(Originally written April 26, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
Plantinga views this problem as a purely logical inconsistency. Thus, any coherent dissolving of the apparent inconsistency is sufficient. Plantinga uses transworld depravity to dissolve the inconsistency.
Verification principle: a sentence is only meaningful if and only if a sentence, in principle, is verifiable by empirical evidence.
Falsification: (Antony Flew) in order to be a meaningful statement, a statement must be, at least in principle, falsifiable.
God loves us as a Father loves his children. According to Flew this is a meaningless statement because we have many experiences that do not fit nicely with this statement.
The fact that believers allow nothing to count against God's love shows that their language is unfalsifiable and therefore, meaningless.
R. M. Hare
Blik - an unfalsifiable statement that is an assumption that you cannot change.
Hare asserts that Flew is correct on the grounds that he states, but has completely misunderstood religious language.
Hare asserts that when Christians hold that God loves us as a Father they are not making factual assertions, they are assuming bliks.
Basil Mitchell
The parable of the stranger: the leader of the resistance movement will sometimes be seen resisting and sometimes fighting against the resistance. We have to assume that no matter what, the stranger knows best.
Mitchell asserts that God loves us as a Father despite events that seem to contradict that statement.
Thus, what he believes is in principle, falsifiable. He simply does not allow the events to falsify his beliefs.
Mitchell concedes to Flew that believers normally do not allow evidence to falsify their beliefs, but they do feel the tension of the seeming inconsistency between evil and a loving God.
Showing posts with label Plantinga. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Plantinga. Show all posts
Thursday, April 26, 2007
Tuesday, April 24, 2007
Plantinga's transworld depravity
(Originally written April 24, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
The Problem of Evil
God is all-Good
God wants to prevent evil
If there is evil then he can't
Therefore, God is not omnipotent
God is omnipotent
God can prevent evil
If there is evil then he doesn't want to prevent it
Therefore, God is not all-Good
There is no God that is both omnipotent and omni-benevolent
Marilyn McCord Adams
Horrendous evil and the goodness of God
Adams points out that the notion of an omnipotent and omni-benevolent eliminating all evil may be a strong perennial philosophical problem but that this notion is found nowhere in theistic beliefs.
1. God
2. Evil
The existence of God and the existence of evil are inconsistencies, not contradictions.
Inconsistency: both cannot be true, but both could be false
Contradictory - one is true, but both cannot be false. One must be true; one must be false.
1. There is an omniscient and omni-benevolent God
2. There is evil.
The inconsistency comes to play only if there is no way for both to be true, but there may be a way to show that both could be true.
Alvin Plantinga's Free-Will Defense
Logically it is always possible to reconcile inconsistencies
There must be a third proposition which is consistent with one and they jointly imply the other:
1. There is an omnipotent and omni-benevolent God
2. There is evil
3. An omnipotent and omni-benevolent Being gives us an unlimited supply of candy
Propositions one and three will lead to evil, but the inconsistency of propositions one and two is resolved.
Plantinga takes the extraordinary position that it does not matter if the resolving propositions is plausible or not, only that it is conceptually possible to resolve the inconsistency. Plantinga feels secure in knowing that the inconsistency is conceptually resolvable whereas most seek a plausible or true resolution of the inconsistency.
God created the best of all possible worlds
The best of all possible worlds contains evil.
The evil in the best of all possible worlds must enhance the total goodness.
World A is without evil and 10 to the 13th power merits.
World B has 10 to the 7th power terps of evil and 10 to the 18th power merits
Merits - measurement of goodness
Terps - measurement of evil (Plantinga)
World B (the world God creates) is better than world A because of Free Will.
Plantinga builds on Leibnizian principles.
Plantinga states Leibniz was right but forgot about something very vital. He calls it Leibniz's lapse. This is that God created the world but has not fully actualized it.
1. God created å (actual world)
2. God did not actualize the current state of affairs of å
World å was created by God, but not necessarily actualized by God
World W was created by God, but not actualized at all
If we have genuine freedom then God (although created the world) did not actualize the world.
W1 (Free Will but no evil). It is logically possible for a possible world to exist that possesses individuals with free will that never do evil.
Transworld depravity - depravity of man in all possible worlds because depravity is a part of man's essence.
No matter what logically possible world I am in I will misuse my free will in some manner.
Planting claims that all humans are under the curse of transworld depravity.
This makes W1 (the world with free will but no evil) logically impossible.
God exists and creates å and creates free beings
The free beings suffer from transworld depravity
Evil Exists
Therefore, there is no inconsistency because free beings misuse this free will to actualize evil.
Class Notes
The Problem of Evil
God is all-Good
God wants to prevent evil
If there is evil then he can't
Therefore, God is not omnipotent
God is omnipotent
God can prevent evil
If there is evil then he doesn't want to prevent it
Therefore, God is not all-Good
There is no God that is both omnipotent and omni-benevolent
Marilyn McCord Adams
Horrendous evil and the goodness of God
Adams points out that the notion of an omnipotent and omni-benevolent eliminating all evil may be a strong perennial philosophical problem but that this notion is found nowhere in theistic beliefs.
1. God
2. Evil
The existence of God and the existence of evil are inconsistencies, not contradictions.
Inconsistency: both cannot be true, but both could be false
Contradictory - one is true, but both cannot be false. One must be true; one must be false.
1. There is an omniscient and omni-benevolent God
2. There is evil.
The inconsistency comes to play only if there is no way for both to be true, but there may be a way to show that both could be true.
Alvin Plantinga's Free-Will Defense
Logically it is always possible to reconcile inconsistencies
There must be a third proposition which is consistent with one and they jointly imply the other:
1. There is an omnipotent and omni-benevolent God
2. There is evil
3. An omnipotent and omni-benevolent Being gives us an unlimited supply of candy
Propositions one and three will lead to evil, but the inconsistency of propositions one and two is resolved.
Plantinga takes the extraordinary position that it does not matter if the resolving propositions is plausible or not, only that it is conceptually possible to resolve the inconsistency. Plantinga feels secure in knowing that the inconsistency is conceptually resolvable whereas most seek a plausible or true resolution of the inconsistency.
God created the best of all possible worlds
The best of all possible worlds contains evil.
The evil in the best of all possible worlds must enhance the total goodness.
World A is without evil and 10 to the 13th power merits.
World B has 10 to the 7th power terps of evil and 10 to the 18th power merits
Merits - measurement of goodness
Terps - measurement of evil (Plantinga)
World B (the world God creates) is better than world A because of Free Will.
Plantinga builds on Leibnizian principles.
Plantinga states Leibniz was right but forgot about something very vital. He calls it Leibniz's lapse. This is that God created the world but has not fully actualized it.
1. God created å (actual world)
2. God did not actualize the current state of affairs of å
World å was created by God, but not necessarily actualized by God
World W was created by God, but not actualized at all
If we have genuine freedom then God (although created the world) did not actualize the world.
W1 (Free Will but no evil). It is logically possible for a possible world to exist that possesses individuals with free will that never do evil.
Transworld depravity - depravity of man in all possible worlds because depravity is a part of man's essence.
No matter what logically possible world I am in I will misuse my free will in some manner.
Planting claims that all humans are under the curse of transworld depravity.
This makes W1 (the world with free will but no evil) logically impossible.
God exists and creates å and creates free beings
The free beings suffer from transworld depravity
Evil Exists
Therefore, there is no inconsistency because free beings misuse this free will to actualize evil.
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Salvation in Christianity
(Originally written April 22, 2007 in Book 15)
A Tapestry of Faiths
Win Corduan
Is Christianity alone true?
By asking if a religion is true we ask if it is as a whole true, not if it contains some truth.
Pluralism asserts that all truth claims made by all religions are equal.
Hick claims that those Christians who maintain exclusivist theologies must revise their thinking.
Hick's pluralism is however, completely wrongheaded. No religion teaches that it is one way of relating to the Real.
Most, if not all, religions make exclusive claims. This is another point where Hick's theory does not accurately describe religions.
Hick's theory is either false or arbitrary if it is based on data from religion it is obviously false. If it is not then it is simply arbitrary.
Hick also demands that religions, especially Christianity, rewrite themselves to fit his theory. This is absurd.
Rather than an aggressive form of pluralism like Hick's, William P. Alston postulates a more subtle form:
1) Christians basing their beliefs on their mystical experience of God are justified in holding there beliefs.
2) Adherents of different religions basing their beliefs on their mystical experience are justified in holding their beliefs.
3) There is no way of adjudicating between different belief systems.
4) All persons are entitled to their beliefs since their system is coherent and productive.
Alston's theory hinges on mystical experience alone. He ignores any other type of evidence.
There are two component in accepting a belief system as true:
1) Accepting the beliefs as true
2) Justification of the belief system
Some ways of justifying religious beliefs:
1) They are self-evident
2) based on experience
3) superiority of teaching, etc., etc.
Christians can find confirmation for the beliefs in:
1) General revelation and natural theology
2) Fundamental rationality of Christian beliefs (Plantinga's "warrant" or "proper function")
3) Historical and archeological evidence
4) Inner witness of the Holy Spirit
5) Experience of when God manifested himself
Mainly, Christians have grounds for their beliefs that correspond to reality.
Christianity as a belief system based on the New Testament must be either false or exclusively true.
To deny pluralism one must show that it is rational to believe that Christianity is exclusively true.
Establishing Grounds for Answers
The problem of evil has been posed as a loving God is incompatible with the circumstances of this world since the time of Hume. But, Marilyn McCord Adams made the excellent point that: "It does the atheologian no good to argue for the falsity of Christianity on the ground that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, pleasure-maximizer is incompatible with a world such as ours, because Christians never believed that God was a pleasure-maximizer anyway" (Corduan, 156).
Christian theology must be firmly rooted and wholly based in Biblical revelation. One cannot abstract a specific principle and build from there (a common mistake).
Who is Definitely Saved?
In Old Testament theology those who are the people of God are saved by faith in God. These include the chosen people, converts to the chosen people (i.e. Ruth) and those who helped form the chosen people.
New Testament theology demands personal knowledge of the gospel as a prerequisite to salvation: How can we accept what he does not know?
In addition to knowing the Gospel, one must accept it as true and place trust in the atoning work of Christ.
The New Testament stress the need for missionary work.
The notion of implicit faith in Christ as a way of salvation is oxymoronic. Implicit faith makes as much sense as unfelt pain or inaudible speech.
However, all of these seemingly incoherent expressions are made coherent by mediation. Inaudible speech is made coherent by the usage of sign language. Sign language mediates the speech.
The sacrificial cultus of pre-Christ Jews was the meditation for implicit faith.
Who is Perhaps Saved Before Christ?
In the Old Testament the people of Israel are those who were saved. In the New Testament explicit faith in Christ and his atonement is the criterion for salvation.
To expand either of these criterions require that it is Biblically revealed, not what is merely fair or consistent.
Idolatry, under no circumstances can serve as the mediator in implicit faith. Thus, idolators are not saved.
C.S. Lewis claims that prayers made to false gods in earnest are heard by the true God. But, Lewis cannot substantiate this theory with Biblical evidence.
One argument for idolatry as a mediating device for implicit faith is the relationship of Abram and Melchizedek.
Melchizedek was the priest of El Elyon (God Most Hight) and Abram paid him a tithe for his blessing.
Clark Pinnock makes the claim that El Elyon and YHWH are equivalent. Corduan contends that rather than being equivalent deities, El Elyon and YHWH are identical, two names for the same deity.
This argument (Cordon's) makes sense because Hebrews 7's treatment of Melchizedek as the forerunner of Christ. If Melchizedek were some pagan priest, Hebrews 7 would make no sense.
Melchizedek and others (like Jethro, Moses' father-in-law) are saved by their implicit faith in Christ as mediated by their explicit faith in the God of original monotheism who is identical to the God of Old Testament Israel.
Who is perhaps saved after Christ?
The Jews were no longer saved by being a member of the chosen people because they rejected Christ. Thus, even if Gentiles were worshippers of the original monotheistic God and equivalent to Jews they are no longer saved.
In the New Testament men who worshipped the God of original monotheism were granted the opportunity to have explicit faith in Christ:
1) The Ethiopian Eunuch (Acts 8:26-40)
2) Cornelius, the Roman Centurion (Acts 10)
3) The "God-fearing Greeks" (Acts 17:4)
4) Apollos (Acts 18:24-28)
5) The disciples of John the Baptist (Acts 19:1-6)
"Natural revelation does not save, but it provides the opportunity for the saving message to be sent to those who respond to it" (Corduan, 168).
Thomas Aquinas believed in this, "God will send the message" theory. Robertson McQuilken and Oliver Buswell also advocate this position.
Epistemologically - Is Christianity alone true?
Metaphysically: Do the effects of Christ's atonement extend only to those who believe in Him?
Yes! But, there is a small amount of room for implicit faith in pre-Christ times.
Ethically: Is a human being required to express faith in Christ in order to be eligible for salvation? Yes.
Subjectively: Is an implicit faith in Christ expressed in actions as valid as an explicit faith? Yes, only in pre-Christ times.
Theologically: Does God's saving love extend to those who do not know of Christ? Yes, but only within the further plan of God.
Socially: Are those who never heard of the gospel without hope of salvation? Yes, but God reaches out in the New Testament to those without limited with natural revelation and why would he stop this practice?
A Tapestry of Faiths
Win Corduan
Is Christianity alone true?
By asking if a religion is true we ask if it is as a whole true, not if it contains some truth.
Pluralism asserts that all truth claims made by all religions are equal.
Hick claims that those Christians who maintain exclusivist theologies must revise their thinking.
Hick's pluralism is however, completely wrongheaded. No religion teaches that it is one way of relating to the Real.
Most, if not all, religions make exclusive claims. This is another point where Hick's theory does not accurately describe religions.
Hick's theory is either false or arbitrary if it is based on data from religion it is obviously false. If it is not then it is simply arbitrary.
Hick also demands that religions, especially Christianity, rewrite themselves to fit his theory. This is absurd.
Rather than an aggressive form of pluralism like Hick's, William P. Alston postulates a more subtle form:
1) Christians basing their beliefs on their mystical experience of God are justified in holding there beliefs.
2) Adherents of different religions basing their beliefs on their mystical experience are justified in holding their beliefs.
3) There is no way of adjudicating between different belief systems.
4) All persons are entitled to their beliefs since their system is coherent and productive.
Alston's theory hinges on mystical experience alone. He ignores any other type of evidence.
There are two component in accepting a belief system as true:
1) Accepting the beliefs as true
2) Justification of the belief system
Some ways of justifying religious beliefs:
1) They are self-evident
2) based on experience
3) superiority of teaching, etc., etc.
