(Originally written November 14, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Chapter 11 - Methodological Changes in Method
[Against Universal Method]
Feyerabend made a strong case against the various accounts of scientific method by showing the incompatibility of these accounts and Galileo's advances in physics and astronomy.
Chalmers states that he takes issue with Feyerabend's historical accuracy, but states that the various scientific methods still fall short with the corrected history.
Feyerabend makes a strong case against a universal, ahistorical method of science.
Feyerabend represents one extreme: not method. Other methods represent the other extreme: dogmatic method.
Feyerabend gives no attack against a fluid, revisable method within any particular science.
Chalmers proposes that there is a middle ground between the two extremes. There are historically contingent methods and standards implicit in any successful science.
A common response to a middle-road approach is that if a scientific method is to change then it must be shown that it changes for the better to avoid extreme relativism. In order for there to be a way to show that any change is a change for the better there must be a standard to judge the standards. Any standard to judge the standards is a super standard or a universal, which Feyerabend thoroughly decimated.
John Worrall proposed an argument like this and concluded that there must be either a universal method or relativism.
[Telescopic for naked-eye data: a change in standards]
Aristotelian opponents of Galileo held that the senses and experience should be our guide in philosophizing and the criterion for science.
Aristotelians backed up the primacy of the senses with a teleological argument.
The Function of the senses was to provide us with information about the world. Because of this it makes no sense to believe that the senses systematically mislead us because that is the opposite of their function.
Galileo had to argue against this Aristotelian/Thomistic mind-set to introduce the telescope and telescopic data.
Feyerabend claims that Galileo resorted to propaganda and trickery to overcome this dilemma.
In fact though, Galileo used his hypothesis, not propaganda to prove his point. The dependence of irradiation is the test he used to change the mind-set of the scientific community. Galileo proved that the eye was misleading when it viewed small light sources (i.e. the stars, planets) at a distance. The telescope removes the irradiation and thus yields more reliable data.
[Piece meal change of theory, method and standards]
Galileo was able to convince his rivals in such a short time-span because he and his rivals showed a lot of common theoretical beliefs.
At any stage, a science will have some specific aims and some methods to meet their knowledge aims.
Science is like a web that grows and catches new things in it.
"Any part of the web of aims, methods, standards, theories, and observational facts that constitute a science at a particular time can be progressively changed, and the remaining part of the web will provide the background against which a case for the change can be made" (Chalmers, 170).
The entire web cannot change at once because the thing would collapse.
[A light hearted interlude]
Opponents of Chalmer's middle-road method would state that rival theorists appeal to some higher or more general standard if they shared aims. Thus there is a universal method (though unarticulated or inarticulate whatever)
Chalmers concedes that there is a common sense version of the universal scientific method. "Take argument and the available evidence seriously and do not aim for a kind of knowledge or a level of confirmation that is beyond the reach of available methods" (Chalmers, 171).
But this concession, if it is the end, all puts all philosophers of science out of business because the formulation this method could be done by anyone with any common sense.
Also once the common sense view has been stated, any further investigation will vary from science to science and be played against an historical backdrop.
An appreciation of the common sense view of the scientific method is sufficient enough to resist socialists and post-modernists who downplay the special status of science on the grounds that scientific knowledge panders to some special interest group.
Michael Mulkay, a post-modernist drew the conclusion that a sociological categorization of science is made necessary by the failure of what he terms the standard view
Showing posts with label Feyerabend. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Feyerabend. Show all posts
Tuesday, November 14, 2006
What is this thing called science? Ch. 10
(Originally written November 14, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Ch. 10: Feyerabend's anarchistic theory of science
[story so far]
It has been a struggle to distinguish scientific knowledge from any other type of knowledge.
[Feyerabend's case against method]
Feyerabend argued that science posses no features that render it superior to any other knowledge pursuit.
Feyerabend sought to undermine philosophers' attempts to characterize method and progress in science.
Feyerabend insists that scientific theories that are unaccepted or unacceptable in a certain time make use of propaganda to gain acceptance.
Feyerabend teased Lakatos for being so lax in his standards he cannot rule anything out as a non-science.
Feyerabend rejected Kuhn's claim of social consensus of the scientific community because he felt the appeal to consensus of a community was incapable of distinguishing science from other activities.
Feyerabend claimed he had proved there is no way of establishing science as special. Thus, we ought not to claim its superiority.
Feyerabend saw a high regard of science as a dangerous dogma. Dogmatic science plays a repressive role like the Church played for centuries.
[Feyerabend's advocacy of freedom]
Feyerabend's theory of science is formulated in an ethical system that emphasizes individual freedom.
Feyerabend saw individual freedom as the means to creating the best human beings. By removing the methodological constraints placed on scientists, individuals will be free to choose between science and other forms of knowledge.
The institutionalization of science was something that Feyerabend fought against.
He stated that we need to "free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our ancestors free us from the strangling hold of the One True Religion" (Chalmers, 156).
Feyeabend advocated for an ideologically neutral state.
Feyerabend claims that philosophies of science are based on aesthetic judgments, judgments of tastes, metaphysical prejudices, religious desire and other subjective feelings.
