(Originally written November 15, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Ch. 13 (Continued)
According to Mayo, an experiment constitutes support for a claim only if possible sources of error have been eliminated so that the claim would be unlikely to pass the rigorous test unless it were true.
The new experimentalists are generally concerned to capture a domain of experimental knowledge that can be reliably established independent of high-level theory.
Scientific knowledge is thus experimental knowledge confirmed by experiments. The growth of scientific knowledge is the accumulation and extension of experimental laws.
[Learning from error and triggering revolutions]
Mayo is also concerned with how well-conducted experiments enable us to learn from error.
An experiment offers a falsification; but, it also serves to identify an effect not perviously known.
The positive role of error detection in science comes out in Mayo's reformulation of Kuhn's notion of normal science.
Mayo identifies normal escinde with experimentation.
The experimentalists' detailed knowledge of the effects at work in an apparatus puts him or her in a position to be able to learn from error.
[The new experimentalism in perspective]
The new experimentalists have shown how experimental results can be substantiated. They have shown the products of experimental effects were highly independent of theory.
They see science as an accumulation of experimental facts.
To them, the best theories are those that survive severe experimental testing.
They have shown how rival theories can be brought together and shown how experiment can lead to scientific revolutions.
Experimentalism has brought philosophy back down to earth. But, Chalmers says that experimentalism is not the final answer.
Experimentalism seems to give too little emphasis to the theories of science.
Experimental knowledge is great, but to apply it to anything a theory is needed.
A problem with the new experimentalism is their concept of experimenting with he same type of experiment. What constitutes as the same type of experiment? Judgments made about what constitutes as a similar type of experiment must be made against a theoretical background.
Despite its efforts, the new experimentalism cannot eliminate theory or high-level theory from science.
[Appendix: Happy meetings of theory and experiment]
The merit of theory is demonstrated by the extent of which it survives severe tests.
The new experimentalists, though they try their best, cannot completely sever theory from the philosophy of science. Any adequate philosophy of science must include theory and experimentation.
Showing posts with label Kuhn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kuhn. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 15, 2006
Tuesday, November 14, 2006
What is this thing called science? Ch. 10
(Originally written November 14, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Ch. 10: Feyerabend's anarchistic theory of science
[story so far]
It has been a struggle to distinguish scientific knowledge from any other type of knowledge.
[Feyerabend's case against method]
Feyerabend argued that science posses no features that render it superior to any other knowledge pursuit.
Feyerabend sought to undermine philosophers' attempts to characterize method and progress in science.
Feyerabend insists that scientific theories that are unaccepted or unacceptable in a certain time make use of propaganda to gain acceptance.
Feyerabend teased Lakatos for being so lax in his standards he cannot rule anything out as a non-science.
Feyerabend rejected Kuhn's claim of social consensus of the scientific community because he felt the appeal to consensus of a community was incapable of distinguishing science from other activities.
Feyerabend claimed he had proved there is no way of establishing science as special. Thus, we ought not to claim its superiority.
Feyerabend saw a high regard of science as a dangerous dogma. Dogmatic science plays a repressive role like the Church played for centuries.
[Feyerabend's advocacy of freedom]
Feyerabend's theory of science is formulated in an ethical system that emphasizes individual freedom.
Feyerabend saw individual freedom as the means to creating the best human beings. By removing the methodological constraints placed on scientists, individuals will be free to choose between science and other forms of knowledge.
The institutionalization of science was something that Feyerabend fought against.
He stated that we need to "free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our ancestors free us from the strangling hold of the One True Religion" (Chalmers, 156).
Feyeabend advocated for an ideologically neutral state.
Feyerabend claims that philosophies of science are based on aesthetic judgments, judgments of tastes, metaphysical prejudices, religious desire and other subjective feelings.
"There is no scientific method, then scientists should follower their subjective wishes. Anything goes" (Chalmers, 157).
[Critique of Feyerabend's individualism]
A central problem with Feyerabend's account of freedom is that it is entirely a negative account. Freedom is simply more than a freedom from constraints.