Christians can find confirmation for the beliefs in:
1) General revelation and natural theology
2) Fundamental rationality of Christian beliefs (Plantinga's "warrant" or "proper function")
3) Historical and archeological evidence
4) Inner witness of the Holy Spirit
5) Experience of when God manifested himself
Mainly, Christians have grounds for their beliefs that correspond to reality.
Christianity as a belief system based on the New Testament must be either false or exclusively true.
To deny pluralism one must show that it is rational to believe that Christianity is exclusively true.
Establishing Grounds for Answers
The problem of evil has been posed as a loving God is incompatible with the circumstances of this world since the time of Hume. But, Marilyn McCord Adams made the excellent point that: "It does the atheologian no good to argue for the falsity of Christianity on the ground that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, pleasure-maximizer is incompatible with a world such as ours, because Christians never believed that God was a pleasure-maximizer anyway" (Corduan, 156).
Christian theology must be firmly rooted and wholly based in Biblical revelation. One cannot abstract a specific principle and build from there (a common mistake).
Who is Definitely Saved?
In Old Testament theology those who are the people of God are saved by faith in God. These include the chosen people, converts to the chosen people (i.e. Ruth) and those who helped form the chosen people.
New Testament theology demands personal knowledge of the gospel as a prerequisite to salvation: How can we accept what he does not know?
In addition to knowing the Gospel, one must accept it as true and place trust in the atoning work of Christ.
The New Testament stress the need for missionary work.
The notion of implicit faith in Christ as a way of salvation is oxymoronic. Implicit faith makes as much sense as unfelt pain or inaudible speech.
However, all of these seemingly incoherent expressions are made coherent by mediation. Inaudible speech is made coherent by the usage of sign language. Sign language mediates the speech.
The sacrificial cultus of pre-Christ Jews was the meditation for implicit faith.
Who is Perhaps Saved Before Christ?
In the Old Testament the people of Israel are those who were saved. In the New Testament explicit faith in Christ and his atonement is the criterion for salvation.
To expand either of these criterions require that it is Biblically revealed, not what is merely fair or consistent.
Idolatry, under no circumstances can serve as the mediator in implicit faith. Thus, idolators are not saved.
C.S. Lewis claims that prayers made to false gods in earnest are heard by the true God. But, Lewis cannot substantiate this theory with Biblical evidence.
One argument for idolatry as a mediating device for implicit faith is the relationship of Abram and Melchizedek.
Melchizedek was the priest of El Elyon (God Most Hight) and Abram paid him a tithe for his blessing.
Clark Pinnock makes the claim that El Elyon and YHWH are equivalent. Corduan contends that rather than being equivalent deities, El Elyon and YHWH are identical, two names for the same deity.
This argument (Cordon's) makes sense because Hebrews 7's treatment of Melchizedek as the forerunner of Christ. If Melchizedek were some pagan priest, Hebrews 7 would make no sense.
Melchizedek and others (like Jethro, Moses' father-in-law) are saved by their implicit faith in Christ as mediated by their explicit faith in the God of original monotheism who is identical to the God of Old Testament Israel.
Who is perhaps saved after Christ?
The Jews were no longer saved by being a member of the chosen people because they rejected Christ. Thus, even if Gentiles were worshippers of the original monotheistic God and equivalent to Jews they are no longer saved.
In the New Testament men who worshipped the God of original monotheism were granted the opportunity to have explicit faith in Christ:
1) The Ethiopian Eunuch (Acts 8:26-40)
2) Cornelius, the Roman Centurion (Acts 10)
3) The "God-fearing Greeks" (Acts 17:4)
4) Apollos (Acts 18:24-28)
5) The disciples of John the Baptist (Acts 19:1-6)
"Natural revelation does not save, but it provides the opportunity for the saving message to be sent to those who respond to it" (Corduan, 168).
Thomas Aquinas believed in this, "God will send the message" theory. Robertson McQuilken and Oliver Buswell also advocate this position.
Epistemologically - Is Christianity alone true?
Metaphysically: Do the effects of Christ's atonement extend only to those who believe in Him?
Yes! But, there is a small amount of room for implicit faith in pre-Christ times.
Ethically: Is a human being required to express faith in Christ in order to be eligible for salvation? Yes.
Subjectively: Is an implicit faith in Christ expressed in actions as valid as an explicit faith? Yes, only in pre-Christ times.
Theologically: Does God's saving love extend to those who do not know of Christ? Yes, but only within the further plan of God.
Socially: Are those who never heard of the gospel without hope of salvation? Yes, but God reaches out in the New Testament to those without limited with natural revelation and why would he stop this practice?
Monday, March 26, 2007
Physical & Moral Evil
(Originally written March 26, 2007 in Book 25)
The Question of Freedom
Plantinga holds that man cannot be caused to have his actions come out in anyway by God's direct or indirect influence.
Plantinga's argument hinges on the belief that humans are significantly free creatures.
The Structure of This Theodicy
Theism acknowledges that God could have chose not to create, that God could have chosen to create a moral world and that God could have created a moral world with free creatures who never chose to sin.
A world with evil is a morally necessary prerequisite to the most perfect world possible.
Theistic Answers to the Problem of Moral Evil
The Theist must prove three things to answer the problem of moral evil:
1) This world is the best way to obtain the best world possible
2) No other possibility is more probable
3) Sufficient reason to believe the best possible world is achievable
The Possibility of a Theistic answer to Evil
If it can be demonstrated that this present world is not the best of al possible ways to achieve the best of all possible moral worlds than this answer to the problem of evil is refuted.
The evil of this world is part of a greater good. If the evil of this world were an end not a means than theism would have a problem.
Disproofs of God from evil are self-defeating because they assume an ultimate (divine) perspective in order to disprove such a perspective
There is no logical contradiction in stating this evil world is a condition for achieving a better one.
The theistic solution to the moral problem of evil is at least possible
The probability of a theistic answer to evil
The probability of the theistic solution to evil (this world is the best way to achieve the best of all possible moral worlds) can be established three ways:
1) Inference from the nature of God as the best Being coupled with the fact that this is not the best possible world leads us to infer that this world must be the best way to achieve the best world
2) By comparing the available alternatives to the theistic God it can be concluded that the morally best world is better than a morally good world or no moral world at all
3) By examining human history one can see the evidence of the probability of this best world to come
The Argument from the Nature of God and this world
1) God is an absolutely perfect Being
2) Producing less than a best possible world would be an evil for God
3) God cannot produce evil
4) God produced this world
5) This world as is, is not the best possible world
6) Therefore, there must be a perfect world to come
The Argument from the alternatives open to God
God had four possibilities in creating a moral world:
1) Not to create a world at all
2) Create an amoral world
3) Create a moral world with free beings who would not choose evil
4) Create a moral world with free beings who would choose evil.
Not to create a world at all cannot be better than choice 4 (the way God created) because nothing cannot be assumed to be better than something
No world could not be metaphysically better than some world because no world would have no metaphysical status
No world could not be morally better than some world because no world is not a moral world at all
There is no way of comparing an amoral world to a moral world. An amoral world is spoken about meaninglessly
The problems for an anti-theist in arguing that a morally perfect world is better than a morally good or morally bad world is that in order to make this judgment the anti-theist must assume a moral objective standard which can only be had by a God
The anti-theist really can only insist that theism is not internally consistent
The theist can reply in two ways:
1) A world with the greater number of virtues is morally better than a world with less virtues and moral viruses like courage, fortitude, mercy and forgiveness are only possible in a sinful/evil world
2) A world with a higher attainment of moral virtues is morally better than a world with a lower attainment and virtues like love and kindness are heightened by the presence of evil
1) God must produce the morally best world he can produce
2) A world where evil serves as a condition for the attainment of higher virtues is a better tone than where less than the highest virtues are attained
3) This world is a world wherein evil serves as such a condition
4) Therefore, this world is better than a world where evil never occurred
A non-evil world versus an evil world
Theists can argue agains this in two ways
1) A world with fully free creatures who chose never to sin may be logically possible, but not actually so
2) Even if such a world occurred it would not be morally better than this one
1) God would not produce a world where free beings will always do evil if it were possible to produce one where they will never more do evil
2) This is a world where free beings do evil
3) Therefore, the world is not God's final production
1) It is morally better for God to create the morally best world possible
2) A world with higher moral virtues is a morally better world
3) A world where humans are permitted to sin as a precondition to a better world is better than one where they are not
4) This present world is one where humans are free and do sin
5) Therefore, this present world is better than a world where humans never sin
God cannot do the impossible and to create a morally perfect world without creating the preconditions for such a world is impossible.
1) God cannot do what is impossible
2) It is impossible to create conditional virtues directly
3) A world with the highest moral virtues is conditioned on the presence of evil
4) Therefore, God cannot create directly a world with the highest moral virtues in it
A world of good and evil is a necessary condition for choosing either good or evil.
It is impossible for God to create directly a world with achieved moral values of the highest nature.
Eschatological verification of this theodicy
A skeptic may challenge this theodicy in claiming that something that is only verifiable in the future is of no assistance to us here and now in deciding what is true
There are two types of obtainable evidence for this theodicy:
1) Human experience is witness to the fact that free beings achieve higher moral perfection through suffering
2) Divine intervention is an evidence that something has ben done to reverse the course of world events for the better
The Attainability of a Theistic Answer to Evil
Is it possible that evil will eventually be totally overcome?
How is it logistically possible to achieve the maximum moral good out of the abuse of moral freedom?
How can we account for the moral evil that never brought about a greater good?
What explanation is offer able for the evils that do not result from an abuse of moral freedom?
How God brings good out of evil is not a serious problem for theism.
William James put it well when he wrote, "The word is all the richer for having a devil in it, so long as we keep our feet upon his neck" (357).
Only an all powerful being is capable of eradicating evil completely. Only an omniscient Being can utilize good and evil for the greatest good. Only an all-loving God would grant creatures the freedom to reject Him.
1) It is logically possible for evil to turn out for a greater good.
2) An all powerful God has the ability to bring the greatest good out of evil.
3) An all-loving God has the desire to bring the greatest good out of evil.
4) An all-knowing God possesses the wisdom to bring out the greatest good from evil
5) Therefore, the greatest good will be brought out of evil.
All moral evil is a necessary condition to achieving a greater good.
But, why does God permit unnecessary suffering or unnecessary moral evil?
Theism is the only solution to the moral problem of evil and the success of it hinges on the guarantee of an infinite God.
A world capable of optimal moral perfection implies a world of optimal moral freedom. The highest moral perfection depends on the presence of evil obstacles. Thus, there must be a permanent heaven (when evil will nevermore be done) and a permanent hell (where evil will evermore be done, but can never spread).
"Demanding that a man consent to love God against his will would be divine rape. It is better that each person be given the free choice to love or not love God" (362).
An optimally perfect moral world should contain four components:
1. The process leading to the final achievement of a world where humans are free but never will do any evil.
2. A world wherein is permitted the full and final uncorked exercise of moral freedom
3. A world in which there is permitted the presence of enough evil to provide both the condition for the achievement of higher moral virtues and a comprehensive lesson of the wrongness of evil for creatures.
4. A world where free creatures learn for themselves why evil is wrong.
The Physical Problem of Evil
The Problem of Physical Evil for Theism
It appears that not all evil results directly or indirectly from the abuse of human freedom.
Posing the problem of physical evil
Albert Camus' Plague is the most widely used problem of physical evil.
1) Either one must join the Doctor and fight the plague or else he must join the priest and not fight the plague.
2) Not to fight the plague is anti humanitarian
3) To fight the plague is to fight against God who sent it
4) Therefore, if humanitarianism is right, theism is wrong
5) Humanitarianism is right
6) Therefore, theism is wrong
The dilemma for the theist is this: if suffering is a condition of the greater good than we ought not to eliminate suffering so as to indirectly work against the greatest good.
Proposed Theistic Solutions to Physical Evil
1. Evil is a necessary contrast to Good
- without pain one cannot fully appreciate pleasure
- problems: it only explains pain, less pain would accomplish the same thing, even if evil depends on good, experience show that one can know the good without participating in evil
2. Evil is a necessary byproduct of laws that bring good results
problems: -only explains some kinds of evil, an omnipotent God could have created a world without evil byproducts. an omnipotent God could intervene and stop evil byproducts
3. Evil is necessary to punish the wicked
problems: - Job suffered innocently, Jesus said sin si not the cause of all suffering (Luke 13:4), babies are born with deformities
4. Evil is a necessary example to others
problems: - accounts for only a tiny portion of suffering
5. Evil is necessary to warn the wicked
problems: physical disasters often turn people away from God, not to God, Natural disasters are inconsistent with a benevolent God
6. Evil is a necessary part of the best possible world
problems: - an all powerful God could make a world without evil, the unjust distribution of evil could be distributed justly
7. Evil is necessary for ultimate harmony
problems: it makes evil only prima facie and eliminates reform, it makes evil illusionary because it is not evil in God's eyes, it gives God a double standard
8. Evil is a necessary condition for achieving the best world
Problems: - it does not explain first order evil, the price for long run goods is too high, some long run consequences are evil, immortal bliss does not justify suffering
9. Evil is a necessary conflict among natural systems
problems: God could have created a world without conflicting systems
10. Evil is necessary to build character
Problems: character building does not apply to all evil, the price is too high to make character building worthwhile
A Theistic Solution to the Problem of Physical Evil
Many of the anti-theistic criticism gain weight only by assuming false pretexts
- an all powerful God is capable of creating the best possible world without suffering
- the greater good does not result from suffering
- evil cannot be explained as necessary to human freedom
- the best world possible is not worth the high price to achieve it
Unnecessary evil of any kind is inconsistent with an absolutely perfect God. Thus, all evil is somehow necessary
One major criticism of the theistic solution to physical evil is that theists try to use a combination of all these tactics. They cannot achieve success because each is like a leaky bucket and no matter how many leaky buckets are used to catch water, water will still seep through. But, in reality each of these is like a bucket that has no leaks, but can only hold so much water. All the buckets together can hold all the water and all the solutions can explain all the evil.
Some physical evils are necessary conditions for moral perfections. There are second order goods that are unachievable without first order evils.
Some physical evils are a necessary consequence of human free choice.
The elimination of pain would eliminate all pleasure. One cannot have a painful experience without knowing the meaning of non-pain and one cannot have a pleasurable experience without knowing a non-pleasurable experience (i.e. pain).
Some physical evil is a necessary consequence of the free choice of demons.
Why doesn't God eliminate demonic powers? The best way to defeat evil is to let it expires itself because it is ultimately self-defeating.
Some physical evil is a necessary moral warning.
C.S. Lewis held that 'God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pain: it is his megaphone to rouse the deaf world" (376)
While it is true that not all persons respond positively to pain, it still remains an opportunity to respond positively.
