The Atomists: Leucippus & Democritus

History of Western Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
1972

Chapter IX - The Atomists

Leucippus
-circa 440 BC
-influenced by Parmenides & Zeno
-questionable/shadowy historical figure

Democritus
-circa 420 BC
-much more concrete of an historical figure than Democritus
-from Thrace
-Contemporary of Socrates

Atomism was an attempted solution and synthesis of monism and pluralism

Everything is composed of indestructible atoms. The atoms are in constant motion, with the first motion seeming to have been a random motion. The collisions of the atoms formed vortices and then created the physical-visible world.

Atomists were strict determinists - everything happened in accordance with natural laws. There was no chance in their system, despite that being the most common argument leveled against them in the ancient world.

"The atomists, unlike Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, sought to explain the world without introducing the notion of purpose or final cause" (Russell 66-67).

As an aside, Russell makes an interesting point about causation on page 67. He points out that both teleology and pure mechanical causation systems can only be applied within reality and not to reality as a whole. If either are applied to reality as a whole they end with an infinite regress or at some arbitrary beginning of reality. While, he is his normal harsh self to those who might have a bent toward teleology his words make me think. "But if a man is so obstinately teleological as to continue to ask what purpose is served by the Creator, it becomes obvious that his question is impious. It is, moreover, unmeaning, since, to make it significant, we  should have to suppose the Creator created by some super-Creator whose purposes He served" (Russell, 67). That made me think of two things: first, the religions of the ancient world who believed in a dualism that had a benevolent and a malevolent creator. But, also the relationship between God the Father and Jesus the Son in authoring and completing creation. Allow me a moment to slip into some thought without taking this as my definitive belief as to regards the nature of creation.

Genesis 1:26 always made me pause when I read it and thought about the radical notion of monotheism often associated with the ancient Hebrews. Why would a radically monotheistic religion write of God saying "Let us make man in our image"? Of course, it could be like the 'royal we', but then when paired with John 1 it makes sense in a trinitarian understanding. "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through Him all things were made; without Him nothing was made that has been made" (John 1:1-4). When reading that little paragraph from Russell I suddenly saw that even Russell's logic is binding and correct we have creator and Super-Creator whose purposes He served. What does Christ teach throughout His ministry on earth? That He is doing the will of the Father. If the Father created all things through Christ (the Word) and nothing was made without Christ (the Word) then it stands that the teleological underpinnings are at least internally consistent. But, I digress and return to the pre-Socratic matter at hand, the Atomists.

Leucippus was a thinker of his time - he was concerned with the seemingly irrefutable arguments of Parmenides and the obvious fact that motion occurred. To the Greek thought one had to accept that Parmenides was right and no motion occurred or there had to be a void for motion to occur in. To combine Monism and Pluralism he added the void in which motion could occur. Aristotle sums his theory up nicely "The many move in the void (for there is a void): and by coming together they produce coming-to-be, while by separating they produce passing-away" (Russell, 68-69).

Even the Atomists had to admit though that Parmenides' arguments against the void were logically inscrutable. Parmenides would say that if there is a void than there is a void and that void is not nothing because even in nothing there is air; thus there is no void and motion is impossible. This mixture of logic and empirical observation caused a lot of problems in Greek thought and the Atomists simply chose to ignore the argument and state basically that there is motion and thus, a void, even if we can't quite put our fingers on it.

FUTURE MODERN ANCIENT GREEKS

In essence, Democritus claimed each atom was a Parmenidean One, indivisible and indestructible, never changing. Atoms collide to create everything. "There are many worlds, some growing, some decaying; some may have no sun or moon, some several. Every world has a beginning and an end. A world may be destroyed by collision with a larger world" (Russell, 71-71).\

-Life came from the primeval slime
-there is some fire in every living thing, but most in the brain or the breast
-thought is a kind of motion (and thus can cause motion elsewhere)

"Like Locke, Democritus held that such qualities as warmth, taste, and colour are not really in the object, but are due to our sense-organs, while such qualities as weight, density and hardness are really in the object" (Russell, 72)

-Democritus denied an immaterial soul (it was made of atoms), denied purpose in the universe, and didn't believe in the popular religion of the time.

Early Greek Philosophy
Jonathan Barnes
2001

Chapter 20 - Leucippus

-It is nearly impossible to separate the teachings of Leucippus from his pupil, Democritus
-possibly from Elea or Miletus

The one quote that is readily attributed to him is "No thing happens in vain, but all things for a reason and by necessity" (Barnes, 202). This shows the determinist nature of his thought.

Chapter 21 - Democritus

"He was the most prolific, and ultimately the most influential, of the Presocratic philosophers" (Barnes, 203). This is impressive because not a single of his writings have survived intact and much of his work is fragmented.

Future Modern Ancient Greeks

"Some suppose that the strange things which happen in the world gave us the conception of the gods. Democritus seems to be of this opinion; for he says that men in the distant past, remarking the events of the upper air- thunder and lightning, thunderbotls and conjunctions of stars, and eclipses of sun and moon - were frightened, thinking gods to be their cause - Sextus Empiricus" (Barnes, 220).

Life after death: "Many of the old thinkers, among them the natural scientist Democritus in his writings about Hades, have collected stories of those who are thought to have died and then come to life again - Proclus (Barnes, 222).
"
Really, I tend to ask,,, Is joy and absence of joy "the boundary advantage and disadvantage" (Barnes. 227).

Porphyry makes him out to be a vegetarian, not eating flesh by necessity but being pious. Those that are living badly, unwisely and un-piously aren't actually living, but dying slowly.

A quote: " Do not be eager to know everything lest you become ignorant of everything" (Barnes, 230) - probably good advice from Democritus to me...

In his ethical work he points out that "from the same sources from which good things come to us we may also draw bad" and that "for men, bad things spring from good when they do not know how to manage the good or to preserve them resourcefully".

His ethics had its end in contentment and joy - "It is best for a man to live his life with as much contentment and as little grief as possible; this will come about if he does not take his pleasure in mortal things" (Barnes, 233).

His ethics have an ascetic tone - "Desire for money, if it is not limited by satiety, is far heavier than extreme poverty; for greater desires create greater needs" (Barnes, 237). "It is fitting for men to take account of their souls rather than of their bodies; for a perfect soul corrects wickedness of body, but strength of body without reasoning makes the soul no better at all" (Barnes, 249). But, he isn't totally ascetic - "A life without a feast is a long road without an inn" (Barnes, 238). He seems to be of the mind, moderation is the best way to happiness and that happiness is a state of mind you can choose. "Fortunate is he who is content with moderate goods, unfortunate he who is discontent with many" (Barnes, 247).

In a funny quote that sums up every man from every generation he says, "More men are good by practice than by nature" (Barnes, 240).

"When bad men gain office, the more unworthy they are the more heedless they become and the more they are filled with folly and rashness" (Barnes, 242). Is Democritus anticipating Trump????? Of course he is, because he states, ""anyone who kills any highwayman or pirate is not punishable, whether he does it by his own hand, by issuing an order or by casting a vote" (Barnes, 243). Anticipation is key, homies! Hence he says, "It is hard to be ruled by an inferior"! Amen brother,

Democritus' ethic was ruled by personal shame - feel shame before others and do wrong no more before others than before yourself, your shame should keep you from doing wrong.

His social ethics are interesting and strangely corresponding to Christ's view of wealth. He doesn't rail against acquiring wealth or condemn being wealthy, much like Christ's view. They both simply claim that the love of wealth interferes with the life you ought to live. While Democritus and Christ differ on what that life is, they both agree money ain't everything. "A man enslaved to money will never be just" (Barnes, 249).