Scientists are free only to the extent that they are free to choose from various available techniques in their given field.
Another major problem with Feyerabend is his notion of an ideologically-neutral state. It is childishly naive.
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Ch. 10: Feyerabend's anarchistic theory of science
[story so far]
It has been a struggle to distinguish scientific knowledge from any other type of knowledge.
[Feyerabend's case against method]
Feyerabend argued that science posses no features that render it superior to any other knowledge pursuit.
Feyerabend sought to undermine philosophers' attempts to characterize method and progress in science.
Feyerabend insists that scientific theories that are unaccepted or unacceptable in a certain time make use of propaganda to gain acceptance.
Feyerabend teased Lakatos for being so lax in his standards he cannot rule anything out as a non-science.
Feyerabend rejected Kuhn's claim of social consensus of the scientific community because he felt the appeal to consensus of a community was incapable of distinguishing science from other activities.
Feyerabend claimed he had proved there is no way of establishing science as special. Thus, we ought not to claim its superiority.
Feyerabend saw a high regard of science as a dangerous dogma. Dogmatic science plays a repressive role like the Church played for centuries.
[Feyerabend's advocacy of freedom]
Feyerabend's theory of science is formulated in an ethical system that emphasizes individual freedom.
Feyerabend saw individual freedom as the means to creating the best human beings. By removing the methodological constraints placed on scientists, individuals will be free to choose between science and other forms of knowledge.
The institutionalization of science was something that Feyerabend fought against.
He stated that we need to "free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our ancestors free us from the strangling hold of the One True Religion" (Chalmers, 156).
Feyeabend advocated for an ideologically neutral state.
Feyerabend claims that philosophies of science are based on aesthetic judgments, judgments of tastes, metaphysical prejudices, religious desire and other subjective feelings.
"There is no scientific method, then scientists should follower their subjective wishes. Anything goes" (Chalmers, 157).
[Critique of Feyerabend's individualism]
A central problem with Feyerabend's account of freedom is that it is entirely a negative account. Freedom is simply more than a freedom from constraints.
Scientists are free only to the extent that they are free to choose from various available techniques in their given field.
Another major problem with Feyerabend is his notion of an ideologically-neutral state. It is childishly naive.
What is this thing called science? Ch. 13 (A)
(Originally written November 14, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Chapter 13 - The New Experimentalism
Introduction:
If the Bayesian account of scientific inference failed, we have not proven much at all about the characterization of what is distinctive about science.
Popper used theory-dependence of observation to poke holes in positivism and inductivism. Popper's account was, however, unable to prove what was falsified: a theory or a part of a theory.
Corrections to Popper's account, like Kuhn and Lakatos became even more theory-dependent. Bayesianism is also a theory-dependent case and suffers the same problems.
Feyerabend saw this and chucked science and took it off its pedestal.
Modern philosophers of science are split; but, some of them are attempting to get off the theory-dependent train without returning to positivism's naive belief in the reliability of sense-datum.
If scientific progress is the steady build-up of experimental knowledge then the philosophy of science's notion of science as being the accumulation of facts can be reinstated in a way that is not destroyed by old arguments.
[Experiment with life of its own]
If experiment is the basis for science then a theory-dependent or fallible account of science is unnecessary and wrong.
Knowledge of the experimental factors can be more valuable then theoretical knowledge.
[Deborah Mayo on severe experimental testing]
Mayo focuses on the detailed way in which claims are validated by experiment.
She holds that a claim can only be said to be borne out of experiment if the claim has been severely tested by experiment and has never been shown to be false
What is this thing called science?
Chapter 13 - The New Experimentalism
Introduction:
If the Bayesian account of scientific inference failed, we have not proven much at all about the characterization of what is distinctive about science.
Popper used theory-dependence of observation to poke holes in positivism and inductivism. Popper's account was, however, unable to prove what was falsified: a theory or a part of a theory.
Corrections to Popper's account, like Kuhn and Lakatos became even more theory-dependent. Bayesianism is also a theory-dependent case and suffers the same problems.