God would be morally accountable if he did not warn us with pain as a doctor would be morally accountable not to warn sexually actively clients of the danger of AIDS.
Some physical evils are necessary components of a physical world. The pain of lower life forms is a necessary condition for the sustaining of higher life forms.
Objections to the Theistic solution to Physical evil
1) This theodicy implies that the ends justify the means.
Response: God has utilitarian goals, but does not use utilitarian means. That is, He allows evil to happen and uses it to create the ultimate good but does not use evil (commit it) to achieve such an end.
2) The theodicy does not account for the vastness of evil or the unequal distribution of it.
Respones:
1) No finite mind can really press this point
2) This theodicy need not measure evil quantitatively
3) This theodicy entails a double standard
Response: God does not commit the evil acts, only permits them. There is only one standard and that is God Himself. God cannot break that standard because he cannot contradict himself
4) This theodicy implies it is wrong to alleviate human suffering
Respones: when man is working against evil he is not frustrating God's effort, but fulfilling them. God does not send human suffering. Man's free choice causes suffering.
5) This theodicy exalts human freedom at the expense of divine sovereignty
Response: Moral acts are self-determined. Human self-determination enhances God's sovereignty and human dignity.
Finished!! Done! Praise God!
My thoughts on Evil:
1) Evil is a privation
2) Evil is only existent in the absence of good
3) God is good
4) The world contains evil.
5) The world is not wholly evil
6) Therefore, God is neither wholly present nor wholly absent from the world
Physical evil and moral evil are subcategories of metaphysical evils
All evil regardless of it being physical or moral is a result of human choice.
Moral evil is a direct result of human choice. But who the vil befalls may not be the direct choice maker, i.e. the Nazis chose to kill the Jews. The Jews suffered a moral evil because of a direct choice of the Nazis. But the Nazis eventually suffered for their choices.
Physical Evil is an indirect result of human choice. The flood (the first natural disaster) was a direct result of human choice to be wicked. Subsequent disasters are a result of the ecosystem being traumatized by the flood. Thus while no wicked acts may be directly responsible for Katrina or the Tsunami of 2004, they are nonetheless a recurring punitive measure for human wickedness.
All evil is inherited. We are all relatives in that we are all descendent of Adam and Eve. Their moral sin had physical and spiritual consequences. We inherit the physical consequences (death) in our DNA, but we also inherit the spiritual consequences (fallenness) via our inherited spiritual DNA.
Yes, I am advocating that souls, like physical bodies are created via reproduction. This is a very plausible explanation of how all men have fallen short of the glory of God and for the sins of the father. Souls are created from father and mother history. The sins of all ancestors are passed down to each generation. This also explains why Jesus Christ did not inherit a sin nature or fallenness because
because he was not born of a man. Thus, he did not inherit the sins of the Father because his father is God and thus, sinless.
The Question of Freedom
Plantinga holds that man cannot be caused to have his actions come out in anyway by God's direct or indirect influence.
Plantinga's argument hinges on the belief that humans are significantly free creatures.
The Structure of This Theodicy
Theism acknowledges that God could have chose not to create, that God could have chosen to create a moral world and that God could have created a moral world with free creatures who never chose to sin.
A world with evil is a morally necessary prerequisite to the most perfect world possible.
Theistic Answers to the Problem of Moral Evil
The Theist must prove three things to answer the problem of moral evil:
1) This world is the best way to obtain the best world possible
2) No other possibility is more probable
3) Sufficient reason to believe the best possible world is achievable
The Possibility of a Theistic answer to Evil
If it can be demonstrated that this present world is not the best of al possible ways to achieve the best of all possible moral worlds than this answer to the problem of evil is refuted.
The evil of this world is part of a greater good. If the evil of this world were an end not a means than theism would have a problem.
Disproofs of God from evil are self-defeating because they assume an ultimate (divine) perspective in order to disprove such a perspective
There is no logical contradiction in stating this evil world is a condition for achieving a better one.
The theistic solution to the moral problem of evil is at least possible
The probability of a theistic answer to evil
The probability of the theistic solution to evil (this world is the best way to achieve the best of all possible moral worlds) can be established three ways:
1) Inference from the nature of God as the best Being coupled with the fact that this is not the best possible world leads us to infer that this world must be the best way to achieve the best world
2) By comparing the available alternatives to the theistic God it can be concluded that the morally best world is better than a morally good world or no moral world at all
3) By examining human history one can see the evidence of the probability of this best world to come
The Argument from the Nature of God and this world
1) God is an absolutely perfect Being
2) Producing less than a best possible world would be an evil for God
3) God cannot produce evil
4) God produced this world
5) This world as is, is not the best possible world
6) Therefore, there must be a perfect world to come
The Argument from the alternatives open to God
God had four possibilities in creating a moral world:
1) Not to create a world at all
2) Create an amoral world
3) Create a moral world with free beings who would not choose evil
4) Create a moral world with free beings who would choose evil.
Not to create a world at all cannot be better than choice 4 (the way God created) because nothing cannot be assumed to be better than something
No world could not be metaphysically better than some world because no world would have no metaphysical status
No world could not be morally better than some world because no world is not a moral world at all
There is no way of comparing an amoral world to a moral world. An amoral world is spoken about meaninglessly
The problems for an anti-theist in arguing that a morally perfect world is better than a morally good or morally bad world is that in order to make this judgment the anti-theist must assume a moral objective standard which can only be had by a God
The anti-theist really can only insist that theism is not internally consistent
The theist can reply in two ways:
1) A world with the greater number of virtues is morally better than a world with less virtues and moral viruses like courage, fortitude, mercy and forgiveness are only possible in a sinful/evil world
2) A world with a higher attainment of moral virtues is morally better than a world with a lower attainment and virtues like love and kindness are heightened by the presence of evil
1) God must produce the morally best world he can produce
2) A world where evil serves as a condition for the attainment of higher virtues is a better tone than where less than the highest virtues are attained
3) This world is a world wherein evil serves as such a condition
4) Therefore, this world is better than a world where evil never occurred
A non-evil world versus an evil world
Theists can argue agains this in two ways
1) A world with fully free creatures who chose never to sin may be logically possible, but not actually so
2) Even if such a world occurred it would not be morally better than this one
1) God would not produce a world where free beings will always do evil if it were possible to produce one where they will never more do evil
2) This is a world where free beings do evil
3) Therefore, the world is not God's final production
1) It is morally better for God to create the morally best world possible
2) A world with higher moral virtues is a morally better world
3) A world where humans are permitted to sin as a precondition to a better world is better than one where they are not
4) This present world is one where humans are free and do sin
5) Therefore, this present world is better than a world where humans never sin
God cannot do the impossible and to create a morally perfect world without creating the preconditions for such a world is impossible.
1) God cannot do what is impossible
2) It is impossible to create conditional virtues directly
3) A world with the highest moral virtues is conditioned on the presence of evil
4) Therefore, God cannot create directly a world with the highest moral virtues in it
A world of good and evil is a necessary condition for choosing either good or evil.
It is impossible for God to create directly a world with achieved moral values of the highest nature.
Eschatological verification of this theodicy
A skeptic may challenge this theodicy in claiming that something that is only verifiable in the future is of no assistance to us here and now in deciding what is true
There are two types of obtainable evidence for this theodicy:
1) Human experience is witness to the fact that free beings achieve higher moral perfection through suffering
2) Divine intervention is an evidence that something has ben done to reverse the course of world events for the better
The Attainability of a Theistic Answer to Evil
Is it possible that evil will eventually be totally overcome?
How is it logistically possible to achieve the maximum moral good out of the abuse of moral freedom?
How can we account for the moral evil that never brought about a greater good?
What explanation is offer able for the evils that do not result from an abuse of moral freedom?
How God brings good out of evil is not a serious problem for theism.
William James put it well when he wrote, "The word is all the richer for having a devil in it, so long as we keep our feet upon his neck" (357).
Only an all powerful being is capable of eradicating evil completely. Only an omniscient Being can utilize good and evil for the greatest good. Only an all-loving God would grant creatures the freedom to reject Him.
1) It is logically possible for evil to turn out for a greater good.
2) An all powerful God has the ability to bring the greatest good out of evil.
3) An all-loving God has the desire to bring the greatest good out of evil.
4) An all-knowing God possesses the wisdom to bring out the greatest good from evil
5) Therefore, the greatest good will be brought out of evil.
All moral evil is a necessary condition to achieving a greater good.
But, why does God permit unnecessary suffering or unnecessary moral evil?
Theism is the only solution to the moral problem of evil and the success of it hinges on the guarantee of an infinite God.
A world capable of optimal moral perfection implies a world of optimal moral freedom. The highest moral perfection depends on the presence of evil obstacles. Thus, there must be a permanent heaven (when evil will nevermore be done) and a permanent hell (where evil will evermore be done, but can never spread).
"Demanding that a man consent to love God against his will would be divine rape. It is better that each person be given the free choice to love or not love God" (362).
An optimally perfect moral world should contain four components:
1. The process leading to the final achievement of a world where humans are free but never will do any evil.
2. A world wherein is permitted the full and final uncorked exercise of moral freedom
3. A world in which there is permitted the presence of enough evil to provide both the condition for the achievement of higher moral virtues and a comprehensive lesson of the wrongness of evil for creatures.
4. A world where free creatures learn for themselves why evil is wrong.
The Physical Problem of Evil
The Problem of Physical Evil for Theism
It appears that not all evil results directly or indirectly from the abuse of human freedom.
Posing the problem of physical evil
Albert Camus' Plague is the most widely used problem of physical evil.
1) Either one must join the Doctor and fight the plague or else he must join the priest and not fight the plague.
2) Not to fight the plague is anti humanitarian
3) To fight the plague is to fight against God who sent it
4) Therefore, if humanitarianism is right, theism is wrong
5) Humanitarianism is right
6) Therefore, theism is wrong
The dilemma for the theist is this: if suffering is a condition of the greater good than we ought not to eliminate suffering so as to indirectly work against the greatest good.
Proposed Theistic Solutions to Physical Evil
1. Evil is a necessary contrast to Good
- without pain one cannot fully appreciate pleasure
- problems: it only explains pain, less pain would accomplish the same thing, even if evil depends on good, experience show that one can know the good without participating in evil
2. Evil is a necessary byproduct of laws that bring good results
problems: -only explains some kinds of evil, an omnipotent God could have created a world without evil byproducts. an omnipotent God could intervene and stop evil byproducts
3. Evil is necessary to punish the wicked
problems: - Job suffered innocently, Jesus said sin si not the cause of all suffering (Luke 13:4), babies are born with deformities
4. Evil is a necessary example to others
problems: - accounts for only a tiny portion of suffering
5. Evil is necessary to warn the wicked
problems: physical disasters often turn people away from God, not to God, Natural disasters are inconsistent with a benevolent God
6. Evil is a necessary part of the best possible world
problems: - an all powerful God could make a world without evil, the unjust distribution of evil could be distributed justly
7. Evil is necessary for ultimate harmony
problems: it makes evil only prima facie and eliminates reform, it makes evil illusionary because it is not evil in God's eyes, it gives God a double standard
8. Evil is a necessary condition for achieving the best world
Problems: - it does not explain first order evil, the price for long run goods is too high, some long run consequences are evil, immortal bliss does not justify suffering
9. Evil is a necessary conflict among natural systems
problems: God could have created a world without conflicting systems
10. Evil is necessary to build character
Problems: character building does not apply to all evil, the price is too high to make character building worthwhile
A Theistic Solution to the Problem of Physical Evil
Many of the anti-theistic criticism gain weight only by assuming false pretexts
- an all powerful God is capable of creating the best possible world without suffering
- the greater good does not result from suffering
- evil cannot be explained as necessary to human freedom
- the best world possible is not worth the high price to achieve it
Unnecessary evil of any kind is inconsistent with an absolutely perfect God. Thus, all evil is somehow necessary
One major criticism of the theistic solution to physical evil is that theists try to use a combination of all these tactics. They cannot achieve success because each is like a leaky bucket and no matter how many leaky buckets are used to catch water, water will still seep through. But, in reality each of these is like a bucket that has no leaks, but can only hold so much water. All the buckets together can hold all the water and all the solutions can explain all the evil.
Some physical evils are necessary conditions for moral perfections. There are second order goods that are unachievable without first order evils.
Some physical evils are a necessary consequence of human free choice.
The elimination of pain would eliminate all pleasure. One cannot have a painful experience without knowing the meaning of non-pain and one cannot have a pleasurable experience without knowing a non-pleasurable experience (i.e. pain).
Some physical evil is a necessary consequence of the free choice of demons.
Why doesn't God eliminate demonic powers? The best way to defeat evil is to let it expires itself because it is ultimately self-defeating.
Some physical evil is a necessary moral warning.
C.S. Lewis held that 'God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pain: it is his megaphone to rouse the deaf world" (376)
While it is true that not all persons respond positively to pain, it still remains an opportunity to respond positively.
God would be morally accountable if he did not warn us with pain as a doctor would be morally accountable not to warn sexually actively clients of the danger of AIDS.
Some physical evils are necessary components of a physical world. The pain of lower life forms is a necessary condition for the sustaining of higher life forms.
Objections to the Theistic solution to Physical evil
1) This theodicy implies that the ends justify the means.
Response: God has utilitarian goals, but does not use utilitarian means. That is, He allows evil to happen and uses it to create the ultimate good but does not use evil (commit it) to achieve such an end.
2) The theodicy does not account for the vastness of evil or the unequal distribution of it.
Respones:
1) No finite mind can really press this point
2) This theodicy need not measure evil quantitatively
3) This theodicy entails a double standard
Response: God does not commit the evil acts, only permits them. There is only one standard and that is God Himself. God cannot break that standard because he cannot contradict himself
4) This theodicy implies it is wrong to alleviate human suffering
Respones: when man is working against evil he is not frustrating God's effort, but fulfilling them. God does not send human suffering. Man's free choice causes suffering.
5) This theodicy exalts human freedom at the expense of divine sovereignty
Response: Moral acts are self-determined. Human self-determination enhances God's sovereignty and human dignity.
Finished!! Done! Praise God!
My thoughts on Evil:
1) Evil is a privation
2) Evil is only existent in the absence of good
3) God is good
4) The world contains evil.
5) The world is not wholly evil
6) Therefore, God is neither wholly present nor wholly absent from the world
Physical evil and moral evil are subcategories of metaphysical evils
All evil regardless of it being physical or moral is a result of human choice.
Moral evil is a direct result of human choice. But who the vil befalls may not be the direct choice maker, i.e. the Nazis chose to kill the Jews. The Jews suffered a moral evil because of a direct choice of the Nazis. But the Nazis eventually suffered for their choices.
