The History of Western Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
Ch IX Ecclesiastical Reform in the 11th Century
The level of education rose enormously in the clergy and considerably in the aristocracy during this time. The Normans had kicked out the Saracens from Sicily and curbed the activities of the Scandinavians with their conquests in France and England. Unlike the brief Carolingian renaissance, the gains made in the 11th century had some sticking power.
The reforms were primarily against simony and concubinage.
Simony was a sin, but it also meant that the bishops were selected based on wealth and not merit. And, bishoprics costing a fortune, the newly purchased position was then exploited to recoup the lost income in the purchase.
Clerical celibacy had been admired but was not routine. The imposition of celibacy on the priests made it impossible for a priest to pass Church lands on to his children and further removed the priests from the laity by showing the celibate life of the priest to be greater than the married life of the commonfolk.
The reform of the Church began primarily with monastic reform. The reform of the Papacy was more the work of the Emperor.
Emperor Henry III (1039-1056) deposed the pope Gregory VI, who though a reformer, had acquired the papacy by simony. Henry III would go on to appoint four popes and after the death of Henry III the papacy, which had its moral authority restored by the Emperor declared independence and then superiority over the emperor and two hundred years of tug-a-war ensued.
During the reign of Henry IV the selection of the Pope was codified to essential be a position chosen by the Cardinals, freezing the Emperor out. It was during Henry IV's reign that the investiture crisis began.
The philosophical activity of the 11th century came entirely from monks connected with the reform movement. They including Peter Damian, Berengar of Tours, Lanfranc and Saint Anselm.
Saint Anselm is most famous for the ontological argument, but he also had a foundation in Augustine and Plato. Through neoplatonic arguments he derived another proof for God and proof for Trinity. (Plotinus also had an argument for a trinity, though not one the Christian orthodox could accept).
Anselm, like most of his predecessors were more Platonic in their Christianity. After Aquinas, Christian philosophers became more Aristotelian. Roscelin, a younger contemporary of Anselm, marks the beginning of the Aristotelian bent and scholastic philosophy.
Showing posts with label Aquinas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Aquinas. Show all posts
Saturday, September 28, 2019
Wednesday, September 25, 2019
The Religious Development of the Jews
The History of Western Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
Book Two Catholic Philosophy
Introduction
The Middle Ages was dominated by the Church and thus intellectual thought was also dominated by churchmen.
There is a dualism present in the Middle Ages, the dualism of clergy and laity, of Latin & Teuton, of the kingdom of this world and the kingdom of God, of spirit of flesh and of Pope and Emperor.
The early part of the Middle Ages is dominated by Augustine and Plato. The latter part is dominated with St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle.
The misery of the Middle Ages "heightened the intensity of religious feeling". Nothing in the world which was full of death and war and strife was of value except for virtue because that steadfast virtue would lead to eternal bliss.
Part I. The Fathers
Ch. I The Religious Development of the Jews
"The Christian religion, as it was handed over by the late Roman Empire to the barbarians,
consisted of three elements: first, certain philosophical beliefs, derived mainly from Plato and
the Neoplatonists, but also in part from the Stoics; second, a conception of morals and history
derived from the Jews; and thirdly, certain theories, more especially as to salvation, which were
on the whole new in Christianity, though in part traceable to Orphism, and to kindred cults of
the Near East" (Russell, 308).
The most important Jewish elements in Christianity according to Russell:
1. A sacred history that justifies the ways of God to man
2. The existence of a select few whom God especially loves, i.e. The Chosen People or the elect
3. A new concept of what is righteousness. Practical philanthropy as part of the Christian concept of virtue comes from the Jews.
4. The Law
5. The Messiah, the Christians simply moved the prosperity from a temporal plane to a heavenly one
6. The Kingdom of Heaven
Judaism became different from other contemporary religions when it became exclusive and monotheistic. "Jeremiah and Ezekiel, especially, seem to have invented the idea that all religions except one are false, and that the Lord punishes idolatry" (Russell, 310).
The captivity periods in Jewish history were understood to be a justification of the nationalistic and doomsday prophets of earlier times.
The Jews looked to God as a parental relationship and the Jews could be purified through God's punishment.
Judaism also moved from a sacrificial religion to a non-sacrificial one when the Temple was destroyed.
Isaiah greatly increased the belief in a Messiah, possibly as a result of Persian influence.
The Hellenization of Jews was difficult. Jerusalem fell in between the Seleucid and the Ptolemies. When in 175 B.C. the Seleucid king Antiochus IV sought to fully hellenize the Jews he was met with resistance. In 170 B.C. the Jews revolted. This is the history told in the First Book of Maccabees.
It was during this time that the Jews started to believe in an immortality in order to account for the good suffering and the belief that God would reward the good.
Some Jews living in the diaspora were hellenized, but the survival of Judaism is the result of brave Jews in Jerusalem who fought to preserve the original and uniqueness of their monotheistic faith.
The Jewish focus on the Law made them an intensely conservative group.
Both Jews and Christians think a lot about sin, but Christians thought of themselves as sinners while Jews mainly did not.
After the Roman destruction of the Temple in AD 70 the Jews of the Diaspora became increasingly important, especially the very Hellenized Jews of Alexandria.
Philo, a contemporary of Christ, is the perfect illustration of Greek influence on Jews. Philo was orthodox in his religion and a Platonist in his philosophy. He was very important to the early Christian Fathers.
Bertrand Russell
Book Two Catholic Philosophy
Introduction
The Middle Ages was dominated by the Church and thus intellectual thought was also dominated by churchmen.
There is a dualism present in the Middle Ages, the dualism of clergy and laity, of Latin & Teuton, of the kingdom of this world and the kingdom of God, of spirit of flesh and of Pope and Emperor.
The early part of the Middle Ages is dominated by Augustine and Plato. The latter part is dominated with St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle.
The misery of the Middle Ages "heightened the intensity of religious feeling". Nothing in the world which was full of death and war and strife was of value except for virtue because that steadfast virtue would lead to eternal bliss.
Part I. The Fathers
Ch. I The Religious Development of the Jews
"The Christian religion, as it was handed over by the late Roman Empire to the barbarians,
consisted of three elements: first, certain philosophical beliefs, derived mainly from Plato and
the Neoplatonists, but also in part from the Stoics; second, a conception of morals and history
derived from the Jews; and thirdly, certain theories, more especially as to salvation, which were
on the whole new in Christianity, though in part traceable to Orphism, and to kindred cults of
the Near East" (Russell, 308).
The most important Jewish elements in Christianity according to Russell:
1. A sacred history that justifies the ways of God to man
2. The existence of a select few whom God especially loves, i.e. The Chosen People or the elect
3. A new concept of what is righteousness. Practical philanthropy as part of the Christian concept of virtue comes from the Jews.
4. The Law
5. The Messiah, the Christians simply moved the prosperity from a temporal plane to a heavenly one
6. The Kingdom of Heaven
Judaism became different from other contemporary religions when it became exclusive and monotheistic. "Jeremiah and Ezekiel, especially, seem to have invented the idea that all religions except one are false, and that the Lord punishes idolatry" (Russell, 310).
The captivity periods in Jewish history were understood to be a justification of the nationalistic and doomsday prophets of earlier times.
The Jews looked to God as a parental relationship and the Jews could be purified through God's punishment.
Judaism also moved from a sacrificial religion to a non-sacrificial one when the Temple was destroyed.
Isaiah greatly increased the belief in a Messiah, possibly as a result of Persian influence.
The Hellenization of Jews was difficult. Jerusalem fell in between the Seleucid and the Ptolemies. When in 175 B.C. the Seleucid king Antiochus IV sought to fully hellenize the Jews he was met with resistance. In 170 B.C. the Jews revolted. This is the history told in the First Book of Maccabees.
It was during this time that the Jews started to believe in an immortality in order to account for the good suffering and the belief that God would reward the good.
Some Jews living in the diaspora were hellenized, but the survival of Judaism is the result of brave Jews in Jerusalem who fought to preserve the original and uniqueness of their monotheistic faith.
The Jewish focus on the Law made them an intensely conservative group.
Both Jews and Christians think a lot about sin, but Christians thought of themselves as sinners while Jews mainly did not.
After the Roman destruction of the Temple in AD 70 the Jews of the Diaspora became increasingly important, especially the very Hellenized Jews of Alexandria.
Philo, a contemporary of Christ, is the perfect illustration of Greek influence on Jews. Philo was orthodox in his religion and a Platonist in his philosophy. He was very important to the early Christian Fathers.
Saturday, May 12, 2007
Notes on Discoure on Metaphysics (A)
(Originally written May 12, 2007 in Book 14)
We come back to my mentor and favorite, the much maligned G.W. Leibniz.
Discourse on Metaphysics and other Essays
G.W. Leibniz
Trans. Daniel Garber & Raoger Ariew
Hackett Publishing Co.
Indianapolis, IN
1991
Discourse on Metaphysics 1686
1. On Divine Perfection and that God does everyone in the most desirable way
- God is an absolutely perfect being
- Power & knowledge are perfection and have no limits within God
- The more enlightened we are of God's works the more we'll "be disposed to find them excellent and in complete conformity with what we might have desired" (Leibniz, 1).
2. Against those who claim that there is no goodness in God's works or that the rules of goodness and Beauty are arbitrary
- By looking at the created things we can discover the creator
- All acts of will presuppose a reason for willing
- Reason is prior to the act of will
- Eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry and the rules of goodness, justice and perfection are not merely the effects of the will of God, but the consequences of His understanding.
3. Against those who believe that God might have made things better
- The consequences of believing that God could have made things better are wholly contrary to the glory of God.
- "A lesser evil is relatively good, so a lesser good is relatively evil" (Leibniz, 3).
- To act with less perfection than one could have is to act imperfectly
- The reason many believe that God could have created better is our inadequate knowledge of the general harmony of the universe and the hidden reasons for God's conduct
- "God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified" (Leibniz, 3).
4. That the Love of God requires our complete satisfaction and acquiescence with respect to what he has done without our being quietist as a result
- Those who are dissatisfied with God's creation cannot fully love God
- We must be truly satisfied with everything that comes to us because it is according to His will
- As to regards to future events though we must not be passive and simply await what God will do, but act in accordance to what may be the will of God as best we can. We must strive to contribute to the general good.
- The outcome of our actions may show that God did not wish our good to have immediate effect, but it does not follow that He did not wish us to act
- "He never demands more than the right intention, and it is for Him to know the proper hour and place for letting the good designs succeed"
5. What the rules of the perfection of divine conduct consist in, and that the simplicity of the ways is in balance with the richness of the effects
- To know in detail the reason that could have moved God to choose the order of the universe is beyond the scope of finite minds
- As finite minds we cannot fully comprehend why God allows sin or bestows grace in the way He does, especially prior to attaining the full enjoyment of the vision of God.
- Minds have perfections and these consist of virtues
- The happiness of minds is the principal aim of God
6. God does nothing which is not orderly and it is not even possible to imagine events that are not regular
- The acts of God are commonly divided into ordinary and extraordinary. But everything is in conformity with the universal order.
- In understanding this we understand little other than what happens happens according to the order of harmony that God established.
7. That miracles conform to the General order, even though they may be contrary to the subordinate maxims; and about what God wills or permits by a General volition
- Miracles are as much in the order of things as typical events
8. To distinguish the actions of God from those of Creatures we explain the notion of an individual substance
- Every predicate of a subject must be contained within the subject at least "in-esse"
- One who understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know the predicates which belong to it
- There is something in the being of every substance or in the haecceity (thingness) of a thing, vestiges of everything that has happened to it and that will happen to it and even traces of everyone that happens in the universe. But, God alone is capable of recognizing this and knowing the thing's haecceity perfectly.
9. That each singular substance expresses the whole universe in its own way, and that all its events, together with all their circumstances and the whole sequence of external things are included in its notion
- Two substances cannot resemble each other completely and differ only in number or spatial qualities
- A substance can only begin by creation and end via annihilation
- A substance is not divisible into two. Likewise two substances cannot be combined into one.
- Every substance is like a complete world and a mirror of God
- The glory of God is multiplied by the number of substances in the universe
- Every substance bears in some way the infinite wisdom of God and imitates it insofar it is capable
10. That the belief in substantial forms has some basis, but that these forms do not change anything in the phenomena and must not be used to explain particular effects
- Without using the forms (Platonic forms) we cannot "elevate our minds sufficiently well to the knowledge of incorporeal natures and the wonders of God" (Leibniz, 10).
11. That the Thoughts of Theologians and Philosophers who are called scholastics are not entirely to be disdained
- If we are to look at St. Thomas and the other scholastics we would find a great treasure of demonstrative truths
12. That the notions involved in extension contain something imaginary and cannot constitute the substance of body
- The nature of substance and body does not wholly lie in extension, that is size, shape and motion, but is something related to souls or substantial form
- Souls sustain existence of bodies from moment to moment and preserve the basis for knowledge of what they are
- Souls alone are susceptible to punishment and reward and citizens subject to God.
13.
- The individual notion of each person includes once and for all everything that will ever happen to him but these truths are nonetheless contingent because they are caused by either the Free Will of God or of his creation
- It would appear that if all that happens is included in the nation of a single substance we would be left with complete fatalism. However, there is a big difference between certainty and necessity. Everything that will occur is certain because God foresees all actions, but it does not follow that what happens happens necessarily.
- An effect is necessary when its opposite implies a contradiction. An effect is contingent when its opposite course is not a contradictory one.
- Whatever happens in conformity with the predeterminations is certain, but not necessary, fore he would have done the opposite without it causing a contradiction, despite it being impossible for him to take the opposite action
14.
- Every created substance depends on God who preserves them in the manner we preserve our thoughts, only completely and perfectly.
- Every created substance is independent of everything save for God.
- No substance truly acts upon or is enacted upon by another substance because every substance is sustained by itself and God.
15.
- A substance is of infinitely extension insofar as it expresses everything, but is limited insofar as it expresses everything imperfectly
- Substances act upon one another in only the sense that they serve to limit the extension of one another. When one substance is greatened another must be limited to accommodate the other's growth.
- Whenever a thing acts it improves its efficacy. Thus, when a thing increases its efficacy it achieves more perfection and is strengthened and another substance is weakened.
- Pleasure arises when a perceptional being increases itself and pain occurs when it is decreased.
- One can sin by seeking to increase and thus seeking power and pleasure.
16.
- Miracles and extraordinary influence from God on man seems impossible because all events are consequences according to nature's demands.
- Miracles exist but are always in conformity with the universal law and general order of the universe.
- Miracles are miracles because they cannot be presupposed or foreseen by any created mind.
- What we express is our essence or idea and that is unlimited, but our nature or our power is limited.
- Whatever surpasses the nature or power of created substances is supernatural, but nothing can surpass our essences.
17.
???
We come back to my mentor and favorite, the much maligned G.W. Leibniz.
Discourse on Metaphysics and other Essays
G.W. Leibniz
Trans. Daniel Garber & Raoger Ariew
Hackett Publishing Co.
Indianapolis, IN
1991
Discourse on Metaphysics 1686
1. On Divine Perfection and that God does everyone in the most desirable way
- God is an absolutely perfect being
- Power & knowledge are perfection and have no limits within God
- The more enlightened we are of God's works the more we'll "be disposed to find them excellent and in complete conformity with what we might have desired" (Leibniz, 1).
2. Against those who claim that there is no goodness in God's works or that the rules of goodness and Beauty are arbitrary
- By looking at the created things we can discover the creator
- All acts of will presuppose a reason for willing
- Reason is prior to the act of will
- Eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry and the rules of goodness, justice and perfection are not merely the effects of the will of God, but the consequences of His understanding.
3. Against those who believe that God might have made things better
- The consequences of believing that God could have made things better are wholly contrary to the glory of God.
- "A lesser evil is relatively good, so a lesser good is relatively evil" (Leibniz, 3).
- To act with less perfection than one could have is to act imperfectly
- The reason many believe that God could have created better is our inadequate knowledge of the general harmony of the universe and the hidden reasons for God's conduct
- "God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified" (Leibniz, 3).
4. That the Love of God requires our complete satisfaction and acquiescence with respect to what he has done without our being quietist as a result
- Those who are dissatisfied with God's creation cannot fully love God
- We must be truly satisfied with everything that comes to us because it is according to His will
- As to regards to future events though we must not be passive and simply await what God will do, but act in accordance to what may be the will of God as best we can. We must strive to contribute to the general good.
- The outcome of our actions may show that God did not wish our good to have immediate effect, but it does not follow that He did not wish us to act
- "He never demands more than the right intention, and it is for Him to know the proper hour and place for letting the good designs succeed"
5. What the rules of the perfection of divine conduct consist in, and that the simplicity of the ways is in balance with the richness of the effects
- To know in detail the reason that could have moved God to choose the order of the universe is beyond the scope of finite minds
- As finite minds we cannot fully comprehend why God allows sin or bestows grace in the way He does, especially prior to attaining the full enjoyment of the vision of God.
- Minds have perfections and these consist of virtues
- The happiness of minds is the principal aim of God
6. God does nothing which is not orderly and it is not even possible to imagine events that are not regular
- The acts of God are commonly divided into ordinary and extraordinary. But everything is in conformity with the universal order.
- In understanding this we understand little other than what happens happens according to the order of harmony that God established.
7. That miracles conform to the General order, even though they may be contrary to the subordinate maxims; and about what God wills or permits by a General volition
- Miracles are as much in the order of things as typical events
8. To distinguish the actions of God from those of Creatures we explain the notion of an individual substance
- Every predicate of a subject must be contained within the subject at least "in-esse"
- One who understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know the predicates which belong to it
- There is something in the being of every substance or in the haecceity (thingness) of a thing, vestiges of everything that has happened to it and that will happen to it and even traces of everyone that happens in the universe. But, God alone is capable of recognizing this and knowing the thing's haecceity perfectly.
9. That each singular substance expresses the whole universe in its own way, and that all its events, together with all their circumstances and the whole sequence of external things are included in its notion
- Two substances cannot resemble each other completely and differ only in number or spatial qualities
- A substance can only begin by creation and end via annihilation
- A substance is not divisible into two. Likewise two substances cannot be combined into one.
- Every substance is like a complete world and a mirror of God
- The glory of God is multiplied by the number of substances in the universe
- Every substance bears in some way the infinite wisdom of God and imitates it insofar it is capable
10. That the belief in substantial forms has some basis, but that these forms do not change anything in the phenomena and must not be used to explain particular effects
- Without using the forms (Platonic forms) we cannot "elevate our minds sufficiently well to the knowledge of incorporeal natures and the wonders of God" (Leibniz, 10).
11. That the Thoughts of Theologians and Philosophers who are called scholastics are not entirely to be disdained
- If we are to look at St. Thomas and the other scholastics we would find a great treasure of demonstrative truths
12. That the notions involved in extension contain something imaginary and cannot constitute the substance of body
- The nature of substance and body does not wholly lie in extension, that is size, shape and motion, but is something related to souls or substantial form
- Souls sustain existence of bodies from moment to moment and preserve the basis for knowledge of what they are
- Souls alone are susceptible to punishment and reward and citizens subject to God.
