that God exists.
3. Therefore, it is certain that God exists.
They objected to Descartes' argument in two ways:
1. The minor premise can be doubted or denied.
2. Descartes admitted that his idea of God was inadequate and thus unclear. By Descartes definition of truth as "clear and distinct" then it is untrue.
Descartes' replies:
1. God's nonexistence is noncontradictory in either of two senses of the word:
- Whatever does not disagree with human thought (God is noncontradictory)
- What cannot be known by the human mind (no one could know anything, thus God's existence is noncontradictory)
2. Even if our concept of God is inadequate it does not follow that it is contradictory. God's necessary existence is a clear concept, thus the argument is unaffected by lack of clarity in other aspects of God's nature.
The debate between Gassendi and Descartes.
Pierre Gassendi, a skeptic, contended that Descartes confused existence with a property. He argued with 7 points:
1. The essence of a thing can be thought of apart from its existence.
2. Existence is not a property.
3. Essence and existence can be distinguished only in thought, not in reality.
4. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as we are to think of Pegasus as not existing.
5. We need demonstration that God exists, not merely the assumption that it does.
6. Descartes did not really prove that nonexistence is incompatible with God.
Descartes replied to Gassendi with four points:
1. Existence is a property in that it is attributable to something. Necessary existence is a necessary property of a necessary being.
2. We cannot compare the existence of that which is contingent to the existence of what is necessary.
3. It is not begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent.
4. God's existence and essence are inseparable.
Leibniz's Consideration of the Ontological Argument
Leibniz held that the ontological argument was valid but sensed that it was necessary to demonstrate the concept of God was not contradictory.
He stated
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exists.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.
To support his minor premise Leibniz argued that:
1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limitations.
2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities (they differ in kind).
3. Whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it.
4. Therefore, it is possible for on Being (God) to possess all possible perfections.
Three objections to Leibniz's arg.
1. It assumes that some qualities are essentially positive and others negative, but this may not be the case.
2. Leibniz assumes that some qualities are intrinsically simple, but Wittgenstein showed that what is simple in one conceptual system may be complex in another.
3. It depends on the principle of the actual identity which is conceptually indiscernible.
Spinoza's Ontological Proof
Like Descartes, Spinoza held that God was mathematically demonstrable.
Spinoza's argument:
1. There must be a cause for everything, either for its existence or for its nonexistence.
2. A necessary Being (God) necessarily exists, unless there is an adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
3. There is no adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being, necessarily exists.
One may object to Spinoza's insistence that there must be a cause for nothing because it appears contradictory.
Spinoza's second form:
1. Something necessarily exists.
2. This necessary existence is either finite or infinite.
3. It is possible for this necessary existence to be infinite.
4. There must be a cause as to why this is not an infinite existence.
5. No finite existence can hinder this being (an infinite existence).
6. Therefore, this must be an infinite existence
Spinoza's arguments borrow from the premise that something exists from the cosmological argument.
Spinoza's God is not the theistic God of Leibniz or Anselm, it is a pantheistic God.
The Objections of Hume and Kant
Hume's Objection:
1. Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradictory
2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
3. Whatever we conceive to exist we can conceive as nonexistent
4. There is no being whose existence implies a contradiction
5. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.
Hume argues that no argument for God is rationally inescapable because it always contains premises that are logically deniable.
Kant's critique of the Ontological proof
Kant objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary Being (that which cannot be).
He also contended that necessity applied only to propositions, not existence.
Also, what is logically possible is not always ontologically possible.
Existence (Kant held) is not a predicate of a thing. It is not a perfection.
Supposed Causes of the Ontological Mistake
Opponents of the Ontological argument have blamed many sources of the ontological 'mistake'
1) Platonic Philosophy - Platonic epistemology holds that one can directly and intuitively know essences.
2) Metaphysical thinking - some argue that "is" or "exists" is only logical, not ontological.
3) Confusion of cause and reason - Causes need something outside of itself where a reason can be itself (Schopenhauer)
4) Use of a proper name - the use of a proper name implies existence (Russell)
5) The use of the English conditional. Alvin Plantinga claimed that "If Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" does not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. Likewise, "If God exists, then he Necessarily exists" does not imply "God exists" There may be no God at all.
Linehan - Unfair analogy!
"IF Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" may not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. But there is a bachelor. Likewise, "If God exists, then he necessarily exists" may not imply "God exists" But, there is a necessary existence which must be filled by a necessary Existent, which is God.
Findlay's Ontological Disproof of God.
The ontological argument has been widely rejected in modern times.
J. N. Findlay used the ontological proof against itself:
1. God must be thought of as a necessary Being, for anything else short of this would be unworthy of worship.
2. But existential necessary propositions cannot be true for necessity is merely a logical characteristic of propositions, not of reality.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A simpler, proper form of this argument:
1. The only way a necessary Being could exist is to exist necessarily.
2. The proposition "God exists necessarily" is an existentially necessary proposition.
3. No existentially necessary propositions can be true.
4. Therefore, the proposition "God exists necessarily" cannot be true.
A theist can object to this in 4 ways:
1. Change the proposition "God exists necessarily" to "God exists". Then holding the proposition "God exists" as a logically necessary proposition to hold.
2. Deny that necessity applied to existential propositions makes them untrue. (Existentially necessary propositions can be true). Examples of existentially necessary propositions: "I am I". "There is an infinite number of prime numbers". "Square circles do not exist".
3. "God necessarily exists" is a special case (Anselm and Descartes).