Beyond Good & Evil 248-256

(Originally written August 26, 2007 in Notebook 18)

Beyond Good & Evil
Friedrich Nietzsche

248

There are two types of genius:
1) That which wants to beget (man)
2) That which wants to give birth (woman)

These two types of peoples and genius search for one another looking to combine (as with man and woman) but, as with man and woman they often misunderstand one another.

249

"What is best in us we do not know - we cannot know" (Nietzsche 375).

250

Europe owes many things to the Jews, both good and bad.

Above all Europe owes the grand style of morality, infinite demands, infinite meanings; these we owe to the Jews and it is both the best and worst they have offered.

Nietzsche seeks to initiate a revolution process. He uses the Jews as a model on how to do so while disagreeing with the values they have set.

251

The Jews are the strongest and purest race in all of Europe. They prevail in hardships and change when they wish to.

The Jews have a faith that stands unembarrassed in the presence of modern ideas.

The Jews, if they wished, could take over all of Europe.

But rather than conquering the Jews wish only to be admitted and assimilated into a nation's culture.

The task which Nietzsche is serious about is the cultivation of a new caste that will rule Europe.

252

The English are unphilosophic as a race. Bacon is an attack on the philosophical spirit. Hobbes, Hume and Locke have amounted to a debasement of the value of philosophy.

His characteristic of an unphilosophical race is to cling to Christianity. The English need Christianity for its discipline, its power to moralize and its power to humanize.

The English person lacks a musical sense. The movements of their bodies and souls completely lack rhythm and dance.

253

There are truths that are recognized by mediocre minds at best.

The spirit of respectable, albeit mediocre, English minds like Darwin, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer is becoming fashionable in middle Europe.

These mediocre minds are necessary at times. For they are knowledgeable, but the higher man is a man who "can"

The disparity between 'know' and 'can' is great. In fact, a high mind must be able to do something starkly new and innovative. Their focus on new and can may demand that he not know as much.

254

The French are a semi-successful blending of the North and South cultures.

255

We must rise above the good and evil, and as the sun sets on the moral world it becomes hospitable and profound enough for fugitives.

256

"Europe wants to become one" (Nietzsche, 386).

Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and Universals

(Originally written December 7, 2006 in Book 7)

History of Philosophy I notes

Duns Scotus (1265-1308)

-Prefers univocal regarding language applied to God

Scouts maintained that not only does God's essence play a role in his existence, but individual men's essences play a role in their existence.

Principle of individuation
-Aquinas claimed that matter was what gave individual things their individuality
-Scotus believed it was an individual essence or a "haecceity" that distinguished us from all other things, not mere matter

Natural Theology
- Far less confident in the power of reason to teach us about God then Aquinas was
- Scotus' standards of proof are much more rigorous than Aquinas' standards

Problem of Induction
-First to identify the problem
- His solution was to focus on the cause and effect and state that there is a certain necessity in causal relations
-His solution was satisfactory until David Hume

Freedom of the Will
-Aquinas held that the intellect was primary, not the will
-Scotus held that the will is primary

The will is:
1. Contingent - has the power of contrary choice
2. Self-caused - the will has no other cause than itself (like God

The self-caused will is an early version of the libertarian doctrine of the will

William of Ockham (ca. 1285 - 1349)

-Born in London
-Franciscan, just like Scotus
-Even more negative regarding natural theology than Scotus
-Faith contradicts reason, but we must follow faith
-Regarded omnipotence as God's power to do literally anything
-God could produce the world in such a way that he made it without any matter
-The object of our knowledge is particulars, but we use universals
-Generally he is regarded as a nominalist, but he could be called a conceptualist
-What is explained on X number of principles is needless explained by more (Ockham's razor)
-Other things being equal, the simpler explanation is better or preferred (Ockham's razor)
-Ockham's Razor was useful in the history of Philosophy and the history of Science

Summary of the thoughts on Universals

Schools of thought on Universals

1. Realism (Plato, Anselm, Augustine) - there are eternal ideas, otherwise we couldn't know general things.
Problem: Where are the ideas

2. Nominalism (Stoics, Sophists) - there are no universals, only particulars
Problem: Can't account for use of general terms or general ideas

3. Conceptualism (Peter Abelard, Locke, Berkeley) - Universals exist as mental concepts

Virtues of the Mind - Ch. 3

(Originally written December 3, 2006 in Book 12)

Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski

3. Intellectual and Moral Virtues

3.1 Aristotle's distinction between intellectual and moral virtues

The human cognitive and feeling processes are regarded as distinct and relatively autonomous by Western Philosophers.

Many Western Philosophers have aimed for what Michael Stocker calls a "purified view of the intellect" despite Philosophers like Hume and James showing the connection between feelings/emotions and cognition.

Few philosophers have openly denied Aristotle's division of feelings and cognition.

Spinoza was an exception, he connected the passions and virtue via the ideas of God. No one have unified intellectual and moral virtue like Spinoza.

David Hume insisted that the difference between moral and intellectual virtues was merely verbal. But, Hume's notion of virtue was broader than most other philosophers.

Zagzebski holds that Aristotle's distinction between virtues and other capacities is an important one; but, his division of moral and intellectual virtue is not an important one.

Aristotle divides intellectual virtues into two classes:
1) Art (techne) - theoretical knowledge
2) Practical wisdom (phronesis) - practical knowledge

Aristotle links the two different types of virtues to the two parts of the soul.

The thinking part of the soul commands and the feelings part obeys.

Pascal saw being full of faults as being an evil, but it was worse to be full of faults and unwilling to recognize it.

Self-love weakens the love of truth and leads to self-deception, hypocrisy and other intellectual vices.

"Feelings are involved in intellectual virtues, and intellectual virtues are involved in handling feelings" (Zagzebski, 148).

In addition to distinguishing intellectual virtues from moral ones on the ground that intellectual virtues regulate feelings (an inadequate argument), Aristotle distinguishes them on the basis of how they are acquired.

He holds that intellectual virtues can be taught, whereas moral virtues can only be acquired by practice and training.

Zagzebski holds that both intellectual and moral virtues are learned in stages.

Young people do not possess virtues or vices. We do not start with vice and work up to a virtue.

William James held that it is bad to be too doubtful and too uncritical in holding a belief. He held that the virtue lies in the mean between the two.

Intellectual akrasia (weakness) is higher than a vice. It exists when one knows the good, but does not intellectually actualize it.

Above akrasia is intellectual self-control. This is not a virtue, but it is knowing the bad and not doing it.

Intellectual and moral states (higher to lower)
1) Virtue
2) Self-Control
3) Akrasia
4) Vice

Zagzebski hold that the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is a real one. She argues that because a person can possess intellectual virtues but no moral virtues (and vice-versa) the distinction is real and not linguistic as Hume and Spinoza held.

Both intellectual and moral virtues are acquired in the same fashion. They both require training and imitation.

Both involve feelings and require one to act virtuously. Both have the states virtue, self-control, akrasia and vice.

3.2 Some connections between intellectual and moral virtues

Zagzebski argues that no-one has offered adequate reason to think moral and intellectual virtues differ any more than one moral virtue differs from another.

The two types of virtue are similar in their natures, similarly acquired and are intimately connected in their operation.

There are logical and causal connections between moral and intellectual virtues.

Moral virtues logically entail some intellectual virtues.

Moral vices can causally inhibit the acquisition of intellectual virtues.

Intellectual failures can be caused by moral failures.

Some virtues have both an intellectual and moral form (i.e. trust and autonomy)

Francis Bacon and John Locke associate intellectual failings with the passions and moral vices.

Francis Bacon states that human understanding is infused by desire and emotion.