Feyerabend saw this and chucked science and took it off its pedestal.
Modern philosophers of science are split; but, some of them are attempting to get off the theory-dependent train without returning to positivism's naive belief in the reliability of sense-datum.
If scientific progress is the steady build-up of experimental knowledge then the philosophy of science's notion of science as being the accumulation of facts can be reinstated in a way that is not destroyed by old arguments.
[Experiment with life of its own]
If experiment is the basis for science then a theory-dependent or fallible account of science is unnecessary and wrong.
Knowledge of the experimental factors can be more valuable then theoretical knowledge.
[Deborah Mayo on severe experimental testing]
Mayo focuses on the detailed way in which claims are validated by experiment.
She holds that a claim can only be said to be borne out of experiment if the claim has been severely tested by experiment and has never been shown to be false
Wednesday, November 8, 2006
What is this thing called science? Ch. 9
(Originally written November 8, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Chapter 9 - Theories as Structures II: research programs
[Introducing Imre Lakatos]
Lakatos was an Hungarian who moved to England and was influenced by Popper. Although an avid Popper supporter, Lakatos was able to recognize the problems of falsificationism. He grafted some of Kuhn's work into sophisticated falsificationism.
[Lakatos' Research Programs]
Main problem with Popper's falsificationism was no clear guidance in determining what was falsified in an experiment.
Lakatos claimed that not all laws are equal in science. Some laws are so fundamental to be the nature of a science. These cannot be falsified.
The fundamental principles are the "hard core" of a research program to Lakatos.
Lakatos called all additions to the hard core as the protective belt. Thus, things falsified in the protective belt do not harm the hard core.
Lakatos made free usage of a heuristic. A heuristic is a set of rules or hints to aid discovery or invention.
The positive heuristic of a program stresses what one should do.
Lakatos emphasized the development of research programs as the progress of science.
He stressed the fact that observational statements become relevant in late stages of development.
Lakatos states that it is not the early falsification of observations, but late, mature confirmations of observations that truly matter.
The merits of a research program come from both the extent it leads to novel predictions and the extent it actually affects a program.
A progressive research program will retain its coherence and lead to confirmation of novel predictions.
A degenerating research program will be one that loses its coherence and will be one that loses its coherence and/or fail to lead to novel predictions' confirmations.
"The replacement of a degenerating program by a progressive one constitutes Lakatos' version of a scientific revolution" (Chalmers, 135-136).
[Methodology within a program and the comparison of programs]
A modification or addition to any field's protective belt is the purpose of science, so long as they are not ad hoc.
Modifications to the hard core are strictly prohibited by Lakatos.
Lakatos was dissatisfied with Kuhn's relativist account of scientific revolution and proposed that progressive replacing degenerating programs was not relative.
[Novel Predictions] pg 138
Lakatos' progress relied heavily on novel predictions.
Novel predictions as defined by Popper would not fit into Lakatos' system.
Lakatos' methodology states that a program is progressive to the extent that it makes natural, not novel or contrived or ad hoc predictions.
[Testing the methodology against history]
Lakatos was concerned with the history of science.
A theory of science must match an historical account of science.
Popper and Lakatos regarded Kuhn's analysis of science as mere description and thus, not a viable philosophy of science.
Lakatos criticizes positivist and falsficationist models for philosophy of science because they do not fit in with the facts of the history of science.
Research programs are given time to mature and develop despite early falsifications.
But Lakatos does not give a guideline to scientists who need to choose between two rival programs. There is no objective way of choosing.
[Problems with Lakatos' Methodology]
Lakatos' method is not an accurate description of science? Where are the historical hard cores?
Lakatos insists that program shifts must be via rational inquiry, but there is no historical or contemporary factual basis for this.
Lakatos simplicity suggests that his methodology answers the question of what, if anything, constitutes scientific knowledge.
Lakatos claims that the central problem in the philosophy of science is stating universal conditions under which a theory is scientific.