13.
- The individual notion of each person includes once and for all everything that will ever happen to him but these truths are nonetheless contingent because they are caused by either the Free Will of God or of his creation
- It would appear that if all that happens is included in the nation of a single substance we would be left with complete fatalism. However, there is a big difference between certainty and necessity. Everything that will occur is certain because God foresees all actions, but it does not follow that what happens happens necessarily.
- An effect is necessary when its opposite implies a contradiction. An effect is contingent when its opposite course is not a contradictory one.
- Whatever happens in conformity with the predeterminations is certain, but not necessary, fore he would have done the opposite without it causing a contradiction, despite it being impossible for him to take the opposite action
14.
- Every created substance depends on God who preserves them in the manner we preserve our thoughts, only completely and perfectly.
- Every created substance is independent of everything save for God.
- No substance truly acts upon or is enacted upon by another substance because every substance is sustained by itself and God.
15.
- A substance is of infinitely extension insofar as it expresses everything, but is limited insofar as it expresses everything imperfectly
- Substances act upon one another in only the sense that they serve to limit the extension of one another. When one substance is greatened another must be limited to accommodate the other's growth.
- Whenever a thing acts it improves its efficacy. Thus, when a thing increases its efficacy it achieves more perfection and is strengthened and another substance is weakened.
- Pleasure arises when a perceptional being increases itself and pain occurs when it is decreased.
- One can sin by seeking to increase and thus seeking power and pleasure.
16.
- Miracles and extraordinary influence from God on man seems impossible because all events are consequences according to nature's demands.
- Miracles exist but are always in conformity with the universal law and general order of the universe.
- Miracles are miracles because they cannot be presupposed or foreseen by any created mind.
- What we express is our essence or idea and that is unlimited, but our nature or our power is limited.
- Whatever surpasses the nature or power of created substances is supernatural, but nothing can surpass our essences.
17.
???
Tuesday, May 8, 2007
Philosophy of Soul
(Originally written May 8, 2007 in Book 25)
Soul
There are many theories about the soul that are dualistic, but there are a few that are not.
Thomas Hobbes believed that man was purely physical.
Bishop Berkeley believed that the physical nature was essentially soul.
Plato - essence of man is his soul, which is trapped in the body
Descartes
- Dualist, but not as strict as Plato
- Believed the soul and body interacted
Problems: implied that there is a specific center between physical and soul
How can extended and unextended substances interact?
Augustine
- Soul and physical men make up whole man
- somewhat Platonic
- Believed the soul was immortal
- Soul gives life to the body
Nemesius
- Platonic
- Soul not just a part of a composite man
- Soul is an intelligible substance, incorporeal substance
Problem: if man is a soul that uses the body, what is the body?
Bible rules out some theories:
1. Materialism (Hobbes)
2. Spiritualism (Berkeley) [Not Really]
3. Strict Dualism
Aristotle
- Everything has four causes:
1. Final
2. Material
3. Formal
4. Efficient
Man:
- Soul is the formal Cause
- Mom and Dad is the efficient cause
- Flesh & bones is the material cause
- Happiness is the final cause
Soul is the form of man. Soul is inextricable from the body.
Aristotle's theory allows for a separation of mind and body
Aristotle's theory allows for a separation of mind and body
Does not have the Cartesian problems.
Allows man to be physical and spiritual
His theory is Biblically justifiable
Thomas Aquinas
Soul is the form of man, but differed from Aristotle
God: Ideals -> Exemplar Cause:
- Efficient
- Formal
- Material
- Final
Soul distinguish us from animals.
Soul is not the motor of the body
Soul is indestructible (similar to Plato)
Antony Flew objected:
Why is the new Flew better than the original Flew (post-return of Christ/resurrection of the body)?
Thomas' questions
1. Is the soul a body?
2. Is the soul a man or is the man composite of body and soul?
3. Is the soul composed of matter and form?
4. Is the intellectual principle united to the body as a form?
5. Is the intellectual principle multiplied according to the bodies or a single collective mind?
The soul is moved accidentally, but the body is moved essentially.
The soul is the first principle of life.
The soul is not a body, but is the act of a body.
The intellect is the form of the body. It is separate, but it still exists in matter. The intellect can be united with the body but not an act of the body.
How can the soul influence the body?
Way of power relation:
How does the pot hold the clay together? Power relation. There is no mechanism that holds it together, but it does. So it is how the soul influences the body.
Man: Shape, vegetative soul, sensitive soul and rational soul are the form of man
The soul and body are aspects of the single substance that is man.
String Theory?
Soul
There are many theories about the soul that are dualistic, but there are a few that are not.
Thomas Hobbes believed that man was purely physical.
Bishop Berkeley believed that the physical nature was essentially soul.
Plato - essence of man is his soul, which is trapped in the body
Descartes
- Dualist, but not as strict as Plato
- Believed the soul and body interacted
Problems: implied that there is a specific center between physical and soul
How can extended and unextended substances interact?
Augustine
- Soul and physical men make up whole man
- somewhat Platonic
- Believed the soul was immortal
- Soul gives life to the body
Nemesius
- Platonic
- Soul not just a part of a composite man
- Soul is an intelligible substance, incorporeal substance
Problem: if man is a soul that uses the body, what is the body?
Bible rules out some theories:
1. Materialism (Hobbes)
2. Spiritualism (Berkeley) [Not Really]
3. Strict Dualism
Aristotle
- Everything has four causes:
1. Final
2. Material
3. Formal
4. Efficient
Man:
- Soul is the formal Cause
- Mom and Dad is the efficient cause
- Flesh & bones is the material cause
- Happiness is the final cause
Soul is the form of man. Soul is inextricable from the body.
Aristotle's theory allows for a separation of mind and body
Aristotle's theory allows for a separation of mind and body
Does not have the Cartesian problems.
Allows man to be physical and spiritual
His theory is Biblically justifiable
Thomas Aquinas
Soul is the form of man, but differed from Aristotle
God: Ideals -> Exemplar Cause:
- Efficient
- Formal
- Material
- Final
Soul distinguish us from animals.
Soul is not the motor of the body
Soul is indestructible (similar to Plato)
Antony Flew objected:
Why is the new Flew better than the original Flew (post-return of Christ/resurrection of the body)?
Thomas' questions
1. Is the soul a body?
2. Is the soul a man or is the man composite of body and soul?
3. Is the soul composed of matter and form?
4. Is the intellectual principle united to the body as a form?
5. Is the intellectual principle multiplied according to the bodies or a single collective mind?
The soul is moved accidentally, but the body is moved essentially.
The soul is the first principle of life.
The soul is not a body, but is the act of a body.
The intellect is the form of the body. It is separate, but it still exists in matter. The intellect can be united with the body but not an act of the body.
How can the soul influence the body?
Way of power relation:
How does the pot hold the clay together? Power relation. There is no mechanism that holds it together, but it does. So it is how the soul influences the body.
Man: Shape, vegetative soul, sensitive soul and rational soul are the form of man
The soul and body are aspects of the single substance that is man.
String Theory?
Thursday, May 3, 2007
Double Effect
(Originally written May 3, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
God is pure actuality. There are no privations in his actions. An action is good or bad based on the four causes of actions. All four causes contributes to status of an action.
Actions
Object - formal cause
Circumstances - Material Cause
Purpose/Goal - Final Cause
Intention - Efficient Cause
Intention is a mental act. Purpose is a physical outcome.
The Double Effect Theory
Double Effect:
- not the ends justify themes
- not evil subsequent to the good
It is unavoidable second effect stemming from the same cause
Key note: Cause and Effect are not separate instances. They are one event.
Causality is normally defined as "event a causes event b".
Hume criticizes causality because you never see the causation. This is true, but meaningless.
Causation is rightly defined as an actualization of a potential.
Double effect is two effects at the same time.
The crucial difference between double effect and consequentialist theories is that Aquinas holds that one should never do evil to bring what good whereas consequentialist theories come only to bring about good consequences regardless of the action.
Question: Why does God permit evil in the world?
Answer: Double Effect
God -> Creation -> The Best
(Double Effect) Evil
This theory does not put evil in a positive light. It keeps evil as bad, not a disguised good.
Class Notes
God is pure actuality. There are no privations in his actions. An action is good or bad based on the four causes of actions. All four causes contributes to status of an action.
Actions
Object - formal cause
Circumstances - Material Cause
Purpose/Goal - Final Cause
Intention - Efficient Cause
Intention is a mental act. Purpose is a physical outcome.
The Double Effect Theory
Double Effect:
- not the ends justify themes
- not evil subsequent to the good
It is unavoidable second effect stemming from the same cause
Key note: Cause and Effect are not separate instances. They are one event.
Causality is normally defined as "event a causes event b".
Hume criticizes causality because you never see the causation. This is true, but meaningless.
Causation is rightly defined as an actualization of a potential.
Double effect is two effects at the same time.
The crucial difference between double effect and consequentialist theories is that Aquinas holds that one should never do evil to bring what good whereas consequentialist theories come only to bring about good consequences regardless of the action.
Question: Why does God permit evil in the world?
Answer: Double Effect
God -> Creation -> The Best
(Double Effect) Evil
This theory does not put evil in a positive light. It keeps evil as bad, not a disguised good.
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Salvation in Christianity
(Originally written April 22, 2007 in Book 15)
A Tapestry of Faiths
Win Corduan
Is Christianity alone true?
By asking if a religion is true we ask if it is as a whole true, not if it contains some truth.
Pluralism asserts that all truth claims made by all religions are equal.
Hick claims that those Christians who maintain exclusivist theologies must revise their thinking.
Hick's pluralism is however, completely wrongheaded. No religion teaches that it is one way of relating to the Real.
Most, if not all, religions make exclusive claims. This is another point where Hick's theory does not accurately describe religions.
Hick's theory is either false or arbitrary if it is based on data from religion it is obviously false. If it is not then it is simply arbitrary.
Hick also demands that religions, especially Christianity, rewrite themselves to fit his theory. This is absurd.
Rather than an aggressive form of pluralism like Hick's, William P. Alston postulates a more subtle form:
1) Christians basing their beliefs on their mystical experience of God are justified in holding there beliefs.
2) Adherents of different religions basing their beliefs on their mystical experience are justified in holding their beliefs.
3) There is no way of adjudicating between different belief systems.
4) All persons are entitled to their beliefs since their system is coherent and productive.
Alston's theory hinges on mystical experience alone. He ignores any other type of evidence.
There are two component in accepting a belief system as true:
1) Accepting the beliefs as true
2) Justification of the belief system
Some ways of justifying religious beliefs:
1) They are self-evident
2) based on experience
3) superiority of teaching, etc., etc.
Christians can find confirmation for the beliefs in:
1) General revelation and natural theology
2) Fundamental rationality of Christian beliefs (Plantinga's "warrant" or "proper function")
3) Historical and archeological evidence
4) Inner witness of the Holy Spirit
5) Experience of when God manifested himself
Mainly, Christians have grounds for their beliefs that correspond to reality.
Christianity as a belief system based on the New Testament must be either false or exclusively true.
To deny pluralism one must show that it is rational to believe that Christianity is exclusively true.
Establishing Grounds for Answers
The problem of evil has been posed as a loving God is incompatible with the circumstances of this world since the time of Hume. But, Marilyn McCord Adams made the excellent point that: "It does the atheologian no good to argue for the falsity of Christianity on the ground that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, pleasure-maximizer is incompatible with a world such as ours, because Christians never believed that God was a pleasure-maximizer anyway" (Corduan, 156).
Christian theology must be firmly rooted and wholly based in Biblical revelation. One cannot abstract a specific principle and build from there (a common mistake).
Who is Definitely Saved?
In Old Testament theology those who are the people of God are saved by faith in God. These include the chosen people, converts to the chosen people (i.e. Ruth) and those who helped form the chosen people.
New Testament theology demands personal knowledge of the gospel as a prerequisite to salvation: How can we accept what he does not know?
In addition to knowing the Gospel, one must accept it as true and place trust in the atoning work of Christ.
The New Testament stress the need for missionary work.
The notion of implicit faith in Christ as a way of salvation is oxymoronic. Implicit faith makes as much sense as unfelt pain or inaudible speech.
However, all of these seemingly incoherent expressions are made coherent by mediation. Inaudible speech is made coherent by the usage of sign language. Sign language mediates the speech.
The sacrificial cultus of pre-Christ Jews was the meditation for implicit faith.
Who is Perhaps Saved Before Christ?
In the Old Testament the people of Israel are those who were saved. In the New Testament explicit faith in Christ and his atonement is the criterion for salvation.
To expand either of these criterions require that it is Biblically revealed, not what is merely fair or consistent.
Idolatry, under no circumstances can serve as the mediator in implicit faith. Thus, idolators are not saved.
C.S. Lewis claims that prayers made to false gods in earnest are heard by the true God. But, Lewis cannot substantiate this theory with Biblical evidence.
One argument for idolatry as a mediating device for implicit faith is the relationship of Abram and Melchizedek.
Melchizedek was the priest of El Elyon (God Most Hight) and Abram paid him a tithe for his blessing.
Clark Pinnock makes the claim that El Elyon and YHWH are equivalent. Corduan contends that rather than being equivalent deities, El Elyon and YHWH are identical, two names for the same deity.
This argument (Cordon's) makes sense because Hebrews 7's treatment of Melchizedek as the forerunner of Christ. If Melchizedek were some pagan priest, Hebrews 7 would make no sense.
Melchizedek and others (like Jethro, Moses' father-in-law) are saved by their implicit faith in Christ as mediated by their explicit faith in the God of original monotheism who is identical to the God of Old Testament Israel.
Who is perhaps saved after Christ?
The Jews were no longer saved by being a member of the chosen people because they rejected Christ. Thus, even if Gentiles were worshippers of the original monotheistic God and equivalent to Jews they are no longer saved.
In the New Testament men who worshipped the God of original monotheism were granted the opportunity to have explicit faith in Christ:
1) The Ethiopian Eunuch (Acts 8:26-40)
2) Cornelius, the Roman Centurion (Acts 10)
3) The "God-fearing Greeks" (Acts 17:4)
4) Apollos (Acts 18:24-28)
5) The disciples of John the Baptist (Acts 19:1-6)
"Natural revelation does not save, but it provides the opportunity for the saving message to be sent to those who respond to it" (Corduan, 168).
Thomas Aquinas believed in this, "God will send the message" theory. Robertson McQuilken and Oliver Buswell also advocate this position.
Epistemologically - Is Christianity alone true?
Metaphysically: Do the effects of Christ's atonement extend only to those who believe in Him?
Yes! But, there is a small amount of room for implicit faith in pre-Christ times.
Ethically: Is a human being required to express faith in Christ in order to be eligible for salvation? Yes.
Subjectively: Is an implicit faith in Christ expressed in actions as valid as an explicit faith? Yes, only in pre-Christ times.
Theologically: Does God's saving love extend to those who do not know of Christ? Yes, but only within the further plan of God.
Socially: Are those who never heard of the gospel without hope of salvation? Yes, but God reaches out in the New Testament to those without limited with natural revelation and why would he stop this practice?
A Tapestry of Faiths
Win Corduan
Is Christianity alone true?
By asking if a religion is true we ask if it is as a whole true, not if it contains some truth.
Pluralism asserts that all truth claims made by all religions are equal.
Hick claims that those Christians who maintain exclusivist theologies must revise their thinking.
Hick's pluralism is however, completely wrongheaded. No religion teaches that it is one way of relating to the Real.
Most, if not all, religions make exclusive claims. This is another point where Hick's theory does not accurately describe religions.
Hick's theory is either false or arbitrary if it is based on data from religion it is obviously false. If it is not then it is simply arbitrary.
Hick also demands that religions, especially Christianity, rewrite themselves to fit his theory. This is absurd.
Rather than an aggressive form of pluralism like Hick's, William P. Alston postulates a more subtle form:
1) Christians basing their beliefs on their mystical experience of God are justified in holding there beliefs.
2) Adherents of different religions basing their beliefs on their mystical experience are justified in holding their beliefs.
3) There is no way of adjudicating between different belief systems.
4) All persons are entitled to their beliefs since their system is coherent and productive.
Alston's theory hinges on mystical experience alone. He ignores any other type of evidence.
There are two component in accepting a belief system as true:
1) Accepting the beliefs as true
2) Justification of the belief system
Some ways of justifying religious beliefs:
1) They are self-evident
2) based on experience
3) superiority of teaching, etc., etc.
Christians can find confirmation for the beliefs in:
1) General revelation and natural theology
2) Fundamental rationality of Christian beliefs (Plantinga's "warrant" or "proper function")
3) Historical and archeological evidence
4) Inner witness of the Holy Spirit
5) Experience of when God manifested himself
Mainly, Christians have grounds for their beliefs that correspond to reality.
Christianity as a belief system based on the New Testament must be either false or exclusively true.
To deny pluralism one must show that it is rational to believe that Christianity is exclusively true.
Establishing Grounds for Answers
The problem of evil has been posed as a loving God is incompatible with the circumstances of this world since the time of Hume. But, Marilyn McCord Adams made the excellent point that: "It does the atheologian no good to argue for the falsity of Christianity on the ground that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, pleasure-maximizer is incompatible with a world such as ours, because Christians never believed that God was a pleasure-maximizer anyway" (Corduan, 156).
Christian theology must be firmly rooted and wholly based in Biblical revelation. One cannot abstract a specific principle and build from there (a common mistake).
Who is Definitely Saved?
In Old Testament theology those who are the people of God are saved by faith in God. These include the chosen people, converts to the chosen people (i.e. Ruth) and those who helped form the chosen people.
New Testament theology demands personal knowledge of the gospel as a prerequisite to salvation: How can we accept what he does not know?
In addition to knowing the Gospel, one must accept it as true and place trust in the atoning work of Christ.
The New Testament stress the need for missionary work.
The notion of implicit faith in Christ as a way of salvation is oxymoronic. Implicit faith makes as much sense as unfelt pain or inaudible speech.
However, all of these seemingly incoherent expressions are made coherent by mediation. Inaudible speech is made coherent by the usage of sign language. Sign language mediates the speech.
The sacrificial cultus of pre-Christ Jews was the meditation for implicit faith.
Who is Perhaps Saved Before Christ?
In the Old Testament the people of Israel are those who were saved. In the New Testament explicit faith in Christ and his atonement is the criterion for salvation.
To expand either of these criterions require that it is Biblically revealed, not what is merely fair or consistent.
Idolatry, under no circumstances can serve as the mediator in implicit faith. Thus, idolators are not saved.
C.S. Lewis claims that prayers made to false gods in earnest are heard by the true God. But, Lewis cannot substantiate this theory with Biblical evidence.
One argument for idolatry as a mediating device for implicit faith is the relationship of Abram and Melchizedek.