4. Findlay's statement "there are no existentially necessary propositions" is an existentially necessary proposition.
Hartshorne's Restatement of the Ontological Proof.
Charles Hartshorne is one of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument and states it like this:
1. The existence of a necessary being is either:
a) Impossible, and there is no example of it
b) Possible, but there is no example of it
c) Possible, and there is an example of it
2. Possible, but there is no example of it is meaningless because a necessary Being cannot be a possible being.
3. Impossible, and there is no example of it is not eliminated by the ontological argument, but the meaningfulness of the term 'necessary Being' is a justifiable assumption that may be defeated on other grounds.
Hartshorne's Argument:
1. All thought must refer to something beyond itself which is at least possible
2. The necessary existence of a necessary Being is at least possible.
3. With a necessary Being an "at-least-possible" existence is indistinguishable from a "possible and actual" existence. A necessary Being cannot have a "merely possible" existence.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being necessarily has both a possible and an actual existence.
Hartshorne's view of God is neither theistic and pantheistic. It is panentheistic.
Hartshorne states, "Either God is a meaningless term or there exists a divine Being" (141).
All versions of the ontological argument contain the implicit premise that what is rationally inescapable is the real.
Malcolm's restatement of the ontological proof
Malcolm believes that Kant invalidated Anselm's first form, but the second form is immune to all criticism.
Malcolm's restatement of Anselm's 2nd form:
1. The existence of a necessary being must be either:
a) a necessary existence
b) an impossible existence
c) a possible existence
2. The existence of a necessary Being is not an impossible existence
a) No one has ever shown the concept of a necessary being to be contradictory
b) there is a basis in human experience for "a greater than which cannot be thought"
c) Leibniz's attempt to prove that there is no contradiction fails. We cannot show that there cannot be one.
3. The existence of a necessary Being cannot be a possible being because:
a) it is contradictory to the very nature of a necessary being
b) a possible being is dependent, a necessary Being is independent
4. Therefore, A necessary Being Necessarily exists
Plantinga's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Plantinga argues that God could exist without his existence being a necessary one. His existence could be logically contingent but not ontologically so.
Planting states that it is logically possible that God never existed at all. It is logically possible that nothing ever existent including God.
All that proponents of the ontological argument have to do invalidate Plantinga's objections too.
Planting offers an ontological argument that is very cosmological. It has left the a priori realm and moved into the a posteriori realm.
Planting uses modal logic in his argument:
1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a world "W" and an essence "E" such that "E" is exemplified in "W" and "E" entails the property "has maximal greatness in W"
5. For any object X, if X, exemplifies E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
7. If W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified.
8. What is impossible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10 Therefore, the being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.
Plantinga's argument is tight and compelling. It avoids many of the traditional criticism of the ontological argument. However there are a few criticisms:
1. The use of modal logic assumes existence of an actual world. Thus, it is a posteriori, not a priori.
2. Defining a perfect being in theistic terms is gratuitous.
3. The essence E is supposed by Plantinga to havre a real existence.
The ontological argument to be valid must assume that something exists and thus it rests on a cosmological principle.
The ontological argument has not proven God exists by itself. It has in fact yielded four types of God and a possible atheistic conception:
1. Leibniz & Descartes - theistic God
2. Spinoza - pantheistic God
3. Hartshorne - panentheistic God
4. Henle - polytheistic gods
5. Atheism - the universe is necessary, but does not include God
Anselm's Debate with Gaunilo
Gaunilo objected to Anselm's argument on a few grounds:
1. It is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must exist outside the mind.
2. If God's non-existence were really inconceivable then no one could doubt his existence.
3. We cannot even form the concept of the most perfect being possible.
4. The existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of a perfect Being anymore than the existence of a perfect island can be inferred from the idea of a perfect island.
5. God's nonexistence is no more inconceivable than my own nonexistence. I can conceive of my own nonexistence so I can conceive of God's nonexistence too.
6. God's existence must be proved before we can discuss his essence. Otherwise there is no basis for saying he is the most perfect Being possible.
Anselm's replies:
1. The argument only applies to an absolute perfect Being.
2. God's nonexistence is affirmable, but not conceivable.
3. We do understand the word because of 6 facts:
- It is a common word
- It is a familiar word
- Our faith and conscience provide content for it
- Conceptions do not have to be in terms of sensible images
- God can be understood indirectly
- Those who deny that they can have a conception of God must have a conception of what they cannot conceive
4. The idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything, especially being; whereas, the idea of anything else can lack being.
5. If it is possible for a necessary being a necessary being must exist. It's nonexistence is inconceivable.
6. We can compare ideal characteristics prior to ascertaining their reality.
Anselm charged Gaunilo with misunderstanding the argument as:
1. God is the greatest of all Beings
2. It is greater to exist in reality then merely in the understanding.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
Anselm states this argument confuses the greatest actual Being with the greatest possible being.
Aquinas' objection to the ontological argument
Aquinas understood Anselm to mean:
1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived
2. What exists actually and mentally is greater than that with exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually.
Aquinas had 3 objections to the argument:
1. Not everyone understands the term "God" to mean that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Even if everyone did understand that the term God meant this, it does not follow that God exists actually.
3. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident, but not self-evident to us.
Descartes' formulation of the Ontological Argument
Descartes' argument (2nd form)
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature of that concept.
2. Existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent.
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
"If God by definition cannot exist, then he must exist" (128).
Descartes' argument (1st form)
1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive of something is true.
2. We clearly and distinctly perceive that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being necessitates the existence of that Being.