Lakatos' claim of solving these problems proved to be a farce and his criteria inadequate for objectively determining when a program is progressive, degenerative or in need of replacement.
His theory worked well in hindsight, but was not capable of foresight.
Another major flaw of Lakatos' theory was that he emphasized the historical significance and studied only physics. He then applied it to other studies. Thus, he stated only that a study is not science if it does not match physics' criteria. But if something is not physics does that make it not science?
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Chapter 9 - Theories as Structures II: research programs
[Introducing Imre Lakatos]
Lakatos was an Hungarian who moved to England and was influenced by Popper. Although an avid Popper supporter, Lakatos was able to recognize the problems of falsificationism. He grafted some of Kuhn's work into sophisticated falsificationism.
[Lakatos' Research Programs]
Main problem with Popper's falsificationism was no clear guidance in determining what was falsified in an experiment.
Lakatos claimed that not all laws are equal in science. Some laws are so fundamental to be the nature of a science. These cannot be falsified.
The fundamental principles are the "hard core" of a research program to Lakatos.
Lakatos called all additions to the hard core as the protective belt. Thus, things falsified in the protective belt do not harm the hard core.
Lakatos made free usage of a heuristic. A heuristic is a set of rules or hints to aid discovery or invention.
The positive heuristic of a program stresses what one should do.
Lakatos emphasized the development of research programs as the progress of science.
He stressed the fact that observational statements become relevant in late stages of development.
Lakatos states that it is not the early falsification of observations, but late, mature confirmations of observations that truly matter.
The merits of a research program come from both the extent it leads to novel predictions and the extent it actually affects a program.
A progressive research program will retain its coherence and lead to confirmation of novel predictions.
A degenerating research program will be one that loses its coherence and will be one that loses its coherence and/or fail to lead to novel predictions' confirmations.
"The replacement of a degenerating program by a progressive one constitutes Lakatos' version of a scientific revolution" (Chalmers, 135-136).
[Methodology within a program and the comparison of programs]
A modification or addition to any field's protective belt is the purpose of science, so long as they are not ad hoc.
Modifications to the hard core are strictly prohibited by Lakatos.
Lakatos was dissatisfied with Kuhn's relativist account of scientific revolution and proposed that progressive replacing degenerating programs was not relative.
[Novel Predictions] pg 138
Lakatos' progress relied heavily on novel predictions.
Novel predictions as defined by Popper would not fit into Lakatos' system.
Lakatos' methodology states that a program is progressive to the extent that it makes natural, not novel or contrived or ad hoc predictions.
[Testing the methodology against history]
Lakatos was concerned with the history of science.
A theory of science must match an historical account of science.
Popper and Lakatos regarded Kuhn's analysis of science as mere description and thus, not a viable philosophy of science.
Lakatos criticizes positivist and falsficationist models for philosophy of science because they do not fit in with the facts of the history of science.
Research programs are given time to mature and develop despite early falsifications.
But Lakatos does not give a guideline to scientists who need to choose between two rival programs. There is no objective way of choosing.
[Problems with Lakatos' Methodology]
Lakatos' method is not an accurate description of science? Where are the historical hard cores?
Lakatos insists that program shifts must be via rational inquiry, but there is no historical or contemporary factual basis for this.
Lakatos simplicity suggests that his methodology answers the question of what, if anything, constitutes scientific knowledge.
Lakatos claims that the central problem in the philosophy of science is stating universal conditions under which a theory is scientific.
Lakatos' claim of solving these problems proved to be a farce and his criteria inadequate for objectively determining when a program is progressive, degenerative or in need of replacement.
His theory worked well in hindsight, but was not capable of foresight.
Another major flaw of Lakatos' theory was that he emphasized the historical significance and studied only physics. He then applied it to other studies. Thus, he stated only that a study is not science if it does not match physics' criteria. But if something is not physics does that make it not science?
What is this thing called science? Ch. 8 (B)
(Originally written November 8, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Ch. 8 continued...