"There is no scientific method, then scientists should follower their subjective wishes. Anything goes" (Chalmers, 157).
[Critique of Feyerabend's individualism]
A central problem with Feyerabend's account of freedom is that it is entirely a negative account. Freedom is simply more than a freedom from constraints.
Scientists are free only to the extent that they are free to choose from various available techniques in their given field.
Another major problem with Feyerabend is his notion of an ideologically-neutral state. It is childishly naive.
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Ch. 10: Feyerabend's anarchistic theory of science
[story so far]
It has been a struggle to distinguish scientific knowledge from any other type of knowledge.
[Feyerabend's case against method]
Feyerabend argued that science posses no features that render it superior to any other knowledge pursuit.
Feyerabend sought to undermine philosophers' attempts to characterize method and progress in science.
Feyerabend insists that scientific theories that are unaccepted or unacceptable in a certain time make use of propaganda to gain acceptance.
Feyerabend teased Lakatos for being so lax in his standards he cannot rule anything out as a non-science.
Feyerabend rejected Kuhn's claim of social consensus of the scientific community because he felt the appeal to consensus of a community was incapable of distinguishing science from other activities.
Feyerabend claimed he had proved there is no way of establishing science as special. Thus, we ought not to claim its superiority.
Feyerabend saw a high regard of science as a dangerous dogma. Dogmatic science plays a repressive role like the Church played for centuries.
[Feyerabend's advocacy of freedom]
Feyerabend's theory of science is formulated in an ethical system that emphasizes individual freedom.
Feyerabend saw individual freedom as the means to creating the best human beings. By removing the methodological constraints placed on scientists, individuals will be free to choose between science and other forms of knowledge.
The institutionalization of science was something that Feyerabend fought against.
He stated that we need to "free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our ancestors free us from the strangling hold of the One True Religion" (Chalmers, 156).
Feyeabend advocated for an ideologically neutral state.
Feyerabend claims that philosophies of science are based on aesthetic judgments, judgments of tastes, metaphysical prejudices, religious desire and other subjective feelings.
"There is no scientific method, then scientists should follower their subjective wishes. Anything goes" (Chalmers, 157).
[Critique of Feyerabend's individualism]
A central problem with Feyerabend's account of freedom is that it is entirely a negative account. Freedom is simply more than a freedom from constraints.
Scientists are free only to the extent that they are free to choose from various available techniques in their given field.
Another major problem with Feyerabend is his notion of an ideologically-neutral state. It is childishly naive.
What is this thing called science? Ch. 13 (A)
(Originally written November 14, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Chapter 13 - The New Experimentalism
Introduction:
If the Bayesian account of scientific inference failed, we have not proven much at all about the characterization of what is distinctive about science.
Popper used theory-dependence of observation to poke holes in positivism and inductivism. Popper's account was, however, unable to prove what was falsified: a theory or a part of a theory.
Corrections to Popper's account, like Kuhn and Lakatos became even more theory-dependent. Bayesianism is also a theory-dependent case and suffers the same problems.
Feyerabend saw this and chucked science and took it off its pedestal.
Modern philosophers of science are split; but, some of them are attempting to get off the theory-dependent train without returning to positivism's naive belief in the reliability of sense-datum.
If scientific progress is the steady build-up of experimental knowledge then the philosophy of science's notion of science as being the accumulation of facts can be reinstated in a way that is not destroyed by old arguments.
[Experiment with life of its own]
If experiment is the basis for science then a theory-dependent or fallible account of science is unnecessary and wrong.
Knowledge of the experimental factors can be more valuable then theoretical knowledge.
[Deborah Mayo on severe experimental testing]
Mayo focuses on the detailed way in which claims are validated by experiment.
She holds that a claim can only be said to be borne out of experiment if the claim has been severely tested by experiment and has never been shown to be false
What is this thing called science?
Chapter 13 - The New Experimentalism
Introduction:
If the Bayesian account of scientific inference failed, we have not proven much at all about the characterization of what is distinctive about science.
Popper used theory-dependence of observation to poke holes in positivism and inductivism. Popper's account was, however, unable to prove what was falsified: a theory or a part of a theory.
Corrections to Popper's account, like Kuhn and Lakatos became even more theory-dependent. Bayesianism is also a theory-dependent case and suffers the same problems.
Feyerabend saw this and chucked science and took it off its pedestal.
Modern philosophers of science are split; but, some of them are attempting to get off the theory-dependent train without returning to positivism's naive belief in the reliability of sense-datum.
If scientific progress is the steady build-up of experimental knowledge then the philosophy of science's notion of science as being the accumulation of facts can be reinstated in a way that is not destroyed by old arguments.
[Experiment with life of its own]
If experiment is the basis for science then a theory-dependent or fallible account of science is unnecessary and wrong.
Knowledge of the experimental factors can be more valuable then theoretical knowledge.
[Deborah Mayo on severe experimental testing]
Mayo focuses on the detailed way in which claims are validated by experiment.
She holds that a claim can only be said to be borne out of experiment if the claim has been severely tested by experiment and has never been shown to be false
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