3. Therefore, it is true that an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack existence.
Descartes qualified his argument in three ways:
1. This argument applies only to an absolutely perfect or necessary being.
2. It is not necessary for anyone to think of God, but if and when he does he must conceive of God as necessarily existing.
3. To conceive of God as a necessary Being is not imaginary, but necessary. The concept of a necessary being must be what it is and cannot be any other way. Thus, the concept of a necessary Being cannot be the product of one's imagination.
The debate between Caters and Descartes
Caters the priest agreed with Thomas Aquinas in that he felt the Ontological Argument proved only a conceptual and not a real existence of God.
Caters contended that the words "existent lion" is conceptually necessary, but it does not prove that a lion exists.
Descartes stated that Aquinas refuted an argument that stated existence is concluded from the meaning of God, not his own argument.
Other reactions to Descartes' proofs
Other 17th century philosophers reacted negatively to Descartes' arguments. They restated his argument this way.
1. If it is not contradictory that God exists, then it is certain that He exists.
2. It is not contradictory that God exists.
3. Therefore, it is certain that God exists.
They objected to Descartes' argument in two ways:
1. The minor premise can be doubted or denied.
2. Descartes admitted that his idea of God was inadequate and thus unclear. By Descartes definition of truth as "clear and distinct" then it is untrue.
Descartes' replies:
1. God's nonexistence is noncontradictory in either of two senses of the word:
- Whatever does not disagree with human thought (God is noncontradictory)
- What cannot be known by the human mind (no one could know anything, thus God's existence is noncontradictory)
2. Even if our concept of God is inadequate it does not follow that it is contradictory. God's necessary existence is a clear concept, thus the argument is unaffected by lack of clarity in other aspects of God's nature.
The debate between Gassendi and Descartes.
Pierre Gassendi, a skeptic, contended that Descartes confused existence with a property. He argued with 7 points:
1. The essence of a thing can be thought of apart from its existence.
2. Existence is not a property.
3. Essence and existence can be distinguished only in thought, not in reality.
4. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as we are to think of Pegasus as not existing.
5. We need demonstration that God exists, not merely the assumption that it does.
6. Descartes did not really prove that nonexistence is incompatible with God.
Descartes replied to Gassendi with four points:
1. Existence is a property in that it is attributable to something. Necessary existence is a necessary property of a necessary being.
2. We cannot compare the existence of that which is contingent to the existence of what is necessary.
3. It is not begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent.
4. God's existence and essence are inseparable.
Leibniz's Consideration of the Ontological Argument
Leibniz held that the ontological argument was valid but sensed that it was necessary to demonstrate the concept of God was not contradictory.
He stated
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exists.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.
To support his minor premise Leibniz argued that:
1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limitations.
2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities (they differ in kind).
3. Whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it.
4. Therefore, it is possible for on Being (God) to possess all possible perfections.
Three objections to Leibniz's arg.
1. It assumes that some qualities are essentially positive and others negative, but this may not be the case.
2. Leibniz assumes that some qualities are intrinsically simple, but Wittgenstein showed that what is simple in one conceptual system may be complex in another.
3. It depends on the principle of the actual identity which is conceptually indiscernible.
Spinoza's Ontological Proof
Like Descartes, Spinoza held that God was mathematically demonstrable.
Spinoza's argument:
1. There must be a cause for everything, either for its existence or for its nonexistence.
2. A necessary Being (God) necessarily exists, unless there is an adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
3. There is no adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being, necessarily exists.
One may object to Spinoza's insistence that there must be a cause for nothing because it appears contradictory.
Spinoza's second form:
1. Something necessarily exists.
2. This necessary existence is either finite or infinite.
3. It is possible for this necessary existence to be infinite.
4. There must be a cause as to why this is not an infinite existence.
5. No finite existence can hinder this being (an infinite existence).
6. Therefore, this must be an infinite existence
Spinoza's arguments borrow from the premise that something exists from the cosmological argument.
Spinoza's God is not the theistic God of Leibniz or Anselm, it is a pantheistic God.
The Objections of Hume and Kant
Hume's Objection:
1. Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradictory
2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
3. Whatever we conceive to exist we can conceive as nonexistent
4. There is no being whose existence implies a contradiction
5. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.
Hume argues that no argument for God is rationally inescapable because it always contains premises that are logically deniable.
Kant's critique of the Ontological proof
Kant objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary Being (that which cannot be).
He also contended that necessity applied only to propositions, not existence.
Also, what is logically possible is not always ontologically possible.
Existence (Kant held) is not a predicate of a thing. It is not a perfection.
Supposed Causes of the Ontological Mistake
Opponents of the Ontological argument have blamed many sources of the ontological 'mistake'
1) Platonic Philosophy - Platonic epistemology holds that one can directly and intuitively know essences.
2) Metaphysical thinking - some argue that "is" or "exists" is only logical, not ontological.
3) Confusion of cause and reason - Causes need something outside of itself where a reason can be itself (Schopenhauer)
4) Use of a proper name - the use of a proper name implies existence (Russell)
5) The use of the English conditional. Alvin Plantinga claimed that "If Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" does not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. Likewise, "If God exists, then he Necessarily exists" does not imply "God exists" There may be no God at all.
Linehan - Unfair analogy!
"IF Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" may not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. But there is a bachelor. Likewise, "If God exists, then he necessarily exists" may not imply "God exists" But, there is a necessary existence which must be filled by a necessary Existent, which is God.
Findlay's Ontological Disproof of God.
The ontological argument has been widely rejected in modern times.