Every paradigm has its puzzles to solve. When they encounter a problem that is too serious or problems that are too serious, a crisis will occur.
If a crisis is too big to overcome it "may lead to the rejection of a paradigm and its replacement by an incompatible alternative" (Chalmers, 112).
Anomalies will occur all the time in a paradigm. These will only become a crisis if the anomaly strikes at the foundation of a paradigm.
Anomalies can trigger a crisis due to some sociological needs.
Extremely serious anomalies and a mass number of anomalies can trigger a crisis.
When a crisis is undermining the confidence of proponents of any paradigm a revolution will occur.
The situation is exasperated when a rival and incompatible paradigm emerges.
Rival paradigms will be wholly incompatible. They will ask different questions and assert different standards.
Paradigms guide a scientist's worldview.
Rival paradigms are not chosen as better due to logical supremacy; the switch is sort of like a "gestalt switch" or a "religious conversion"
Kuhn compares scientific revolutions to political revolutions.
For many reasons, Kuhn calls rival paradigms "incommensurable".
Scientific revolutions are successful when a majority of scientists in any field switch paradigms, then holdovers to the old paradigm are obsoleted and left to die.
[The function of normal science and revolution]
Kuhn's account of science is very describe but includes a theory of science because he describes the function of science. He claimed that normal science and revolution have necessary functions in science.
Normal science serves the function of giving the opportunity for scientists to develop a theory.
Normal science creates a safe zone for experimentation. If all scientists were critical of the paradigm, no advances would be made.
Revolution is needed for science to advance.
[The merits of Kuhn's account of science]
Kuhn nailed the descriptive element of science.
Kuhn vs. Popper on differentiating science from astrology:
Popper claims astrology is non-science because it is either unfalsifiable or falsified. (Neither of these is an adequate rejection of astrology.) Kuhn's utilization of the paradigm adequately debunks astrology as a science.
[Kuhn's ambivalence on progress through revolution]
Kuhn is notoriously ambiguous.
Kuhn is relativistic in his account of scientific progress.
Kuhn's denial of relativity in the scope of scientific progress disagrees with his other relativistic claims.
Kuhn's sociological emphasis also emphasizes a relativist view point.
[Objective knowledge]
Kuhn claims that a scientific revolution is analogous to a gestalt shift and yet can occur over time.
Chalmers claims that Kuhn is confusing two types of knowledge here, subjective and objective.
The relationship between one paradigm to another is an objective knowledge, but the switch from one to the other by any given scientist is a psychological one, thus a subjective one.
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Ch. 8 continued...
Every paradigm has its puzzles to solve. When they encounter a problem that is too serious or problems that are too serious, a crisis will occur.
If a crisis is too big to overcome it "may lead to the rejection of a paradigm and its replacement by an incompatible alternative" (Chalmers, 112).
Anomalies will occur all the time in a paradigm. These will only become a crisis if the anomaly strikes at the foundation of a paradigm.
Anomalies can trigger a crisis due to some sociological needs.
Extremely serious anomalies and a mass number of anomalies can trigger a crisis.
When a crisis is undermining the confidence of proponents of any paradigm a revolution will occur.
The situation is exasperated when a rival and incompatible paradigm emerges.
Rival paradigms will be wholly incompatible. They will ask different questions and assert different standards.
Paradigms guide a scientist's worldview.
Rival paradigms are not chosen as better due to logical supremacy; the switch is sort of like a "gestalt switch" or a "religious conversion"
Kuhn compares scientific revolutions to political revolutions.
For many reasons, Kuhn calls rival paradigms "incommensurable".
Scientific revolutions are successful when a majority of scientists in any field switch paradigms, then holdovers to the old paradigm are obsoleted and left to die.
[The function of normal science and revolution]
Kuhn's account of science is very describe but includes a theory of science because he describes the function of science. He claimed that normal science and revolution have necessary functions in science.
Normal science serves the function of giving the opportunity for scientists to develop a theory.
Normal science creates a safe zone for experimentation. If all scientists were critical of the paradigm, no advances would be made.