Physical Evil is an indirect result of human choice. The flood (the first natural disaster) was a direct result of human choice to be wicked. Subsequent disasters are a result of the ecosystem being traumatized by the flood. Thus while no wicked acts may be directly responsible for Katrina or the Tsunami of 2004, they are nonetheless a recurring punitive measure for human wickedness.
All evil is inherited. We are all relatives in that we are all descendent of Adam and Eve. Their moral sin had physical and spiritual consequences. We inherit the physical consequences (death) in our DNA, but we also inherit the spiritual consequences (fallenness) via our inherited spiritual DNA.
Yes, I am advocating that souls, like physical bodies are created via reproduction. This is a very plausible explanation of how all men have fallen short of the glory of God and for the sins of the father. Souls are created from father and mother history. The sins of all ancestors are passed down to each generation. This also explains why Jesus Christ did not inherit a sin nature or fallenness because
because he was not born of a man. Thus, he did not inherit the sins of the Father because his father is God and thus, sinless.
Sunday, March 25, 2007
Metaphysical & Moral Evil
(Originally written March 25, 2007 in Book 25)
Augustine: All things are Metaphysically Good
All things (substances) are good because God created them.
He denied the dualist contention of an all good substance and an all evil substance because God is supreme existence and if the were an opposite of God it would be superman non-existence. Hence, there is no two great powers dualism.
"Every substance as such is good" - Augustine
God, the supreme Good is incorruptible. he is the standard by which evil is measured and cannot be evil.
All created goods are corruptible because they are not simple, they are composite.
Created beings by their nature contain the possibility (but not the necessity) of metaphysical evil.
Creation makes evil possible, but evil is actualized by creatures, not the Creator.
Evil is not a substance. It is simply the loss of good. It is a privation of substance.
Evil is a deficiency in some substance. It has no existence of its own, it subsists within another.
Any substance that has been corrupted by evil may be said to be an evil substance, but whatever substance it still possess is nonetheless good. The same is true of anything's nature.
God is not the cause of metaphysical evil.
Augustine held that the efficient cause of evil is unknowable because what is nothing cannot be known.
Being cannot corrupt itself or any other being. Nonbeing cannot corrupt being.
Freedom is the cause of evil. The ultimate cause of evil is moral. The cause of privation is pride.
If freedom is the cause of sin it is meaningless to ask what is the cause of freedom because freedom is the first cause of sin.
The meaningful question is 'how did evil come about?'
Augustine used the example of Satan to illustrate how evil came about. Satan, being conscious of himself took a perverted pleasure in himself in imitating God. Pride was the origin of Satan's sin.
Evil never completely corrupts a good.
Even though God did not create evil he orders it for his own good purpose.
Evil is part of a total picture of good.
Aquinas: Evil is a metaphysical privation
Aquinas held that metaphysical evil is a metaphysical privation with no formal cause and only an indirect efficient cause.
Evil is a privation in a good. A thing is evil in that it lacks a perfection it ought to have.
Utter evil is impossible. Evil has no essence of its own.
Nothing can be essentially evil.
Evil has no formal cause. Evil has no form; it is disorder, not order.
Evil is a privation of form.
Evil has no final cause.
Evil has a material cause, but its material cause is good because matter is good.
Evil has an indirect efficient cause. Evil is a byproduct of causality.
God caused evil incidentally. Through his creative power he indirectly caused either because through creating some things God must destroy others or because there is an incapacity in what he causes.
Human nature is neither diminished nor destroyed by evil.
A fallen human being is metaphysically good but weakened morally.
Conclusions from the Augustinian-Thomistic Solution
Metaphysically, evil has no essence or being of its own. Evil has no form or formal cause.
God is not the direct, efficient cause of evil.
Moral evil is rooted in human freedom.
The nature of human beings cannot be totally corrupted.
Human metaphysical nature is not diminished to the point that a person is no longer rationally and morally responsible for his actions.
The grace of God enables the person to overcome whatever propensities to evil he has so he is able to not sin.
Finitude makes evil possible, but not necessary.
The theistic answer to metaphysical evil solves the existence of evil without retreating to dualism, but does not answer why evil exists.
The theistic answer to metaphysical illusionism.
Evil may not be a real entity but it is a reality.
Metaphysical evil is not nothing. It indicates that something ought to be there.
Contemporary rejoinders
G. Stanley Kane states that the notion of evil as privation is almost universally ignored or misunderstood. He holds that any attempt of refuting the privation theory makes elementary mistakes:
1) it confuses privation with illusion
2) demands that God is the efficient cause of privation
3) asserts that the privation theory does not comfort those who suffer
Kane however argues against it like this
1) The theory of evil as privation has been advanced as a general theory to account for all evils
2) Some evils are clearly not privations
a) pain is a positive evil
b) moral evil is a positive evil
3) Therefore, the privation theory does not fulfill its intended purpose
Linehan response:
Pain is not a positive evil:
1) Pain is the result of something that occurs (i.e. I have a headache because I have not had my coffee today or I have a toothache because I have a cavity)
2) Pain derives its existence in a substance, it does not exist apart from any substance
3) Pain is thus, not a substance
4) Whatever is not a substance cannot have a positive existence of its own
5) Pain is therefore, some deficiency or privation of a normal state within a substance
Moral evil is not a positive evil
1) Whatever is a moral evil must exist within a moral creature
2) There can be no absolutely morally evil creature because absolute evil entails non-existence
3) Thus, if any creature possess or commits a moral evil they do not do so absolutely
4) If there is no absolute moral evil there must be degrees of moral evil because there are some moral evils and not all are equal in quantity (while they may be so qualitatively)
5) If there are degrees of quantity within moral evil they cannot exist on their own right because there are no degrees between existence and non-existence. Either something exists fully or it does not exist at all
6) Whatever does not have its own existence cannot be a substance
7) Whatever is not a substance cannot have positive standing
8) Therefore, moral evil is not a positive evil
16 The Moral Problem of Evil
3 Kinds of evil:
1) Moral
2) Metaphysical
3) Physical
It seems obvious that some nonmoral evil is not the result of human free will.
Natural evil is evil that does not result from human choice. Moral evil is resulted of human choice.
The problem of moral evil and the Alternatives for theism
Moral Evil: The Problem and Actual Alternatives
1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, Either God is benevolent and impotent, malevolent, or impotent and malevolent or God does not exit
The theist objects to premise three and states God is actually working to eliminate evil.
Moral Evil: The Bind of the Hypothetical Alternatives
Plantinga and the Free Will Defense
Plantinga holds that in order for the world to be morally good it must possess creatures who can do moral good. Only free creatures are capable of doing morally good work.
Augustine: All things are Metaphysically Good
All things (substances) are good because God created them.
He denied the dualist contention of an all good substance and an all evil substance because God is supreme existence and if the were an opposite of God it would be superman non-existence. Hence, there is no two great powers dualism.
"Every substance as such is good" - Augustine
God, the supreme Good is incorruptible. he is the standard by which evil is measured and cannot be evil.
All created goods are corruptible because they are not simple, they are composite.
Created beings by their nature contain the possibility (but not the necessity) of metaphysical evil.
Creation makes evil possible, but evil is actualized by creatures, not the Creator.
Evil is not a substance. It is simply the loss of good. It is a privation of substance.
Evil is a deficiency in some substance. It has no existence of its own, it subsists within another.
Any substance that has been corrupted by evil may be said to be an evil substance, but whatever substance it still possess is nonetheless good. The same is true of anything's nature.
God is not the cause of metaphysical evil.
Augustine held that the efficient cause of evil is unknowable because what is nothing cannot be known.
Being cannot corrupt itself or any other being. Nonbeing cannot corrupt being.
Freedom is the cause of evil. The ultimate cause of evil is moral. The cause of privation is pride.
If freedom is the cause of sin it is meaningless to ask what is the cause of freedom because freedom is the first cause of sin.
The meaningful question is 'how did evil come about?'
Augustine used the example of Satan to illustrate how evil came about. Satan, being conscious of himself took a perverted pleasure in himself in imitating God. Pride was the origin of Satan's sin.
Evil never completely corrupts a good.
Even though God did not create evil he orders it for his own good purpose.
Evil is part of a total picture of good.
Aquinas: Evil is a metaphysical privation
Aquinas held that metaphysical evil is a metaphysical privation with no formal cause and only an indirect efficient cause.
Evil is a privation in a good. A thing is evil in that it lacks a perfection it ought to have.
Utter evil is impossible. Evil has no essence of its own.
Nothing can be essentially evil.
Evil has no formal cause. Evil has no form; it is disorder, not order.
Evil is a privation of form.
Evil has no final cause.
Evil has a material cause, but its material cause is good because matter is good.
Evil has an indirect efficient cause. Evil is a byproduct of causality.
God caused evil incidentally. Through his creative power he indirectly caused either because through creating some things God must destroy others or because there is an incapacity in what he causes.
Human nature is neither diminished nor destroyed by evil.
A fallen human being is metaphysically good but weakened morally.
Conclusions from the Augustinian-Thomistic Solution
Metaphysically, evil has no essence or being of its own. Evil has no form or formal cause.
God is not the direct, efficient cause of evil.
Moral evil is rooted in human freedom.
The nature of human beings cannot be totally corrupted.
Human metaphysical nature is not diminished to the point that a person is no longer rationally and morally responsible for his actions.
The grace of God enables the person to overcome whatever propensities to evil he has so he is able to not sin.
Finitude makes evil possible, but not necessary.
The theistic answer to metaphysical evil solves the existence of evil without retreating to dualism, but does not answer why evil exists.
The theistic answer to metaphysical illusionism.
Evil may not be a real entity but it is a reality.
Metaphysical evil is not nothing. It indicates that something ought to be there.
Contemporary rejoinders
G. Stanley Kane states that the notion of evil as privation is almost universally ignored or misunderstood. He holds that any attempt of refuting the privation theory makes elementary mistakes:
1) it confuses privation with illusion
2) demands that God is the efficient cause of privation
3) asserts that the privation theory does not comfort those who suffer
Kane however argues against it like this
1) The theory of evil as privation has been advanced as a general theory to account for all evils
2) Some evils are clearly not privations
a) pain is a positive evil
b) moral evil is a positive evil
3) Therefore, the privation theory does not fulfill its intended purpose
Linehan response:
Pain is not a positive evil:
1) Pain is the result of something that occurs (i.e. I have a headache because I have not had my coffee today or I have a toothache because I have a cavity)
2) Pain derives its existence in a substance, it does not exist apart from any substance
3) Pain is thus, not a substance
4) Whatever is not a substance cannot have a positive existence of its own
5) Pain is therefore, some deficiency or privation of a normal state within a substance
Moral evil is not a positive evil
1) Whatever is a moral evil must exist within a moral creature
2) There can be no absolutely morally evil creature because absolute evil entails non-existence
3) Thus, if any creature possess or commits a moral evil they do not do so absolutely
4) If there is no absolute moral evil there must be degrees of moral evil because there are some moral evils and not all are equal in quantity (while they may be so qualitatively)
5) If there are degrees of quantity within moral evil they cannot exist on their own right because there are no degrees between existence and non-existence. Either something exists fully or it does not exist at all
6) Whatever does not have its own existence cannot be a substance
7) Whatever is not a substance cannot have positive standing
8) Therefore, moral evil is not a positive evil
16 The Moral Problem of Evil
3 Kinds of evil:
1) Moral
2) Metaphysical
3) Physical
It seems obvious that some nonmoral evil is not the result of human free will.
Natural evil is evil that does not result from human choice. Moral evil is resulted of human choice.
The problem of moral evil and the Alternatives for theism
Moral Evil: The Problem and Actual Alternatives
1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, Either God is benevolent and impotent, malevolent, or impotent and malevolent or God does not exit
The theist objects to premise three and states God is actually working to eliminate evil.
Moral Evil: The Bind of the Hypothetical Alternatives
Plantinga and the Free Will Defense
Plantinga holds that in order for the world to be morally good it must possess creatures who can do moral good. Only free creatures are capable of doing morally good work.
Wednesday, March 7, 2007
Ontological Arguments and Objections
(Originally written March 7, 2007 in Book 13)
Anselm's Debate with Gaunilo
Gaunilo objected to Anselm's argument on a few grounds:
1. It is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must exist outside the mind.
2. If God's non-existence were really inconceivable then no one could doubt his existence.
3. We cannot even form the concept of the most perfect being possible.
4. The existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of a perfect Being anymore than the existence of a perfect island can be inferred from the idea of a perfect island.
5. God's nonexistence is no more inconceivable than my own nonexistence. I can conceive of my own nonexistence so I can conceive of God's nonexistence too.
6. God's existence must be proved before we can discuss his essence. Otherwise there is no basis for saying he is the most perfect Being possible.
Anselm's replies:
1. The argument only applies to an absolute perfect Being.
2. God's nonexistence is affirmable, but not conceivable.
3. We do understand the word because of 6 facts:
- It is a common word
- It is a familiar word
- Our faith and conscience provide content for it
- Conceptions do not have to be in terms of sensible images
- God can be understood indirectly
- Those who deny that they can have a conception of God must have a conception of what they cannot conceive
4. The idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything, especially being; whereas, the idea of anything else can lack being.
5. If it is possible for a necessary being a necessary being must exist. It's nonexistence is inconceivable.
6. We can compare ideal characteristics prior to ascertaining their reality.
Anselm charged Gaunilo with misunderstanding the argument as:
1. God is the greatest of all Beings
2. It is greater to exist in reality then merely in the understanding.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
Anselm states this argument confuses the greatest actual Being with the greatest possible being.
Aquinas' objection to the ontological argument
Aquinas understood Anselm to mean:
1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived
2. What exists actually and mentally is greater than that with exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually.
Aquinas had 3 objections to the argument:
1. Not everyone understands the term "God" to mean that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Even if everyone did understand that the term God meant this, it does not follow that God exists actually.
3. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident, but not self-evident to us.
Descartes' formulation of the Ontological Argument
Descartes' argument (2nd form)
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature of that concept.
2. Existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent.
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
"If God by definition cannot exist, then he must exist" (128).
Descartes' argument (1st form)
1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive of something is true.
2. We clearly and distinctly perceive that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being necessitates the existence of that Being.
3. Therefore, it is true that an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack existence.
Descartes qualified his argument in three ways:
1. This argument applies only to an absolutely perfect or necessary being.
2. It is not necessary for anyone to think of God, but if and when he does he must conceive of God as necessarily existing.
3. To conceive of God as a necessary Being is not imaginary, but necessary. The concept of a necessary being must be what it is and cannot be any other way. Thus, the concept of a necessary Being cannot be the product of one's imagination.