Bacon states that there are four types of error in belief formation (he calls the errors 'idols')
1) Idols of the tribe: "The human understanding is like an uneven mirror that cannot truly reflect the rays from objects, but distorts and corrupts the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it (aphorism 41)" (Zagzebski, 164).
2) Idols of the cave: these come from every individual's particularisms, from education, habits and chance
3) Idols of the marketplace: language dictates reason, when reason ought to dictate language. Sometimes language can make philosophy sophistical and inactive.
4) Idols of the theater: errors of this sort come from the fashions of the day. These trends in theology and philosophy can be used to make theory better than truth

Locke's explanation of error comes from his classification of types of men:
1) Those who do not think independently
2) Those who use passion instead of reason as a substitute
3) Those who follow reason, but only seek one source for information and tat source corroborates their opinions

Virtues of the Mind - 2.1-5

(Originally written November 26, 2006 in Book 8)

Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski

2.1

Internists often try to relativize epistemic justification. A justification in internalism is one that justifies an individual's belief

2.2 The neglect of understanding and wisdom

Arguments against contemporary epistemology have shown that it is favorable to adapting a virtue epistemology.

Some philosophers have complained that contemporary epistemology is insufficiently attentive to the social aspects of cognitive activity.

Virtue is more adaptable to social context than reliabilist positions like reliable belief-forming mechanism (Goldman) or belief forming faculty (Sosa).

Aristotle understand the acquisition of virtue as fundamentally social.

Jonathon Kvanvig objects to the focus on one belief in one person in epistemology. If it is impossible to abstract a single belief from a core of beliefs, a belief-based epistemological theory appears less attractive.

Contemporary epistemology is concerned with amassing the most propositional knowledge as possible.

In post-Aristotelian ancient philosophy and modern philosophy certitude has been favored over wisdom. Wisdom was the focus of Plato, Aristotle, the Middle Age philosophies by the latter two, Spinoza and Locke.

Propositional knowledge was secondary to wisdom and understanding in Greek philosophy. Plato (according to Julius Moravcsik) sees propositional knowledge as a derivative of the process of understanding.

Moravcsik maintains that the increasing complexity of modern social and scientific theories has created a need to return to the concept of understanding in epistemology.

Gai Fine holds that Plato's focus on understanding in his epistemology leads to a less atomistic approach in epistemology.

Understanding ought to be a major point in epistemology. It has been ignored for too long

A belief-based epistemology is incapable of explaining the nature of understanding involving the comprehension of structures of reality, rather than its propositional structure.

Wisdom, like understanding has been neglected in modern epistemology.

Wisdom is tough to define, but whatever it is, it is qualitatively different than the accumulation of propositional knowledge.

Wisdom is not a property of propositional beliefs or a matter of relations between propositional beliefs.

Wisdom is concerned with grasping reality as a whole.

3. More reasons to try a virtue approach: the relations between believing and feeling

The advantages of virtue-based epistemology have been shown from:
1) Ethics and corresponding epistemic theories
2) Problems within epistemology
Now, 3) Philosophy of mind

"The treatment of belief as a psychic state independent of non-cognitive states is happily nearing its demise" (Zagzebski, 51).

Stephen Stich argues that the concept of belief is a useless figment of folk psychology.

Psychic states conventionally assigned to epistemologists are not that distinct from psychic states assigned to ethicists.

Many philosophers tend to think of the influence of feeling as an embarrassment, a defect, that needs to be eliminated.

William James held feelings in high regards, stating that belief is more allied to the emotions than anything else.

James defined belief as "the sense of reality". Hume defined belief as to believe is to have a vivid impression.

Without going as fas as James or Hume we can find supporting evidence that vividness of conception is causally connected with belief.

Belief comes in degrees. Belief is closely connected with states like wanting, hoping and expecting.

Wanting and hoping are emotive states, whereas belief and expecting are usually not considered emotive. But, are the emotive states truly distinguishable from cognitive states?

Emotion is either a component of belief or has a direct causal relationship with belief.

It is a widely held false notion that a belief influenced by desire makes it a belief acquired independent of facts.

If beliefs and emotions are intimately connected then we should be motivated to search for connections between moral and intellectual values.

4. An objection to modeling evaluation in epistemology on ethics: the dispute over the voluntariness of belief

The widespread assumption that human actions are voluntary, whereas cognitive activity is involuntary could completely undermine the connection of theoretical ethics and normative epistemology.

Believing is thought to be involuntary and this is the strongest argument against evaluating beliefs like moral evaluation.

Beliefs often seem to be the outcome of instinctive processes.

If beliefs are involuntary, then it is inappropriate to evaluate them from a moral standpoint.

It is wrong to blame a person for a belief if it is involuntary.

4.1 The irrelevance of the objection to virtue theory

Since belief is not the focal point of virtue epistemology, the voluntary or involuntary nature of a belief is less important than a person's disposition to virtue or vice.

The question is then: are our intellectual virtues and vices as voluntary as our moral virtues and vices?

Intellectual courage, perseverance, honesty and sincerity appear to be voluntary. But perceptiveness, insight and ability to form theories appear to be less voluntary and based on natural ability.

But, the intellectual virtues based on natural ability are at least as voluntary to the moral virtues of generosity or the vice of envy.

4.2 The voluntariness of belief

The difference between acts and beliefs is less great than what is thought.

Hume is one of the strongest adherents of involuntary belief. James and Descartes are voluntary belief supporters.

The Cartesian position is that the Will, not the intellect assists in one's belief.

Pascal held that the will is one of the chief organs in belief.

Modern cognitive voluntarism theories come from Murray Clarke, Christopher Hookway, Jonathon Cohen and Lorraine Code.

Zagzebski hold that beliefs are like acts in that they arrange themselves on a continuum of degrees of voluntariness.

Perceptual beliefs which are on the low end of the scale of voluntariness should not be used as paradigm cases for human rationality and justification any more than sneezing or scratching an itch should be used as paradigm cases for moral evaluation

4.3 Moral and Epistemic Luck

Sometimes we blame or praise a person more than is deserved because of moral luck or moral unluckiness.

The Kantian attempt to ground moral evaluation in something free of luck is problematic.

Moral luck is relevant to virtue-based epistemology in two ways:
1. It makes the attempt to model epistemology after ethics easier
2. The rejection of the Kantian position that our moral status is completely within our control takes away one of the motivations for wanting the Kantian theory in the first place

A virtue-based epistemology, because it focuses on inner traits, does not have to pay much attention to moral luck.

Even though few, if any, beliefs are objects of direct choice, they are as voluntary as many acts or omissions of acts for which we are responsible.

5. Conclusion to Part I: Why center epistemology on the virtues?

Be open-minded to see the outcome!

Virtues of the Mind - 1.1-2.1

(Originally written November 23, 2006 in Book 8)

Thanksgiving

Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski

1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models (continued)

Deontological and reliabilist theories of epistemology are structurally similar to act-based ethical theories.

Ernest Sosa proposed that by focusing on intellectual virtues we can bypass the struggle between foundationalist and coherentists and the whole problem of proper cognitive structure.

Sosa is not a virtue theorist. He speaks about intellectual virtues in a consequentialist backdrop.

The only intellectual virtue that really gets any attention is phronesis (tactical wisdom). Phronesis gets attention because Aristotle connects it to the distinctively moral virtues.

Since Sosa introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into epistemic literature, virtue epistemology has become another name for reliablism. Plantinga's theory of proper function and related theories are  prime examples.

Sosa and Greco define intellectual virtue in terms of its propensity to achieve a certain consequence.

Aristotle's intellectual virtues include: sophia (theoretical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom), and nous (insight or understanding). Hobbes includes good wit and discretion. Spinoza's primary intellectual virtue is understanding.

Zagzebski holds that virtue-based epistemology is well suited to analyze justification and knowledge.

Lorraine Code stresses a socialized approach to epistemology, connecting epistemology and moral theory. She shows an epistemological importance to human nature, not just a purely cognitive importance.