Melchizedek was the priest of El Elyon (God Most Hight) and Abram paid him a tithe for his blessing.
Clark Pinnock makes the claim that El Elyon and YHWH are equivalent. Corduan contends that rather than being equivalent deities, El Elyon and YHWH are identical, two names for the same deity.
This argument (Cordon's) makes sense because Hebrews 7's treatment of Melchizedek as the forerunner of Christ. If Melchizedek were some pagan priest, Hebrews 7 would make no sense.
Melchizedek and others (like Jethro, Moses' father-in-law) are saved by their implicit faith in Christ as mediated by their explicit faith in the God of original monotheism who is identical to the God of Old Testament Israel.
Who is perhaps saved after Christ?
The Jews were no longer saved by being a member of the chosen people because they rejected Christ. Thus, even if Gentiles were worshippers of the original monotheistic God and equivalent to Jews they are no longer saved.
In the New Testament men who worshipped the God of original monotheism were granted the opportunity to have explicit faith in Christ:
1) The Ethiopian Eunuch (Acts 8:26-40)
2) Cornelius, the Roman Centurion (Acts 10)
3) The "God-fearing Greeks" (Acts 17:4)
4) Apollos (Acts 18:24-28)
5) The disciples of John the Baptist (Acts 19:1-6)
"Natural revelation does not save, but it provides the opportunity for the saving message to be sent to those who respond to it" (Corduan, 168).
Thomas Aquinas believed in this, "God will send the message" theory. Robertson McQuilken and Oliver Buswell also advocate this position.
Epistemologically - Is Christianity alone true?
Metaphysically: Do the effects of Christ's atonement extend only to those who believe in Him?
Yes! But, there is a small amount of room for implicit faith in pre-Christ times.
Ethically: Is a human being required to express faith in Christ in order to be eligible for salvation? Yes.
Subjectively: Is an implicit faith in Christ expressed in actions as valid as an explicit faith? Yes, only in pre-Christ times.
Theologically: Does God's saving love extend to those who do not know of Christ? Yes, but only within the further plan of God.
Socially: Are those who never heard of the gospel without hope of salvation? Yes, but God reaches out in the New Testament to those without limited with natural revelation and why would he stop this practice?
Thursday, April 19, 2007
Notes on Aquinas' definition of evil
(Originally written April 19, 2007 in Book 25)
Whether evil is found in Things
Objections
A. Whatever is found in things is either something or a privation of something (non-being). Dionysius states, "evil is distant from existence and even more distant from non existence. Therefore, evil is not at all found in things.
B. Being and thing are convertible. If evil is a being in things it follows that evil is a thing which is contrary to what article 1 states.
C. Good unmixed with evil is greater good then good mixed with evil. God only makes what is best. Therefore, in things made by God there is no evil.
Evil consists in the fact that a thing fails in goodness.
Replies to objections
A. Evil is distant from simple being and from simple not-being. It is neither a habit nor a pure negation. It is a privation.
B. In a sense evil (such as blindness) can be called a thing, but it is only ignorance that leads men to conclude that. Therefore, evil has a positive existence.
C. God makes what is best in whole, but parts can fail in goodness. Many good things would not exist if God had not chosen to make good out of evil and evil had not existence.
Whether evil is in god as in its subject?
Objections
A. Good is something that exists. Therefore, Evil is not in good as its subject.
B. Evil is not a being. Good is a being. Non-being does not require being as its subject. Therefore, evil does not require good as its subject.
C. One contrary is not the subject of another. Good and evil are contraries. Therefore, Evil is not in good as in its subject.
D. The subject of evil is evil. If evil is in good as its subject then good is evil.
Augustine states evil exists only in good.
Not every absence of good is evil. A negative absence of good is not evil, otherwise what does not exist would be evil. Only the absence of good in a privative sense is evil.
Replies to the objections
A. Evil does to exist in things as a part or as a natural property of any existing thing.
B. Not-being does not require a subject. Privation is a negation in a subject. only the privation is evil.
C. Good enters into every genus. Thus, one good can coexist with the privation of another good.
D. The prophet is not claiming that good and evil cannot coexist only that woe to those who call a good evil and an evil good.
Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
Objections
A. One contrary is wholly corrupted by another. Good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil corrupts the whole good.
B. Augustine: evil hurts in as much as it takes away good. Good is uniform. Therefore, good is wholly taken away by evil.
C. Evil takes away good. Evil continually takes away from good. Evil can only not fully consume good if that good is infinite. No created good things are infinite. Therefore, evil wholly consume good.
Augustine: evil cannot wholly consume the good.
Good is threefold:
1. One kind of good can be wholly destroyed by evil (i.e. sight is wholly destroyed by blindness)
2. One kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil
3. One kind of good is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away
Replies to objections
A. The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away, but other goods are not wholly removed. (Blindness may steal sight but the blind man can still hear)
B. Good, by its relation to different things, is not wholly diminished by evil
C. If evil diminishes quantitatively it can never diminish fully (half of a half of a half... is never equal to zero)
Whether evil is adequately divided into pain and fault (pain means penalty)
Objections:
A. Every defect is a kind of evil. All creatures possess the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which is neither pain nor a fault. Therefore, evil is not adequately divisible into pain and fault.
B. In irrational creatures there is neither pain nor fault, but are nonetheless corrupted and defective. Therefore, not all evil is pain or fault.
C. Temptation is an evil, but not a fault or pain. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault.
D. Augustine: a thing is evil because it hurts. Whatever hurts is penal. Therefore, every evil is pain.
Evil is the privation of good, consisting in perfection and act.
Act is twofold:
1. The form and integrity of a thing
2. The operation of a thing
Evil is twofold:
Blindness - subtraction of the form
Sin - withdrawal of the due operation
Evil like blindness is pain. Evil like sin is fault. Pain evil is in all creatures. Sin evil is only in those creatures of a rational nature (those with a will).
Replies to the objections
A. Evil is the privation of a good, not merely the negation of a good. Thus, not every defect of good is an evil.
B. Pain and fault divide evil that is found in voluntary things, not all evil.
C. Temptation is evil of fault in the tempter, not the tempted.
D. Pain involves injury of self. Fault involves injury to another.
Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
Objections
A. Fault is to pain what meet is to reward. Reward has more good than merit. Therefore, pain has more evil than fault.
B. The greater evil is opposed to the greater good. Pain is opposed to the good of the agent. Fault is opposed to the good of action. An agent is a greater good than an action. Therefore, pain is worse than fault.
C. Pain consists of the forfeiting of the vision of God. Fault does not. Therefore, pain is a greater evil than fault.
Divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault.
One becomes evil by the evil of fault, not by the evil of pain.
God is the author of the evil of pain, but not the author of the evil of fault.
Replies to the objections
A. Pain is brought about to avoid fault. Thus, fault is worse than pain.
B. What is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent.
C. One may be deprived resulting in pain and fault in some way.
Summa Continued
The Case of Evil (Question 49)
1. Whether good can be the cause of evil?
2. Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
3. Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?
Whether good can be the cause of evil?
Objections:
A. Matthew 7:18 "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit"
B. One contrary cannot be the cause of another. Evil is the contrary to good.
C. A deficient effet can only proceed from a deficient cause.
D. Dionysius claims evil has no cause.
Augustine states "there is no possible source of evil except good"
Evil in some way has a cause.
Evil has a material cause, but no formal cause. It is a privation of a form.
Evil has no final cause.
Evil has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.
Evil only has an accidental cause, thus good is the cause of evil.
Replies to the objections:
A. A good will does not produce a morally bad act. The movement of an evil will is caused by a rational creature, which is good. Thus, good is the cause of evil.
B. Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself.
C. Fault follows from the will acts on the defect
D. Evil has no direct cause
Whether the supreme good, God is the cause of evil?
Objections:
A. Amos 3:6 "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hat not done?"
B. Good is the cause of evil. God is the cause of good. Therefore, Evil is from God.
C. The cause of danger and safety is the same thing. God is the cause of safety. Therefore, God is the cause of all evil
Augustine: God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of lending to not-being.
God has no defect. Thus any evil resulting from defect cannot be reduced to God as its cause.
The evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reducible to God as the cause. In creating somethings God must destroy others. But God does not will destruction for destructions sake.
God is the author of evil which is penalty (pain), but not the author of evil which is fault.
Replies to the Objections
A. Amos 3:6 refers to evil of pain not evil of fault.
B. Whatever possesses of being has a cause reducible to God, but evil the privation of being cannot be reduced to anything that has Being (God).
C. God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all.
Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?
Objections
A. Contrary effects have contrary causes
B. If one contrary is in nature the other is. The supreme good is in nature. Therefore, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
C. Good and better are considered to what is best. Thus, for evil and worse to exist they must be considered against some supreme evil.
D. If some supreme evil did not exist, evil would only exist in some, but not the many.
E. The evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause. We cannot proceed to an infinite regress of evil causes. There must be one first evil as the cause of every evil.
The supreme good is the cause of every being. As such there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
Nothing can be essentially bad.
Evil only lessens a good. It cannot fully consume it.
Replies to the objections
A. All contraries must come to one first common cause.
B. Evil is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.
C. Privation removes a perfection. Evil and worse are not judged against a supreme evil, but in their relation to the supreme good.
D. No being is evil by participation, but in the privation of participation. Thus, it is not reducible to any essential evil.
E. Evil can only have an accidental cause
F. There is no infinite regress. All evils are reduced to some good which causes evil accidentally.
Whether evil is found in Things
Objections
A. Whatever is found in things is either something or a privation of something (non-being). Dionysius states, "evil is distant from existence and even more distant from non existence. Therefore, evil is not at all found in things.
B. Being and thing are convertible. If evil is a being in things it follows that evil is a thing which is contrary to what article 1 states.
C. Good unmixed with evil is greater good then good mixed with evil. God only makes what is best. Therefore, in things made by God there is no evil.
Evil consists in the fact that a thing fails in goodness.
Replies to objections
A. Evil is distant from simple being and from simple not-being. It is neither a habit nor a pure negation. It is a privation.
B. In a sense evil (such as blindness) can be called a thing, but it is only ignorance that leads men to conclude that. Therefore, evil has a positive existence.
C. God makes what is best in whole, but parts can fail in goodness. Many good things would not exist if God had not chosen to make good out of evil and evil had not existence.
Whether evil is in god as in its subject?
Objections
A. Good is something that exists. Therefore, Evil is not in good as its subject.
B. Evil is not a being. Good is a being. Non-being does not require being as its subject. Therefore, evil does not require good as its subject.
C. One contrary is not the subject of another. Good and evil are contraries. Therefore, Evil is not in good as in its subject.
D. The subject of evil is evil. If evil is in good as its subject then good is evil.
Augustine states evil exists only in good.
Not every absence of good is evil. A negative absence of good is not evil, otherwise what does not exist would be evil. Only the absence of good in a privative sense is evil.
Replies to the objections
A. Evil does to exist in things as a part or as a natural property of any existing thing.
B. Not-being does not require a subject. Privation is a negation in a subject. only the privation is evil.
C. Good enters into every genus. Thus, one good can coexist with the privation of another good.
D. The prophet is not claiming that good and evil cannot coexist only that woe to those who call a good evil and an evil good.
Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
Objections
A. One contrary is wholly corrupted by another. Good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil corrupts the whole good.
B. Augustine: evil hurts in as much as it takes away good. Good is uniform. Therefore, good is wholly taken away by evil.
C. Evil takes away good. Evil continually takes away from good. Evil can only not fully consume good if that good is infinite. No created good things are infinite. Therefore, evil wholly consume good.
Augustine: evil cannot wholly consume the good.
Good is threefold:
1. One kind of good can be wholly destroyed by evil (i.e. sight is wholly destroyed by blindness)
2. One kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil
3. One kind of good is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away
Replies to objections
A. The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away, but other goods are not wholly removed. (Blindness may steal sight but the blind man can still hear)
B. Good, by its relation to different things, is not wholly diminished by evil
C. If evil diminishes quantitatively it can never diminish fully (half of a half of a half... is never equal to zero)
Whether evil is adequately divided into pain and fault (pain means penalty)
Objections:
A. Every defect is a kind of evil. All creatures possess the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which is neither pain nor a fault. Therefore, evil is not adequately divisible into pain and fault.
B. In irrational creatures there is neither pain nor fault, but are nonetheless corrupted and defective. Therefore, not all evil is pain or fault.
C. Temptation is an evil, but not a fault or pain. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault.
D. Augustine: a thing is evil because it hurts. Whatever hurts is penal. Therefore, every evil is pain.
Evil is the privation of good, consisting in perfection and act.
Act is twofold:
1. The form and integrity of a thing
2. The operation of a thing
Evil is twofold:
Blindness - subtraction of the form
Sin - withdrawal of the due operation
Evil like blindness is pain. Evil like sin is fault. Pain evil is in all creatures. Sin evil is only in those creatures of a rational nature (those with a will).
Replies to the objections
A. Evil is the privation of a good, not merely the negation of a good. Thus, not every defect of good is an evil.
B. Pain and fault divide evil that is found in voluntary things, not all evil.
C. Temptation is evil of fault in the tempter, not the tempted.
D. Pain involves injury of self. Fault involves injury to another.
Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
Objections
A. Fault is to pain what meet is to reward. Reward has more good than merit. Therefore, pain has more evil than fault.
B. The greater evil is opposed to the greater good. Pain is opposed to the good of the agent. Fault is opposed to the good of action. An agent is a greater good than an action. Therefore, pain is worse than fault.
C. Pain consists of the forfeiting of the vision of God. Fault does not. Therefore, pain is a greater evil than fault.
Divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault.
One becomes evil by the evil of fault, not by the evil of pain.
God is the author of the evil of pain, but not the author of the evil of fault.
Replies to the objections
A. Pain is brought about to avoid fault. Thus, fault is worse than pain.
B. What is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent.
C. One may be deprived resulting in pain and fault in some way.
Summa Continued
The Case of Evil (Question 49)
1. Whether good can be the cause of evil?
2. Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
3. Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?
Whether good can be the cause of evil?
Objections:
A. Matthew 7:18 "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit"
B. One contrary cannot be the cause of another. Evil is the contrary to good.
C. A deficient effet can only proceed from a deficient cause.
D. Dionysius claims evil has no cause.
Augustine states "there is no possible source of evil except good"
Evil in some way has a cause.
Evil has a material cause, but no formal cause. It is a privation of a form.
Evil has no final cause.
Evil has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.
Evil only has an accidental cause, thus good is the cause of evil.
Replies to the objections:
A. A good will does not produce a morally bad act. The movement of an evil will is caused by a rational creature, which is good. Thus, good is the cause of evil.
B. Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself.
C. Fault follows from the will acts on the defect
D. Evil has no direct cause
Whether the supreme good, God is the cause of evil?
Objections:
A. Amos 3:6 "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hat not done?"
B. Good is the cause of evil. God is the cause of good. Therefore, Evil is from God.
C. The cause of danger and safety is the same thing. God is the cause of safety. Therefore, God is the cause of all evil
Augustine: God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of lending to not-being.
God has no defect. Thus any evil resulting from defect cannot be reduced to God as its cause.
The evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reducible to God as the cause. In creating somethings God must destroy others. But God does not will destruction for destructions sake.
God is the author of evil which is penalty (pain), but not the author of evil which is fault.
Replies to the Objections
A. Amos 3:6 refers to evil of pain not evil of fault.
B. Whatever possesses of being has a cause reducible to God, but evil the privation of being cannot be reduced to anything that has Being (God).
C. God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all.
Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?
Objections
A. Contrary effects have contrary causes
B. If one contrary is in nature the other is. The supreme good is in nature. Therefore, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
C. Good and better are considered to what is best. Thus, for evil and worse to exist they must be considered against some supreme evil.
D. If some supreme evil did not exist, evil would only exist in some, but not the many.
E. The evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause. We cannot proceed to an infinite regress of evil causes. There must be one first evil as the cause of every evil.
The supreme good is the cause of every being. As such there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
Nothing can be essentially bad.
Evil only lessens a good. It cannot fully consume it.
Replies to the objections
A. All contraries must come to one first common cause.
B. Evil is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.
C. Privation removes a perfection. Evil and worse are not judged against a supreme evil, but in their relation to the supreme good.
D. No being is evil by participation, but in the privation of participation. Thus, it is not reducible to any essential evil.
E. Evil can only have an accidental cause
F. There is no infinite regress. All evils are reduced to some good which causes evil accidentally.
Tuesday, April 17, 2007
Aquinas - Whether evil is a nature
(Originally written April 17, 2007 in Book 25)
St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
Benzinger Brothers, edition, 1947
Treatise on the Distinction of Good and Evil
Concerning evil there are six points to be considered:
1. Whether evil is a nature?
2. Whether evil is found in things?
3. Whether good is the subject of evil?
4. Whether evil totally corrupts good?
5. The division of evil into pain and fault
6. Whether pain, or fault has more the nature of evil.
Whether evil is a nature?
Objections:
A) 1. Every genus is a nature
2. Evil is a genus
3. But Aristotle claims that good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things
4. Therefore, evil is a nature.
B) 1. Every difference which constitutes a species is a nature
2. Evil is a difference constituting a species of morality
3. Therefore, evil signifies a nature
C) 1. Each extreme of two contraries is a nature
2. Evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries
3. Therefore, Evil signifies a nature
D) 1. What is not, acts not
2. Evil acts (for it corrupts good)
3. Therefore, Evil is a being and a nature
E) 1. Nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is being and a nature
2. Evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things
3. Therefore, evil is a nature
Opposites are known through the other. Darkness is known through light, evil is known from the nature of good
The being and perfection of any nature is good. Therefore, evil cannot signify being or any form of nature.
Evil is neither a being nor a good. Being is good, without being there is no good and without good there is no being.
Replies to objections
A) Good and evil are said to be genera, not simply, but in regard to contraries. As every form has the nature of good, so every privation has the nature of evil.
B) Good has an end but the country of good (evil) is different, not in its end but in the fact it has no end at all
C) Between good and evil there is a medium (in moral evil). From moral evil there can be a return to the good. But from physical evil (i.e. blindness) there can be no return to good (sight).
D) A thing acts three ways:
1. Formally
i.e. whiteness makes white
- evil formally acts as a privation as it corrupts goodness
2. Effectively
i.e. a painter makes the wall white
3. Final Cause
- The end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause
Evil does not effect anything as a privation. Every action comes from some form (evil has no form). Evil acts only by some good joined to it.
E) Evil only exists accidentally and acts only as some good joined to it. Therefore, evil does not belong to the perfection of the universe as it has no being.
St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
Benzinger Brothers, edition, 1947
Treatise on the Distinction of Good and Evil
Concerning evil there are six points to be considered:
1. Whether evil is a nature?
2. Whether evil is found in things?
3. Whether good is the subject of evil?
4. Whether evil totally corrupts good?
5. The division of evil into pain and fault
6. Whether pain, or fault has more the nature of evil.
Whether evil is a nature?