The debate between Caters and Descartes
Caters the priest agreed with Thomas Aquinas in that he felt the Ontological Argument proved only a conceptual and not a real existence of God.
Caters contended that the words "existent lion" is conceptually necessary, but it does not prove that a lion exists.
Descartes stated that Aquinas refuted an argument that stated existence is concluded from the meaning of God, not his own argument.
Other reactions to Descartes' proofs
Other 17th century philosophers reacted negatively to Descartes' arguments. They restated his argument this way.
1. If it is not contradictory that God exists, then it is certain that He exists.
2. It is not contradictory that God exists.
3. Therefore, it is certain that God exists.
They objected to Descartes' argument in two ways:
1. The minor premise can be doubted or denied.
2. Descartes admitted that his idea of God was inadequate and thus unclear. By Descartes definition of truth as "clear and distinct" then it is untrue.
Descartes' replies:
1. God's nonexistence is noncontradictory in either of two senses of the word:
- Whatever does not disagree with human thought (God is noncontradictory)
- What cannot be known by the human mind (no one could know anything, thus God's existence is noncontradictory)
2. Even if our concept of God is inadequate it does not follow that it is contradictory. God's necessary existence is a clear concept, thus the argument is unaffected by lack of clarity in other aspects of God's nature.
The debate between Gassendi and Descartes.
Pierre Gassendi, a skeptic, contended that Descartes confused existence with a property. He argued with 7 points:
1. The essence of a thing can be thought of apart from its existence.
2. Existence is not a property.
3. Essence and existence can be distinguished only in thought, not in reality.
4. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as we are to think of Pegasus as not existing.
5. We need demonstration that God exists, not merely the assumption that it does.
6. Descartes did not really prove that nonexistence is incompatible with God.
Descartes replied to Gassendi with four points:
1. Existence is a property in that it is attributable to something. Necessary existence is a necessary property of a necessary being.
2. We cannot compare the existence of that which is contingent to the existence of what is necessary.
3. It is not begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent.
4. God's existence and essence are inseparable.
Leibniz's Consideration of the Ontological Argument
Leibniz held that the ontological argument was valid but sensed that it was necessary to demonstrate the concept of God was not contradictory.
He stated
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exists.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.
To support his minor premise Leibniz argued that:
1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limitations.
2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities (they differ in kind).
3. Whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it.
4. Therefore, it is possible for on Being (God) to possess all possible perfections.
Three objections to Leibniz's arg.
1. It assumes that some qualities are essentially positive and others negative, but this may not be the case.
2. Leibniz assumes that some qualities are intrinsically simple, but Wittgenstein showed that what is simple in one conceptual system may be complex in another.
3. It depends on the principle of the actual identity which is conceptually indiscernible.
Spinoza's Ontological Proof
Like Descartes, Spinoza held that God was mathematically demonstrable.
Spinoza's argument:
1. There must be a cause for everything, either for its existence or for its nonexistence.
2. A necessary Being (God) necessarily exists, unless there is an adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
3. There is no adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being, necessarily exists.
One may object to Spinoza's insistence that there must be a cause for nothing because it appears contradictory.
Spinoza's second form:
1. Something necessarily exists.
2. This necessary existence is either finite or infinite.
3. It is possible for this necessary existence to be infinite.
4. There must be a cause as to why this is not an infinite existence.
5. No finite existence can hinder this being (an infinite existence).
6. Therefore, this must be an infinite existence
Spinoza's arguments borrow from the premise that something exists from the cosmological argument.
Spinoza's God is not the theistic God of Leibniz or Anselm, it is a pantheistic God.
The Objections of Hume and Kant
Hume's Objection:
1. Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradictory
2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
3. Whatever we conceive to exist we can conceive as nonexistent
4. There is no being whose existence implies a contradiction
5. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.
Hume argues that no argument for God is rationally inescapable because it always contains premises that are logically deniable.
Kant's critique of the Ontological proof
Kant objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary Being (that which cannot be).
He also contended that necessity applied only to propositions, not existence.
Also, what is logically possible is not always ontologically possible.
Existence (Kant held) is not a predicate of a thing. It is not a perfection.
Supposed Causes of the Ontological Mistake
Opponents of the Ontological argument have blamed many sources of the ontological 'mistake'
1) Platonic Philosophy - Platonic epistemology holds that one can directly and intuitively know essences.
2) Metaphysical thinking - some argue that "is" or "exists" is only logical, not ontological.
3) Confusion of cause and reason - Causes need something outside of itself where a reason can be itself (Schopenhauer)
4) Use of a proper name - the use of a proper name implies existence (Russell)
5) The use of the English conditional. Alvin Plantinga claimed that "If Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" does not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. Likewise, "If God exists, then he Necessarily exists" does not imply "God exists" There may be no God at all.
Linehan - Unfair analogy!
"IF Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" may not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. But there is a bachelor. Likewise, "If God exists, then he necessarily exists" may not imply "God exists" But, there is a necessary existence which must be filled by a necessary Existent, which is God.
Findlay's Ontological Disproof of God.
The ontological argument has been widely rejected in modern times.
J. N. Findlay used the ontological proof against itself:
1. God must be thought of as a necessary Being, for anything else short of this would be unworthy of worship.
2. But existential necessary propositions cannot be true for necessity is merely a logical characteristic of propositions, not of reality.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A simpler, proper form of this argument:
1. The only way a necessary Being could exist is to exist necessarily.
2. The proposition "God exists necessarily" is an existentially necessary proposition.
3. No existentially necessary propositions can be true.
4. Therefore, the proposition "God exists necessarily" cannot be true.
A theist can object to this in 4 ways:
1. Change the proposition "God exists necessarily" to "God exists". Then holding the proposition "God exists" as a logically necessary proposition to hold.
2. Deny that necessity applied to existential propositions makes them untrue. (Existentially necessary propositions can be true). Examples of existentially necessary propositions: "I am I". "There is an infinite number of prime numbers". "Square circles do not exist".
3. "God necessarily exists" is a special case (Anselm and Descartes).
4. Findlay's statement "there are no existentially necessary propositions" is an existentially necessary proposition.
Hartshorne's Restatement of the Ontological Proof.
Charles Hartshorne is one of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument and states it like this:
1. The existence of a necessary being is either:
a) Impossible, and there is no example of it
b) Possible, but there is no example of it
c) Possible, and there is an example of it
2. Possible, but there is no example of it is meaningless because a necessary Being cannot be a possible being.
3. Impossible, and there is no example of it is not eliminated by the ontological argument, but the meaningfulness of the term 'necessary Being' is a justifiable assumption that may be defeated on other grounds.
Hartshorne's Argument:
1. All thought must refer to something beyond itself which is at least possible
2. The necessary existence of a necessary Being is at least possible.
3. With a necessary Being an "at-least-possible" existence is indistinguishable from a "possible and actual" existence. A necessary Being cannot have a "merely possible" existence.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being necessarily has both a possible and an actual existence.
Hartshorne's view of God is neither theistic and pantheistic. It is panentheistic.
Hartshorne states, "Either God is a meaningless term or there exists a divine Being" (141).
All versions of the ontological argument contain the implicit premise that what is rationally inescapable is the real.
Malcolm's restatement of the ontological proof
Malcolm believes that Kant invalidated Anselm's first form, but the second form is immune to all criticism.
Malcolm's restatement of Anselm's 2nd form:
1. The existence of a necessary being must be either:
a) a necessary existence
b) an impossible existence
c) a possible existence
2. The existence of a necessary Being is not an impossible existence
a) No one has ever shown the concept of a necessary being to be contradictory
b) there is a basis in human experience for "a greater than which cannot be thought"
c) Leibniz's attempt to prove that there is no contradiction fails. We cannot show that there cannot be one.
3. The existence of a necessary Being cannot be a possible being because:
a) it is contradictory to the very nature of a necessary being
b) a possible being is dependent, a necessary Being is independent
4. Therefore, A necessary Being Necessarily exists
Plantinga's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Plantinga argues that God could exist without his existence being a necessary one. His existence could be logically contingent but not ontologically so.
Planting states that it is logically possible that God never existed at all. It is logically possible that nothing ever existent including God.
All that proponents of the ontological argument have to do invalidate Plantinga's objections too.
Planting offers an ontological argument that is very cosmological. It has left the a priori realm and moved into the a posteriori realm.
Planting uses modal logic in his argument:
1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a world "W" and an essence "E" such that "E" is exemplified in "W" and "E" entails the property "has maximal greatness in W"
5. For any object X, if X, exemplifies E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
7. If W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified.
8. What is impossible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10 Therefore, the being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.
Plantinga's argument is tight and compelling. It avoids many of the traditional criticism of the ontological argument. However there are a few criticisms:
1. The use of modal logic assumes existence of an actual world. Thus, it is a posteriori, not a priori.
2. Defining a perfect being in theistic terms is gratuitous.
3. The essence E is supposed by Plantinga to havre a real existence.
The ontological argument to be valid must assume that something exists and thus it rests on a cosmological principle.
The ontological argument has not proven God exists by itself. It has in fact yielded four types of God and a possible atheistic conception:
1. Leibniz & Descartes - theistic God
2. Spinoza - pantheistic God
3. Hartshorne - panentheistic God
4. Henle - polytheistic gods
5. Atheism - the universe is necessary, but does not include God
Anselm's Debate with Gaunilo
Gaunilo objected to Anselm's argument on a few grounds:
1. It is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must exist outside the mind.
2. If God's non-existence were really inconceivable then no one could doubt his existence.
3. We cannot even form the concept of the most perfect being possible.
4. The existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of a perfect Being anymore than the existence of a perfect island can be inferred from the idea of a perfect island.
5. God's nonexistence is no more inconceivable than my own nonexistence. I can conceive of my own nonexistence so I can conceive of God's nonexistence too.
6. God's existence must be proved before we can discuss his essence. Otherwise there is no basis for saying he is the most perfect Being possible.
Anselm's replies:
1. The argument only applies to an absolute perfect Being.
2. God's nonexistence is affirmable, but not conceivable.
3. We do understand the word because of 6 facts:
- It is a common word
- It is a familiar word
- Our faith and conscience provide content for it
- Conceptions do not have to be in terms of sensible images
- God can be understood indirectly
- Those who deny that they can have a conception of God must have a conception of what they cannot conceive
4. The idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything, especially being; whereas, the idea of anything else can lack being.
5. If it is possible for a necessary being a necessary being must exist. It's nonexistence is inconceivable.
6. We can compare ideal characteristics prior to ascertaining their reality.
Anselm charged Gaunilo with misunderstanding the argument as:
1. God is the greatest of all Beings
2. It is greater to exist in reality then merely in the understanding.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
Anselm states this argument confuses the greatest actual Being with the greatest possible being.
Aquinas' objection to the ontological argument
Aquinas understood Anselm to mean:
1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived
2. What exists actually and mentally is greater than that with exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually.
Aquinas had 3 objections to the argument:
1. Not everyone understands the term "God" to mean that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Even if everyone did understand that the term God meant this, it does not follow that God exists actually.
3. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident, but not self-evident to us.
Descartes' formulation of the Ontological Argument
Descartes' argument (2nd form)
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature of that concept.
2. Existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent.
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
"If God by definition cannot exist, then he must exist" (128).
Descartes' argument (1st form)
1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive of something is true.
2. We clearly and distinctly perceive that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being necessitates the existence of that Being.
3. Therefore, it is true that an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack existence.
Descartes qualified his argument in three ways:
1. This argument applies only to an absolutely perfect or necessary being.
2. It is not necessary for anyone to think of God, but if and when he does he must conceive of God as necessarily existing.
3. To conceive of God as a necessary Being is not imaginary, but necessary. The concept of a necessary being must be what it is and cannot be any other way. Thus, the concept of a necessary Being cannot be the product of one's imagination.
The debate between Caters and Descartes
Caters the priest agreed with Thomas Aquinas in that he felt the Ontological Argument proved only a conceptual and not a real existence of God.
Caters contended that the words "existent lion" is conceptually necessary, but it does not prove that a lion exists.
Descartes stated that Aquinas refuted an argument that stated existence is concluded from the meaning of God, not his own argument.
Other reactions to Descartes' proofs
Other 17th century philosophers reacted negatively to Descartes' arguments. They restated his argument this way.
1. If it is not contradictory that God exists, then it is certain that He exists.
2. It is not contradictory that God exists.
3. Therefore, it is certain that God exists.
They objected to Descartes' argument in two ways:
1. The minor premise can be doubted or denied.
2. Descartes admitted that his idea of God was inadequate and thus unclear. By Descartes definition of truth as "clear and distinct" then it is untrue.
Descartes' replies:
1. God's nonexistence is noncontradictory in either of two senses of the word:
- Whatever does not disagree with human thought (God is noncontradictory)
- What cannot be known by the human mind (no one could know anything, thus God's existence is noncontradictory)
2. Even if our concept of God is inadequate it does not follow that it is contradictory. God's necessary existence is a clear concept, thus the argument is unaffected by lack of clarity in other aspects of God's nature.
The debate between Gassendi and Descartes.
Pierre Gassendi, a skeptic, contended that Descartes confused existence with a property. He argued with 7 points:
1. The essence of a thing can be thought of apart from its existence.
2. Existence is not a property.
3. Essence and existence can be distinguished only in thought, not in reality.
4. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as we are to think of Pegasus as not existing.
5. We need demonstration that God exists, not merely the assumption that it does.
6. Descartes did not really prove that nonexistence is incompatible with God.
Descartes replied to Gassendi with four points:
1. Existence is a property in that it is attributable to something. Necessary existence is a necessary property of a necessary being.
2. We cannot compare the existence of that which is contingent to the existence of what is necessary.
3. It is not begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent.
4. God's existence and essence are inseparable.
Leibniz's Consideration of the Ontological Argument
Leibniz held that the ontological argument was valid but sensed that it was necessary to demonstrate the concept of God was not contradictory.
He stated
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exists.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.
To support his minor premise Leibniz argued that:
1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limitations.
2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities (they differ in kind).
3. Whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it.
4. Therefore, it is possible for on Being (God) to possess all possible perfections.
Three objections to Leibniz's arg.
1. It assumes that some qualities are essentially positive and others negative, but this may not be the case.
2. Leibniz assumes that some qualities are intrinsically simple, but Wittgenstein showed that what is simple in one conceptual system may be complex in another.
3. It depends on the principle of the actual identity which is conceptually indiscernible.
Spinoza's Ontological Proof
Like Descartes, Spinoza held that God was mathematically demonstrable.