Code argues for a "responsiblist epistemology", emphasizing the active nature of the knower: A knower/believer has a choice of cognitive structuring, and is then accountable for these choices.

Code denounces reliabilism because she feels it makes knowers too passive. "A reliable knower could simply be an accurate, and relatively passive, recorder of experience" (Zagzebski, 12).

Code still only structures her epistemological theory on deontological and consequentialist ethics, not virtue-theory.

James Montmarquet takes epistemic virtue in the classical sense and connects epistemic works with moral virtue literature.

Montmarquet labels virtues of impartiality:
-openness to the ideas of others
-willingness to exchange ideas
-lack of jealousy
-lack of personal bias
-a lively sense of one's own fallibility

Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual sobriety:
- sober-minded inquiry, not won't to embrace what is not really warranted.

Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual courage:
-the willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held beliefs
-perseverance in the face of opposition from others
-determination to see a project through to completion

Montmarquet holds that any one desiring the truth must have these traits. But he holds that the intellectual virtues, even if they are not conductive and that some epistemic virtues function as regulators of the desire for truth.

Montmarquet's approach is vaguely Aristotelian. His epistemology is belief-based. Montmarquet does not connect his theory with aretaic moral theory.

Alvin Goldman accepts a form of virtue epistemology that is similar to Sosa. He explicitly links justification to intellectual virtue.

Zagzebski states that, while many epistemic theories recognize the desirability of an epistemological theory based on a carefully developed virtue theory, none have fully articulated a theory.

1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories

The mark of a virtue theory is that the primary object of evaluation is inner traits of a person, rather than acts of that person.

"To describe a good person is to describe that person's virtues, and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible neither to the performance of acts independently identified as right nor to a moral virtue than a disposition to act in the right way" (Zagzebski, 15).

There is more and less to a disposition to act in a right way to moral virtues.

A virtue includes a disposition to:
1) Characteristic emotions
2) Desires
3) Motives
4) Attitudes

There is less to moral virtues then the disposition to act right because a virtuous person does not invariably act in a way that can be fully captured by any independent set of normative criteria.

Agent-focused virtue theories focus on the agent and her traits as a way of determining what is right, but do not maintain that what is right is right because it is what a virtuous person would do. What a virtuous person would do is the best criterion for what is right. Zagzebski calls this weak virtue-theory.

Pure virtue-theory treats act-evaluation as a derivative from the character of an agent. An act is right because it is what a virtuous person might do.

Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) was probably the first major attempt in recent philosophy to show the advantages of virtue ethics over act-based ethics.

Anscombe argues that the principal notions of modern moral discourse (right, wrong, obligation and moral duty) lack content, but concepts of virtue (justice, chastity, courage and truth) are conceptually rich.

Anscombe also argues that right, wrong, obligation and duty are legal concepts and worthless without judge and jury. Since ethics is not rooted in theism (as it was when God was judge and jury) they are worthless terms.

Anscombe argues that we should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which doesn't hold to a blanket concept of wrong or a concept of duty.

The idea that there can be no exhaustive set of rules for how to act in every situation is showing more and more philosophers that a virtue-based theory of ethics is advantageous to cover all bases.

Virtue theory ethics can better explain the moral value of personal goods like love and friendship.

Duty-based ethics does not clearly show that their hierarchical approach is correct.

Another reason for favoring virtue-based ethics is that some virtues are not reducible to specific acts or disposition.

Modern epistemology is belief-based. A positively evaluated belief is called justified.

Legalistic language makes very little sense in epistemology. What does it mean to be epistemically guilty?

Linehan - does this notion give better fuel for virtue-based epistemology or does it glorify the ignorance of epistemology in ordinary people? One should not be swayed by the ignorance or fervor of the masses.

Wisdom is the unification of propositional and other types of knowledge. Knowledge can be misused but wisdom cannot be. Wisdom unifies knowledge and desires and values.

The focus on belief in epistemology has led to the neglect of wisdom. Also, a belief-based theory cannot explain the connection between wisdom and moral goodness.

Consequentialism is an externalist moral theory. A good is something that is produced.

Externalist moral theories face all sorts of problems. Reliabilism, which is structurally similar to consequentialism, faces similar problems.

Reliabilism's epistemic goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false ones. It is quantitative.

In Reliabilism, an accumulation of propositional knowledge is the goal, regardless of how that knowledge is gained. It can be done ignorantly or in a vicious manner.

Because of the difficulties faced by reliabilism and its basis of consequentialism, it is a good idea to search for an alternative ethical mode for epistemology.

Act-based ethics label right as merely not-wrong. Right means permissible. Virtue ethics focus on praiseworthiness.

Belief based epistemology see justification as analogous to epistemic blamelessness. It isn't really praiseworthy.

Virtue theory can evaluate virtue, vice and their intermediate states; whereas act-based/belief-based can only offer black and white cases

2. Difficulties in contemporary epistemology

Contemporary epistemology is too atomistic and the value of understanding has been neglected.

2.1 Problems in the notion of justification

For centuries, maybe as far back as Plato, knowledge has been considered to be a justified true belief. Then Gettier screwed everything up.

Justification has been the primary focus of Anlgo-American philosophers in epistemology.

Justification is a hot topic in epistemology, but it is a very vague and ambiguous term used in connection with countless theories.

Planting claims that:
1) The traditional view of justification originated with Locke and Descartes and identifies justification with a component of knowledge and to true belief and to performing one's epistemic duty.
2) The traditional view is incoherent equivocation and responsible for the externalist and internalist impasse
3) The remedy to the impasse is to dissolve the connections between justification and epistemic duty and justification and warrant.

Planting too readily connects moral and deontological concepts. Then by arguing against deontology he denounces internalism.

But, Zagzebski feels Plantinga's historical and conceptual points fail to make a convincing argument against internalism

William Alston goes further than Plantinga. He identifies six candidates for necessary conditions for justification:
1) Must be based on adequate ground
2) what justices a belief must probabalize it
3) a justification must be cognitively accessible to the subject
4) A justified belief must fit into a coherent system of beliefs
5) It must satisfy certain higher-level conditions
6) The believer must satisfy intellectual obligations in forming and maintaining the belief

Alston holds that justification cannot bear all the conceptual weight that has been given to it.

Alston points out that the issue between externalists and internists cannot be resolved because justification is in such different context in these two theories.

What is this thing called science? Ch. 1

(Originally written October 15, 2006 in Book 8)

A.F. Chalmers

What is this thing called Science?
3rd Edition

"Like all young men I set out to be a genius, but mercifully laughter intervened."
-Clea Lawerence Durrell

Chapter 1 - Science as Knowledge derived from the facts of experience

(A widely held common sense view of science)

-Science is derived from the facts
-Science is special because it is based on facts
-It is unprejudiced sensory data
-Based on empirical data, not personal opinions
-Science is secure
-Science is objective
-J.J. Davies - "science is a structure built upon facts" (Chalmers, 1)

-H.D. Anthony claims it was as much Galileo's attitude as his experiments that uprooted tradition
-We must accept the facts first, then form theories of everything
-Modern scientists claim the birth of science as knowledge occurred in the 17th century. Prior to this everything was seen through Biblical and/or Aristotelian eyes
-Two groups have attempted to formalize the common view of science:
1. The Empiricists
2. The positivists

Empiricists (17th & 18th Century) Locke, Berkeley, Hume

Logical Positivists (Early 20th century) Followers of Auguste Comte

Both Empiricists and Logical positivists share the belief that scientific knowledge ought to be derived from observational facts.

Two distinct issues in the claim that science is derived from the facts:
1. The nature of the facts and how scientists are meant to have access to them
2. The laws and theories that constitute our knowledge and how they are derived for the obtained facts.