Objections:
A) 1. Every genus is a nature
2. Evil is a genus
3. But Aristotle claims that good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things
4. Therefore, evil is a nature.
B) 1. Every difference which constitutes a species is a nature
2. Evil is a difference constituting a species of morality
3. Therefore, evil signifies a nature
C) 1. Each extreme of two contraries is a nature
2. Evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries
3. Therefore, Evil signifies a nature
D) 1. What is not, acts not
2. Evil acts (for it corrupts good)
3. Therefore, Evil is a being and a nature
E) 1. Nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is being and a nature
2. Evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things
3. Therefore, evil is a nature
Opposites are known through the other. Darkness is known through light, evil is known from the nature of good
The being and perfection of any nature is good. Therefore, evil cannot signify being or any form of nature.
Evil is neither a being nor a good. Being is good, without being there is no good and without good there is no being.
Replies to objections
A) Good and evil are said to be genera, not simply, but in regard to contraries. As every form has the nature of good, so every privation has the nature of evil.
B) Good has an end but the country of good (evil) is different, not in its end but in the fact it has no end at all
C) Between good and evil there is a medium (in moral evil). From moral evil there can be a return to the good. But from physical evil (i.e. blindness) there can be no return to good (sight).
D) A thing acts three ways:
1. Formally
i.e. whiteness makes white
- evil formally acts as a privation as it corrupts goodness
2. Effectively
i.e. a painter makes the wall white
3. Final Cause
- The end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause
Evil does not effect anything as a privation. Every action comes from some form (evil has no form). Evil acts only by some good joined to it.
E) Evil only exists accidentally and acts only as some good joined to it. Therefore, evil does not belong to the perfection of the universe as it has no being.
Class notes on Analogical Language
(Originally written April 17, 2007 in book 25)
Class Notes
How can I, a finite human being, whose language is learned in the context of finitude, apply this same language to an infinite God?
Thomistic Analogous language about God
Objection to Analogy:
1. Finite concepts taken out of a finite mode are meaningless
2. To think our finite concepts are applicable to God takes away from the transcendence of God
3. Even if analogy works it is a weak analogy at best
4. Ambiguity as to which finite concepts can be applied to God
5. Choices of finite concepts appear arbitrary
6. Equivocation and univocity are inconsistent. You can't have just a little equivocity nor can you have just some univocity. Analogy attempts to blend the two
Is there no way we can talk about God? Or Analogy as our last hope
Words can be used in two senses:
Univocal - anthropomorphism
Equivocal - Skepticism
It is central to our faith that we can talk about God
Philosophically, univocal and equivocal language is null
We have no choice but to talk analogically about God
Analogy makes the best sense of our experience of life and talk about God
Analogy is how we talk about most things most often
Linehan: Why we can talk univocally about God:
1. Image of God/likeness of God
2. Incarnation of Christ
3. Indwelling of the holy spirit
Analogy and Being
In the concept of Being everything is understood analogically (Eric Mascall)
Objections/Hurdles:
1. Analogy is an arbitrary way of thinking
response: analogy is used in lots of language why not religious language?
2. Isn't God too inaccessible to us to speak about Him by analogy or in any way?
response: there is no gulf between God and man that is impassible. God bridged the gap with creation/incarnation
3. There must be definable, separable univocity and equivocacy
- It can't be all univocity
- It can't be all equivocate
Response: When we talk about God the word/concept is univocal, but the way it is predicated is equivocal
i.e. Chris has being. God has being. Being is univocal in meaning, but applicable to God in a different way than to Chris
Duns Scotus claimed everything must be univocal. Aquinas held that the concept was univocally understood and defined, but predicated analogically.
This works because God and people are causally connected (Metaphysical argument). God is the essential cause, not the accidental cause of the universe.
Analogy can yield no new knowledge. If X is like Y is only comprehensible if I know X and Y and can then deduce similarities. But if I do not know Y at all I cannot say anything about it (equivocally, analogically, or univocally)
What does the analogy look like?
Not analogy duorum ad tertium, analogy unius ad alterum
duorum ad tertium: 3rd party analogy
unius ad alterum: analogy of similar aspects of two things
Attribution analogy: God has being so much as it is necessary to have in order to cause being in Mr. Jones.
Proportionality analogy - Life of a woman/essence of a woman = life of God/essence of God
the way in which the life of the woman is determined by the essence of a woman is proportional to the life of God is determined by the essence of God
By combining analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality we can produce meaningful language concerning God. Without analogy of attribution or without analogy of proportionality the analogy fails to be meaningful.
How a woman is is proper to its mode. How a man is is proper to its mode. How an elephant is is proper to its mode. How God is is proper to its mode.
Class Notes
How can I, a finite human being, whose language is learned in the context of finitude, apply this same language to an infinite God?
Thomistic Analogous language about God
Objection to Analogy:
1. Finite concepts taken out of a finite mode are meaningless
2. To think our finite concepts are applicable to God takes away from the transcendence of God
3. Even if analogy works it is a weak analogy at best
4. Ambiguity as to which finite concepts can be applied to God
5. Choices of finite concepts appear arbitrary
6. Equivocation and univocity are inconsistent. You can't have just a little equivocity nor can you have just some univocity. Analogy attempts to blend the two
Is there no way we can talk about God? Or Analogy as our last hope
Words can be used in two senses:
Univocal - anthropomorphism
Equivocal - Skepticism
It is central to our faith that we can talk about God
Philosophically, univocal and equivocal language is null
We have no choice but to talk analogically about God
Analogy makes the best sense of our experience of life and talk about God
Analogy is how we talk about most things most often
Linehan: Why we can talk univocally about God:
1. Image of God/likeness of God
2. Incarnation of Christ
3. Indwelling of the holy spirit
Analogy and Being
In the concept of Being everything is understood analogically (Eric Mascall)
Objections/Hurdles:
1. Analogy is an arbitrary way of thinking
response: analogy is used in lots of language why not religious language?
2. Isn't God too inaccessible to us to speak about Him by analogy or in any way?
response: there is no gulf between God and man that is impassible. God bridged the gap with creation/incarnation
3. There must be definable, separable univocity and equivocacy
- It can't be all univocity
- It can't be all equivocate
Response: When we talk about God the word/concept is univocal, but the way it is predicated is equivocal
i.e. Chris has being. God has being. Being is univocal in meaning, but applicable to God in a different way than to Chris
Duns Scotus claimed everything must be univocal. Aquinas held that the concept was univocally understood and defined, but predicated analogically.
This works because God and people are causally connected (Metaphysical argument). God is the essential cause, not the accidental cause of the universe.
Analogy can yield no new knowledge. If X is like Y is only comprehensible if I know X and Y and can then deduce similarities. But if I do not know Y at all I cannot say anything about it (equivocally, analogically, or univocally)
What does the analogy look like?
Not analogy duorum ad tertium, analogy unius ad alterum
duorum ad tertium: 3rd party analogy
unius ad alterum: analogy of similar aspects of two things
Attribution analogy: God has being so much as it is necessary to have in order to cause being in Mr. Jones.
Proportionality analogy - Life of a woman/essence of a woman = life of God/essence of God
the way in which the life of the woman is determined by the essence of a woman is proportional to the life of God is determined by the essence of God
By combining analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality we can produce meaningful language concerning God. Without analogy of attribution or without analogy of proportionality the analogy fails to be meaningful.
How a woman is is proper to its mode. How a man is is proper to its mode. How an elephant is is proper to its mode. How God is is proper to its mode.
Monday, March 26, 2007
Class notes on God as a causal agent
(Originally written March 26, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
Objections to God as a direct causal agent
1. Laws of nature cannot be violated; miracles are a violation
2. If miracles can occur, God would be changeable
3. Miracles are correctives to our understanding of the laws of nature, not violations of the laws
4. Miracles are not rationally believed in
5. Providence violates the the simplicity of God
6. God is eternal, how can an infinite God contain a finite attribute?
7. If God has to intervene in what he created to fix it it implies a defect in his creation
8. Miracles can be explained by natural occurrences; we just don't understand them
9. Miracles are always a result of natural causes
10. How can a non-physical being directly cause a physical change
11. If God is directly intervening in the world, and there is evil in the world, then God is not good.
12. Anomalies in nature do not prove direct intervention
13. Miracles intervene in human freedom
14. Every actualization of a potential through an immediate contingent cause; therefore, a remote cause is not necessary
15. If God governed directly it would destroy the perfection of the causal order
16. If God is outside of time but his causal action would have to be inside of time
Divine Providence and Miracles
Is God a direct causal agent in the world?
Views of God's interaction:
Classical theology
Deist
Neo-Thomism (primary cause working through secondary causes)
Kenotic God (limiting his power willingly)
Existential theology
Linguistic theology
Process theology
Neo-Thomism and Divine Providence
God as an end for everything
Action <- Man <- God
Miracles
- an effect in the physical world that surpasses all known human powers and beyond natural powers
Objection to miracles
- Principle of uniformity
Spinoza:
1. Miracles are a violation of natural laws
2. Natural laws are immutable
3. It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated
4. Therefore, miracles are impossible
Hume, Kant and Flew all argued agains miracles based on the principle of uniformity
God can't do anything against nature
Evidence for miracles is scarce and unpredictable by nature
God cannot violate the law of nature because the law of nature stems from God. So any violation of the law of nature is a violation of God's personal nature.
What is a secondary cause?
Could quantum mechanics explain God's intervening in human/natural affairs?
God effects the secondary cause (quantum mechanics) in effecting the probability at the molecular level.
Problems with this is that new technology is discovered accounting for previously unexplainable events.
Antony Flew
Science:
- Laws from observation
- Limited to this method by definition
Unexplained events are either miracles (outside of science) or anomaly (inside of science)
No unexplained event can ever be considered a miracle. At worst it is a not yet explained anomaly.
Are miracles possible?
Are miracles knowable?
Are miracles recognizable?
Hume critiqued miracles on the basis of whether they are knowable. Flew critiqued miracles on rather they are recognizable.
Superseding Miracles - where the laws of nature are superseded, direct action by God
Constellation Miracle - no law of nature is violated, but many circumstances come together in such away that they could have occurred by accident is less probable than it occurring by divine intervention
Reasonable presumption - reasonableness of a presumption
Worldview
If you do not have a worldview favorable to theism then you will not be convinced of miracles existing.
Circumstances, reasonable presumption and whether or not divine agency is the best explanation for the event all play a part in regarding something as a miracle.
Class Notes
Objections to God as a direct causal agent
1. Laws of nature cannot be violated; miracles are a violation
2. If miracles can occur, God would be changeable
3. Miracles are correctives to our understanding of the laws of nature, not violations of the laws
4. Miracles are not rationally believed in
5. Providence violates the the simplicity of God
6. God is eternal, how can an infinite God contain a finite attribute?
7. If God has to intervene in what he created to fix it it implies a defect in his creation
8. Miracles can be explained by natural occurrences; we just don't understand them
9. Miracles are always a result of natural causes
10. How can a non-physical being directly cause a physical change
11. If God is directly intervening in the world, and there is evil in the world, then God is not good.
12. Anomalies in nature do not prove direct intervention
13. Miracles intervene in human freedom
14. Every actualization of a potential through an immediate contingent cause; therefore, a remote cause is not necessary
15. If God governed directly it would destroy the perfection of the causal order
16. If God is outside of time but his causal action would have to be inside of time
Divine Providence and Miracles
Is God a direct causal agent in the world?
Views of God's interaction:
Classical theology
Deist
Neo-Thomism (primary cause working through secondary causes)
Kenotic God (limiting his power willingly)
Existential theology
Linguistic theology
Process theology
Neo-Thomism and Divine Providence
God as an end for everything
Action <- Man <- God
Miracles
- an effect in the physical world that surpasses all known human powers and beyond natural powers
Objection to miracles
- Principle of uniformity
Spinoza:
1. Miracles are a violation of natural laws
2. Natural laws are immutable
3. It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated
4. Therefore, miracles are impossible
Hume, Kant and Flew all argued agains miracles based on the principle of uniformity
God can't do anything against nature
Evidence for miracles is scarce and unpredictable by nature
God cannot violate the law of nature because the law of nature stems from God. So any violation of the law of nature is a violation of God's personal nature.
What is a secondary cause?
Could quantum mechanics explain God's intervening in human/natural affairs?
God effects the secondary cause (quantum mechanics) in effecting the probability at the molecular level.
Problems with this is that new technology is discovered accounting for previously unexplainable events.
Antony Flew
Science:
- Laws from observation
- Limited to this method by definition
Unexplained events are either miracles (outside of science) or anomaly (inside of science)
No unexplained event can ever be considered a miracle. At worst it is a not yet explained anomaly.
Are miracles possible?
Are miracles knowable?
Are miracles recognizable?
Hume critiqued miracles on the basis of whether they are knowable. Flew critiqued miracles on rather they are recognizable.
Superseding Miracles - where the laws of nature are superseded, direct action by God
Constellation Miracle - no law of nature is violated, but many circumstances come together in such away that they could have occurred by accident is less probable than it occurring by divine intervention
Reasonable presumption - reasonableness of a presumption
Worldview
If you do not have a worldview favorable to theism then you will not be convinced of miracles existing.
Circumstances, reasonable presumption and whether or not divine agency is the best explanation for the event all play a part in regarding something as a miracle.
Sunday, March 25, 2007
Metaphysical & Moral Evil
(Originally written March 25, 2007 in Book 25)
Augustine: All things are Metaphysically Good
All things (substances) are good because God created them.
He denied the dualist contention of an all good substance and an all evil substance because God is supreme existence and if the were an opposite of God it would be superman non-existence. Hence, there is no two great powers dualism.
"Every substance as such is good" - Augustine
God, the supreme Good is incorruptible. he is the standard by which evil is measured and cannot be evil.
All created goods are corruptible because they are not simple, they are composite.
Created beings by their nature contain the possibility (but not the necessity) of metaphysical evil.
Creation makes evil possible, but evil is actualized by creatures, not the Creator.
Evil is not a substance. It is simply the loss of good. It is a privation of substance.
Evil is a deficiency in some substance. It has no existence of its own, it subsists within another.
Any substance that has been corrupted by evil may be said to be an evil substance, but whatever substance it still possess is nonetheless good. The same is true of anything's nature.
God is not the cause of metaphysical evil.
Augustine held that the efficient cause of evil is unknowable because what is nothing cannot be known.
Being cannot corrupt itself or any other being. Nonbeing cannot corrupt being.
Freedom is the cause of evil. The ultimate cause of evil is moral. The cause of privation is pride.
If freedom is the cause of sin it is meaningless to ask what is the cause of freedom because freedom is the first cause of sin.
The meaningful question is 'how did evil come about?'
Augustine used the example of Satan to illustrate how evil came about. Satan, being conscious of himself took a perverted pleasure in himself in imitating God. Pride was the origin of Satan's sin.
Evil never completely corrupts a good.
Even though God did not create evil he orders it for his own good purpose.
Evil is part of a total picture of good.
Aquinas: Evil is a metaphysical privation
Aquinas held that metaphysical evil is a metaphysical privation with no formal cause and only an indirect efficient cause.
Evil is a privation in a good. A thing is evil in that it lacks a perfection it ought to have.
Utter evil is impossible. Evil has no essence of its own.
Nothing can be essentially evil.
Evil has no formal cause. Evil has no form; it is disorder, not order.
Evil is a privation of form.
Evil has no final cause.
Evil has a material cause, but its material cause is good because matter is good.
Evil has an indirect efficient cause. Evil is a byproduct of causality.
God caused evil incidentally. Through his creative power he indirectly caused either because through creating some things God must destroy others or because there is an incapacity in what he causes.
Human nature is neither diminished nor destroyed by evil.
A fallen human being is metaphysically good but weakened morally.
Conclusions from the Augustinian-Thomistic Solution
Metaphysically, evil has no essence or being of its own. Evil has no form or formal cause.
God is not the direct, efficient cause of evil.
Moral evil is rooted in human freedom.
The nature of human beings cannot be totally corrupted.
Human metaphysical nature is not diminished to the point that a person is no longer rationally and morally responsible for his actions.
The grace of God enables the person to overcome whatever propensities to evil he has so he is able to not sin.
Finitude makes evil possible, but not necessary.
The theistic answer to metaphysical evil solves the existence of evil without retreating to dualism, but does not answer why evil exists.
The theistic answer to metaphysical illusionism.
Evil may not be a real entity but it is a reality.
Metaphysical evil is not nothing. It indicates that something ought to be there.
Contemporary rejoinders
G. Stanley Kane states that the notion of evil as privation is almost universally ignored or misunderstood. He holds that any attempt of refuting the privation theory makes elementary mistakes:
1) it confuses privation with illusion
2) demands that God is the efficient cause of privation
3) asserts that the privation theory does not comfort those who suffer
Kane however argues against it like this
1) The theory of evil as privation has been advanced as a general theory to account for all evils
2) Some evils are clearly not privations
a) pain is a positive evil
b) moral evil is a positive evil
3) Therefore, the privation theory does not fulfill its intended purpose
Linehan response:
Pain is not a positive evil:
1) Pain is the result of something that occurs (i.e. I have a headache because I have not had my coffee today or I have a toothache because I have a cavity)
2) Pain derives its existence in a substance, it does not exist apart from any substance
3) Pain is thus, not a substance
4) Whatever is not a substance cannot have a positive existence of its own
5) Pain is therefore, some deficiency or privation of a normal state within a substance
Moral evil is not a positive evil
1) Whatever is a moral evil must exist within a moral creature
2) There can be no absolutely morally evil creature because absolute evil entails non-existence
3) Thus, if any creature possess or commits a moral evil they do not do so absolutely
4) If there is no absolute moral evil there must be degrees of moral evil because there are some moral evils and not all are equal in quantity (while they may be so qualitatively)
5) If there are degrees of quantity within moral evil they cannot exist on their own right because there are no degrees between existence and non-existence. Either something exists fully or it does not exist at all
6) Whatever does not have its own existence cannot be a substance
7) Whatever is not a substance cannot have positive standing
8) Therefore, moral evil is not a positive evil
16 The Moral Problem of Evil
3 Kinds of evil:
1) Moral
2) Metaphysical
3) Physical
It seems obvious that some nonmoral evil is not the result of human free will.
Natural evil is evil that does not result from human choice. Moral evil is resulted of human choice.
The problem of moral evil and the Alternatives for theism
Moral Evil: The Problem and Actual Alternatives
1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, Either God is benevolent and impotent, malevolent, or impotent and malevolent or God does not exit
The theist objects to premise three and states God is actually working to eliminate evil.
Moral Evil: The Bind of the Hypothetical Alternatives
Plantinga and the Free Will Defense
Plantinga holds that in order for the world to be morally good it must possess creatures who can do moral good. Only free creatures are capable of doing morally good work.
Augustine: All things are Metaphysically Good
All things (substances) are good because God created them.