Spinoza's argument:
1. There must be a cause for everything, either for its existence or for its nonexistence.
2. A necessary Being (God) necessarily exists, unless there is an adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
3. There is no adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being, necessarily exists.
One may object to Spinoza's insistence that there must be a cause for nothing because it appears contradictory.
Spinoza's second form:
1. Something necessarily exists.
2. This necessary existence is either finite or infinite.
3. It is possible for this necessary existence to be infinite.
4. There must be a cause as to why this is not an infinite existence.
5. No finite existence can hinder this being (an infinite existence).
6. Therefore, this must be an infinite existence
Spinoza's arguments borrow from the premise that something exists from the cosmological argument.
Spinoza's God is not the theistic God of Leibniz or Anselm, it is a pantheistic God.
The Objections of Hume and Kant
Hume's Objection:
1. Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradictory
2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
3. Whatever we conceive to exist we can conceive as nonexistent
4. There is no being whose existence implies a contradiction
5. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.
Hume argues that no argument for God is rationally inescapable because it always contains premises that are logically deniable.
Kant's critique of the Ontological proof
Kant objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary Being (that which cannot be).
He also contended that necessity applied only to propositions, not existence.
Also, what is logically possible is not always ontologically possible.
Existence (Kant held) is not a predicate of a thing. It is not a perfection.
Supposed Causes of the Ontological Mistake
Opponents of the Ontological argument have blamed many sources of the ontological 'mistake'
1) Platonic Philosophy - Platonic epistemology holds that one can directly and intuitively know essences.
2) Metaphysical thinking - some argue that "is" or "exists" is only logical, not ontological.
3) Confusion of cause and reason - Causes need something outside of itself where a reason can be itself (Schopenhauer)
4) Use of a proper name - the use of a proper name implies existence (Russell)
5) The use of the English conditional. Alvin Plantinga claimed that "If Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" does not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. Likewise, "If God exists, then he Necessarily exists" does not imply "God exists" There may be no God at all.
Linehan - Unfair analogy!
"IF Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" may not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. But there is a bachelor. Likewise, "If God exists, then he necessarily exists" may not imply "God exists" But, there is a necessary existence which must be filled by a necessary Existent, which is God.
Findlay's Ontological Disproof of God.
The ontological argument has been widely rejected in modern times.
J. N. Findlay used the ontological proof against itself:
1. God must be thought of as a necessary Being, for anything else short of this would be unworthy of worship.
2. But existential necessary propositions cannot be true for necessity is merely a logical characteristic of propositions, not of reality.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A simpler, proper form of this argument:
1. The only way a necessary Being could exist is to exist necessarily.
2. The proposition "God exists necessarily" is an existentially necessary proposition.
3. No existentially necessary propositions can be true.
4. Therefore, the proposition "God exists necessarily" cannot be true.
A theist can object to this in 4 ways:
1. Change the proposition "God exists necessarily" to "God exists". Then holding the proposition "God exists" as a logically necessary proposition to hold.
2. Deny that necessity applied to existential propositions makes them untrue. (Existentially necessary propositions can be true). Examples of existentially necessary propositions: "I am I". "There is an infinite number of prime numbers". "Square circles do not exist".
3. "God necessarily exists" is a special case (Anselm and Descartes).
4. Findlay's statement "there are no existentially necessary propositions" is an existentially necessary proposition.
Hartshorne's Restatement of the Ontological Proof.
Charles Hartshorne is one of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument and states it like this:
1. The existence of a necessary being is either:
a) Impossible, and there is no example of it
b) Possible, but there is no example of it
c) Possible, and there is an example of it
2. Possible, but there is no example of it is meaningless because a necessary Being cannot be a possible being.
3. Impossible, and there is no example of it is not eliminated by the ontological argument, but the meaningfulness of the term 'necessary Being' is a justifiable assumption that may be defeated on other grounds.
Hartshorne's Argument:
1. All thought must refer to something beyond itself which is at least possible
2. The necessary existence of a necessary Being is at least possible.
3. With a necessary Being an "at-least-possible" existence is indistinguishable from a "possible and actual" existence. A necessary Being cannot have a "merely possible" existence.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being necessarily has both a possible and an actual existence.
Hartshorne's view of God is neither theistic and pantheistic. It is panentheistic.
Hartshorne states, "Either God is a meaningless term or there exists a divine Being" (141).
All versions of the ontological argument contain the implicit premise that what is rationally inescapable is the real.
Malcolm's restatement of the ontological proof
Malcolm believes that Kant invalidated Anselm's first form, but the second form is immune to all criticism.
Malcolm's restatement of Anselm's 2nd form:
1. The existence of a necessary being must be either:
a) a necessary existence
b) an impossible existence
c) a possible existence
2. The existence of a necessary Being is not an impossible existence
a) No one has ever shown the concept of a necessary being to be contradictory
b) there is a basis in human experience for "a greater than which cannot be thought"
c) Leibniz's attempt to prove that there is no contradiction fails. We cannot show that there cannot be one.
3. The existence of a necessary Being cannot be a possible being because:
a) it is contradictory to the very nature of a necessary being
b) a possible being is dependent, a necessary Being is independent
4. Therefore, A necessary Being Necessarily exists
Plantinga's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Plantinga argues that God could exist without his existence being a necessary one. His existence could be logically contingent but not ontologically so.
Planting states that it is logically possible that God never existed at all. It is logically possible that nothing ever existent including God.
All that proponents of the ontological argument have to do invalidate Plantinga's objections too.
Planting offers an ontological argument that is very cosmological. It has left the a priori realm and moved into the a posteriori realm.
Planting uses modal logic in his argument:
1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a world "W" and an essence "E" such that "E" is exemplified in "W" and "E" entails the property "has maximal greatness in W"
5. For any object X, if X, exemplifies E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
7. If W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified.
8. What is impossible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10 Therefore, the being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.
Plantinga's argument is tight and compelling. It avoids many of the traditional criticism of the ontological argument. However there are a few criticisms:
1. The use of modal logic assumes existence of an actual world. Thus, it is a posteriori, not a priori.
2. Defining a perfect being in theistic terms is gratuitous.
3. The essence E is supposed by Plantinga to havre a real existence.
The ontological argument to be valid must assume that something exists and thus it rests on a cosmological principle.
The ontological argument has not proven God exists by itself. It has in fact yielded four types of God and a possible atheistic conception:
1. Leibniz & Descartes - theistic God
2. Spinoza - pantheistic God
3. Hartshorne - panentheistic God
4. Henle - polytheistic gods
5. Atheism - the universe is necessary, but does not include God
Monday, March 5, 2007
Notes Theistic Proofs, Teleological emphasis
(Originally written March 5, 2007 in Book 13)
It seems implausible that all religious people have been deceived completely. The existence of a Transcendent God is more plausible than a completely skeptical outlook on life.
"It seems much more likely that such self-analyzing and self-critical men as Augustine, Blaise Pascal and Kierkegaard were not totally deceived than that total skepticism is right. Unless it is true that no person in the history of the world has ever really been truly critical of his religious experience, then it follows that the reality of God has been critically established from human experience" (76).
Part 2: God & Reason
5 The Function of Theistic Proofs
Most theists are not satisfied with proving God's existence on experience alone. They went to establish rational proofs.
The Modern attitude toward proofs for God
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have offered proofs for the existence of God.
There are four basic categories of theistic proofs:
1) Teleological - argument from telos (design or purpose)
2) Cosmological (aetiological) arguments from causation
3) Ontological - argument from onto (being)
4) Moral - argument from morality
Peter Koëstenbaum stated that theistic proofs are "logically invalid, epistemologically defective and axiologically misplaced" (80).
Proofs are Psychologically Unconvincing
Rational proofs are generally unpersuasive to non-believers.
Some argue that the mystical theology, not rational theology is the draw for religion. William James thought this was so because human needs are deeper than the rational.
"Psychological persuasion precedes rational demonstration" (81).
Proofs are logically invalid
If God does not appear in any of the premises he cannot appear in the conclusion because a conclusion cannot be broader than the premises.
Also, if God appears in the premises than the argument begs the question.
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective
This argument holds that even if God exists we cannot rationally know that he exists.
Kant held that we can only know the thing as it appears to us and not the thing in and of itself.
Proofs are ontologically inadequate
This argues that what is rationally inescapable may not be real. We may be able to devise a rational argument for there existence of God, but that does not mean God exists.
The inescapability of a rational argument is based on the principle of non-contradiction but the principle of non-contradiction, while being rationally inescapable has not been proven to be necessarily true.
Proofs are Axiologically Misplaced
The proof for the existence of God should not be the prime importance of one's religious experience.
Relating to the Modern Attitude Toward Proofs
Modern criticism are of value to theists today, but should not warrant a retreat to fideism.
Proof or Persuasion?
If people are never persuaded by proof then there is not intellectual integrity in the world.
While a rational proof may not play as crucial a role as Rene Descartes held it to, it does not follow that it plays no role at all. Even if if were true that people always believed in God apart from evidence, it does not follow that they believed against the evidence.
A proof for God, if it is successful, leads only to the belief that there is a God, not necessarily a belief in that God.
Disbelief does not always indicate disbelief.
Why do some great minds reject theistic proofs?
1) Some atheists accept no kinds of proof.
2) Some do not allow the types of arguments for God that they allow elsewhere.
3) Some choose not to commit themselves to God despite the evidence.
A lack of persuasion by a theistic proof is not necessarily a fault of that proof, it is a result of a personal choice.
Proofs and logical validity
A formal invalidity of a single proof does not mean all proofs are invalid.
Even if no one has stated a formally valid proof yet, it does not follow that one won't ever be stated.
Logical validity is not purely objective.
Not all rationally acceptable demonstration need to be valid deductions.
Are all Theistic Proofs Epistemologically Defective?
Kant's objections are rested on the unfounded assumption that all true knowledge is modeled after the empirical/mathematical knowledge of Newtonian science.
Kant's consistent agnosticism is not livable because it is self-defeating.
The dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is an unfounded assumption.
Each argument or theistic proof must be examined on its own grounds. One cannot reject all theistic proofs a priori.
Is the Rationally Inescapable Real?
Admitting that theistic proofs are rationally inescapable would be a triumph for theism. Because if theism is rational than atheism is irrational.
People believe that reality is rational and to deny that a rational argument is valid, but not real is to state that a reality is not rational.
To deny that rational is real is to deny that logic or reason has any place in reality.
To state that logic does not apply to reality is self-defeating.
Are proofs Axiologically Misplaced?
Proofs can play a practical and a critical role.
Theoretical proofs should not be used to replace immediate help for immediate needs, but immediate needs should not eliminate theoretical proofs altogether.
6. Theological and Moral Arguments
4 Kinds of attempts to prove the existence of God:
1) Teleological
2) Moral
3) Ontological
4) Cosmological
Teleological Proofs and Problems
The teleological argument in a nutshell is this: the apparent design of the universe is evidence of an intelligent architect
Paley's Watchmaker
William Paley (1743-1805), the archdeacon of Carlisle, gave one of the most popular forms of the teleological argument: Paley argued that if one were to come across a watch in an empty field one would rightly conclude that it had a maker because of its design. The world is even more complexly designed; thus, there must be a world maker.
Cleanthes' Greater Machine Maker
In Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' the theist Clenches offers this teleological argument:
1) All design implies a designer
2) Great design implies a great designer
3) There is great design in the world (like that of a great machine)
4) Therefore, there must be a great Designer of the world
Cleanthes' argument extends beyond Paley's in four ways:
1) He uses other illustrations of design (human eye, male-flame relation, a book, and a voice from Heaven)
2) Makes it clear that the teleological argument is an argument from analogy and that like effects have like causes
3) Denies that chance could cause a voice from heaven
4) Insists that irregularities in nature do not detract from the argument
Mill's objection to the Watchmaker's Argument
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) objected to Paley's argument and then posited one he considered better.
Mill weakened Paley's argument but did not destroy it.
He argued that Paley's argument is built on an analogy. He stated that analogy is weak when there are dissimilarities. Also there is a significant difference between a watch and the world. Thus, Paley's argument is weak.
Mill built his argument on his "method of agreement".
Mill's argument:
1) There is an amazing concurrence of many diverse elements in a human eye.
2) It is impossible that random selection brought this concurrence.
3) The method of agreement argues for a common cause of the eye.
4) The cause was a final (purposing) cause, not an efficient (producing) cause
Mill admitted that if evolution were true, then this argument would be weak.
Hackett's rejoinder on Analogy
Stuart C. Hackett argues:
1) All composites that involve the relation of complex means so as to produce a significant result are composites of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
2) The space-time universe is a composite in which complex means are so heated as to produce significant results.
3) Therefore, the space-time universe is a composite of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
Alvin Plantinga, while not a proponent of the teleological argument points out that criticism of analogy principles is not as strong as it appears to be.
Russell's Evolutionary Disproof
Bertrand Russell offered a disproof of the teleological argument from evolution:
1) The adaptation of means to end in the world is either the result of evolution or else the result of design.
2) This adaptation is the result of evolution.
3) Therefore, this adaptation is not the result of design.
Russell's argument does not disprove the teleological argument. It (at best) forces a modification because:
1) There is no logical reason why adaptation cannot be the result of both evolution and design.
2) Natural selection has not been shown to fully account for all adaptation.
Hume's Skeptical Alternatives to Teleology
Hume stated that if the world were designed that the design would be either:
1) Different from human designs
2) Finite, since the effect is fine
3) Imperfect, because there are imperfection in nature
4) Multiple
5) Male and female because males and females generate this way
6) Anthropomorphic
Or that there is no design
1) The apparent order in the world arose via chance
Alvin Plantinga agrees with Hume's criticism of the teleological argument stating that there may exist a "smidgin of evidence" for design, but that one ought not infer designer from a minute amount of evidence.
Since the time of Hume a teleological theist must show that both the teleological argument woks and that disproofs of teleological arguments are wrong. (It must show that God exists and that the world did not arise from chance).
Taylor's Anticipatory Design
A.E. Taylor hoped to account for evolutionary and chance alternatives with his argument. His argument states:
1. Nature reveals an anticipatory order; it plans for its own preservation.
2. Nature's advanced planning cannot be accounted for by physical laws alone.
3. Mind or intelligence is the only known condition that can remove these improbabilities against life emerging despite these improbabilities.
4. The mind or intelligence that explains anticipatory adaptations cannot be explained as a result of evolution.
5. Darwinian natural selection cannot explain the advance planning evident in nature.
Clark: Design and Thermodynamics
R.E.D. Clark argues against chance by using the second law of thermodynamics
1. Whatever had a beginning had a beginner
2. The Universe had a beginning (as evidenced by the second law of thermodynamics)
3. Therefore, the universe had a beginner who is intelligent and moral.
Intelligence and morality imply personality, thus the Beginner must be personal.