There are three components of the facts assumed to be the basis of common view of science:
"1. Facts are directly given to careful, unprejudiced observers via the senses.
2. Facts are prior and independent of theory.
3. Facts constitute a firm and reliable foundation for scientific knowledge" (Chalmers, 4).

At this point I must admit a prejudice against science. I do not feel swayed by its authority and am consciously or subconsciously looking for ammo to slay the dragon of science.

[Seeing is believing]

-Humans see with their eyes
-The lens and retina are the most important components of the eye
-The eye functions like a camera
-Optic nerves then carry the image to the cerebral cortex
-The brain's recording of data is what produces the culmination of sight

Empiricists use this account of sight in their scientific basis for two reasons:
1. A human observer has more or less direct access to facts
2. Two normal observers will see the same thing when observing the same object

[Visual experiences not determined solely by the object viewed]

Empiricists and common sense scientists hold that all we must do is observe the world and we thus obtain unprejudiced facts.

If this were true than visual experiences would be the basis for facts, but here is strong evidence that simply seeing an object is not the only factor in forming a mental picture and thus obtaining factual datum.

"Two normal observers viewing the same object from the same place under the same physical circumstances do not necessarily have identical visual experiences, even though the images on their respective retinas may be virtually identical" (Chalmers, 5).

The perceptual experiences of the past affect a person's current perceptual experience. Memory shapes vision.

If a face is hidden in a drawing of a tree the observer will see the tree and then upon further inspection will see the face. But, once the face has been seen the tree branches and leaves conform in our mind to the face. The visual data received by our eyeballs do not change, only our conception of the image. The raw data received by our observation cannot be the only basis for observation. Other factors play a part in our seeing the face versus seeing the tree.

Experienced observers of particular objects will see different things than novice observers when looking at the same object.

The common argument against this is that the people see the same thing, but interpret it differently.

But if they argue this than they are self-defeating. They claim that the physical act of sight is all that is needed for fact, but if interpretation is involved in the perception process than the physical act of seeing is not all that composes sight.

Chalmers claims that he is not:
1. Claiming physical images have nothing to do with sight.
2. People are incapable of seeing basically the same thing.

[Observable facts expressed as statements]

Linguistically, the word "fact" is very, very ambiguous.

I hate ambiguity!!! AAH!

Fact can refer to either a statement about "X" or it can refer to the actual state of affairs involving "X"

Scientific knowledge is supposedly based on the circumstances and not the statements.

"For those who wish to claim that knowledge is derived from the facts, they must have statements in mind, and neither perceptions nor objects like mountains and craters" (Chalmers, 10).

Factual statements, if they are based on factual observations as science claims, it still stands that the factual statements made are not derived through a direct experience with the sensory data. Therefore, to claim that science is special because it comes directly from observation is absurd.

Knowledge in a conceptual sense is required prior to making strong observational (factual) statements about observational experiences. Thus the notion that observation precedes knowledge is mistaken. At the very least a concept must be understood prior to knowledgable statements being uttered about a specific observation.

"The recording of observable facts requires more than the reception of the stimuli in the form of light rays that impinge on the eye. It requires the knowledge of the appropriate conceptual scheme and how to apply it. Statements of fact are not determined in a straightforward way by sensual stimuli and observations statements presuppose knowledge, so it cannot be the case that we first establish the facts and then derive our knowledge from them" (Chalmers, 12)

[Why should facts precede theory?]

It would be ridiculous to attempt to go and search for facts without first forming a theory and techniques. If we did this we would not have the slightest of clues where to even begin observation. Thus, theory must precede facts.

The truth or falsity of observational statements can be judged via observation and tested by theory and thus serve as scientific knowledge.

[The fallibility of observational statements]

Observational statements, even if they are factual, must be allowed to be fallible because observation is not always 100% reliable.

Observational facts and thus the scientific knowledge derived from them must be admitted to be fallible and subject to correction via improved scientific theories, methods or "facts".

"Science is derived from the facts" is the slogan that exalts science. Bust as we have seen, there are problems with derivation and the facts themselves.

Perceptions are always exposed to the background and expectations of the perceiver. This can destroy any notion of non-prejudicial observation.

Introductory Epistemology (B)

(Originally written September 2, 2006 in Book 6)

Fanatics, bigots, mystics and dogmatists all claim to know more than they really do.

Skeptics claim to know less than they really do.

Popular science reading leads us to skepticism. Drunkenness, drug usage, religious and emotional experience leads us to dogmatism.

Linehan - It's offensive to equate religion to drunkenness. It's simply inflammatory.

"Truth is somewhere in the middle: we can know far more than the skeptic says [and] far less than the dogmatists or the mystic says" (Polman, 10).

Cardinal Mercier states that if we have knowledge it must meet three criterion of truth:
1) Internal
2) Objective
3) Immediate

Internal - one's own mind must find sufficient reason for adhering to testimony of authority

Objective - certitude cannot consist of purely subjective feeling, objective knowledge must produce a feeling that is adequate to reason

Immediate - certitude must rest on immediate criterion, lest we fall into an infinite regress

Descartes believed that bad ideas infected our good ones. We must sort the good beliefs from the bad ones. Once we throw the bad beliefs away we are left with a stockpile of good ones. But how are we to sort good from bad? We are in the wheel. By using common sense, science and logic we can sort the beliefs, but that leaves skepticism a strong foothold.

We must distinguish two pairs of questions:
1) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
2) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?

If you can answer question 1) you should be able to answer question 2). But, if you know the answer to 2) then you have hope of answering question 1). The skeptic says you cannot answer question 1) until you answer question 2) but you cannot answer question 2) until first answering question 1). Thus, you cannot know anything. Methodists believe they have the answers to 2) and can figure out the answers to 1). Particularists believe they have the answers to 10 and can figure out the answers to 2).

Hume and Locke were methodists. Empiricism is methodism.

There are two objections to empiricism:
1) The criterion is very broad and is arbitrary.
2) It destroys too much knowledge. All you can know is sensations.

Thomas Ried, a Scottish philosopher disagreed with Hume. He was a particularist. G.E. Moore was a particularist.

Thus, there are three views:
1) Skepticism - you cannot know any answers
2) Methodism - you know the answer to 2)
3) Particularism - you know the answer to 1)

Chisholm was a particularist. He agrees with Spinoza that "in order to know there is no need to know that we know, much less that we know that we know" (Polman, 13). He admits that people have hallucinations and thus our senses can deceive us. He denies though that this leads to the notion that our senses deceive us all the time. (The same can be said of memories).

St. Augustine stated that it is reasonable to trust the senses over distrusting them. As long as everything seems normal or as the way things should be the senses are trustworthy. The same can be said of memory.

To answer the puzzle of dialectus, Chisholm suggests that we start with particular cases of knowledge and generalize from them a criterion of goodness. (Particulars are known and then we develop a method to discern criterion or methods).

The theory of evidence presupposes an objective right and wrong.

Right preference is the concept of one state of mind being epistemically preferable to another state of mind.

The concept of epistemic preferability is what Cardinal Mercier called an objective concept.

An objectively preferable state of mind is much different to a subjectively preferable state of mind.

The concept of epistemic preferability allows us to use the theory of evidence and state that "P" is beyond reasonable doubt "T" if "P" is objectively preferable to withholding "P" (Meaning not holding "p" or "not-p")

"A proposition is evident for a person if it is beyond reasonable doubt for that person and is such that his including it among the propositions upon which he bases his decisions is preferable to his not so including it" (Pojman, 14).

A proposition is acceptable if withholding it is not preferable to believing it. A proposition is unacceptable if withholding it is preferable to believing it.

Propositions that are not beyond reasonable doubt can still be accepted if they have "some presumption in their favor". The proposition, "I will be alive tomorrow" is such a proposition.