He denied the dualist contention of an all good substance and an all evil substance because God is supreme existence and if the were an opposite of God it would be superman non-existence. Hence, there is no two great powers dualism.
"Every substance as such is good" - Augustine
God, the supreme Good is incorruptible. he is the standard by which evil is measured and cannot be evil.
All created goods are corruptible because they are not simple, they are composite.
Created beings by their nature contain the possibility (but not the necessity) of metaphysical evil.
Creation makes evil possible, but evil is actualized by creatures, not the Creator.
Evil is not a substance. It is simply the loss of good. It is a privation of substance.
Evil is a deficiency in some substance. It has no existence of its own, it subsists within another.
Any substance that has been corrupted by evil may be said to be an evil substance, but whatever substance it still possess is nonetheless good. The same is true of anything's nature.
God is not the cause of metaphysical evil.
Augustine held that the efficient cause of evil is unknowable because what is nothing cannot be known.
Being cannot corrupt itself or any other being. Nonbeing cannot corrupt being.
Freedom is the cause of evil. The ultimate cause of evil is moral. The cause of privation is pride.
If freedom is the cause of sin it is meaningless to ask what is the cause of freedom because freedom is the first cause of sin.
The meaningful question is 'how did evil come about?'
Augustine used the example of Satan to illustrate how evil came about. Satan, being conscious of himself took a perverted pleasure in himself in imitating God. Pride was the origin of Satan's sin.
Evil never completely corrupts a good.
Even though God did not create evil he orders it for his own good purpose.
Evil is part of a total picture of good.
Aquinas: Evil is a metaphysical privation
Aquinas held that metaphysical evil is a metaphysical privation with no formal cause and only an indirect efficient cause.
Evil is a privation in a good. A thing is evil in that it lacks a perfection it ought to have.
Utter evil is impossible. Evil has no essence of its own.
Nothing can be essentially evil.
Evil has no formal cause. Evil has no form; it is disorder, not order.
Evil is a privation of form.
Evil has no final cause.
Evil has a material cause, but its material cause is good because matter is good.
Evil has an indirect efficient cause. Evil is a byproduct of causality.
God caused evil incidentally. Through his creative power he indirectly caused either because through creating some things God must destroy others or because there is an incapacity in what he causes.
Human nature is neither diminished nor destroyed by evil.
A fallen human being is metaphysically good but weakened morally.
Conclusions from the Augustinian-Thomistic Solution
Metaphysically, evil has no essence or being of its own. Evil has no form or formal cause.
God is not the direct, efficient cause of evil.
Moral evil is rooted in human freedom.
The nature of human beings cannot be totally corrupted.
Human metaphysical nature is not diminished to the point that a person is no longer rationally and morally responsible for his actions.
The grace of God enables the person to overcome whatever propensities to evil he has so he is able to not sin.
Finitude makes evil possible, but not necessary.
The theistic answer to metaphysical evil solves the existence of evil without retreating to dualism, but does not answer why evil exists.
The theistic answer to metaphysical illusionism.
Evil may not be a real entity but it is a reality.
Metaphysical evil is not nothing. It indicates that something ought to be there.
Contemporary rejoinders
G. Stanley Kane states that the notion of evil as privation is almost universally ignored or misunderstood. He holds that any attempt of refuting the privation theory makes elementary mistakes:
1) it confuses privation with illusion
2) demands that God is the efficient cause of privation
3) asserts that the privation theory does not comfort those who suffer
Kane however argues against it like this
1) The theory of evil as privation has been advanced as a general theory to account for all evils
2) Some evils are clearly not privations
a) pain is a positive evil
b) moral evil is a positive evil
3) Therefore, the privation theory does not fulfill its intended purpose
Linehan response:
Pain is not a positive evil:
1) Pain is the result of something that occurs (i.e. I have a headache because I have not had my coffee today or I have a toothache because I have a cavity)
2) Pain derives its existence in a substance, it does not exist apart from any substance
3) Pain is thus, not a substance
4) Whatever is not a substance cannot have a positive existence of its own
5) Pain is therefore, some deficiency or privation of a normal state within a substance
Moral evil is not a positive evil
1) Whatever is a moral evil must exist within a moral creature
2) There can be no absolutely morally evil creature because absolute evil entails non-existence
3) Thus, if any creature possess or commits a moral evil they do not do so absolutely
4) If there is no absolute moral evil there must be degrees of moral evil because there are some moral evils and not all are equal in quantity (while they may be so qualitatively)
5) If there are degrees of quantity within moral evil they cannot exist on their own right because there are no degrees between existence and non-existence. Either something exists fully or it does not exist at all
6) Whatever does not have its own existence cannot be a substance
7) Whatever is not a substance cannot have positive standing
8) Therefore, moral evil is not a positive evil
16 The Moral Problem of Evil
3 Kinds of evil:
1) Moral
2) Metaphysical
3) Physical
It seems obvious that some nonmoral evil is not the result of human free will.
Natural evil is evil that does not result from human choice. Moral evil is resulted of human choice.
The problem of moral evil and the Alternatives for theism
Moral Evil: The Problem and Actual Alternatives
1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, Either God is benevolent and impotent, malevolent, or impotent and malevolent or God does not exit
The theist objects to premise three and states God is actually working to eliminate evil.
Moral Evil: The Bind of the Hypothetical Alternatives
Plantinga and the Free Will Defense
Plantinga holds that in order for the world to be morally good it must possess creatures who can do moral good. Only free creatures are capable of doing morally good work.
Thursday, March 22, 2007
Combining Aquinas & Wittgenstien
(Originally written March 22, 2007 in Book 25)
Burrell: Combining Aquinas & Wittgenstien
1) Univocal language may be understood as ordinary language usage in a Wittgenstienian setting. Family resemblance is strongly similar to analogy.
2) Transcendental terms are trans-categorical. These terms derive their meaning from their particular language games and as they re trans-categorical they are analogical.
3) Appraisal terms (i.e. "good") function similar to transcendental terms.
4) Transcendental and appraisal terms are crucial for language about God ontologically and semantically.
a) Ontologically, God is the cause of the world and thus there is an analogy between talk of God and talk of the world.
b) Semantically, the transcendental and appraisal terms are applied to God without their usual predication
5) Analogical language lies in a decision. It originates out of the community of the speaker/listener.
Burrell gives analogy the deserved ontological setting while engaging Wittgenstein's concepts.
But, Burrell has dropped univocal concepts and is not entirely immune to equivocation charges.
There must be a univocal concept underneath all analogy to avoid equivocation.
Burrell: Combining Aquinas & Wittgenstien
1) Univocal language may be understood as ordinary language usage in a Wittgenstienian setting. Family resemblance is strongly similar to analogy.
2) Transcendental terms are trans-categorical. These terms derive their meaning from their particular language games and as they re trans-categorical they are analogical.
3) Appraisal terms (i.e. "good") function similar to transcendental terms.
4) Transcendental and appraisal terms are crucial for language about God ontologically and semantically.
a) Ontologically, God is the cause of the world and thus there is an analogy between talk of God and talk of the world.
b) Semantically, the transcendental and appraisal terms are applied to God without their usual predication
5) Analogical language lies in a decision. It originates out of the community of the speaker/listener.
Burrell gives analogy the deserved ontological setting while engaging Wittgenstein's concepts.
But, Burrell has dropped univocal concepts and is not entirely immune to equivocation charges.
There must be a univocal concept underneath all analogy to avoid equivocation.
Monday, March 19, 2007
Allegorical & Contemporary Language Problems
(Originally written March 19, 2007 in Book 13)
Analogical Predication: The Only Alternative
If terms cannot be applied to God in a univocal or an equivocal sense, they must be applied analogically.
The analogical way of speaking about God helps to solve Parmenides' paradox because being is not taken as univocal. Being is analogical and thus things essentially differ in being.
Being cannot be univocal because it would mean that everything that hath being would be one. Being cannot be equivocal because whatever hath being hath being and what else cannot hath being or they are one. Therefore, Being must analogical.
God does not have properties at all. "God is the perfections that his creatures only have by causal participation" (263).
Univocal Concepts but Analogical Predication
Scotus was correct that any concept applied to men and God must be univocally understood. Aquinas was correct in stating that concepts must be analogically affirmed of God.
The attribute of man and God are same but the application of that attribute differs in God and man.
Whatever concept is understood of God must be understood univocally, but must be predicated (attributed to) of God must be predicated analogically.
Finite Concepts and Finite Predications
Aquinas held God is one in reality, but many things logically.
We cannot know the substance of God, but we can predicate many things about God substantively.
While there is an infinite difference in perfection between Creator and creatures, there is not a total dissimilarity. Thus, concepts are univocally understood.
A creature must bear some similarity to its creator.
The Causal Basis for Analogy Between God and Creatures
Analogy is based on intrinsic causality.
Analogy is based on efficient causality.
Analogy is based on essential causality. God is the cause of the very being of the world, not only its beginning.
Analogy is not based on material causality. God is the cause of the existence of matter, but he is not material. God is the cause of all perfections in the world, but not the imperfection resulting from the limiting conditions of a material world.
Analogy is based on principal, not instrumental causality.
God is the principal, intrinsic, essential and efficient cause of the being and perfection of the world.
Objections and Responses
1) Why select some, but not all qualities drawn from the world and apply them to God?
- Only some things flow from God's efficient, principal, essential and intrinsic causality.
2) Words are divorced from their finite mode or conditions are devoid of meaning.
- The univocal concept of the words remains the same while the way in which they are predicated charges.
-Terms applied to God are not made meaningless only extended without limitations
3) Analogy rests on the assumption that causality provides without limitations.
-If something is caused it must be caused by something. God cannot give what he does not have. Thus if God does not have existence He cannot give existence.
4) Any analogous predication of God as a "First cause" involves an infinite regress of meaning to identify the univocal element.
-The only way to predicate something of a finite being and an infinite being must be analogous because if it is univocal it predicates it equivocally. An infinite being cannot have the same mode as a finite being. It must be predicated analogously.
5) Even assuming the metaphysical assumption that there is a similarity among beings, that ontology is not univocally expressible.
-This is not a mere theistic. It is the only alternative to monism.
6) Since Wittgenstein the distinction between equivocal and univocal is obsolete, and thus, the notion of analogy is obsolete.
7) A general theory of analogy does not work.
This is not an analogical theory, but rather a metaphysical scheme in which language fits. This metaphysical scheme is rooted in reality and thus, the language is so rooted.
13. Model Religious Language
The Background of the Contemporary Language Problem
Hume is the source of the contemporary problems of religious language.
Hume: Two kinds of propositions
There are only two kinds of meaningful statements:
1. Statements expressing elation of ideas
- true by definition
- not informative about the real world
2. Statements about matters of fact
Kant called he former analytic and the latter synthetic.
Wittgenstein: Linguistic Silence
Wittgenstein held that what was mystical (religious experience) cannot be expressed in words.
He held that we are to eliminate religious language, not religious experience.
Ayer: Religious Language and Verification
In Language, Truth and Logic A. J. Ayer attempted to eliminate all metaphysics and theology.
He held that no statement can be meaningful unless it is tautological or empirically verifiable.
But Ayer's principle of verifiability is neither tautological nor verifiable and thus, meaningless on his grounds.
Ayer was neither atheistic nor agnostic. He was non-cognitivistic. He held that no cognitively meaningful statement can be made about a transcendent reality.
2/15/07 - 3/19/07
Analogical Predication: The Only Alternative
If terms cannot be applied to God in a univocal or an equivocal sense, they must be applied analogically.
The analogical way of speaking about God helps to solve Parmenides' paradox because being is not taken as univocal. Being is analogical and thus things essentially differ in being.
Being cannot be univocal because it would mean that everything that hath being would be one. Being cannot be equivocal because whatever hath being hath being and what else cannot hath being or they are one. Therefore, Being must analogical.
God does not have properties at all. "God is the perfections that his creatures only have by causal participation" (263).
Univocal Concepts but Analogical Predication
Scotus was correct that any concept applied to men and God must be univocally understood. Aquinas was correct in stating that concepts must be analogically affirmed of God.
The attribute of man and God are same but the application of that attribute differs in God and man.
Whatever concept is understood of God must be understood univocally, but must be predicated (attributed to) of God must be predicated analogically.
Finite Concepts and Finite Predications
Aquinas held God is one in reality, but many things logically.
We cannot know the substance of God, but we can predicate many things about God substantively.
While there is an infinite difference in perfection between Creator and creatures, there is not a total dissimilarity. Thus, concepts are univocally understood.
A creature must bear some similarity to its creator.
The Causal Basis for Analogy Between God and Creatures
Analogy is based on intrinsic causality.
Analogy is based on efficient causality.
Analogy is based on essential causality. God is the cause of the very being of the world, not only its beginning.
Analogy is not based on material causality. God is the cause of the existence of matter, but he is not material. God is the cause of all perfections in the world, but not the imperfection resulting from the limiting conditions of a material world.
Analogy is based on principal, not instrumental causality.
God is the principal, intrinsic, essential and efficient cause of the being and perfection of the world.
Objections and Responses
1) Why select some, but not all qualities drawn from the world and apply them to God?
- Only some things flow from God's efficient, principal, essential and intrinsic causality.
2) Words are divorced from their finite mode or conditions are devoid of meaning.
- The univocal concept of the words remains the same while the way in which they are predicated charges.
-Terms applied to God are not made meaningless only extended without limitations
3) Analogy rests on the assumption that causality provides without limitations.
-If something is caused it must be caused by something. God cannot give what he does not have. Thus if God does not have existence He cannot give existence.
4) Any analogous predication of God as a "First cause" involves an infinite regress of meaning to identify the univocal element.
-The only way to predicate something of a finite being and an infinite being must be analogous because if it is univocal it predicates it equivocally. An infinite being cannot have the same mode as a finite being. It must be predicated analogously.
5) Even assuming the metaphysical assumption that there is a similarity among beings, that ontology is not univocally expressible.
-This is not a mere theistic. It is the only alternative to monism.
6) Since Wittgenstein the distinction between equivocal and univocal is obsolete, and thus, the notion of analogy is obsolete.
7) A general theory of analogy does not work.
This is not an analogical theory, but rather a metaphysical scheme in which language fits. This metaphysical scheme is rooted in reality and thus, the language is so rooted.
13. Model Religious Language
The Background of the Contemporary Language Problem
Hume is the source of the contemporary problems of religious language.
Hume: Two kinds of propositions
There are only two kinds of meaningful statements:
1. Statements expressing elation of ideas
- true by definition
- not informative about the real world
2. Statements about matters of fact
Kant called he former analytic and the latter synthetic.
Wittgenstein: Linguistic Silence
Wittgenstein held that what was mystical (religious experience) cannot be expressed in words.
He held that we are to eliminate religious language, not religious experience.
Ayer: Religious Language and Verification
In Language, Truth and Logic A. J. Ayer attempted to eliminate all metaphysics and theology.
He held that no statement can be meaningful unless it is tautological or empirically verifiable.
But Ayer's principle of verifiability is neither tautological nor verifiable and thus, meaningless on his grounds.
Ayer was neither atheistic nor agnostic. He was non-cognitivistic. He held that no cognitively meaningful statement can be made about a transcendent reality.
2/15/07 - 3/19/07
Saturday, March 17, 2007
Univocal, Equivocal, Analogous and Negative Language
(Originally written March 17, 2007 in Book 13)
From Unity to Multiplicity
All multiplicity presupposes some prior unity, thus there must be some absolute simplicity as the source of all multiplicity. God is this absolute simplicity.
God does not have being because being involves multiplicity.
God is the One beyond all being.
Creation is the process of the One becoming multiplicity. When it gains knowledge of itself it creates mind. The Mind produces other minds when minds reflect outwards it creates Soul and Soul gives rises to other souls.
Souls create matter. Matter is the most multiplicity.
Being is good; matter is evil. Matter possesses no good in it, only the mere capacity for good.
Eventually all multiplicity will return to unity and evil will give way to good.
From Multiplicity to Unity
Humans are matter and soul, thus good and evil.
In order to travel towrads unity a person must turn from the multiplicity of matter to the unity of soul. Hue must become ascetic.
The Soul must move from what is sensible to what is intellectual. For, what is intellectual is touched by Mind which is almost pure unity.
Once one has achieved union with mind by moving from sensible to intellectual one must move from intellectual to intuitional to achieve whole unity because even mind is multiplicity (knower and known).
The goal is to become one with the One.
The Need for Negative Language of the One (God)
Plotinus states that there can be no positive descriptions about the One.
All the properties Plotinus ascribes the One he denies that he has.
In calling God the One he means, "not many". In calling him good he means, "not evil". But the One is not the first of any series and the One is not good in the sense that anything else is good.
"The One is nothing but itself and cannot be named in terms of anything else" (237).
Plotinus maintains that we "know" God via two ways:
1. Indirectly from his effects
2. by direct mystical intuitions which transcend all cognitive knowledge and provides a positive being for all cognitive negations of God.
Naming God from his Emanational Effects
All that comes from the One is a trace of the transcendent ONe.
If something comes from the One that is beauty then we can God is beautiful in the sense that He causally creates beauty. Thus, his effect is beauty and he therefore is Beauty, but greater.
God is called goodness because causes goodness, not because he possesses goodness.
Unity (God) is beyond Being because he caused being.
The intuitional basis for all naming of God
Giving God positive names from his extrinsically related effects does not provide any proper knowledge of God.
Rational and cognitive through can only point in the direction of God who is knowable only by mystical intuition.
Intuitional knowledge of God comes by purification of all multiplicity and the knower becomes one with the One in a temporary mystical union.
Negative language about God is wholly dependent on a prior positive intuition of God gained via mystical union with the One.
Pseudo-Dionysius brought Plotinus to Christianity in the 6th century A.D.
He affirmed the incomprehensibility of God. He stated God cannot be known directly but He can be known indirectly 3 ways:
1. Affirmation of the God of the Bible (positive theology)
2. Deny that these qualities apply to God in the same sense they apply to the created order (negative theology)
3. Apply these terms to God in a higher way
Moses Maimonides: Negative Attributes of God
Maimonides believed that the literal interpretations of Scripture were the heart of all problematic theology.
The way to positively attribute something to God
He had five ways to attribute a positive quality of God. The first four he felt inconsistent with the monotheistic God of Judaism. So he worked out the fifth way.
1. An object is described by its definition
2. An object is described by part of its definition
3. An object is described by something other than its true essence
4. An object is described by its relation to another object
5. An object is described by its action.
He claimed that Biblical language is anthropomorphic.
The knowledge o the works of God is the knowledge of His attributes.
The Use of Negative Attributes to Describe God
Maimonides held that negative attributes of God are true attributes and that positive attributes imply polytheism.
The function of negative attributes is that they are necessary to direct the mind to the truths necessary to believe concerning God. With each negative attribute learned one inches closer to knowledge of God.
He held that only YHWH indicates God's true essence and its meaning is wholly unknowable.