J. N. Findlay used the ontological proof against itself:
1. God must be thought of as a necessary Being, for anything else short of this would be unworthy of worship.
2. But existential necessary propositions cannot be true for necessity is merely a logical characteristic of propositions, not of reality.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A simpler, proper form of this argument:
1. The only way a necessary Being could exist is to exist necessarily.
2. The proposition "God exists necessarily" is an existentially necessary proposition.
3. No existentially necessary propositions can be true.
4. Therefore, the proposition "God exists necessarily" cannot be true.
A theist can object to this in 4 ways:
1. Change the proposition "God exists necessarily" to "God exists". Then holding the proposition "God exists" as a logically necessary proposition to hold.
2. Deny that necessity applied to existential propositions makes them untrue. (Existentially necessary propositions can be true). Examples of existentially necessary propositions: "I am I". "There is an infinite number of prime numbers". "Square circles do not exist".
3. "God necessarily exists" is a special case (Anselm and Descartes).
4. Findlay's statement "there are no existentially necessary propositions" is an existentially necessary proposition.
Hartshorne's Restatement of the Ontological Proof.
Charles Hartshorne is one of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument and states it like this:
1. The existence of a necessary being is either:
a) Impossible, and there is no example of it
b) Possible, but there is no example of it
c) Possible, and there is an example of it
2. Possible, but there is no example of it is meaningless because a necessary Being cannot be a possible being.
3. Impossible, and there is no example of it is not eliminated by the ontological argument, but the meaningfulness of the term 'necessary Being' is a justifiable assumption that may be defeated on other grounds.
Hartshorne's Argument:
1. All thought must refer to something beyond itself which is at least possible
2. The necessary existence of a necessary Being is at least possible.
3. With a necessary Being an "at-least-possible" existence is indistinguishable from a "possible and actual" existence. A necessary Being cannot have a "merely possible" existence.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being necessarily has both a possible and an actual existence.
Hartshorne's view of God is neither theistic and pantheistic. It is panentheistic.
Hartshorne states, "Either God is a meaningless term or there exists a divine Being" (141).
All versions of the ontological argument contain the implicit premise that what is rationally inescapable is the real.
Malcolm's restatement of the ontological proof
Malcolm believes that Kant invalidated Anselm's first form, but the second form is immune to all criticism.
Malcolm's restatement of Anselm's 2nd form:
1. The existence of a necessary being must be either:
a) a necessary existence
b) an impossible existence
c) a possible existence
2. The existence of a necessary Being is not an impossible existence
a) No one has ever shown the concept of a necessary being to be contradictory
b) there is a basis in human experience for "a greater than which cannot be thought"
c) Leibniz's attempt to prove that there is no contradiction fails. We cannot show that there cannot be one.
3. The existence of a necessary Being cannot be a possible being because:
a) it is contradictory to the very nature of a necessary being
b) a possible being is dependent, a necessary Being is independent
4. Therefore, A necessary Being Necessarily exists
Plantinga's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Plantinga argues that God could exist without his existence being a necessary one. His existence could be logically contingent but not ontologically so.
Planting states that it is logically possible that God never existed at all. It is logically possible that nothing ever existent including God.
All that proponents of the ontological argument have to do invalidate Plantinga's objections too.
Planting offers an ontological argument that is very cosmological. It has left the a priori realm and moved into the a posteriori realm.
Planting uses modal logic in his argument:
1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a world "W" and an essence "E" such that "E" is exemplified in "W" and "E" entails the property "has maximal greatness in W"
5. For any object X, if X, exemplifies E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
7. If W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified.
8. What is impossible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10 Therefore, the being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.
Plantinga's argument is tight and compelling. It avoids many of the traditional criticism of the ontological argument. However there are a few criticisms:
1. The use of modal logic assumes existence of an actual world. Thus, it is a posteriori, not a priori.
2. Defining a perfect being in theistic terms is gratuitous.
3. The essence E is supposed by Plantinga to havre a real existence.
The ontological argument to be valid must assume that something exists and thus it rests on a cosmological principle.
The ontological argument has not proven God exists by itself. It has in fact yielded four types of God and a possible atheistic conception:
1. Leibniz & Descartes - theistic God
2. Spinoza - pantheistic God
3. Hartshorne - panentheistic God
4. Henle - polytheistic gods
5. Atheism - the universe is necessary, but does not include God
Monday, March 5, 2007
Notes Theistic Proofs, Teleological emphasis
(Originally written March 5, 2007 in Book 13)
It seems implausible that all religious people have been deceived completely. The existence of a Transcendent God is more plausible than a completely skeptical outlook on life.
"It seems much more likely that such self-analyzing and self-critical men as Augustine, Blaise Pascal and Kierkegaard were not totally deceived than that total skepticism is right. Unless it is true that no person in the history of the world has ever really been truly critical of his religious experience, then it follows that the reality of God has been critically established from human experience" (76).
Part 2: God & Reason
5 The Function of Theistic Proofs
Most theists are not satisfied with proving God's existence on experience alone. They went to establish rational proofs.
The Modern attitude toward proofs for God
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have offered proofs for the existence of God.
There are four basic categories of theistic proofs:
1) Teleological - argument from telos (design or purpose)
2) Cosmological (aetiological) arguments from causation
3) Ontological - argument from onto (being)
4) Moral - argument from morality
Peter Koëstenbaum stated that theistic proofs are "logically invalid, epistemologically defective and axiologically misplaced" (80).
Proofs are Psychologically Unconvincing
Rational proofs are generally unpersuasive to non-believers.