A proposition is certain when it is evident and there is no other proposition that is epistemically preferable.

"The concept of epistemic preferability can be axiomatized and made the basis of a system of epistemic logic exhibiting the relations among these and other concepts of the theory of evidence" (Pojman, 15).

Certainty applies to being certain at a given time for a specific man.

Leibniz held that there are two kinds of evident propositions:
1) First truths of fact
2) First truths of reason

First truths of fact are propositions that a person is aware of at a specific time, i.e. sensory perceptions, emotions, thoughts, etc. They are 'self-presenting'.

A man's being is self-presenting to him at a given time if he is in that state at the time and it is necessarily true that if he is in that state at the time, he is evident of it.

First truths of fact are truths that are evidence in and of themselves. St. Thomas Aquinas says, "the intellect knows that it possesses the truth by reflection on itself" (Pojman, 15).

First truths of reason are sometimes called 'a priori' or 'maxims' or 'axioms'. These are necessary propositions that by understanding it one cannot understand it without affirming that it is true.

A proposition is axiomatic for a given subject of a given time if:
1) The proposition is necessarily true
2) If it is necessarily true, the the proposition is evident.

A proposition is a priori if:
1) The proposition is axiomatic for the subject at that time
2) The proposition is evident to the man at the time that the proposition is entailed by a set of axiomatic propositions at that time.

Evident truths are certain, either directly or indirectly evident

By investigating instance of knowledge we can develop methods to ascertain the difference between knowledge that is good anthem that is bad. Because we are rational beings we assume that we can investigate instances of truth we can formulate criterion to get better, more or rule out knowledge. By doing this we satisfy Cardinal Mercier's criteria for his theory of certitude.

In dealing with the problem of the wheel, "few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the question" (Pojman, 17).

Introductory Epistemology (A)

(Originally written September 1, 2006 in Book 6)

Well, school is back in session and leisurely philosophical time is beginning to slow down and I have some direction again. This semester I am taking Epistemology, Logic and History I. So I will begin with Epistemology.

Classical and Contemporary Readings: The theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
Louis P. Polman

Part I - General Introduction: The theory of knowledge

Epistemology - Greek for 'the science of knowing'

Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge and the justification of belief

Many philosophers hold epistemology to be the central area of philosophy (I believe it to be metaphysics)

To know - "to recognize, to identify, to distinguish, to be acquainted with, to apprehend or comprehend as a fact or truth" - Oxford English Dictionary

This definition is too broad for philosophy.

Typical uses of the verb 'to know'
1) I know John
2) I know how to speak English
3) I know that DC is the capital of the U.S.

1) is knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance provides knowledge of our pains, our beliefs our friends, the town we grew up in, etc.

2) is 'competence knowledge' or 'skill knowledge'. This is knowing how to do 'X'

3) is 'propositional knowledge' or 'descriptive knowledge'. Propositions are true or false. People know propositions. i.e. I know Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492.

Epistemology focuses on propositional knowledge.

Epistemology seeks to illuminate three questions:
1) What is knowledge? What are the essential characteristics of this concept?
2) Can we know anything at all? Or are we doomed to ignorance about the most important subjects in life?
3) How do we obtain knowledge? Through our senses? Through our intellect?

1) What is knowledge?

Propositional knowledge is knowledge of a true proposition.

By claiming to know a proposition one claims that the proposition is in fact true.

"Of course, we may be wrong about our knowledge claims... we often believe falsely that we know" (Polman, 2).

This can happen because;
1) our knowledge is based on inadequate or misleading evidence
2) we remember wrongly
3) we perceive incorrectly

People can disagree, especially on moral, ethical and religious knowledge.

Knowledge involves more than having a true belief.

Knowledge has an adequate justification in addition to a true belief.

What exactly is justification of a belief? Coming later (parts V, VI, VIII, IX, and X)

2) Can we know anything at all?

Skepticism is the theory that we do not have any knowledge. Radical skepticism believes we cannot even be certain of the belief that we cannot be completely certain that any of our beliefs are true. We can't even know that we don't have any knowledge.

3) How do we obtain knowledge?

Rationalism holds that reason alone is sufficient to discover truth.

Empiricism - knowledge originates through sense perception.

Descartes holds that the mind discovers truth apart from experience.

Kant, and A.C. Ewing and Roderick Chisholm argue for the reality of a priori knowledge.

Locke and Berkeley attacked innate ideas and a priori knowledge as empiricists. Locke proposes a representational theory of knowledge that claims that the core of our knowledge is caused by the world, whereas some qualities are the products of the way our perceptual mechanisms are affected by the world.

Primary qualities (motion, size, shape and number) are accurate representatives of the objective features of the world.

Secondary qualities are modes of apprehending the primary qualities (like taste, color, odor and sound).

Primary qualities are objective, and while primary qualities cause secondary qualities, secondary qualities are subjective.

How do we acquire ideas?

Rationalism - some non-analytical propositions are innate or known a priori.

Empiricism - all propositions are acquired from experience. No non-analytical propositions are known a priori.

How is knowledge organized in the mind?

Rationalism - The mind brings to experience principles of order from the mind's own nature.

Empiricism - The mind arranges and stores materials that are given in experience

Skepticism - Can we have any knowledge at all?

Perception - Can we have knowledge of the external world?

Analysis of knowledge - Is knowledge true justified belief?

Theories of justification - Is the structure of justification foundational or coherentist or neither? Is the correct account of justification one of externalism or internals?

A priori knowledge - Is there synthetic a priori truth? Is the analytic-synthetic distinction itself valid?

Induction - which is the correct solution to the problem of inductive knowledge?

Science, justification and the demarcation problem - The scientific method and the demarcation problem

The ethics of belief - are there epistemic obligations? Are there moral obligations to seek the truth or to have the best set of justified beliefs?

Challenges to Contemporary Epistemology -

Is knowledge social or individual? Is the Cartesian paradigm correct? Etc. Etc.

(Originally written September 1, 2006)

What can we know? Appearance and Reality

Bertrand Russell

Russell (1872-1970)

-one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century
-broad philosophical interests
-spoke on his personal beliefs even at personal risk

"Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?" Russell calls this one of the most difficult questions to answer.

Our immediate experience provides us with knowledge that is very likely to be wrong.

Russell exams a table, which appears to be a solid color, but his perception can cause it to seem lighter in some areas. So it is reasonable to doubt that the table is one solid color.

There is a difference between appearances and reality. Appearance is how things seem. Reality is how things really are.

Color, texture and shape are perceived by the senses, but we have been conditioned to change them in our mind's eye to the "real" color, texture or shape.

Touch and sound are the same way.

The real object is not known to us. It is inferred from what experience tells us. This leads to two difficult questions:

1) Is there a real object at all?
2) If so, what sort of object can it be?

Sense-Data - Things that are immediately known in sensation: color, sound, smell, hardness, roughness, etc.

Physical object - the 'real' object

We become aware of sense data, not the physical object. If there is a real object, a problem arises between the relation of sense-data to the physical object.

Matter - the collection of all physical objects.

Considering the relation between sense data and physical objects (and thus matter) raises two question:

1) Is there anything as matter?
2) If so, what is its nature?

Berkeley claims that there is no such thing as matter. Berkeley showed that the existence of matter can be denied without absurdity and that if anything exists independently of us that they cannot be the immediate objects of our sensations. Berkeley held that we perceived the sense-data, and the real object was an idea in the mind of God. Since it is an idea it is not wholly unknowable, like matter would be.

Idealists believe that nothing exists except minds and their ideas. Ideas are whatever a mind can think of. What is inconceivable, cannot exist.

Idealists:
Berkeley - matter is a collection of ideas
Leibniz - matter is actually aggregates of more or less rudimentary minds
Both claim that matter is a mere appearance

The Problem of Criterion

Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999)
-one of the most influential American Epistemologicians

"To know anything...we need a method or criterion, a process that guarantees that what we claim to knows truly knowledge" (Polman, 9).