The New Teleological argument:
1) The Universe resulted from either design or chance
2) It is highly improbable it resulted from chance
3) Therefore, it is highly probable it resulted from design.
A loophole in the Argument Against Chance
There is an immensely small probability that the universe happened solely by chance. But, this is an a priori notion. In actual fact, which is a posteriori, it may have occurred by chance despite the remoteness of that chance.
Julian Huxley, a defender of evolution estimated that the odds against evolution were 3 million zeros (15 pages of zeros) to one. Huxley argued that natural selection was the process of overcoming these odds.
Tennant: Filling in the Loophole of chance
One argument against the teleological argument is that the design in the knowable universe may be only temporary and fragmentary.
F.R. Tennant admits that this is a possibility, but only a highly improbable one.
Tennant states that:
1) Mere possibilities of the unknown or unknowable world cannot be used to refute the probabilities within the knowable world
2) There is no evidence to support that the thesis that the knowable world is a lie to the unknowable world
3) The knowable universe is interwoven and interdependent with the unknown universe
4) Thermodynamics shows complexity; random development to be unlikely
5) Chance rearranging of matter cannot explain mind or intelligence
6) The qualitative greatness of human values outweighs the quantitative immensity of the unknowable world
Kant: Ontological defects in the Teleological Argument
Kant rather than offering a disproof for God or completely disregarding the teleological argument, insisted that it was inconclusive.
He stated that we cannot move from experience of design to the idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary being.
The teleological argument does not provide evidence for a creator, but indicates an architect.
The argument yields the highest cause, but is not a sufficient basis for religion. The sap from the highest actual cause indicated by experience to the highest possible cause demanded by pure reason is an unjustifiable ontological leap.
Ducasse: Cosmological Problems in the Teleological Argument
C.J. Ducasse claims that the teleological argument suffers from a number of defects:
1) It does not prove a perfect creator (evil, waste and disease show a lack of purpose)
2) Designers can be inferior to what they design
3) The teleological argument has the same defects the cosmological argument was:
-If the world needs a designer, then so does that designer (ad infinitum)
-If everything is caused, there can be no first cause
Ducasse offers this in replace of the teleological argument:
1) The most economical explanation is probably the correct one
2) The world is more economically explained by a purposeless craving within man than by some intelligence beyond the world
3) Therefore, it is more probable that the world is the result of purposeless craving than of intelligent design
This argument is lacking in several ways:
1) The principle of economy may not be appropriately applied to the cause of the universe
2) Assuming that the best cause will come from within the universe, but not from beyond it begs the question
3) How is a purposeless craving a more economical explanation than that of a God?
4) How can a purposeless craving result in purposeful activity?
The teleological argument is not definitive as it stands, but it does:
1) Make it probable (not certain) that some kind of intelligence is behind the design of the world (chance is possible, but not probable)
2) Favor the unity of this cause
3) Not demand that the cause be absolutely perfect
4) Does not ipso facto explain the presence of evil and disorder in the world?
5) Is dependent on the cosmological and moral arguments to establish these other aspects of a theistic God
6) Is really a causal argument from effect to cause, only it argues from the intelligence nature of the effect to an intelligent one.
The teleological argument depends on the cosmological argument in that it borrows the principle of causality.
It seems implausible that all religious people have been deceived completely. The existence of a Transcendent God is more plausible than a completely skeptical outlook on life.
"It seems much more likely that such self-analyzing and self-critical men as Augustine, Blaise Pascal and Kierkegaard were not totally deceived than that total skepticism is right. Unless it is true that no person in the history of the world has ever really been truly critical of his religious experience, then it follows that the reality of God has been critically established from human experience" (76).
Part 2: God & Reason
5 The Function of Theistic Proofs
Most theists are not satisfied with proving God's existence on experience alone. They went to establish rational proofs.
The Modern attitude toward proofs for God
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have offered proofs for the existence of God.
There are four basic categories of theistic proofs:
1) Teleological - argument from telos (design or purpose)
2) Cosmological (aetiological) arguments from causation
3) Ontological - argument from onto (being)
4) Moral - argument from morality
Peter Koëstenbaum stated that theistic proofs are "logically invalid, epistemologically defective and axiologically misplaced" (80).
Proofs are Psychologically Unconvincing
Rational proofs are generally unpersuasive to non-believers.
Some argue that the mystical theology, not rational theology is the draw for religion. William James thought this was so because human needs are deeper than the rational.
"Psychological persuasion precedes rational demonstration" (81).
Proofs are logically invalid
If God does not appear in any of the premises he cannot appear in the conclusion because a conclusion cannot be broader than the premises.
Also, if God appears in the premises than the argument begs the question.
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective
This argument holds that even if God exists we cannot rationally know that he exists.
Kant held that we can only know the thing as it appears to us and not the thing in and of itself.
Proofs are ontologically inadequate
This argues that what is rationally inescapable may not be real. We may be able to devise a rational argument for there existence of God, but that does not mean God exists.
The inescapability of a rational argument is based on the principle of non-contradiction but the principle of non-contradiction, while being rationally inescapable has not been proven to be necessarily true.
Proofs are Axiologically Misplaced
The proof for the existence of God should not be the prime importance of one's religious experience.
Relating to the Modern Attitude Toward Proofs
Modern criticism are of value to theists today, but should not warrant a retreat to fideism.
Proof or Persuasion?
If people are never persuaded by proof then there is not intellectual integrity in the world.
While a rational proof may not play as crucial a role as Rene Descartes held it to, it does not follow that it plays no role at all. Even if if were true that people always believed in God apart from evidence, it does not follow that they believed against the evidence.
A proof for God, if it is successful, leads only to the belief that there is a God, not necessarily a belief in that God.
Disbelief does not always indicate disbelief.
Why do some great minds reject theistic proofs?
1) Some atheists accept no kinds of proof.
2) Some do not allow the types of arguments for God that they allow elsewhere.
3) Some choose not to commit themselves to God despite the evidence.
A lack of persuasion by a theistic proof is not necessarily a fault of that proof, it is a result of a personal choice.
Proofs and logical validity
A formal invalidity of a single proof does not mean all proofs are invalid.
Even if no one has stated a formally valid proof yet, it does not follow that one won't ever be stated.
Logical validity is not purely objective.
Not all rationally acceptable demonstration need to be valid deductions.
Are all Theistic Proofs Epistemologically Defective?
Kant's objections are rested on the unfounded assumption that all true knowledge is modeled after the empirical/mathematical knowledge of Newtonian science.
Kant's consistent agnosticism is not livable because it is self-defeating.
The dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is an unfounded assumption.
Each argument or theistic proof must be examined on its own grounds. One cannot reject all theistic proofs a priori.
Is the Rationally Inescapable Real?
Admitting that theistic proofs are rationally inescapable would be a triumph for theism. Because if theism is rational than atheism is irrational.
People believe that reality is rational and to deny that a rational argument is valid, but not real is to state that a reality is not rational.
To deny that rational is real is to deny that logic or reason has any place in reality.
To state that logic does not apply to reality is self-defeating.
Are proofs Axiologically Misplaced?
Proofs can play a practical and a critical role.
Theoretical proofs should not be used to replace immediate help for immediate needs, but immediate needs should not eliminate theoretical proofs altogether.
6. Theological and Moral Arguments
4 Kinds of attempts to prove the existence of God:
1) Teleological
2) Moral
3) Ontological
4) Cosmological
Teleological Proofs and Problems
The teleological argument in a nutshell is this: the apparent design of the universe is evidence of an intelligent architect
Paley's Watchmaker
William Paley (1743-1805), the archdeacon of Carlisle, gave one of the most popular forms of the teleological argument: Paley argued that if one were to come across a watch in an empty field one would rightly conclude that it had a maker because of its design. The world is even more complexly designed; thus, there must be a world maker.
Cleanthes' Greater Machine Maker
In Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' the theist Clenches offers this teleological argument:
1) All design implies a designer
2) Great design implies a great designer
3) There is great design in the world (like that of a great machine)
4) Therefore, there must be a great Designer of the world
Cleanthes' argument extends beyond Paley's in four ways:
1) He uses other illustrations of design (human eye, male-flame relation, a book, and a voice from Heaven)
2) Makes it clear that the teleological argument is an argument from analogy and that like effects have like causes
3) Denies that chance could cause a voice from heaven
4) Insists that irregularities in nature do not detract from the argument
Mill's objection to the Watchmaker's Argument
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) objected to Paley's argument and then posited one he considered better.
Mill weakened Paley's argument but did not destroy it.
He argued that Paley's argument is built on an analogy. He stated that analogy is weak when there are dissimilarities. Also there is a significant difference between a watch and the world. Thus, Paley's argument is weak.
Mill built his argument on his "method of agreement".
Mill's argument:
1) There is an amazing concurrence of many diverse elements in a human eye.
2) It is impossible that random selection brought this concurrence.
3) The method of agreement argues for a common cause of the eye.
4) The cause was a final (purposing) cause, not an efficient (producing) cause
Mill admitted that if evolution were true, then this argument would be weak.
Hackett's rejoinder on Analogy
Stuart C. Hackett argues:
1) All composites that involve the relation of complex means so as to produce a significant result are composites of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
2) The space-time universe is a composite in which complex means are so heated as to produce significant results.
3) Therefore, the space-time universe is a composite of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
Alvin Plantinga, while not a proponent of the teleological argument points out that criticism of analogy principles is not as strong as it appears to be.
Russell's Evolutionary Disproof
Bertrand Russell offered a disproof of the teleological argument from evolution:
1) The adaptation of means to end in the world is either the result of evolution or else the result of design.
2) This adaptation is the result of evolution.
3) Therefore, this adaptation is not the result of design.
Russell's argument does not disprove the teleological argument. It (at best) forces a modification because:
1) There is no logical reason why adaptation cannot be the result of both evolution and design.
2) Natural selection has not been shown to fully account for all adaptation.
Hume's Skeptical Alternatives to Teleology
Hume stated that if the world were designed that the design would be either:
1) Different from human designs
2) Finite, since the effect is fine
3) Imperfect, because there are imperfection in nature
4) Multiple
5) Male and female because males and females generate this way
6) Anthropomorphic
Or that there is no design
1) The apparent order in the world arose via chance
Alvin Plantinga agrees with Hume's criticism of the teleological argument stating that there may exist a "smidgin of evidence" for design, but that one ought not infer designer from a minute amount of evidence.
Since the time of Hume a teleological theist must show that both the teleological argument woks and that disproofs of teleological arguments are wrong. (It must show that God exists and that the world did not arise from chance).
Taylor's Anticipatory Design
A.E. Taylor hoped to account for evolutionary and chance alternatives with his argument. His argument states:
1. Nature reveals an anticipatory order; it plans for its own preservation.
2. Nature's advanced planning cannot be accounted for by physical laws alone.
3. Mind or intelligence is the only known condition that can remove these improbabilities against life emerging despite these improbabilities.
4. The mind or intelligence that explains anticipatory adaptations cannot be explained as a result of evolution.
5. Darwinian natural selection cannot explain the advance planning evident in nature.
Clark: Design and Thermodynamics
R.E.D. Clark argues against chance by using the second law of thermodynamics
1. Whatever had a beginning had a beginner
2. The Universe had a beginning (as evidenced by the second law of thermodynamics)
3. Therefore, the universe had a beginner who is intelligent and moral.
Intelligence and morality imply personality, thus the Beginner must be personal.
The New Teleological argument:
1) The Universe resulted from either design or chance
2) It is highly improbable it resulted from chance
3) Therefore, it is highly probable it resulted from design.
A loophole in the Argument Against Chance
There is an immensely small probability that the universe happened solely by chance. But, this is an a priori notion. In actual fact, which is a posteriori, it may have occurred by chance despite the remoteness of that chance.
Julian Huxley, a defender of evolution estimated that the odds against evolution were 3 million zeros (15 pages of zeros) to one. Huxley argued that natural selection was the process of overcoming these odds.
Tennant: Filling in the Loophole of chance
One argument against the teleological argument is that the design in the knowable universe may be only temporary and fragmentary.
F.R. Tennant admits that this is a possibility, but only a highly improbable one.
Tennant states that:
1) Mere possibilities of the unknown or unknowable world cannot be used to refute the probabilities within the knowable world
2) There is no evidence to support that the thesis that the knowable world is a lie to the unknowable world
3) The knowable universe is interwoven and interdependent with the unknown universe
4) Thermodynamics shows complexity; random development to be unlikely
5) Chance rearranging of matter cannot explain mind or intelligence
6) The qualitative greatness of human values outweighs the quantitative immensity of the unknowable world
Kant: Ontological defects in the Teleological Argument
Kant rather than offering a disproof for God or completely disregarding the teleological argument, insisted that it was inconclusive.
He stated that we cannot move from experience of design to the idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary being.
The teleological argument does not provide evidence for a creator, but indicates an architect.
The argument yields the highest cause, but is not a sufficient basis for religion. The sap from the highest actual cause indicated by experience to the highest possible cause demanded by pure reason is an unjustifiable ontological leap.
Ducasse: Cosmological Problems in the Teleological Argument
C.J. Ducasse claims that the teleological argument suffers from a number of defects:
1) It does not prove a perfect creator (evil, waste and disease show a lack of purpose)
2) Designers can be inferior to what they design
3) The teleological argument has the same defects the cosmological argument was:
-If the world needs a designer, then so does that designer (ad infinitum)
-If everything is caused, there can be no first cause
Ducasse offers this in replace of the teleological argument:
1) The most economical explanation is probably the correct one
2) The world is more economically explained by a purposeless craving within man than by some intelligence beyond the world
3) Therefore, it is more probable that the world is the result of purposeless craving than of intelligent design
This argument is lacking in several ways:
1) The principle of economy may not be appropriately applied to the cause of the universe
2) Assuming that the best cause will come from within the universe, but not from beyond it begs the question
3) How is a purposeless craving a more economical explanation than that of a God?
4) How can a purposeless craving result in purposeful activity?
The teleological argument is not definitive as it stands, but it does:
1) Make it probable (not certain) that some kind of intelligence is behind the design of the world (chance is possible, but not probable)
2) Favor the unity of this cause
3) Not demand that the cause be absolutely perfect
4) Does not ipso facto explain the presence of evil and disorder in the world?
5) Is dependent on the cosmological and moral arguments to establish these other aspects of a theistic God
6) Is really a causal argument from effect to cause, only it argues from the intelligence nature of the effect to an intelligent one.
The teleological argument depends on the cosmological argument in that it borrows the principle of causality.
Thursday, March 1, 2007
Reality and the Existential Need for God
(Originally written March 1, 2007 in Book 13)
Philosophy of Religion
Norman Geisler & Winfried Corduan
The Meaning of Reality
"Reality is more than a subjective condition of human experience" (64).