Some argue that the mystical theology, not rational theology is the draw for religion. William James thought this was so because human needs are deeper than the rational.
"Psychological persuasion precedes rational demonstration" (81).
Proofs are logically invalid
If God does not appear in any of the premises he cannot appear in the conclusion because a conclusion cannot be broader than the premises.
Also, if God appears in the premises than the argument begs the question.
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective
This argument holds that even if God exists we cannot rationally know that he exists.
Kant held that we can only know the thing as it appears to us and not the thing in and of itself.
Proofs are ontologically inadequate
This argues that what is rationally inescapable may not be real. We may be able to devise a rational argument for there existence of God, but that does not mean God exists.
The inescapability of a rational argument is based on the principle of non-contradiction but the principle of non-contradiction, while being rationally inescapable has not been proven to be necessarily true.
Proofs are Axiologically Misplaced
The proof for the existence of God should not be the prime importance of one's religious experience.
Relating to the Modern Attitude Toward Proofs
Modern criticism are of value to theists today, but should not warrant a retreat to fideism.
Proof or Persuasion?
If people are never persuaded by proof then there is not intellectual integrity in the world.
While a rational proof may not play as crucial a role as Rene Descartes held it to, it does not follow that it plays no role at all. Even if if were true that people always believed in God apart from evidence, it does not follow that they believed against the evidence.
A proof for God, if it is successful, leads only to the belief that there is a God, not necessarily a belief in that God.
Disbelief does not always indicate disbelief.
Why do some great minds reject theistic proofs?
1) Some atheists accept no kinds of proof.
2) Some do not allow the types of arguments for God that they allow elsewhere.
3) Some choose not to commit themselves to God despite the evidence.
A lack of persuasion by a theistic proof is not necessarily a fault of that proof, it is a result of a personal choice.
Proofs and logical validity
A formal invalidity of a single proof does not mean all proofs are invalid.
Even if no one has stated a formally valid proof yet, it does not follow that one won't ever be stated.
Logical validity is not purely objective.
Not all rationally acceptable demonstration need to be valid deductions.
Are all Theistic Proofs Epistemologically Defective?
Kant's objections are rested on the unfounded assumption that all true knowledge is modeled after the empirical/mathematical knowledge of Newtonian science.
Kant's consistent agnosticism is not livable because it is self-defeating.
The dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is an unfounded assumption.
Each argument or theistic proof must be examined on its own grounds. One cannot reject all theistic proofs a priori.
Is the Rationally Inescapable Real?
Admitting that theistic proofs are rationally inescapable would be a triumph for theism. Because if theism is rational than atheism is irrational.
People believe that reality is rational and to deny that a rational argument is valid, but not real is to state that a reality is not rational.
To deny that rational is real is to deny that logic or reason has any place in reality.
To state that logic does not apply to reality is self-defeating.
Are proofs Axiologically Misplaced?
Proofs can play a practical and a critical role.
Theoretical proofs should not be used to replace immediate help for immediate needs, but immediate needs should not eliminate theoretical proofs altogether.
6. Theological and Moral Arguments
4 Kinds of attempts to prove the existence of God:
1) Teleological
2) Moral
3) Ontological
4) Cosmological
Teleological Proofs and Problems
The teleological argument in a nutshell is this: the apparent design of the universe is evidence of an intelligent architect
Paley's Watchmaker
William Paley (1743-1805), the archdeacon of Carlisle, gave one of the most popular forms of the teleological argument: Paley argued that if one were to come across a watch in an empty field one would rightly conclude that it had a maker because of its design. The world is even more complexly designed; thus, there must be a world maker.
Cleanthes' Greater Machine Maker
In Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' the theist Clenches offers this teleological argument:
1) All design implies a designer
2) Great design implies a great designer
3) There is great design in the world (like that of a great machine)
4) Therefore, there must be a great Designer of the world
Cleanthes' argument extends beyond Paley's in four ways:
1) He uses other illustrations of design (human eye, male-flame relation, a book, and a voice from Heaven)
2) Makes it clear that the teleological argument is an argument from analogy and that like effects have like causes
3) Denies that chance could cause a voice from heaven
4) Insists that irregularities in nature do not detract from the argument
Mill's objection to the Watchmaker's Argument
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) objected to Paley's argument and then posited one he considered better.
Mill weakened Paley's argument but did not destroy it.
He argued that Paley's argument is built on an analogy. He stated that analogy is weak when there are dissimilarities. Also there is a significant difference between a watch and the world. Thus, Paley's argument is weak.
Mill built his argument on his "method of agreement".
Mill's argument:
1) There is an amazing concurrence of many diverse elements in a human eye.
2) It is impossible that random selection brought this concurrence.
3) The method of agreement argues for a common cause of the eye.
4) The cause was a final (purposing) cause, not an efficient (producing) cause
Mill admitted that if evolution were true, then this argument would be weak.
Hackett's rejoinder on Analogy
Stuart C. Hackett argues:
1) All composites that involve the relation of complex means so as to produce a significant result are composites of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
2) The space-time universe is a composite in which complex means are so heated as to produce significant results.
3) Therefore, the space-time universe is a composite of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
Alvin Plantinga, while not a proponent of the teleological argument points out that criticism of analogy principles is not as strong as it appears to be.
Russell's Evolutionary Disproof
Bertrand Russell offered a disproof of the teleological argument from evolution:
1) The adaptation of means to end in the world is either the result of evolution or else the result of design.
2) This adaptation is the result of evolution.
3) Therefore, this adaptation is not the result of design.