Mysticism: Ineffability
A definition of Mysticism
F.C. Haploid outlined the nature of mysticism in four points:
1. The phenomenal world is a manifestation of an Absolute and as such this world is not true reality. Only the Absolute is true reality.
2. Human beings can know the Absolute by a direct intuition. In this intuition a union between the human and the absolute occurs.
3. This intuition is a unique function of the true human self, which is usually obscured by the phenomenal self.
4. The possibility is the main goal of human existence and is the door to the experience of ultimate reality.
William James described the mystical union with four points:
1. Ineffability - the experience cannot be contained in words
2. Noetic quality - The impression of having received absolute truth is part of the experience
3. Transiency - The experience will not last very long
4. Passivity - The experience is received by or given to the person. He does not create it.
The mystic does not allow for a difference between the experience of the Absolute and the Absolute.
In the way one cannot doubt he is having a headache, a mystic cannot doubt he is having (or had) a mystical experience.
The problem with mystical experiences is that no one who has not had a mystical experience can know what it is like. Secondly, the mystic cannot describe it because it is ineffable by nature.
Stace's Theories of Ineffability
W.T. Stace provides a number of theories on ineffable experiences:
1. The emotion theory: mystical experience is ineffable because it essentially contains emotions that are too deep for words.
2. The spiritual blindness theory: mystical experience is ineffable because those who have not had it cannot understand it.
Stace rejects these two common sense theories because
a) mystical experience is not merely an empirical perception that must be held to understand
b) mystics themselves admit that it is ineffable, not the fault of their audience
c) The Dionysian Theory: positive language does not apply literally. God is described as "X" because he causes "X", not because he is "X".
d) The Metaphor theory: positive language is merely metaphorical
But, Stace rejects these four as well because if the mystic speaks metaphorically he uses either reducible metaphors (reducible to literal understanding) in which case it is not ineffable or irreducible metaphors in which case he speakings meaninglessly. He rejects c) because it is odd to label the cause of a property with the name of that property.
e) They mystic, during his experience is beyond words, but in describing his experience he is forced to use words which describe his experience as contradictory. But, while this makes it something ineffable, mystical experiences are in fact somewhat contradictory. "The language is paradoxical because the experience is paradoxical" (249).
Thomas Aquinas: Via Negativa
Thomas Aquinas agreed with Maimonides that no one in this life could grasp the essence of God in a positive way.
The knowledge of God by remotion is Aquinas' process of deriving the distinction of God from other beings by way of negative differences.
A creature can be admitted to be God-like but God cannot be creature-like.
Aquinas did hold that one can make position affirmations about God through intrinsic causal similarities between God and his creatures.
The via negativa is the denial of any imperfections in him.
The idea of negation is always based on a positive affirmation.
Positive affirmation are made possible by the intrinsic causal relation between Creator and creatures.
A totally negative God-talk is meaningless.
Complete negation without any affirmation is total skepticism about God.
But, without some kind of negation there is no way to preserve the transcendence of the theistic God.
12: Positive Language About God
There are two basic attempts to develop positive language about God:
1. Univocal (Scotus)
2. Analogous (Aquinas)
The Scotistic Insistence on Univocal Concepts
John Duns Scotus maintained that there can be no meaningful positive talk bout God unless it is univocal.
The Impossibility of Analogous Concepts
Henry of Ghent defended his "analogous concept of being" while Scotus was alive.
Henry claimed that God is known in a universal concept that is analogically common to himself and to creatures.
He claimed that God and creatures are distinguishable by negation of determination. Man is determined, God is undetermined.
Scotus rejects this on a few grounds
1. Differentiation by negation is no different at all
2. The concept of Henry's analogous concept is two concepts and thus equivocal
The Necessity of Univocal Concepts of God
Scouts chose univocal language because it avoids skepticism and meaninglessness.
Univocal to Scotus is that which possess sufficient unity in itself.
He gives four arguments to why concepts of God and man must be understood univocally:
1) The intellect can be certain about the concept of being without knowing it refers to created or uncreated being.
2) It is impossible to have natural knowledge of God without univocal concepts. We have natural knowledge of God. Thus, there are univocal concepts.
3) We would have no proper concept of God without univocal concepts. We have a proper concept of the Trinity, thus of God. Thus, we have univocal concepts.
4) Pure perfection applies wholly proper to God and not to creatures. Thus there must be universal understanding of pure perfection.
Scotus held that if there is no univocity in concepts of God there is no knowledge of God.
Scotus held that there is equivocal talk about God, which is meaningless. There is analogous talk about God which is either equivocal or univocal. If it is equivocal it is meaningless. If it is univocal it is not really analogical.
Thomistic Contention for Analogous Predication
Aquinas held that it was impossible for anything to be predicated of God and a creature in a univocal sense.
Aquinas' rejection of Univocal Predication
Aquinas had 6 arguments against univocality
1. Nothing may be said if God and other things univocally because the forms of the things God has made do not measure up to any specific likeness of God.
2. No creature has the same mode as God thus nothing can be predicated of God and other things universally.
3. Whatever is predicated of many things is a genus or species, but there exists no genus or species of God.
4. Whatever is predicated of many things univocally is simpler in concept than that which it is predicated of. God is wholly simple, thus there can be nothing predicated of God univocally.
5. Whatever is predicated univocally in many things belongs through participation to each of things of which it is predicated. But nothing participates with God, only through God.
6. Nothing is predicated of God and creation in the same order, but rather according to priority and posteriority.
Aquinas also argued that the difference between an infinitely perfect being an a finitely perfect being is infinite and thus, there can be no univocal predication of such beings.
The Need for the Via Negative
God cannot possess perfections in the way crated things possess them.
Properly speaking God dos not posses the properties of perfections; those perfections are the very essence of God.
Univocal predication removes the necessary distance between Creator and created. If any property were univocally attributed to God and created thing it would either limit God or delimit the created thing.
Aquinas' Rejecting of Equivocal Predication
Both Aquinas and Scotus agreed that equivocal predication lends no knowledge of God.
He held that if all knowledge of God came from equivocal terms then there would be no chance of rising from finite things to the infinite.
Equivocal language is false because if it were true there would be nothing known or demonstrable about God.
From Unity to Multiplicity
All multiplicity presupposes some prior unity, thus there must be some absolute simplicity as the source of all multiplicity. God is this absolute simplicity.
God does not have being because being involves multiplicity.
God is the One beyond all being.
Creation is the process of the One becoming multiplicity. When it gains knowledge of itself it creates mind. The Mind produces other minds when minds reflect outwards it creates Soul and Soul gives rises to other souls.
Souls create matter. Matter is the most multiplicity.
Being is good; matter is evil. Matter possesses no good in it, only the mere capacity for good.
Eventually all multiplicity will return to unity and evil will give way to good.
From Multiplicity to Unity
Humans are matter and soul, thus good and evil.
In order to travel towrads unity a person must turn from the multiplicity of matter to the unity of soul. Hue must become ascetic.
The Soul must move from what is sensible to what is intellectual. For, what is intellectual is touched by Mind which is almost pure unity.
Once one has achieved union with mind by moving from sensible to intellectual one must move from intellectual to intuitional to achieve whole unity because even mind is multiplicity (knower and known).
The goal is to become one with the One.
The Need for Negative Language of the One (God)
Plotinus states that there can be no positive descriptions about the One.
All the properties Plotinus ascribes the One he denies that he has.
In calling God the One he means, "not many". In calling him good he means, "not evil". But the One is not the first of any series and the One is not good in the sense that anything else is good.
"The One is nothing but itself and cannot be named in terms of anything else" (237).
Plotinus maintains that we "know" God via two ways:
1. Indirectly from his effects
2. by direct mystical intuitions which transcend all cognitive knowledge and provides a positive being for all cognitive negations of God.
Naming God from his Emanational Effects
All that comes from the One is a trace of the transcendent ONe.
If something comes from the One that is beauty then we can God is beautiful in the sense that He causally creates beauty. Thus, his effect is beauty and he therefore is Beauty, but greater.
God is called goodness because causes goodness, not because he possesses goodness.
Unity (God) is beyond Being because he caused being.
The intuitional basis for all naming of God
Giving God positive names from his extrinsically related effects does not provide any proper knowledge of God.
Rational and cognitive through can only point in the direction of God who is knowable only by mystical intuition.
Intuitional knowledge of God comes by purification of all multiplicity and the knower becomes one with the One in a temporary mystical union.
Negative language about God is wholly dependent on a prior positive intuition of God gained via mystical union with the One.
Pseudo-Dionysius brought Plotinus to Christianity in the 6th century A.D.
He affirmed the incomprehensibility of God. He stated God cannot be known directly but He can be known indirectly 3 ways:
1. Affirmation of the God of the Bible (positive theology)
2. Deny that these qualities apply to God in the same sense they apply to the created order (negative theology)
3. Apply these terms to God in a higher way
Moses Maimonides: Negative Attributes of God
Maimonides believed that the literal interpretations of Scripture were the heart of all problematic theology.
The way to positively attribute something to God
He had five ways to attribute a positive quality of God. The first four he felt inconsistent with the monotheistic God of Judaism. So he worked out the fifth way.
1. An object is described by its definition
2. An object is described by part of its definition
3. An object is described by something other than its true essence
4. An object is described by its relation to another object
5. An object is described by its action.
He claimed that Biblical language is anthropomorphic.
The knowledge o the works of God is the knowledge of His attributes.
The Use of Negative Attributes to Describe God
Maimonides held that negative attributes of God are true attributes and that positive attributes imply polytheism.
The function of negative attributes is that they are necessary to direct the mind to the truths necessary to believe concerning God. With each negative attribute learned one inches closer to knowledge of God.
He held that only YHWH indicates God's true essence and its meaning is wholly unknowable.
Mysticism: Ineffability
A definition of Mysticism
F.C. Haploid outlined the nature of mysticism in four points:
1. The phenomenal world is a manifestation of an Absolute and as such this world is not true reality. Only the Absolute is true reality.
2. Human beings can know the Absolute by a direct intuition. In this intuition a union between the human and the absolute occurs.
3. This intuition is a unique function of the true human self, which is usually obscured by the phenomenal self.
4. The possibility is the main goal of human existence and is the door to the experience of ultimate reality.
William James described the mystical union with four points:
1. Ineffability - the experience cannot be contained in words
2. Noetic quality - The impression of having received absolute truth is part of the experience
3. Transiency - The experience will not last very long
4. Passivity - The experience is received by or given to the person. He does not create it.
The mystic does not allow for a difference between the experience of the Absolute and the Absolute.
In the way one cannot doubt he is having a headache, a mystic cannot doubt he is having (or had) a mystical experience.
The problem with mystical experiences is that no one who has not had a mystical experience can know what it is like. Secondly, the mystic cannot describe it because it is ineffable by nature.
Stace's Theories of Ineffability
W.T. Stace provides a number of theories on ineffable experiences:
1. The emotion theory: mystical experience is ineffable because it essentially contains emotions that are too deep for words.
2. The spiritual blindness theory: mystical experience is ineffable because those who have not had it cannot understand it.
Stace rejects these two common sense theories because
a) mystical experience is not merely an empirical perception that must be held to understand
b) mystics themselves admit that it is ineffable, not the fault of their audience
c) The Dionysian Theory: positive language does not apply literally. God is described as "X" because he causes "X", not because he is "X".
d) The Metaphor theory: positive language is merely metaphorical
But, Stace rejects these four as well because if the mystic speaks metaphorically he uses either reducible metaphors (reducible to literal understanding) in which case it is not ineffable or irreducible metaphors in which case he speakings meaninglessly. He rejects c) because it is odd to label the cause of a property with the name of that property.
e) They mystic, during his experience is beyond words, but in describing his experience he is forced to use words which describe his experience as contradictory. But, while this makes it something ineffable, mystical experiences are in fact somewhat contradictory. "The language is paradoxical because the experience is paradoxical" (249).
Thomas Aquinas: Via Negativa
Thomas Aquinas agreed with Maimonides that no one in this life could grasp the essence of God in a positive way.
The knowledge of God by remotion is Aquinas' process of deriving the distinction of God from other beings by way of negative differences.
A creature can be admitted to be God-like but God cannot be creature-like.
Aquinas did hold that one can make position affirmations about God through intrinsic causal similarities between God and his creatures.
The via negativa is the denial of any imperfections in him.
The idea of negation is always based on a positive affirmation.
Positive affirmation are made possible by the intrinsic causal relation between Creator and creatures.
A totally negative God-talk is meaningless.
Complete negation without any affirmation is total skepticism about God.
But, without some kind of negation there is no way to preserve the transcendence of the theistic God.
12: Positive Language About God
There are two basic attempts to develop positive language about God:
1. Univocal (Scotus)
2. Analogous (Aquinas)
The Scotistic Insistence on Univocal Concepts
John Duns Scotus maintained that there can be no meaningful positive talk bout God unless it is univocal.
The Impossibility of Analogous Concepts
Henry of Ghent defended his "analogous concept of being" while Scotus was alive.
Henry claimed that God is known in a universal concept that is analogically common to himself and to creatures.
He claimed that God and creatures are distinguishable by negation of determination. Man is determined, God is undetermined.
Scotus rejects this on a few grounds
1. Differentiation by negation is no different at all
2. The concept of Henry's analogous concept is two concepts and thus equivocal
The Necessity of Univocal Concepts of God
Scouts chose univocal language because it avoids skepticism and meaninglessness.
Univocal to Scotus is that which possess sufficient unity in itself.
He gives four arguments to why concepts of God and man must be understood univocally:
1) The intellect can be certain about the concept of being without knowing it refers to created or uncreated being.
2) It is impossible to have natural knowledge of God without univocal concepts. We have natural knowledge of God. Thus, there are univocal concepts.
3) We would have no proper concept of God without univocal concepts. We have a proper concept of the Trinity, thus of God. Thus, we have univocal concepts.
4) Pure perfection applies wholly proper to God and not to creatures. Thus there must be universal understanding of pure perfection.
Scotus held that if there is no univocity in concepts of God there is no knowledge of God.
Scotus held that there is equivocal talk about God, which is meaningless. There is analogous talk about God which is either equivocal or univocal. If it is equivocal it is meaningless. If it is univocal it is not really analogical.
Thomistic Contention for Analogous Predication
Aquinas held that it was impossible for anything to be predicated of God and a creature in a univocal sense.
Aquinas' rejection of Univocal Predication
Aquinas had 6 arguments against univocality
1. Nothing may be said if God and other things univocally because the forms of the things God has made do not measure up to any specific likeness of God.
2. No creature has the same mode as God thus nothing can be predicated of God and other things universally.
3. Whatever is predicated of many things is a genus or species, but there exists no genus or species of God.
4. Whatever is predicated of many things univocally is simpler in concept than that which it is predicated of. God is wholly simple, thus there can be nothing predicated of God univocally.
5. Whatever is predicated univocally in many things belongs through participation to each of things of which it is predicated. But nothing participates with God, only through God.
6. Nothing is predicated of God and creation in the same order, but rather according to priority and posteriority.
Aquinas also argued that the difference between an infinitely perfect being an a finitely perfect being is infinite and thus, there can be no univocal predication of such beings.
The Need for the Via Negative
God cannot possess perfections in the way crated things possess them.
Properly speaking God dos not posses the properties of perfections; those perfections are the very essence of God.
Univocal predication removes the necessary distance between Creator and created. If any property were univocally attributed to God and created thing it would either limit God or delimit the created thing.
Aquinas' Rejecting of Equivocal Predication
Both Aquinas and Scotus agreed that equivocal predication lends no knowledge of God.
He held that if all knowledge of God came from equivocal terms then there would be no chance of rising from finite things to the infinite.
Equivocal language is false because if it were true there would be nothing known or demonstrable about God.
Friday, March 16, 2007
More Notes on God-Language
(Originally written March 16, 2007 in Book 13)
Some Attempts at Building an Adequate Religious Language
Negative Language of God
The classic example of Negative theology in the West is Plotinus.
Plotinus felt that the One was so far beyond sensibility and intellectual awareness that it could never be spoken of or written about.
Negative religious assertions avoid verbal idolatry.
Finite concepts cannot be applied to an infinite Being.
But, the problem with Negative language is that it presupposes some positive understanding.
Univocal Language of God
John Duns Scotus believed that language used to describe finite creatures are wholly different then that describing the infinite.
He maintained that unless there is univocity in concepts of God there can be no certain knowledge of God.
Analogous Language about God
Thomas Aquinas pointed out the problem with univocal language. He showed that a created concept cannot be expressed univocally about an uncreated Being.
Aquinas advocated analogous language about God to avoid total skepticism and complete dogmatics.
If language is univocal, having a totally different meaning then we have no true knowledge of God.
He held that finite concepts are adequate in describing God if their finitude can be removed, that is to say if we can remove the limitations of concepts (like goodness, justice, etc.). Then we can apply them to God.
Model Language about God
Analogy of intrinsic attribution has not been widely accepted outside of Thomistic circles.
Frederick Ferré offered six objections to analogous language
1. A wholly extrinsic analogy says nothing about the intrinsic properties of God
2. If there is an extrinsic causal relation between God and the world, why are not all qualities drawn from the world applicable to God?
3. When words are disengaged from their finite mode of signification and applied to God they become meaningless.
4. Analogy is based on the challengeable assumption that the causal relation assumption that the causal relation between God and the world provides a basis for their similarity.
5. Even if analogy could be based on some Platonic ontological similarity between cause and effect, properties dawn from finite creatures could not be attributed to an infinite creature in a univocal sense and if they were attributed in a non-univocal sense then it is an equivocation of the word "cause".
6. If the ontology of similarity is not univocally expressed, it is an infinite regress of equivocations. If it is univocal then there is no need of analogy.
Ian T. Ramsey claims God is revealed via disclosure models.
"Disclosure models are the means by which the inverse reveals itself to men" (227).
Disclosure models point to mystery and allow one to speak about God, even if one cannot describe him.
While disclosure models are not ontologically they help to build 'family resemblances'.
In the disclosure model approach, God-language is the result of family resemblances built out of disclosure models integrated into the term, "God".
Autonomous Language about God
This movement denies that religious language needs to be judged by scientific or any other type of language.
In using Wittgenstein concepts they hold that one who is not religious cannot pass judgment on the meaningfulness of the religious language game.
D.Z. Phillips argued that the believer is under no obligation to the unbeliever to account for his beliefs, but the believer cannot impeach the non-believer's non belief on rational grounds.
Under Phillips' context religious language is justified internally, not externally.
Many believers and nonbelievers are unsatisfied with using Wittgenstein's concepts because it makes religious language completely isolated and some argue completely non-cognitive.
The basic problem of religious language is how one can speak meaningfully about God (infinite) by using finite concepts.
Mystics use the "via negative" - no positive affirmations about God are possible.
Scouts and others argue that if there are no positive assertions about God we are left with utter skepticism.
Thomas's argue that finite concepts have only an analogous meaning to the infinite.