Before a method or criterion is found to be reliable, particular instances of knowledge must be recognized. Right? Particularists find knowledge instances first, then criterion. Methodists find methods first, then identify knowledge. Chisholm calls the 'problem of the criterion' one of the most important and most difficult problems of philosophy.It is the ancient problem of 'the dialectus', 'the wheel', or 'the vicious cycle'. Montaigne put the problem neatly in his Essays.

There must be a procedure for distinguishing true appearances from false ones.

To know whether a procedure is a good procedure one must know whether it succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from ones that are false. But, we can't know if a procedure is successful without having knowledge of true and false appearances. Thus, we have a circle.

Great Epistemological Traditions

(Originally Written September 1, 2006 in Epistemology)

The Great Epistemological Traditions:

1. Rationalism - Parmenides, Zeno, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant
2. Empiricism - Heraclitus, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Berkeley, Hume

Hume (1711-1776)

External objects (a fortiori)

A Fortiori argument - If "x", then how much more "y".
An a fortiori argument is to be used inductively

Hume argued that what we experience is a kind of constancy and a coherence.

He asked how can we know that the box in our mind correlates to anything in the real world?

Why can't our own mind form constancy and coherence? Are not dreams real to us?

The Law of Causality - every effect is necessarily connected to a cause

Hume argued against the law of causality in that you don't see the necessary connection, you see the event after event after event, etc.

Uniformity of nature

Two types of knowledge:
1) Relations of ideas - true by their nature
2) Matters of fact - empirically observed

Class notes on Locke

(Originally written March 15, 2006 in 3 Subject)

History of Philosophy II

Locke

Knowledge & the external world

-Our existence is known by introspections or reflection
-God's existence is known through reason
-Physical objects are known by sensations

Why can we trust our senses?

1) Those who lack a sense also lack its ideas.
-Problem: This argument assumes that the external world exists when it is trying to prove that the external world exists. (It assumes that people who lack a sense exist)

2) Some ideas are unavoidable, that is they are not in the control of the will.
-Problems: There could be a hidden faculty or unknown in us, that produces these thoughts.

3) Many painful ideas are remembered without the pain.
-Problems: This is also true in dreams and in hallucinations.

4)Intersensory confirmation. We can see, smell, touch, taste and hear the same physical objects.
-Problems: 1) Dreams can produce the same effects. 2) Berkeley - Heterogenity of the senses

Solipsism - only I exist and thus, the external world is a product of my ideas (metaphysical version)

Solipsism - only I and my thoughts can be known to me (epistemological version)

You cannot notice a working clock that is digital or turn off or on the light switch in dreams.

Hobbes to Hume (Page 252, Locke)

3 Degrees of Cognitive Adequacy:

1) Intuitive knowledge (single intuition) - immediate certainty, the mind sees the necessary connection

2) Demonstrative knowledge (chain of intuitions) - "less easy" or "less clear" than intuitive knowledge. The immediate connection is not seen; the connections is seen by seeing subconnections (which are seen immediately)

3) Sensitive knowledge - no connection is seen. Locke & Descartes define knowledge as "clear and distinct apprehension of a necessary relation" and as such, Locke calls all sensitive knowledge opinion or faith

The objective of knowledge:

The mind knows nothing but itself and what is in it. "Knowledge then seems to me be to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas" (Jones, 253).

Locke side steps the problem of our ideas matching up with reality and simply assumes that they do.

Knowledge of real existence:

3 Real existents:
-selves
-God
-bodies

1) Of the self, one has intuitive knowledge
2) Of God, one has a demonstrative knowledge
3) of other selves and physical objects one has only sensitive knowledge (which are opinions and faith)

Of other selves and physical objects two questions arise:
1) Do they exist while we experience them?
2) Do they exists while we do not experience them?

Locke's Answers
1) "What we see and feel cannot be demonstrated, but nobody can in earnest be so skeptical as to be uncertain" (Jones, 255)
2) It is "highly probable" that they do exist when we do not experience them.

Bodies in motion (in reality) cover two kinds of ideas in us:
1) Ideas that truly resemble existence, i.e. solidity, extensions, figure and mobility (primary qualities of a body)
2) Ideas that do not resemble existence, i.e. sweet, red

Locke denied that essences can be known, but affirmed there existence. His critics then asked how Locke knew that they truly existed.

Knowledge of relations:

Men bring two ideas together without uniting them to view them at the same time. Thus, agreements and disagreements are found between them. There are two types of agreements/disagreements that are most important:
1) Identity and diversity
2) Coexistence

"Blue is not yellow" is an example of identity and diversity. This knowledge is basic. By knowing that blue is blue one knows that blue is not-yellow.

"Iron is susceptible of magnetic attraction" is an example of coexistence. These agreements/disagreements are a set of secondary qualities. All of iron's qualities coexist to form the complex idea of iron. Continental rationalists' science, as being demonstratively certain prepositions is only possible because the Continental rationalists assumed they know the true essences of things. They thought they knew the true essences of things because they were confused about the state of names.

Names:

A name is a device to "abridge discourse". It stands for:
1) a group of coexisting ideas or
2) on of such a coexisting group "apple" is a name for the idea of a "red-spherical-sweet"

"Abstract ideas" are names that we give to ideas that have been isolated or abstracted from its context

Class Notes on Locke and some reflections

(Originally written March 13, 2006 in Book 1)

These are notes from History of Philosophy I dated 3/13/06

Locke: Doctrine of Substance

In what do qualities inhere? Locke's answer: material substratum.

Two reasons for supposing the material substratum:
1. Unity of Qualities
2. Cause & Effect

Berkley's Criticism:

1. Material substratum is never sensed.
2. Material substratum is not necessary as a causal explanation (God will do)
3. Material substratum is unintelligible

Numbers 1 and 3 were refuted by Locke, but number 2 really pins Locke down.

Locke's Compatibilism (soft determinism)

2 Powers in the mind

1. Understanding - power of perception (sensory and mental)
2. Will - power to choose

Volition is the actual exercising of the will

Is the will free?

Locke's answer: Meaningless question. It is meaningless to ask if power is free. The right question is, "is man free?" A man is free if they are able to carry out what the will chooses.

Liberty - the ability to execute what is willed.

Locke defines a person as a thinking-intelligent being.

Personal identity - sameness of rational thought or being or sameness of consciousness

This comes from previous notes on Locke:

Free Will - Chris Linehan

Is there free will in man? This question is irrelevant. A will is always determined to perform some action. A being is free if it has the power to act according to its determined will. Thus, a relevant question would then be "what or who determines the will of man?"

This also comes from reflection of those Locke notes

Questions that need to be answered:

Who am I?

-Chris Linehan, a 22 year-old male in Upland, IN. I am a Christian, a philosopher, a writer, a lover, a son, a brother, a nephew and a grandson. I am, that is I exist. I have a form, one which is constantly in motion, and subject to internal and external changes. I have solidity, that is I cannot be reached through. I have texture. I can be seen. I have a taste and odor, which is frequently pointed out to me. I can be sensed. I can sense. I can sense physical things, as physical objects that I see, and touch, taste, smell and hear. But I can also sense other things that are not physical in nature. I sense feelings, emotions and a sense of God.

Who is God? (or what?)
How do God, if it exists, and I interact?

Brief class notes on Locke

(Originally written March 13, 2006 in 3 Subject)

History of Philosophy II

Locke defines a person as a thinking, intelligent being.