Russell's argument does not disprove the teleological argument. It (at best) forces a modification because:
1) There is no logical reason why adaptation cannot be the result of both evolution and design.
2) Natural selection has not been shown to fully account for all adaptation.
Hume's Skeptical Alternatives to Teleology
Hume stated that if the world were designed that the design would be either:
1) Different from human designs
2) Finite, since the effect is fine
3) Imperfect, because there are imperfection in nature
4) Multiple
5) Male and female because males and females generate this way
6) Anthropomorphic
Or that there is no design
1) The apparent order in the world arose via chance
Alvin Plantinga agrees with Hume's criticism of the teleological argument stating that there may exist a "smidgin of evidence" for design, but that one ought not infer designer from a minute amount of evidence.
Since the time of Hume a teleological theist must show that both the teleological argument woks and that disproofs of teleological arguments are wrong. (It must show that God exists and that the world did not arise from chance).
Taylor's Anticipatory Design
A.E. Taylor hoped to account for evolutionary and chance alternatives with his argument. His argument states:
1. Nature reveals an anticipatory order; it plans for its own preservation.
2. Nature's advanced planning cannot be accounted for by physical laws alone.
3. Mind or intelligence is the only known condition that can remove these improbabilities against life emerging despite these improbabilities.
4. The mind or intelligence that explains anticipatory adaptations cannot be explained as a result of evolution.
5. Darwinian natural selection cannot explain the advance planning evident in nature.
Clark: Design and Thermodynamics
R.E.D. Clark argues against chance by using the second law of thermodynamics
1. Whatever had a beginning had a beginner
2. The Universe had a beginning (as evidenced by the second law of thermodynamics)
3. Therefore, the universe had a beginner who is intelligent and moral.
Intelligence and morality imply personality, thus the Beginner must be personal.
The New Teleological argument:
1) The Universe resulted from either design or chance
2) It is highly improbable it resulted from chance
3) Therefore, it is highly probable it resulted from design.
A loophole in the Argument Against Chance
There is an immensely small probability that the universe happened solely by chance. But, this is an a priori notion. In actual fact, which is a posteriori, it may have occurred by chance despite the remoteness of that chance.
Julian Huxley, a defender of evolution estimated that the odds against evolution were 3 million zeros (15 pages of zeros) to one. Huxley argued that natural selection was the process of overcoming these odds.
Tennant: Filling in the Loophole of chance
One argument against the teleological argument is that the design in the knowable universe may be only temporary and fragmentary.
F.R. Tennant admits that this is a possibility, but only a highly improbable one.
Tennant states that:
1) Mere possibilities of the unknown or unknowable world cannot be used to refute the probabilities within the knowable world
2) There is no evidence to support that the thesis that the knowable world is a lie to the unknowable world
3) The knowable universe is interwoven and interdependent with the unknown universe
4) Thermodynamics shows complexity; random development to be unlikely
5) Chance rearranging of matter cannot explain mind or intelligence
6) The qualitative greatness of human values outweighs the quantitative immensity of the unknowable world
Kant: Ontological defects in the Teleological Argument
Kant rather than offering a disproof for God or completely disregarding the teleological argument, insisted that it was inconclusive.
He stated that we cannot move from experience of design to the idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary being.
The teleological argument does not provide evidence for a creator, but indicates an architect.
The argument yields the highest cause, but is not a sufficient basis for religion. The sap from the highest actual cause indicated by experience to the highest possible cause demanded by pure reason is an unjustifiable ontological leap.
Ducasse: Cosmological Problems in the Teleological Argument
C.J. Ducasse claims that the teleological argument suffers from a number of defects:
1) It does not prove a perfect creator (evil, waste and disease show a lack of purpose)
2) Designers can be inferior to what they design
3) The teleological argument has the same defects the cosmological argument was:
-If the world needs a designer, then so does that designer (ad infinitum)
-If everything is caused, there can be no first cause
Ducasse offers this in replace of the teleological argument:
1) The most economical explanation is probably the correct one
2) The world is more economically explained by a purposeless craving within man than by some intelligence beyond the world
3) Therefore, it is more probable that the world is the result of purposeless craving than of intelligent design
This argument is lacking in several ways:
1) The principle of economy may not be appropriately applied to the cause of the universe
2) Assuming that the best cause will come from within the universe, but not from beyond it begs the question
3) How is a purposeless craving a more economical explanation than that of a God?
4) How can a purposeless craving result in purposeful activity?
The teleological argument is not definitive as it stands, but it does:
1) Make it probable (not certain) that some kind of intelligence is behind the design of the world (chance is possible, but not probable)
2) Favor the unity of this cause
3) Not demand that the cause be absolutely perfect
4) Does not ipso facto explain the presence of evil and disorder in the world?
5) Is dependent on the cosmological and moral arguments to establish these other aspects of a theistic God
6) Is really a causal argument from effect to cause, only it argues from the intelligence nature of the effect to an intelligent one.
The teleological argument depends on the cosmological argument in that it borrows the principle of causality.
It seems implausible that all religious people have been deceived completely. The existence of a Transcendent God is more plausible than a completely skeptical outlook on life.
"It seems much more likely that such self-analyzing and self-critical men as Augustine, Blaise Pascal and Kierkegaard were not totally deceived than that total skepticism is right. Unless it is true that no person in the history of the world has ever really been truly critical of his religious experience, then it follows that the reality of God has been critically established from human experience" (76).
Part 2: God & Reason
5 The Function of Theistic Proofs
Most theists are not satisfied with proving God's existence on experience alone. They went to establish rational proofs.