11: Negative Religious Language
Negation has been used in philosophical though since Plato
Plato: Determination and Non-Being
The Parmenidean Problem
Parmenides was the first monist.
He held that there can be only One Being in the Universe because if there is more than One being they must differ by something (being) or nothing (non-being). They cannot differ by non-being because they wouldn't differ. They cannot differ by being because that is the only respect that they are similar. Thus, there is only one Being.
Plato's answer to the Parmenidean Problem
Plato held that things differ from each other by negation. A horse is not a chair.
There are two problems with Plato's negation:
1. One must have a positive understanding of what a chair is if a horse is not a chair.
2. All possibilities of a things characteristics must be negated before that this is truly known.
But, Plato, by placing all differences through negation only left differences in being as not happening. Thus everything that has being is identical and Monism necessarily follows.
Plotinus - Negation by Intuition of the Beyond-Being
Plotinus held that being had degrees and kinds, unlike Parmenides' assumption that being was pure and simple.
A brief sketch of the Plotinus' Solution
"The way things differ is by the degree of unity they have. The more unity something has, the higher degree of being it possess".
All Being begins with absolute unity, which is God.
Some Attempts at Building an Adequate Religious Language
Negative Language of God
The classic example of Negative theology in the West is Plotinus.
Plotinus felt that the One was so far beyond sensibility and intellectual awareness that it could never be spoken of or written about.
Negative religious assertions avoid verbal idolatry.
Finite concepts cannot be applied to an infinite Being.
But, the problem with Negative language is that it presupposes some positive understanding.
Univocal Language of God
John Duns Scotus believed that language used to describe finite creatures are wholly different then that describing the infinite.
He maintained that unless there is univocity in concepts of God there can be no certain knowledge of God.
Analogous Language about God
Thomas Aquinas pointed out the problem with univocal language. He showed that a created concept cannot be expressed univocally about an uncreated Being.
Aquinas advocated analogous language about God to avoid total skepticism and complete dogmatics.
If language is univocal, having a totally different meaning then we have no true knowledge of God.
He held that finite concepts are adequate in describing God if their finitude can be removed, that is to say if we can remove the limitations of concepts (like goodness, justice, etc.). Then we can apply them to God.
Model Language about God
Analogy of intrinsic attribution has not been widely accepted outside of Thomistic circles.
Frederick Ferré offered six objections to analogous language
1. A wholly extrinsic analogy says nothing about the intrinsic properties of God
2. If there is an extrinsic causal relation between God and the world, why are not all qualities drawn from the world applicable to God?
3. When words are disengaged from their finite mode of signification and applied to God they become meaningless.
4. Analogy is based on the challengeable assumption that the causal relation assumption that the causal relation between God and the world provides a basis for their similarity.
5. Even if analogy could be based on some Platonic ontological similarity between cause and effect, properties dawn from finite creatures could not be attributed to an infinite creature in a univocal sense and if they were attributed in a non-univocal sense then it is an equivocation of the word "cause".
6. If the ontology of similarity is not univocally expressed, it is an infinite regress of equivocations. If it is univocal then there is no need of analogy.
Ian T. Ramsey claims God is revealed via disclosure models.
"Disclosure models are the means by which the inverse reveals itself to men" (227).
Disclosure models point to mystery and allow one to speak about God, even if one cannot describe him.
While disclosure models are not ontologically they help to build 'family resemblances'.
In the disclosure model approach, God-language is the result of family resemblances built out of disclosure models integrated into the term, "God".
Autonomous Language about God
This movement denies that religious language needs to be judged by scientific or any other type of language.
In using Wittgenstein concepts they hold that one who is not religious cannot pass judgment on the meaningfulness of the religious language game.
D.Z. Phillips argued that the believer is under no obligation to the unbeliever to account for his beliefs, but the believer cannot impeach the non-believer's non belief on rational grounds.
Under Phillips' context religious language is justified internally, not externally.
Many believers and nonbelievers are unsatisfied with using Wittgenstein's concepts because it makes religious language completely isolated and some argue completely non-cognitive.
The basic problem of religious language is how one can speak meaningfully about God (infinite) by using finite concepts.
Mystics use the "via negative" - no positive affirmations about God are possible.
Scouts and others argue that if there are no positive assertions about God we are left with utter skepticism.
Thomas's argue that finite concepts have only an analogous meaning to the infinite.
11: Negative Religious Language
Negation has been used in philosophical though since Plato
Plato: Determination and Non-Being
The Parmenidean Problem
Parmenides was the first monist.
He held that there can be only One Being in the Universe because if there is more than One being they must differ by something (being) or nothing (non-being). They cannot differ by non-being because they wouldn't differ. They cannot differ by being because that is the only respect that they are similar. Thus, there is only one Being.
Plato's answer to the Parmenidean Problem
Plato held that things differ from each other by negation. A horse is not a chair.
There are two problems with Plato's negation:
1. One must have a positive understanding of what a chair is if a horse is not a chair.
2. All possibilities of a things characteristics must be negated before that this is truly known.
But, Plato, by placing all differences through negation only left differences in being as not happening. Thus everything that has being is identical and Monism necessarily follows.
Plotinus - Negation by Intuition of the Beyond-Being
Plotinus held that being had degrees and kinds, unlike Parmenides' assumption that being was pure and simple.
A brief sketch of the Plotinus' Solution
"The way things differ is by the degree of unity they have. The more unity something has, the higher degree of being it possess".
All Being begins with absolute unity, which is God.
Thursday, March 15, 2007
Class Notes on the Moral Argument
(Originally written March 15, 2007 in Book 13)
Class Notes
Ultimately the Thomistic cosmological argument comes down to a Transcendental Question: What are the conditions for there to be actualized potential?
(answer) Unless there is a source of actuality that actualizes potential without being actualized by it, there cannot be actualized potential.
Existential Cosmological Argument
1. Something Exists
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9. Only one God exists
10. The God of Theism exists
The Moral Argument for God's existence:
The is a moral law.
The must be a moral lawgiver.
Objections to Moral Argument
1. You can understand goodness apart from belief in God.
2. There is no moral law. Morality is relative to the individual or the culture.
3. Evil is allowed for greater good. If you try to alleviate suffering you go against God allowing for the greater good.
4. If morality is simple whatever God's will is then there is no objective moral standard, only what God said. So morality must be independent of God.
5. If the moral law is independent of God then he is not the ultimate reason.
6. No way to tell empirically what the moral law is or even that it exists.
7. Just because something is the best explanation doesn't make it logically necessary.
8. Atheists can be moral people.
9. If God is a moral God, why is there suffering?
10. No evidence of moral law breakers being punished, so why a law giver?
11. The argument, even if it works, presupposes the cosmological argument.
The Moral Argument for God's Existence
Jeremy Miller
Basic Arg.
1. A universal moral law exists
2. The universal moral law must exist in a supreme mind apart from humanity.
3. It must exist in the mind of God.
4. Therefore, God exists.
There must be a universal law because if not
- moral disagreements would make no sense
- all moral criticism are meaningless
- Promise and treaty keeping are unnecessary
- We would not make excuses for breaking the moral law
C.S. Lewis
- contradiction would result
- there would not be agreement on the meaning of it
- no ethical question could even be discussed
Elton Trueblood
- People are conscious of the moral law
- people acknowledge its claim on them even if they do not follow it
- people admit to its validity prior to following it
- no finite mind fully grasps it
- all finite minds together have not reached conformity on its meaning (Sorley)
-Morality is a rational enterprise
- Morality would not be a rational enterprise if moral skepticism were true
- There is much too much unresolved moral disagreement for us to suppose that moral skepticism can be avoided if we rely solely on human devices
-Therefore, there must be some extra-human source of morality
(Zagzebski)
Why must the moral law exist in a mind outside of the human mind?
Morality cannot come from herd instinct because a) the mob is not always right, b) we would only act on the strongest instinct, but we some times act upon the weaker instinct.
Morality cannot be a social convention because a) not all learned things are social convention b) judgment about the moral progress about a society only makes sense outside of human society and C) variations in value judgments are factual, not moral.
The Moral law cannot be a law of nature because A) the moral law is not descriptive, it is prescriptive B) factually equal situations may not be the same morally C) something may be factually convenient to the whole race, but not to me. Only a universal moral law explains why I should do it.
The moral law cannot be mere fantasy because A) we did not create it, B) We cannot get rid of it, C) value judgments would otherwise be meaningless
The moral law must be from a mind because it does not come from matter. Morality is an idea and ideas come from minds.
God must be the mind from which the universal law flows from.
Possible objections
1. Problem of Evil
Responses
- Evil could be for the greater good.
- Evil could be human's fault
- God could not create without creating evil (Evil is a privation)
- It could be necessary for human freedom
- God is infinitely wise; we are not
2. Everything is meaningless. We may be living in an absurd reality.
3. Attack the law of Causation
response- Just try and believe the law causation
4. There could be a Universal Moral Law without God
Class Notes
Ultimately the Thomistic cosmological argument comes down to a Transcendental Question: What are the conditions for there to be actualized potential?
(answer) Unless there is a source of actuality that actualizes potential without being actualized by it, there cannot be actualized potential.
Existential Cosmological Argument
1. Something Exists
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9. Only one God exists
10. The God of Theism exists
The Moral Argument for God's existence:
The is a moral law.
The must be a moral lawgiver.
Objections to Moral Argument
1. You can understand goodness apart from belief in God.
2. There is no moral law. Morality is relative to the individual or the culture.
3. Evil is allowed for greater good. If you try to alleviate suffering you go against God allowing for the greater good.
4. If morality is simple whatever God's will is then there is no objective moral standard, only what God said. So morality must be independent of God.
5. If the moral law is independent of God then he is not the ultimate reason.
6. No way to tell empirically what the moral law is or even that it exists.
7. Just because something is the best explanation doesn't make it logically necessary.
8. Atheists can be moral people.
9. If God is a moral God, why is there suffering?
10. No evidence of moral law breakers being punished, so why a law giver?
11. The argument, even if it works, presupposes the cosmological argument.
The Moral Argument for God's Existence
Jeremy Miller
Basic Arg.
1. A universal moral law exists
2. The universal moral law must exist in a supreme mind apart from humanity.
3. It must exist in the mind of God.
4. Therefore, God exists.
There must be a universal law because if not
- moral disagreements would make no sense
- all moral criticism are meaningless
- Promise and treaty keeping are unnecessary
- We would not make excuses for breaking the moral law
C.S. Lewis
- contradiction would result
- there would not be agreement on the meaning of it
- no ethical question could even be discussed
Elton Trueblood
- People are conscious of the moral law
- people acknowledge its claim on them even if they do not follow it
- people admit to its validity prior to following it
- no finite mind fully grasps it
- all finite minds together have not reached conformity on its meaning (Sorley)
-Morality is a rational enterprise
- Morality would not be a rational enterprise if moral skepticism were true
- There is much too much unresolved moral disagreement for us to suppose that moral skepticism can be avoided if we rely solely on human devices
-Therefore, there must be some extra-human source of morality
(Zagzebski)
Why must the moral law exist in a mind outside of the human mind?
Morality cannot come from herd instinct because a) the mob is not always right, b) we would only act on the strongest instinct, but we some times act upon the weaker instinct.
Morality cannot be a social convention because a) not all learned things are social convention b) judgment about the moral progress about a society only makes sense outside of human society and C) variations in value judgments are factual, not moral.
The Moral law cannot be a law of nature because A) the moral law is not descriptive, it is prescriptive B) factually equal situations may not be the same morally C) something may be factually convenient to the whole race, but not to me. Only a universal moral law explains why I should do it.
The moral law cannot be mere fantasy because A) we did not create it, B) We cannot get rid of it, C) value judgments would otherwise be meaningless
The moral law must be from a mind because it does not come from matter. Morality is an idea and ideas come from minds.
God must be the mind from which the universal law flows from.
Possible objections
1. Problem of Evil
Responses
- Evil could be for the greater good.
- Evil could be human's fault
- God could not create without creating evil (Evil is a privation)
- It could be necessary for human freedom
- God is infinitely wise; we are not
2. Everything is meaningless. We may be living in an absurd reality.
3. Attack the law of Causation
response- Just try and believe the law causation
4. There could be a Universal Moral Law without God
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Cosmological Arguments and Rebuttals
(Originally written March 13, 2007 in Book 13)
Al-Farabi's Necessary Existence Argument
Arabian and Jewish forms of the cosmological argument later influenced Christian arguments
The Islamic Philosopher Al-Farabi distinguished between existence and essence. He argued:
1) There exists beings whose essence is distinct from their existence. These are possible beings.
2) These beings have existence only accidentally. It is not part of their very essence to exist. It is logically possible that they might not have existed.
3) Anything that exists accidentally (not essentially) must have derived their existence from another.
4) There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of existence.
5) Therefore, there must be a first cause of existence whose essence and existence are identical. This being must be a necessary being because the First Cause cannot be a mere possible being since all possible beings do not explain their own existence.
Avicenna's First Cause Argument
1) There are possible beings
2) Whatever possible beings exist have a cause for their being
3) There cannot be an infinite series of being.
4) Therefore, there must be a first cause for all possible things.
5) This first Cause must be a necessary Being because that which is the cause of all possible beings cannot itself be a possible being.
6) Whatever is essentially One can create immediately only one effect (intelligence)
7) Thinking is creating and God necessarily thinks, since he is a necessary being
8) Therefore, there is an necessary emanation from God of ten intelligences (Angels) that control the various spheres of the universe and the last of which (called Agent Intellect) forms the four elements of the cosmos and by which the human mind (possible intellect) is informed of all truth.
Avicenna's God was a necessary being who created 10 gods who created everything else.
The Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) argued for a first mover, a first Cause and a Necessary Being.
He argued that "I AM" implied absolute existence which applied to God alone.
Thomas Aquinas: Five Ways to Prove God's Existence
Aquinas' arguments were not entirely new
1) Maimonides had arguments similar to the first three
2) Al-Farabi and Avicenna had the first two
3) Anselm had an argument similar to the 4th argument
4) Aquinas' 5th argument was similar to Thierry of Chartes and William of Conches' adaptation of Plato's Timaeus argument
Aquinas was much more Aristotelian in his thought than any of his Christian predecessors.
He argued from:
1) Motion
2) Efficient Causality
3) Possibility and necessity
4) Gradation (perfection)
5) to a First Cause
Duns Scotus: Argument from Producibility
John Duns Scotus modified Aquinas' argument in two ways:
1) He began with the producibility of being, not merely from produced beings
2) He amplified the argument against an invite regress of dependent causes
Duns Scotus' arg.
1) Some being is produced
a) This is learned via experience
b) This is true independent of experience
c) It would be true even if God had not willed to create anything
2) What is produced is producible either by itself, by nothing or by something else
3) No being can produce itself
4) Something cannot be caused by nothing
5) Therefore, being is producible only by some being that is productive
6) There cannot be an infinite regress of productive beings, each producing the being of the one following it because
a) this is an essentially related series of causes, not an accidentally related one
-where the primary cause is more nearly perfect than the secondary one
-where the secondary cause depends on the primary one for its very causality
-where the cause must be simultaneously present to the effect
b) An infinite series of essentially related causes is impossible because:
-if the whole series is dependent for its causalities then there must be something beyond the series that counts for the causality in the series
-If the infinite series were causing the effect, then there would have to be an infinite number of causes simultaneously causing a single effect, and this is impossible
-where ever there are prior causes there must be a prime cause
-higher causes are more nearly perfect than lower causes and this implies a perfect cause at the head of all other less-than-perfect causes
-an infinite regress of causes implies imperfection. But an imperfect series implies something perfect beyond the series as ground for the imperfect
7) Therefore, there must be a first productive cause of all producible beings
8) This first Cause of all producible beings must be one because:
-It is perfect in knowledge and there cannot be two beings that know everything perfectly
-It is perfect in will, hence it loves itself more completely than anything else
-It is infinitely good and there cannot be two as such because one would be more than infinitely good which is impossible
-It is infinite in power. If there were two that were infinite in power than there would be two primary causes of the same effect, and this is impossible
-Absolutely infinite cannot be excelled in perfection because there cannot be anything more perfect than that which is wholly perfect
-There cannot be two necessary beings because one would possess what the other lacked and if it lacked any perfection it would not be necessary
-Omnipotent will cannot be in two beings because then one could render the other impotent
Ockham's Reservations about the Cosmological Argument
William of Ockham (1290-1350) raised three objections to the cosmological argument:
1) He denied that an essentially related infinite series was impossible
2) He argued that efficient causes are only known via experience. (Causality is "that whose existence or presence is followed by something")
3) He denied that one could prove that there was only one God in the absolute sense of the word. Christian theists insist that the unity of God refers to the "most perfect" Being possible. But the proposition "God exists" is not self evident because a self-evident proposition cannot be doubted and "God exists" is doubted. Since God's unity rests on the proposition "God exists" and it is impossible to know via experience and it is not self-evident there is no way to demonstrate that God is absolutely one.
Descartes' A posteriori Proof for God
Descartes' Proof
1) I am doubting
2) If I am doubting, I am thinking
3) Doubt is an imperfect form of thinking
4) But if I know the imperfect, then I must be aware of the perfect
5) But my imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of perfection that I have
6) Only a perfect Mind is an adequate cause for the idea of perfection
7) Therefore, a perfect mind must exist as the cause of this perfection.
Both Augustine and Descartes have a posteriori arguments for the existence of God which is platonic and has an affinity for the ontological argument.
Leibniz: The argument from Sufficient Reason
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) provided the most influential form of the cosmological argument in modern times. He argued:
1. The entire world is changing
2. Whatever is changing lacks within itself the reason for its own existence.
3. There is a sufficient reason for its own existence.
4. Therefore, there must be a cause beyond this world for its existence.
5. This cause is either its own sufficient cause or beyond it.
6. There cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons.
7. Therefore, there must be a first Cause that is its own sufficient reason.
Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Leibniz's disciple offered the proof that became the pattern of the cosmological argument for the modern world.
1. The human soul exists.
2. Nothing exists without a sufficient reason why it exists.
3. The reason for our existence must be contained in ourselves or beyond ourselves.
4. The reason for our existence is not in ourselves.
5. The reason for our existence thus lies beyond ourselves.
6. One does not arrive at sufficient reason for his existence until he reaches a being that has its reason for existence within itself.
7. A being that has its reason for existence within itself is a necessary being.
8. Therefore, there must be a necessary being beyond us that is the sufficient reason for our existence.
9. It is logically impossible for a necessary being not to exist.
10. Therefore, this necessary being is identical with the self-existent God of Scripture.
Leibniz's argument (and Wolff's) rests on the principle of sufficient reason which posits itself as a self-evidently true analytic principle.
The argument is a posteriori, but not existential. The necessity of its conclusion is based on a conceptually certainty, not an existential (actual) certainty.