Revolution is needed for science to advance.
[The merits of Kuhn's account of science]
Kuhn nailed the descriptive element of science.
Kuhn vs. Popper on differentiating science from astrology:
Popper claims astrology is non-science because it is either unfalsifiable or falsified. (Neither of these is an adequate rejection of astrology.) Kuhn's utilization of the paradigm adequately debunks astrology as a science.
[Kuhn's ambivalence on progress through revolution]
Kuhn is notoriously ambiguous.
Kuhn is relativistic in his account of scientific progress.
Kuhn's denial of relativity in the scope of scientific progress disagrees with his other relativistic claims.
Kuhn's sociological emphasis also emphasizes a relativist view point.
[Objective knowledge]
Kuhn claims that a scientific revolution is analogous to a gestalt shift and yet can occur over time.
Chalmers claims that Kuhn is confusing two types of knowledge here, subjective and objective.
The relationship between one paradigm to another is an objective knowledge, but the switch from one to the other by any given scientist is a psychological one, thus a subjective one.
Tuesday, November 7, 2006
What is this thing called science? Ch. 8 (A)
(Originally written November 7, 2006 in Book 8)
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Chapter 8 - Theories as structures in Kuhn's paradigms
[Theories as Structures]
Historical investigations of science prove that inductivism and falsificationism are inadequate to explain evolution and progress in science. To explain science more adequately one must look at theories as structures and as the framework of science.
Concepts derive their meaning from the role they play in any given theory.
[Introducing Thomas Kuhn]
Thomas Kuhn challenged inductivism and falsificationism in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolution in 1962.
Kuhn focused on the history of science to explain the knowledge in science and saw inductivism and falsificationism were inadequate.
He focused on the nature of scientific revolutions. He also focused on the sociological characteristics of scientific communities.
Kuhn's science progress model:
1. Pre-Science
2. Normal Science
3. Crisis
4. Revolution
5. New Normal Science
6. New Crisis
A paradigm is composed of general theoretical assumptions, laws and techniques that a given scientific community has adopted.
Normal science is a science dictated by a specific paradigm.
In operating in a paradigm normal science will face numerous falsifications. If it becomes too serious a crisis will occur.
A crisis is resolved when a new paradigm emerges. This is a scientific revolution.
[Paradigms and Normal Science]
A single operating paradigm distinguishes normal science from non-science.
Each paradigm will possess explicit, fundamental laws and theories.
Paradigms will have standard ways of applying the fundamental laws in experimentation.
Paradigms will possess techniques and procedures for experiments.
A general, metaphysical set of assumptions will also be contained in a paradigm.
Vague general methodologies will also be involved in any paradigm.
Normal science's aim is matching a paradigm with the way nature actually operates.
Normal science is puzzle-solving activities governed by the rules of a paradigm.
Puzzles within a given paradigm that are insolvable are anomalies.
Kuhn recognize anomalies, but rejects all forms of falsificationism.
Normal scientists must accept a paradigm. Acceptance of a paradigm distinguishes normal science from pre-science.
Kuhn admits it is impossible to precisely describe or define a paradigm.
Scientists in any field which accepts a paradigm will be able to articulate basics of that paradigm and despite being able to articulate the whole precise nature of that paradigm it is still a vital and necessary part of science.
[Crisis and Revolution]
PP 112 - 173 need to be done. I need a quick nap. God help me to wake at 4 am and finish!
What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers
Chapter 8 - Theories as structures in Kuhn's paradigms
[Theories as Structures]
Historical investigations of science prove that inductivism and falsificationism are inadequate to explain evolution and progress in science. To explain science more adequately one must look at theories as structures and as the framework of science.
Concepts derive their meaning from the role they play in any given theory.
[Introducing Thomas Kuhn]
Thomas Kuhn challenged inductivism and falsificationism in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolution in 1962.
Kuhn focused on the history of science to explain the knowledge in science and saw inductivism and falsificationism were inadequate.
He focused on the nature of scientific revolutions. He also focused on the sociological characteristics of scientific communities.