The Modern attitude toward proofs for God
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have offered proofs for the existence of God.
There are four basic categories of theistic proofs:
1) Teleological - argument from telos (design or purpose)
2) Cosmological (aetiological) arguments from causation
3) Ontological - argument from onto (being)
4) Moral - argument from morality
Peter Koëstenbaum stated that theistic proofs are "logically invalid, epistemologically defective and axiologically misplaced" (80).
Proofs are Psychologically Unconvincing
Rational proofs are generally unpersuasive to non-believers.
Some argue that the mystical theology, not rational theology is the draw for religion. William James thought this was so because human needs are deeper than the rational.
"Psychological persuasion precedes rational demonstration" (81).
Proofs are logically invalid
If God does not appear in any of the premises he cannot appear in the conclusion because a conclusion cannot be broader than the premises.
Also, if God appears in the premises than the argument begs the question.
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective
This argument holds that even if God exists we cannot rationally know that he exists.
Kant held that we can only know the thing as it appears to us and not the thing in and of itself.
Proofs are ontologically inadequate
This argues that what is rationally inescapable may not be real. We may be able to devise a rational argument for there existence of God, but that does not mean God exists.
The inescapability of a rational argument is based on the principle of non-contradiction but the principle of non-contradiction, while being rationally inescapable has not been proven to be necessarily true.
Proofs are Axiologically Misplaced
The proof for the existence of God should not be the prime importance of one's religious experience.
Relating to the Modern Attitude Toward Proofs
Modern criticism are of value to theists today, but should not warrant a retreat to fideism.
Proof or Persuasion?
If people are never persuaded by proof then there is not intellectual integrity in the world.
While a rational proof may not play as crucial a role as Rene Descartes held it to, it does not follow that it plays no role at all. Even if if were true that people always believed in God apart from evidence, it does not follow that they believed against the evidence.
A proof for God, if it is successful, leads only to the belief that there is a God, not necessarily a belief in that God.
Disbelief does not always indicate disbelief.
Why do some great minds reject theistic proofs?
1) Some atheists accept no kinds of proof.
2) Some do not allow the types of arguments for God that they allow elsewhere.
3) Some choose not to commit themselves to God despite the evidence.
A lack of persuasion by a theistic proof is not necessarily a fault of that proof, it is a result of a personal choice.
Proofs and logical validity
A formal invalidity of a single proof does not mean all proofs are invalid.
Even if no one has stated a formally valid proof yet, it does not follow that one won't ever be stated.
Logical validity is not purely objective.
Not all rationally acceptable demonstration need to be valid deductions.
Are all Theistic Proofs Epistemologically Defective?
Kant's objections are rested on the unfounded assumption that all true knowledge is modeled after the empirical/mathematical knowledge of Newtonian science.
Kant's consistent agnosticism is not livable because it is self-defeating.
The dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is an unfounded assumption.
Each argument or theistic proof must be examined on its own grounds. One cannot reject all theistic proofs a priori.
Is the Rationally Inescapable Real?
Admitting that theistic proofs are rationally inescapable would be a triumph for theism. Because if theism is rational than atheism is irrational.
People believe that reality is rational and to deny that a rational argument is valid, but not real is to state that a reality is not rational.
To deny that rational is real is to deny that logic or reason has any place in reality.
To state that logic does not apply to reality is self-defeating.
Are proofs Axiologically Misplaced?
Proofs can play a practical and a critical role.
Theoretical proofs should not be used to replace immediate help for immediate needs, but immediate needs should not eliminate theoretical proofs altogether.
6. Theological and Moral Arguments
4 Kinds of attempts to prove the existence of God:
1) Teleological
2) Moral
3) Ontological
4) Cosmological
Teleological Proofs and Problems
The teleological argument in a nutshell is this: the apparent design of the universe is evidence of an intelligent architect
Paley's Watchmaker
William Paley (1743-1805), the archdeacon of Carlisle, gave one of the most popular forms of the teleological argument: Paley argued that if one were to come across a watch in an empty field one would rightly conclude that it had a maker because of its design. The world is even more complexly designed; thus, there must be a world maker.
Cleanthes' Greater Machine Maker
In Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' the theist Clenches offers this teleological argument:
1) All design implies a designer
2) Great design implies a great designer
3) There is great design in the world (like that of a great machine)
4) Therefore, there must be a great Designer of the world
Cleanthes' argument extends beyond Paley's in four ways:
1) He uses other illustrations of design (human eye, male-flame relation, a book, and a voice from Heaven)
2) Makes it clear that the teleological argument is an argument from analogy and that like effects have like causes
3) Denies that chance could cause a voice from heaven
4) Insists that irregularities in nature do not detract from the argument
Mill's objection to the Watchmaker's Argument
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) objected to Paley's argument and then posited one he considered better.
Mill weakened Paley's argument but did not destroy it.
He argued that Paley's argument is built on an analogy. He stated that analogy is weak when there are dissimilarities. Also there is a significant difference between a watch and the world. Thus, Paley's argument is weak.
Mill built his argument on his "method of agreement".
Mill's argument:
1) There is an amazing concurrence of many diverse elements in a human eye.
2) It is impossible that random selection brought this concurrence.
3) The method of agreement argues for a common cause of the eye.
4) The cause was a final (purposing) cause, not an efficient (producing) cause
Mill admitted that if evolution were true, then this argument would be weak.
Hackett's rejoinder on Analogy
Stuart C. Hackett argues:
1) All composites that involve the relation of complex means so as to produce a significant result are composites of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
2) The space-time universe is a composite in which complex means are so heated as to produce significant results.