Hume's Skeptical Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument
David Hume (1711-1776) laid down the most fundamental arguments against the cosmological argument:
1) Only a finite cause need be inferred from finite effects
2) No propositions about existence can be logically necessary
3) The words "necessary being" have no consistent meaning. It is possible to think of anything of not existing, even God; and, what might not exist does not need to exist.
4) If "necessary being" means only imperishable, then the universe may be the necessary being.
5) An infinite series is possible. An eternal series cannot have a cause because causes imply priority in time, but nothing can be prior in time to an eternal series. Thus, an eternal series is possible.
6) There is no way to establish the principle of causality
7) The universe as a whole does not need a cause, only the parts do.
8) Theistic argument convince only those who like abstract reasoning.
Kant's Agnosticism on Theistic Argumentation
1) The cosmological argument depends on the invalid ontological argument
2) Existential statements are not necessary
3) A noumenal (real) cause cannot be derived from a phenomenal effect
4) What is logically necessary is not ontologically necessary
5) The cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions
6) The concept of a "necessary being" is not self-clarifying
7) An infinite regress is logically possible
Taylor's restatement of the cosmological argument:
1) The Universe as a whole does not explain its own existence
2) Whatever does not explain its own existence calls for an explanation beyond itself.
3) An infinite regress of reasons is impossible
4) Therefore, there must be a first self-sufficient (independent)_ cause of the whole universe
Taylor's conclusion is rationally inescapable, but it is Leibnizian in that it relies on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, it is open to similar criticisms.
Hackett's Arguments Based on Explanation
Samuel C. Hackett offered two arguments in the Leibnizian tradition.
The first conceptual argument:
1) The world order is possible only on the basis of several necessary conditions:
- There need to be objective a priori principles of knowledge
- There need to objective essences that define the properties of things in the world
- There needs to be a reason why of all the possible worlds this is the one that exists
2) These realities show all of the properties that are associated with the structuring activity of a mind
3) Therefore, these realities can be understood as the workings of an absolute mind.
4) Therefore, there exists an absolute mind as necessary condition to the logical possibility of this world.
His second, causal argument:
1) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
2) Something exists
3) Therefore, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
Hackett's arguments suffer from an unwarranted assumption that a sufficient cause must be an ultimate cause. A finite cause may suffice.
Ross' argument based on Explanation
James F. Ross provided two versions of the argument based on explanation
First:
1) If something is not the case, there must be an explanation for it not being so.
2) Considering the state of affairs, "God does not exist" cannot be the case.
3) Therefore, since "God dos not exist" cannot be the case, "God exists" must be the case. Thus, God exists.
Craig's Kalam Argument
William Lane Craig has produced an argument based on the need to posit an original cause for the universe. He has three premises:
1) Whatever beings to exist has a cause
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Premise 1 seems intuit, but is questionable and uneasy to prove via demonstration
Premise 2 is completely questionable.
The argument, if it stands, does not prove theism because it does not eliminate pantheism.
Teleological and moral arguments depend on the principle of sufficient reason and/or causality. Both of which are questionable.
The ontological argument depends on the cosmological argument because it is theoretically possible that nothing ever existed at all.
The cosmological argument (in Leibnizian form) is rationally inescapable only if the principle of sufficient reason is rationally inescapable. But the principle of sufficient reason is neither analytically or self-evidently true.
The cosmological arguments leaves the actual for the conceptual at call thing world contingent and stating a necessary Being is one whose non-existence is logically impossible. This opens it to Kant's criticism that it confuses the principle of existential causality with the principle of sufficient reason.
The Kalam argument does not prove a theistic God, but a God that could be pantheistic.
9: The Cosmological Argument Reevaluated
Most attempts to defend the cosmological argument in a non-Leibnizian way emanate from Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas did not base his argument on the principle of sufficient reason, but on existential causality.
The Leibnizian type argument is built on logical necessity, whereas the Thomistic argument is based on existential undeniability.
The Cosmological Argument Restated
1. Some limited, changing being(s) exist
2. The present existence of every limited, changing being is caused by another
3. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of being
4. Therefore, there is a first Cause of the present existence of these beings
5. The first cause must be infinite, necessary, eternal, simple, unchanging and one
6. The first uncaused cause is identical with the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
It is logically possible that nothing ever existed. That is, it is possible to conceive of the nonexistence of everything.
Linehan: But logic is an affirmation of existence, so to conceive of the nonexistence of everything is a logical inference and thus, self-defeating?
Any being that undergoes a change is a contingent being. Necessary Beings are immutable.
Whatever changes in existence must be composed of actuality and potentiality.
The fact that there is change is proof that there is potential and actualization of potential.
No potential actualizes itself.
There must be some actuality outside of composed beings (beings possessing potential and actuality) to explain why they exist.
Actuality is a thing's existence and its potentiality is its essence.
An efficient cause is a necessary and sufficient condition to account for the actualization of a potential.
An infinite regress is a series without a first or beginning cause.
A self-caused thing is impossible because it would have had to exist before it existed in order to cause itself.
A way out of this dilemma is to argue that the infinite regress is circular or mutually dependent.
But this argument is obviously circular and thus, fallacious.
To deny causality within an infinite regress is simply an attempt to explain away the need for an explanation (a real need) on ground for the ungrounded finite being.
A being that needs ground for his own existence cannot be the ground of another being that needs to be grounded. One contingent being cannot ground another contingent being.
There must be a first Cause of the existence of every finite thing that exists.
The first Cause is the efficient Cause.
The Frist Cause is an uncaused cause. It can neither be self-caused (impossible) or caused by another (thus negating its status as the first cause).
The uncaused cause must be an unlimited being. If caused things are limited, uncaused things must be unlimited.
An unlimited Being must be a Necessary Being because it can not be limited by contingency.
God is not a logically necessary Being, He is an ontologically necessary being.
The uncaused Being must be an eternal Being. If nothing ever existed (a logical possibility) then nothing would ever exist because nothing can cause itself.
The uncaused Cause must be a simple, undivided Being. The uncaused Cause is pure actuality with no potentiality.
The uncaused Cause of existence must be immutable. What is changeable possess potentiality, thus pure actuality is unchangeable.
An uncaused Cause must be one Being. There cannot be two pure actualities. Pure actuality is indivisible.
The pure actuality possess all of the perfections of being infinite. Thus, the uncaused cause is the source of all perfections.
Al-Farabi's Necessary Existence Argument
Arabian and Jewish forms of the cosmological argument later influenced Christian arguments
The Islamic Philosopher Al-Farabi distinguished between existence and essence. He argued:
1) There exists beings whose essence is distinct from their existence. These are possible beings.
2) These beings have existence only accidentally. It is not part of their very essence to exist. It is logically possible that they might not have existed.
3) Anything that exists accidentally (not essentially) must have derived their existence from another.
4) There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of existence.
5) Therefore, there must be a first cause of existence whose essence and existence are identical. This being must be a necessary being because the First Cause cannot be a mere possible being since all possible beings do not explain their own existence.
Avicenna's First Cause Argument
1) There are possible beings
2) Whatever possible beings exist have a cause for their being
3) There cannot be an infinite series of being.
4) Therefore, there must be a first cause for all possible things.
5) This first Cause must be a necessary Being because that which is the cause of all possible beings cannot itself be a possible being.
6) Whatever is essentially One can create immediately only one effect (intelligence)
7) Thinking is creating and God necessarily thinks, since he is a necessary being
8) Therefore, there is an necessary emanation from God of ten intelligences (Angels) that control the various spheres of the universe and the last of which (called Agent Intellect) forms the four elements of the cosmos and by which the human mind (possible intellect) is informed of all truth.
Avicenna's God was a necessary being who created 10 gods who created everything else.
The Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) argued for a first mover, a first Cause and a Necessary Being.
He argued that "I AM" implied absolute existence which applied to God alone.
Thomas Aquinas: Five Ways to Prove God's Existence
Aquinas' arguments were not entirely new
1) Maimonides had arguments similar to the first three
2) Al-Farabi and Avicenna had the first two
3) Anselm had an argument similar to the 4th argument
4) Aquinas' 5th argument was similar to Thierry of Chartes and William of Conches' adaptation of Plato's Timaeus argument
Aquinas was much more Aristotelian in his thought than any of his Christian predecessors.
He argued from:
1) Motion
2) Efficient Causality
3) Possibility and necessity
4) Gradation (perfection)
5) to a First Cause
Duns Scotus: Argument from Producibility
John Duns Scotus modified Aquinas' argument in two ways:
1) He began with the producibility of being, not merely from produced beings
2) He amplified the argument against an invite regress of dependent causes
Duns Scotus' arg.
1) Some being is produced
a) This is learned via experience
b) This is true independent of experience
c) It would be true even if God had not willed to create anything
2) What is produced is producible either by itself, by nothing or by something else
3) No being can produce itself
4) Something cannot be caused by nothing
5) Therefore, being is producible only by some being that is productive
6) There cannot be an infinite regress of productive beings, each producing the being of the one following it because
a) this is an essentially related series of causes, not an accidentally related one
-where the primary cause is more nearly perfect than the secondary one
-where the secondary cause depends on the primary one for its very causality
-where the cause must be simultaneously present to the effect
b) An infinite series of essentially related causes is impossible because:
-if the whole series is dependent for its causalities then there must be something beyond the series that counts for the causality in the series
-If the infinite series were causing the effect, then there would have to be an infinite number of causes simultaneously causing a single effect, and this is impossible
-where ever there are prior causes there must be a prime cause
-higher causes are more nearly perfect than lower causes and this implies a perfect cause at the head of all other less-than-perfect causes
-an infinite regress of causes implies imperfection. But an imperfect series implies something perfect beyond the series as ground for the imperfect
7) Therefore, there must be a first productive cause of all producible beings
8) This first Cause of all producible beings must be one because:
-It is perfect in knowledge and there cannot be two beings that know everything perfectly
-It is perfect in will, hence it loves itself more completely than anything else
-It is infinitely good and there cannot be two as such because one would be more than infinitely good which is impossible
-It is infinite in power. If there were two that were infinite in power than there would be two primary causes of the same effect, and this is impossible
-Absolutely infinite cannot be excelled in perfection because there cannot be anything more perfect than that which is wholly perfect
-There cannot be two necessary beings because one would possess what the other lacked and if it lacked any perfection it would not be necessary
-Omnipotent will cannot be in two beings because then one could render the other impotent
Ockham's Reservations about the Cosmological Argument
William of Ockham (1290-1350) raised three objections to the cosmological argument:
1) He denied that an essentially related infinite series was impossible
2) He argued that efficient causes are only known via experience. (Causality is "that whose existence or presence is followed by something")
3) He denied that one could prove that there was only one God in the absolute sense of the word. Christian theists insist that the unity of God refers to the "most perfect" Being possible. But the proposition "God exists" is not self evident because a self-evident proposition cannot be doubted and "God exists" is doubted. Since God's unity rests on the proposition "God exists" and it is impossible to know via experience and it is not self-evident there is no way to demonstrate that God is absolutely one.
Descartes' A posteriori Proof for God
Descartes' Proof
1) I am doubting
2) If I am doubting, I am thinking
3) Doubt is an imperfect form of thinking
4) But if I know the imperfect, then I must be aware of the perfect
5) But my imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of perfection that I have
6) Only a perfect Mind is an adequate cause for the idea of perfection
7) Therefore, a perfect mind must exist as the cause of this perfection.
Both Augustine and Descartes have a posteriori arguments for the existence of God which is platonic and has an affinity for the ontological argument.
Leibniz: The argument from Sufficient Reason
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) provided the most influential form of the cosmological argument in modern times. He argued:
1. The entire world is changing
2. Whatever is changing lacks within itself the reason for its own existence.
3. There is a sufficient reason for its own existence.
4. Therefore, there must be a cause beyond this world for its existence.
5. This cause is either its own sufficient cause or beyond it.
6. There cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons.
7. Therefore, there must be a first Cause that is its own sufficient reason.
Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Leibniz's disciple offered the proof that became the pattern of the cosmological argument for the modern world.
1. The human soul exists.
2. Nothing exists without a sufficient reason why it exists.
3. The reason for our existence must be contained in ourselves or beyond ourselves.
4. The reason for our existence is not in ourselves.
5. The reason for our existence thus lies beyond ourselves.
6. One does not arrive at sufficient reason for his existence until he reaches a being that has its reason for existence within itself.
7. A being that has its reason for existence within itself is a necessary being.
8. Therefore, there must be a necessary being beyond us that is the sufficient reason for our existence.
9. It is logically impossible for a necessary being not to exist.
10. Therefore, this necessary being is identical with the self-existent God of Scripture.
Leibniz's argument (and Wolff's) rests on the principle of sufficient reason which posits itself as a self-evidently true analytic principle.
The argument is a posteriori, but not existential. The necessity of its conclusion is based on a conceptually certainty, not an existential (actual) certainty.
Hume's Skeptical Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument
David Hume (1711-1776) laid down the most fundamental arguments against the cosmological argument:
1) Only a finite cause need be inferred from finite effects
2) No propositions about existence can be logically necessary
3) The words "necessary being" have no consistent meaning. It is possible to think of anything of not existing, even God; and, what might not exist does not need to exist.
4) If "necessary being" means only imperishable, then the universe may be the necessary being.
5) An infinite series is possible. An eternal series cannot have a cause because causes imply priority in time, but nothing can be prior in time to an eternal series. Thus, an eternal series is possible.
6) There is no way to establish the principle of causality
7) The universe as a whole does not need a cause, only the parts do.
8) Theistic argument convince only those who like abstract reasoning.
Kant's Agnosticism on Theistic Argumentation
1) The cosmological argument depends on the invalid ontological argument
2) Existential statements are not necessary
3) A noumenal (real) cause cannot be derived from a phenomenal effect
4) What is logically necessary is not ontologically necessary
5) The cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions
6) The concept of a "necessary being" is not self-clarifying
7) An infinite regress is logically possible
Taylor's restatement of the cosmological argument:
1) The Universe as a whole does not explain its own existence
2) Whatever does not explain its own existence calls for an explanation beyond itself.
3) An infinite regress of reasons is impossible
4) Therefore, there must be a first self-sufficient (independent)_ cause of the whole universe
Taylor's conclusion is rationally inescapable, but it is Leibnizian in that it relies on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, it is open to similar criticisms.
Hackett's Arguments Based on Explanation
Samuel C. Hackett offered two arguments in the Leibnizian tradition.
The first conceptual argument:
1) The world order is possible only on the basis of several necessary conditions:
- There need to be objective a priori principles of knowledge
- There need to objective essences that define the properties of things in the world
- There needs to be a reason why of all the possible worlds this is the one that exists
2) These realities show all of the properties that are associated with the structuring activity of a mind
3) Therefore, these realities can be understood as the workings of an absolute mind.
4) Therefore, there exists an absolute mind as necessary condition to the logical possibility of this world.
His second, causal argument:
1) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
2) Something exists
3) Therefore, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
Hackett's arguments suffer from an unwarranted assumption that a sufficient cause must be an ultimate cause. A finite cause may suffice.
Ross' argument based on Explanation
James F. Ross provided two versions of the argument based on explanation
First:
1) If something is not the case, there must be an explanation for it not being so.
2) Considering the state of affairs, "God does not exist" cannot be the case.
3) Therefore, since "God dos not exist" cannot be the case, "God exists" must be the case. Thus, God exists.
Craig's Kalam Argument
William Lane Craig has produced an argument based on the need to posit an original cause for the universe. He has three premises:
1) Whatever beings to exist has a cause
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Premise 1 seems intuit, but is questionable and uneasy to prove via demonstration
Premise 2 is completely questionable.
The argument, if it stands, does not prove theism because it does not eliminate pantheism.
Teleological and moral arguments depend on the principle of sufficient reason and/or causality. Both of which are questionable.
The ontological argument depends on the cosmological argument because it is theoretically possible that nothing ever existed at all.
The cosmological argument (in Leibnizian form) is rationally inescapable only if the principle of sufficient reason is rationally inescapable. But the principle of sufficient reason is neither analytically or self-evidently true.
The cosmological arguments leaves the actual for the conceptual at call thing world contingent and stating a necessary Being is one whose non-existence is logically impossible. This opens it to Kant's criticism that it confuses the principle of existential causality with the principle of sufficient reason.
The Kalam argument does not prove a theistic God, but a God that could be pantheistic.
9: The Cosmological Argument Reevaluated
Most attempts to defend the cosmological argument in a non-Leibnizian way emanate from Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas did not base his argument on the principle of sufficient reason, but on existential causality.
The Leibnizian type argument is built on logical necessity, whereas the Thomistic argument is based on existential undeniability.
The Cosmological Argument Restated
1. Some limited, changing being(s) exist
2. The present existence of every limited, changing being is caused by another
3. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of being
4. Therefore, there is a first Cause of the present existence of these beings
5. The first cause must be infinite, necessary, eternal, simple, unchanging and one
6. The first uncaused cause is identical with the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
It is logically possible that nothing ever existed. That is, it is possible to conceive of the nonexistence of everything.
Linehan: But logic is an affirmation of existence, so to conceive of the nonexistence of everything is a logical inference and thus, self-defeating?
Any being that undergoes a change is a contingent being. Necessary Beings are immutable.
Whatever changes in existence must be composed of actuality and potentiality.
The fact that there is change is proof that there is potential and actualization of potential.
No potential actualizes itself.
There must be some actuality outside of composed beings (beings possessing potential and actuality) to explain why they exist.
Actuality is a thing's existence and its potentiality is its essence.
An efficient cause is a necessary and sufficient condition to account for the actualization of a potential.
An infinite regress is a series without a first or beginning cause.
A self-caused thing is impossible because it would have had to exist before it existed in order to cause itself.
A way out of this dilemma is to argue that the infinite regress is circular or mutually dependent.
But this argument is obviously circular and thus, fallacious.
To deny causality within an infinite regress is simply an attempt to explain away the need for an explanation (a real need) on ground for the ungrounded finite being.
A being that needs ground for his own existence cannot be the ground of another being that needs to be grounded. One contingent being cannot ground another contingent being.
There must be a first Cause of the existence of every finite thing that exists.
The first Cause is the efficient Cause.
The Frist Cause is an uncaused cause. It can neither be self-caused (impossible) or caused by another (thus negating its status as the first cause).
The uncaused cause must be an unlimited being. If caused things are limited, uncaused things must be unlimited.
An unlimited Being must be a Necessary Being because it can not be limited by contingency.
God is not a logically necessary Being, He is an ontologically necessary being.
The uncaused Being must be an eternal Being. If nothing ever existed (a logical possibility) then nothing would ever exist because nothing can cause itself.
The uncaused Cause must be a simple, undivided Being. The uncaused Cause is pure actuality with no potentiality.
The uncaused Cause of existence must be immutable. What is changeable possess potentiality, thus pure actuality is unchangeable.
An uncaused Cause must be one Being. There cannot be two pure actualities. Pure actuality is indivisible.
The pure actuality possess all of the perfections of being infinite. Thus, the uncaused cause is the source of all perfections.
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