Kuhn's science progress model:
1. Pre-Science
2. Normal Science
3. Crisis
4. Revolution
5. New Normal Science
6. New Crisis
A paradigm is composed of general theoretical assumptions, laws and techniques that a given scientific community has adopted.
Normal science is a science dictated by a specific paradigm.
In operating in a paradigm normal science will face numerous falsifications. If it becomes too serious a crisis will occur.
A crisis is resolved when a new paradigm emerges. This is a scientific revolution.
[Paradigms and Normal Science]
A single operating paradigm distinguishes normal science from non-science.
Each paradigm will possess explicit, fundamental laws and theories.
Paradigms will have standard ways of applying the fundamental laws in experimentation.
Paradigms will possess techniques and procedures for experiments.
A general, metaphysical set of assumptions will also be contained in a paradigm.
Vague general methodologies will also be involved in any paradigm.
Normal science's aim is matching a paradigm with the way nature actually operates.
Normal science is puzzle-solving activities governed by the rules of a paradigm.
Puzzles within a given paradigm that are insolvable are anomalies.
Kuhn recognize anomalies, but rejects all forms of falsificationism.
Normal scientists must accept a paradigm. Acceptance of a paradigm distinguishes normal science from pre-science.
Kuhn admits it is impossible to precisely describe or define a paradigm.
Scientists in any field which accepts a paradigm will be able to articulate basics of that paradigm and despite being able to articulate the whole precise nature of that paradigm it is still a vital and necessary part of science.
[Crisis and Revolution]
PP 112 - 173 need to be done. I need a quick nap. God help me to wake at 4 am and finish!
Friday, November 3, 2006
Falsificationism, Inductivism and Kuhn Notes
(Originally Written November 3, 2006 in Book 8)
Ok, so we are in trouble because of a time crunch. The test is in 1.5 hours. It's time to sum up.
Falsificationism:
I. Naive Falsificationism and its problems
Ok, so we are in trouble because of a time crunch. The test is in 1.5 hours. It's time to sum up.
Falsificationism:
I. Naive Falsificationism and its problems
- A hypothesis must be falsifiable in order to be informative.
- Anything that is unfalsifiable can make all situations fit their theory. This makes the theory look good; but, it neither proves anything nor denies anything. It simply explains events according to a theory.
- Since hypotheses must be falsifiable, the more falsifiable a theory is the better it is.
- Problems -
- "Since hypotheses must be falsifiable, the more falsifiable a theory is the better it is" is very vague
- Naive falsificationism takes too static or too isolated a view on individual theories.
- "A hypothesis must be falsifiable in order to be informative" is in fact, a non-falsifiable statement. How can you falsify it?
II. Falsifiability as a criterion for scientific theories.
- Science is a set of hypotheses to explain a certain aspect of the world.
- A hypothesis must be falsifiable to state anything informative
- A non-falsifiable hypothesis can look sound but cannot explain anything or deny anything.
- Falsification makes it informative and if science is to be informative it must be falsifiable
III. Ad Hoc Modifications and Popperian (Sophisticated) Falsificationism
- Ad hoc modification - any modification to a theory that has no independent testability
- Relativity of falsifiability - Naive falsificationism claims that a more falsifiable hypothesis is better. Sophisticated falsifiability claims that a falsifiable hypothesis ought to be replaced by a more falsifiable hypothesis
- Aim of science - The aim of science is to falsify hypotheses and replace them with better ones.
- Confirmation is key in sophisticated falsificationism (Chalmers)
IV. Confirmation in the falsificationist model
- Bold conjectures are better than irrelevant truisms
- Bold conjectures that are not falsified lead to novel predictions
- The bolder the conjecture the better
- Refutations help to eliminate falsehoods which in turn reveals more truth
V. Problems with Falsificationism
- Theory dependence of observation: There is no absolute objectivity in science.
- Falsifications are fallible
- Ad Hoc modifications
- Auxiliary assumptions
- Falsificationism is not recommended by the History of science
- The Copernican Theory, for example, would have been rejected before adequate technology could confirm it.