Personal identity - sameness of rational thought or being or sameness of consciousness

Class notes on Leibniz

(Originally written in March 1, 2006 in Book 22)

Class Notes

Leibniz

Innate ideas

Arguments:
1) Argument from math, logic, metaphysical truths, etc.
a. Triangles have three sides, law of non-contradiction, infinity, freedom
b. Locke's criticism is there is no satisfactory definition of innate ideas
2) Miller illustration

Metaphysics

Monadology
- motivated by problem of communication between substances
- reestablished harmony of these ultimate substances called monads
- monads - metaphysical atoms, fundamental realities that underlie everything in the physical and spiritual realm.
- the most basic entities, but not necessarily small, not at rest or in motion, no shape
- unextended atoms, don't take up physical space
- windowless (unaffected by other things)
- Don't have shape, size, location, etc.

Humans are collections of monads
- one monad is dominant in humanity: the soul

View of Human Nature: Parallelism

Descartes: Body <--> Soul
Spinoza: Body/Soul
Leibniz: God -> Body; God -> Soul

Parallelism: Humans are composed of body and soul, but the body and soul do not interact. Their states are coordinated by God, giving the appearance of causal interaction between body and soul

Bodies are aggregates of monads
a) animate bodies are dominated by a particular monad
b) inanimate bodies are not dominated by a particular monad

Mind/Soul - a dominant monad in an aggregation of monads

Dominate - to priced the other monads with a special clarity

Mind/soul dominates the body

Consciousness: degrees of perception and awareness
1) mere perception: plants
2) perception with memory: animals
3) Aperception (self-consciousness): rational beings: God, Angels and Man

Leviathan Ch. 13-15

(Originally written February 3, 2006)

Continental Rationalism
-Descartes
-Spinoza
-Leibniz

British Empiricism
-Locke
-Berkeley
-Hume

Rationalism (early Modern)

1) Built a system by using math and geometry as a model
2) Believed in innate ideas (certain inborn ideas, conceptions, knowledge we have at the time of birth)
3) The explainability thesis: everything is susceptible to some rational explanation

Empiricism (early modern)

1) The source of ideas come from sense data (experience)
2) Justification of their beliefs must produce evidence of that belief

The Scientific Revolution
- Preceded and concurrent with the births of rationalism and empiricism

The pre-scientific revolution cosmology included:
1) geocentricism
2) the heavenly vault
3) the heterogeneity of the universe (terrestrial and celestial bodies moved differently)
4) Aristotelian doctrine of change/motion (demands a cause for motion, that cause also has to have a purpose)
-Efficient Cause - Mechanical
-Telic cause - giver of purpose

Galileo's science did not defeat the Church or Church theology. Galileo's sound theory deposed a bad influence of Aristotelianism on an uncritical theology.

Keys in Scientific Revolution

-Copernican Revolution (heliocentric)
-Kepler's law of planetary motion
-Bruno's infinite cosmos
-Galileo's kinetics

What are the implications of these on philosophy?

1) Universe is rational
2) The world is comprehensible
3) The cosmos is homogenous
4) Fruitfulness of systematic inquiry
5) Teleological (purpose oriented) explanation is no longer necessary

Classics of Philosophy

Ch. 13 of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan

Ch. 13 "of the natural condition of mankind as concerning their felicity, and misery"

Men are made equal. No one can claim to be greater by birth alone. "The weakest has the strength to kill the strongest" (Pojman, 542)

All men believe they are smarter than other men

From the fact that all men are equal in ability, all men have equal hope to achieve a goal. When these goals become conflicting then the men become enemies and both are capable in one way or another of destroying their enemy.

All men want to have their value assessed by their companions (equal, which is all men) assessed at what they have assessed it as.

In the nature of man we find three principles to quarrels
1) Competition
2) Diffidence
3) Glory

Competition makes men invade for gain, use violence for that gain

Diffidence makes men defend their position for safety

Glory makes men fight for glorify and trifles

Without a power to stop them, man is constantly at war with all other men.

The war exists in the act of fighting and in the knowledge that tensions are there that could ignite and inspire fighting. When there is no fighting and no intention of fighting there is peace.

When man is at war, there is no time for life, art, wealth, knowledge or worst of all, society. In times of war there is "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Pojman, 543).

Hobbes condemns men with words, other men condemn them with acts of locking doors and securing themselves.

Sin is not found in man's nature, passions or desires. It is not found even in his actions until he breaks the law.

Where there is no power to fear there is no law. Where there is no law there is no justice.

Justice and injustice do not lie in man or his nature; they lie in society.

The passions or desires that make men want peace are:
1) Fear of death
2) Desire for commodious living
3) The hope for the means to secure the commodious living

Chapter 14: Of the first and second natural law of contracts

The right of nature is the liberty of man to preserve his own life through any means necessary

Liberty is the absence of anything that would stop him from using his power.

A law of nature is a general rule that forbids man to destroy himself.

Right is the liberty to do something.

Law is what forbids them to do something

The first law of nature is to seek peace because it is good for him.

The second law of nature is to defend ourselves by any means necessary when the first law cannot be achieved.

This law is from the Gospel: "do whatever you wish done unto yourself"

If man insists on keeping the right to do whatever he wishes he is constantly at war; but, if he renounces that right and others renounce theirs they are at peace with each other. But not only one man can renounce his right and all others retain theirs for the man who renounced his right in the face of the others retaining theirs breaks the second law of nature by not employing all means to defend himself.

The bonds by which men transfer or renounce their rights to pursue peace are strengthened by the fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture of this agreement. They are not strengthened by the word of men because nothing is so easily broken as the word of man.

The renunciation or transfer of rights by a man is done so for a right being renounced by another or transferred to him by another or in the hopes of good that will come to him.

The mutual transferring of a right is a contract.

If a contract is made when one man's right is immediately transferred for the future transfer of another's right it is called a pact or a covenant.

When one transfers his right in hope of some future good to come to him it is called a gift, free gift or grace and is not a contract.

When a contract is made for both parties to transfer at a future date upon a power over them is needed to quash their constant tendency to return to state of war.

To make a covenant with God is impossible because we cannot know whether or not our covenants have been accepted.

Men are freed of their covenant in 2 ways:
1) by preforming: natural end of an obligation
2) by being forgive: restoration of a liberty

Chapter 15 "of other laws of nature"

The third natural law is that men perform the covenants that they make, otherwise their covenants are in vain and we are still in the condition of war.

Without any covenants there can be no covenants broken and if no covenant is broken than no injustice has been done.

The definition of justice is simply performing no unjust acts (not breaking any covenants)

To be justice their must be no war, because in a state of war there are no unjust acts. To be no war there must be a coercive power to force men to perform their covenants and thus be justice.

To enforce covenants (justice) the punishment of breaking covenants (injustice) must be greater than the anticipated gain of breaking the covenant.

The foolish man states that there is no justice and that there is no God.

The just man is the man who has taken all reasonable care to keep his covenants, the unjust man is the man who has neglected this reasonable care.

A just man does not by one or a few mistakes or unjust acts caused by sudden passion become unjust.

Injury is done to the man who breaks a covenant. Damage is done to the man whose covenant is broken by the other man.

No man gives without the intention of good to himself.

Compliance is a law of nature that states every man must strive to accommodate himself to the rest.

If a man retains what is superfluous to himself, yet necessary to others he should be cast out of society because he has become cumbersome to that society.

Forgiveness is another law of nature. A man should grant forgiveness for offenses past to another man that desires it.

Pardon is a granting of peace.

Another law of nature is that revenge should be forgone for the greatness of good that will follow a lack of revenge.

Avoidance of hatred is a natural law because hatred breeds war.

Another natural law is that all men must acknowledge one another as equal.

Equity is the distributive justice

There can be no unequal share given to different then, for that is contrary to equity.

Where there can be no equal distribution it is determined first by agreement, second by first seizure or first possession

An arbitrator should decide any dispute of covenant.