3) Therefore, the space-time universe is a composite of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
Alvin Plantinga, while not a proponent of the teleological argument points out that criticism of analogy principles is not as strong as it appears to be.
Russell's Evolutionary Disproof
Bertrand Russell offered a disproof of the teleological argument from evolution:
1) The adaptation of means to end in the world is either the result of evolution or else the result of design.
2) This adaptation is the result of evolution.
3) Therefore, this adaptation is not the result of design.
Russell's argument does not disprove the teleological argument. It (at best) forces a modification because:
1) There is no logical reason why adaptation cannot be the result of both evolution and design.
2) Natural selection has not been shown to fully account for all adaptation.
Hume's Skeptical Alternatives to Teleology
Hume stated that if the world were designed that the design would be either:
1) Different from human designs
2) Finite, since the effect is fine
3) Imperfect, because there are imperfection in nature
4) Multiple
5) Male and female because males and females generate this way
6) Anthropomorphic
Or that there is no design
1) The apparent order in the world arose via chance
Alvin Plantinga agrees with Hume's criticism of the teleological argument stating that there may exist a "smidgin of evidence" for design, but that one ought not infer designer from a minute amount of evidence.
Since the time of Hume a teleological theist must show that both the teleological argument woks and that disproofs of teleological arguments are wrong. (It must show that God exists and that the world did not arise from chance).
Taylor's Anticipatory Design
A.E. Taylor hoped to account for evolutionary and chance alternatives with his argument. His argument states:
1. Nature reveals an anticipatory order; it plans for its own preservation.
2. Nature's advanced planning cannot be accounted for by physical laws alone.
3. Mind or intelligence is the only known condition that can remove these improbabilities against life emerging despite these improbabilities.
4. The mind or intelligence that explains anticipatory adaptations cannot be explained as a result of evolution.
5. Darwinian natural selection cannot explain the advance planning evident in nature.
Clark: Design and Thermodynamics
R.E.D. Clark argues against chance by using the second law of thermodynamics
1. Whatever had a beginning had a beginner
2. The Universe had a beginning (as evidenced by the second law of thermodynamics)
3. Therefore, the universe had a beginner who is intelligent and moral.
Intelligence and morality imply personality, thus the Beginner must be personal.
The New Teleological argument:
1) The Universe resulted from either design or chance
2) It is highly improbable it resulted from chance
3) Therefore, it is highly probable it resulted from design.
A loophole in the Argument Against Chance
There is an immensely small probability that the universe happened solely by chance. But, this is an a priori notion. In actual fact, which is a posteriori, it may have occurred by chance despite the remoteness of that chance.
Julian Huxley, a defender of evolution estimated that the odds against evolution were 3 million zeros (15 pages of zeros) to one. Huxley argued that natural selection was the process of overcoming these odds.
Tennant: Filling in the Loophole of chance
One argument against the teleological argument is that the design in the knowable universe may be only temporary and fragmentary.
F.R. Tennant admits that this is a possibility, but only a highly improbable one.
Tennant states that:
1) Mere possibilities of the unknown or unknowable world cannot be used to refute the probabilities within the knowable world
2) There is no evidence to support that the thesis that the knowable world is a lie to the unknowable world
3) The knowable universe is interwoven and interdependent with the unknown universe
4) Thermodynamics shows complexity; random development to be unlikely
5) Chance rearranging of matter cannot explain mind or intelligence
6) The qualitative greatness of human values outweighs the quantitative immensity of the unknowable world
Kant: Ontological defects in the Teleological Argument
Kant rather than offering a disproof for God or completely disregarding the teleological argument, insisted that it was inconclusive.
He stated that we cannot move from experience of design to the idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary being.
The teleological argument does not provide evidence for a creator, but indicates an architect.
The argument yields the highest cause, but is not a sufficient basis for religion. The sap from the highest actual cause indicated by experience to the highest possible cause demanded by pure reason is an unjustifiable ontological leap.
Ducasse: Cosmological Problems in the Teleological Argument
C.J. Ducasse claims that the teleological argument suffers from a number of defects:
1) It does not prove a perfect creator (evil, waste and disease show a lack of purpose)
2) Designers can be inferior to what they design
3) The teleological argument has the same defects the cosmological argument was:
-If the world needs a designer, then so does that designer (ad infinitum)
-If everything is caused, there can be no first cause
Ducasse offers this in replace of the teleological argument:
1) The most economical explanation is probably the correct one
2) The world is more economically explained by a purposeless craving within man than by some intelligence beyond the world
3) Therefore, it is more probable that the world is the result of purposeless craving than of intelligent design
This argument is lacking in several ways:
1) The principle of economy may not be appropriately applied to the cause of the universe
2) Assuming that the best cause will come from within the universe, but not from beyond it begs the question
3) How is a purposeless craving a more economical explanation than that of a God?
4) How can a purposeless craving result in purposeful activity?
The teleological argument is not definitive as it stands, but it does:
1) Make it probable (not certain) that some kind of intelligence is behind the design of the world (chance is possible, but not probable)
2) Favor the unity of this cause
3) Not demand that the cause be absolutely perfect
4) Does not ipso facto explain the presence of evil and disorder in the world?
5) Is dependent on the cosmological and moral arguments to establish these other aspects of a theistic God
6) Is really a causal argument from effect to cause, only it argues from the intelligence nature of the effect to an intelligent one.
The teleological argument depends on the cosmological argument in that it borrows the principle of causality.
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