Inductivism:
I. Inductivism and its problems
- Science is inductively derived from the facts
- Science has a factual basis, not a theoretical one
- Observation precedes theory
- Problems
- Facts and experimentation are theory dependent and fallible
- What is the criteria for a good inductive inference?
- Science is not the mere accumulation of facts. Relevant theories and methods must precede observation
II. The problem of induction
- How can knowledge of the unobservable be derived from observable facts?
- Solutions
- Hume - animal faith
- Kant - induction is grounded in a priori, not observation
- Will - Past futures resemble past pasts. Therefore, future futures will resemble past pasts and future pasts. (This begs the question)
- Reichenbach - pragmatic approach: "if anything works, induction will"
The Problem of induction
I. Hume's Fork (Two types of knowledge)
- Relation of ideas
- Matters of fact
- Where does the concepts of uniformity of nature and causality lie? They are neither a relation of ideas nor a matter of fact.
- Hume's solution - Animal faith or a habit
II. Kant's response - inductive inferences are grounded in a priori concepts
III. Will states that past futures resemble past pasts so future futures will resemble past futures and past pasts.
IV. Reichenbach - (Pragmatic) "If anything works, induction will"
Kuhn's paradigms
I. Nature of scientific paradigms/incommensurability of paradigms
- Paradigms are relative to their specific field
- Paradigms possess:
- Specific accepted laws and theories
- Specific accepted approaches to experimentation
- Specific accepted metaphysical generalities
- Specific accepted methodologies
- Paradigms are incommensurable because they cannot fit with each other at all
- They are incommensurable because they ask different questions and hold different value systems
- The incommensurability of paradigms leads to the crises and revolutions
II. Paradigm shifts
- Pre-Science - disorganized research, no paradigm
- Normal science (caused by Pre-Science) - puzzle solving activity governed by an accepted paradigm
- Anomalies - unsolved puzzles
- Crisis (caused by Anomalies) - serious anomalies will cause crisis
- Revolution (caused by crisis) - If the crisis is not resolved revolution will occur and a new paradigm will emerge
III. Criticism of Kuhn
- Ambiguous
- Relativity
- Criteria changes within his method
- Is there progress or is there paradigm shift?
Friday, October 27, 2006
Thomas Kuhn
(Originally Written October 27, 2006 in Epistemology)
Thomas Kuhn
Paradigm:
1. Pre-science
2. Normal Science
3. Anomaly
4. Crisis
5. Revolution
Paradigm incommensurability theory
Science proceeds by paradigm shifts, not simple accumulation of data
Paradigm - the theoretical assumptions, laws, techniques, principles, etc, which are assumed by a given community
Paradigms are understood in two senses:
1. Disciplinary matrix - general sense of the term
2. Exemplars - problem solving techniques
Pre-science - inquiry without a guiding paradigm
Normal science - experimentation and theorizing done in service of a paradigm
Anomaly - Theoretical puzzle or unanswered question
Crisis - various anomalies causing unrest in a given paradigm
Revolution - a sudden, human driven paradigm shift
Paradigm incommensurability - paradigms cannot be evaluated by a single standard
Thomas Kuhn
Paradigm:
1. Pre-science
2. Normal Science
3. Anomaly
4. Crisis
5. Revolution
Paradigm incommensurability theory
Science proceeds by paradigm shifts, not simple accumulation of data
Paradigm - the theoretical assumptions, laws, techniques, principles, etc, which are assumed by a given community
Paradigms are understood in two senses:
1. Disciplinary matrix - general sense of the term
2. Exemplars - problem solving techniques
Pre-science - inquiry without a guiding paradigm
Normal science - experimentation and theorizing done in service of a paradigm
Anomaly - Theoretical puzzle or unanswered question
Crisis - various anomalies causing unrest in a given paradigm
Revolution - a sudden, human driven paradigm shift
Paradigm incommensurability - paradigms cannot be evaluated by a single standard
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