In dealing with religious experience it seems there is no surefire way of separating the hallucinatory from the real.
There is always the possibility that one's supposed religious experience is actually explainable by purely psychological phenomena.
All experience is subjective, hence religious experience is subjective.
"Religious transcendence must be more than a subjective condition in religious experience before it should be called 'real'" (64).
Reality is more than merely a projection of human imagination.
Religious transcendence is not real if it is merely a projection of human nature.
Ludwig Feuerbach argued that God was really a projection of humanity's ideal man.
Karl Marx believed that religion was a projection of man's hope for the superman in heaven.
Reality is more than an object of wish-fulfillment.
Freud believed religion is an illusion, not in the sense that God is not real, but that it came about from man's wish that there be a God.
Reality is more than a subconscious force in human experience.
Carl Gustav Jung called the collective subconscious the real, but this is insufficient.
"Reality means to have an independent existence"
Transcendence, in order to be real, must exist outside of the mind of those who conceive it and must exist outside of the experiences of the people who experience it.
"Reality means to have an objective existence" (67).
Objective existence means to exist in and of itself, independently of other things.
The Need For Verification
Deception and illusion are possible so there must be some means of determinism whether there is a basis in reality for religious experience.
Kierkegaard held that the need to give evidence for God is evidence of one's choice to reject God.
Kierkegaard believed verifying God's existence was ridiculous,: "For if God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it, and if he does exist it would be folly to attempt it". (68).
Kierkegaard held that in order to offer a proof for God's existence one must presuppose that God exists.
He believed that faith, not reason, brings one to God.
Alvin Plantinga echoes Kierkegaard in stating that a belief in God is "properly basic".
Properly basic beliefs are beliefs that one needn't require verification; i.e. "I exist" or "there is a past".
There is a difference between the basis for believing that there is a God and the basis for believing in God.
"One needs evidence to know that there is a God, but one needs faith to commit oneself to the God that the evidence indicates is really there" (68).
Verifying the Reality of Religious Experience
People sense a basic need for God and this is the beginning of religious experience.
Theists and atheists alike have a feeling of dependence and a sense of contingency. But, is there really a God to fulfill the need people sense?
The Need for the Transcendent
Freud analyzed the human need for religion as a purely psychological need.
Religion was an infantile neurosis of mankind for Freud.
The Sense of Absolute Dependence
Freud did not deny the validity of people having religious experience.
"Science can never overcome a human's finitude or sense of cosmic contingency" (70).
Friedrich Schleiermacher takes the sense of cosmic need as the essence of religion.
A feeling of absolute dependence is a religious experience.
There is a need for the Transcendent because of the feeling of absolute contingency.
People sense a need for some Transcendence, whether or not it is really there.
Humanity's Being Unto Death
Martin Heidegger characterized human life as "being-unto-death".
Fear of death or nothingness is the anxiety of all man.
"I am, but I need not be and will not be" (70).
Asking about why one is are evidence of human ontological dependency.
Paul Tillich held that finite beings are ungrounded and must search for grounding, an ultimate grounding.
Does the need for God as ontological grounding of one's being imply that there is really such a grounding?
The Existential Need for God
Jean-Paul Sartre said he needed religion, he needed God and "Had it been denied me, I would have invented it myself" (71).
Sartre maintained that humans have more than a psychological need for God. Sartre held that humans have an existential need for God.
Essay Idea: Needs for God
-Psychological
-Existential
-Ontological
-Religiou
-etc.
Sartre held that "To be man means to reach toward being God" (71).
Man is seeking to be self-determined and self-caused.
The existence of a person cries out to God to give it definition and essence.
Sartre held that while this is man's need and goal, the whole concept is absurd. How can man transcend himself to discover himself?
The need for God is a fundamental, existential need, even if there is no God to fulfill this need.
Philosophy of Religion
Norman Geisler & Winfried Corduan
The Meaning of Reality
"Reality is more than a subjective condition of human experience" (64).
In dealing with religious experience it seems there is no surefire way of separating the hallucinatory from the real.
There is always the possibility that one's supposed religious experience is actually explainable by purely psychological phenomena.
All experience is subjective, hence religious experience is subjective.
"Religious transcendence must be more than a subjective condition in religious experience before it should be called 'real'" (64).
Reality is more than merely a projection of human imagination.
Religious transcendence is not real if it is merely a projection of human nature.
Ludwig Feuerbach argued that God was really a projection of humanity's ideal man.
Karl Marx believed that religion was a projection of man's hope for the superman in heaven.
Reality is more than an object of wish-fulfillment.
Freud believed religion is an illusion, not in the sense that God is not real, but that it came about from man's wish that there be a God.
Reality is more than a subconscious force in human experience.
Carl Gustav Jung called the collective subconscious the real, but this is insufficient.
"Reality means to have an independent existence"
Transcendence, in order to be real, must exist outside of the mind of those who conceive it and must exist outside of the experiences of the people who experience it.
"Reality means to have an objective existence" (67).
Objective existence means to exist in and of itself, independently of other things.
The Need For Verification
Deception and illusion are possible so there must be some means of determinism whether there is a basis in reality for religious experience.
Kierkegaard held that the need to give evidence for God is evidence of one's choice to reject God.
Kierkegaard believed verifying God's existence was ridiculous,: "For if God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it, and if he does exist it would be folly to attempt it". (68).
Kierkegaard held that in order to offer a proof for God's existence one must presuppose that God exists.
He believed that faith, not reason, brings one to God.
Alvin Plantinga echoes Kierkegaard in stating that a belief in God is "properly basic".
Properly basic beliefs are beliefs that one needn't require verification; i.e. "I exist" or "there is a past".
There is a difference between the basis for believing that there is a God and the basis for believing in God.
"One needs evidence to know that there is a God, but one needs faith to commit oneself to the God that the evidence indicates is really there" (68).
Verifying the Reality of Religious Experience
People sense a basic need for God and this is the beginning of religious experience.
Theists and atheists alike have a feeling of dependence and a sense of contingency. But, is there really a God to fulfill the need people sense?
The Need for the Transcendent
Freud analyzed the human need for religion as a purely psychological need.
Religion was an infantile neurosis of mankind for Freud.
The Sense of Absolute Dependence
Freud did not deny the validity of people having religious experience.
"Science can never overcome a human's finitude or sense of cosmic contingency" (70).
Friedrich Schleiermacher takes the sense of cosmic need as the essence of religion.
A feeling of absolute dependence is a religious experience.
There is a need for the Transcendent because of the feeling of absolute contingency.
People sense a need for some Transcendence, whether or not it is really there.
Humanity's Being Unto Death
Martin Heidegger characterized human life as "being-unto-death".
Fear of death or nothingness is the anxiety of all man.
"I am, but I need not be and will not be" (70).
Asking about why one is are evidence of human ontological dependency.
Paul Tillich held that finite beings are ungrounded and must search for grounding, an ultimate grounding.
Does the need for God as ontological grounding of one's being imply that there is really such a grounding?
The Existential Need for God
Jean-Paul Sartre said he needed religion, he needed God and "Had it been denied me, I would have invented it myself" (71).
Sartre maintained that humans have more than a psychological need for God. Sartre held that humans have an existential need for God.
Essay Idea: Needs for God
-Psychological
-Existential
-Ontological
-Religiou
-etc.
Sartre held that "To be man means to reach toward being God" (71).
Man is seeking to be self-determined and self-caused.
The existence of a person cries out to God to give it definition and essence.
Sartre held that while this is man's need and goal, the whole concept is absurd. How can man transcend himself to discover himself?
The need for God is a fundamental, existential need, even if there is no God to fulfill this need.
Friday, December 8, 2006
Class notes on Modal Logic
(Originally written December 8, 2006 in Book 9)
Class note
Modal Logic
(W⊃T) 'if today is Wednesday then I need to take out the trash
(S⊃F) 'if this figure is a square then it has four sides
The second statement is necessarily true. The first statement is contingently true.
Modal logic acknowledges that some statements are just plain true (they are actual) and that there are necessary truths.
Modal Logic
True - Actual
True - Necessary
True - Possible
False - Actual
False - impossible, necessarily false
False - possible
A statement that is necessarily rue has something in front of the well formed formula.
□(S⊃F)
But a possible truth has something in front of the well formed formula as well
◊(R⊃T)
□ - necessarily so
◊ - possibly so
~□(F⊃S) - It is not necessarily the case that a four-sided object is a square
◊~(F⊃S) - It is possible that a four-sided object is not a square
□ & ◊ are modal operators
True:
Actual - P
Necessary - □P
Possibly - ◊P
False:
Actual - ~P
Not necessarily true - ~□P
Impossible - ~◊P
Problem with modal logic is ◊□P ≡ □P
Modal logic deals with possible worlds.
Possible statements must be true in at least one possible world.
Necessary statements must be true in all possible worlds.
W.V.O. Quine flat out rejected modal logic because it entails essences.
Alvin Plantinga asserts that there are essences and therefore modal logic is a good system.
In modal logic a possible world cannot contradict the essence of the object of the actual world.
Class note
Modal Logic
(W⊃T) 'if today is Wednesday then I need to take out the trash
(S⊃F) 'if this figure is a square then it has four sides
The second statement is necessarily true. The first statement is contingently true.
Modal logic acknowledges that some statements are just plain true (they are actual) and that there are necessary truths.
Modal Logic
True - Actual
True - Necessary
True - Possible
False - Actual
False - impossible, necessarily false
False - possible
A statement that is necessarily rue has something in front of the well formed formula.
□(S⊃F)
But a possible truth has something in front of the well formed formula as well
◊(R⊃T)
□ - necessarily so
◊ - possibly so
~□(F⊃S) - It is not necessarily the case that a four-sided object is a square
◊~(F⊃S) - It is possible that a four-sided object is not a square
□ & ◊ are modal operators
True:
Actual - P
Necessary - □P
Possibly - ◊P
False:
Actual - ~P
Not necessarily true - ~□P
Impossible - ~◊P
Problem with modal logic is ◊□P ≡ □P
Modal logic deals with possible worlds.
Possible statements must be true in at least one possible world.
Necessary statements must be true in all possible worlds.
W.V.O. Quine flat out rejected modal logic because it entails essences.
Alvin Plantinga asserts that there are essences and therefore modal logic is a good system.
In modal logic a possible world cannot contradict the essence of the object of the actual world.
Final Notes on Virtue Epistemology
(Originally written December 8, 2006 in Book 12)
4.2 Anticipated objections to my theory from the perspective of reliablilism
Intellectual virtues are reliably truth conducive, but they are not virtue simply because they are reliable.
To have knowledge one needn't possess intellectual virtues, but that person must imitate the behavior of intellectually virtuous persons and must be virtuously motivated.
The value of reliability rests on the value of motive for knowledge in motivation-based virtue epistemology.
There is no special value of a true belief that formed via a reliable mechanism.
Doesn't knowledge sometimes come out of intellectual vices?
Zagzebski answers this in two ways:
1) These instances are not knowledge at all
2) These instances satisfy her definition of knowledge (this is her preferred stance).
Beliefs formed out of intellectual vices may occasionally prove true, but something will be amiss in their doxastic structure. Knowledge cannot arise out of a wrong doxastic structure.
Zagzebski' preferred argument begins with Aristotle's distinction of good people (agathos) and good and noble people (kalos kagathos).
Even people, when acting from a vice, can use some virtuous motivation. Even the Nazi showed the virtue of courage in his viciousness. Because some virtue is a partial motivation, the true belief can be knowledge.
5. Plantinga's theory of proper function
Alvin Plantinga's theory of proper function has been labeled as a kind of virtue epistemology.
Planting's theory is more externalist than is defensible and susceptible to common arguments against reliablism.
Planting's definition of knowledge makes reliability a necessity for knowledge, but not a sufficient criteria for it.
Planting's theory has advantages over externalism, but faces the same problems.
One problem is that the proper function of faculties is manipulatable.
Another problem is that it is atomistic like belief-based epistemologies.
A virtue theory has an advantage over proper function theories in solving the generality problem.
The conviction of a belief in a problematic thing to base an epistemology on.
6. Harmonizing Internal and External Aspects of knowing
Planting's theory can be distorted. Zagzebski states hers can be twisted to be more extanerlist than she intends.
Contemporary epistemology faces some serious problems:
1) The concept of knowledge has been overlooked and the idea of understanding has been neglected.
2) The concept of justification is muddled and too ambiguous
3) The stalemate betwixt internalism and externalism
Some day I may reread Virtues of the Mind, but not for awhile. This was a truly difficult read for me. Right now, I am unconvinced. I am not sure if that is because I don't quite understand it or because there is nothing really there to understand.
4.2 Anticipated objections to my theory from the perspective of reliablilism
Intellectual virtues are reliably truth conducive, but they are not virtue simply because they are reliable.
To have knowledge one needn't possess intellectual virtues, but that person must imitate the behavior of intellectually virtuous persons and must be virtuously motivated.
The value of reliability rests on the value of motive for knowledge in motivation-based virtue epistemology.
There is no special value of a true belief that formed via a reliable mechanism.
Doesn't knowledge sometimes come out of intellectual vices?
Zagzebski answers this in two ways:
1) These instances are not knowledge at all
2) These instances satisfy her definition of knowledge (this is her preferred stance).
Beliefs formed out of intellectual vices may occasionally prove true, but something will be amiss in their doxastic structure. Knowledge cannot arise out of a wrong doxastic structure.
Zagzebski' preferred argument begins with Aristotle's distinction of good people (agathos) and good and noble people (kalos kagathos).
Even people, when acting from a vice, can use some virtuous motivation. Even the Nazi showed the virtue of courage in his viciousness. Because some virtue is a partial motivation, the true belief can be knowledge.
5. Plantinga's theory of proper function
Alvin Plantinga's theory of proper function has been labeled as a kind of virtue epistemology.
Planting's theory is more externalist than is defensible and susceptible to common arguments against reliablism.
Planting's definition of knowledge makes reliability a necessity for knowledge, but not a sufficient criteria for it.
Planting's theory has advantages over externalism, but faces the same problems.
One problem is that the proper function of faculties is manipulatable.
Another problem is that it is atomistic like belief-based epistemologies.
A virtue theory has an advantage over proper function theories in solving the generality problem.
The conviction of a belief in a problematic thing to base an epistemology on.
6. Harmonizing Internal and External Aspects of knowing
Planting's theory can be distorted. Zagzebski states hers can be twisted to be more extanerlist than she intends.
Contemporary epistemology faces some serious problems:
1) The concept of knowledge has been overlooked and the idea of understanding has been neglected.
2) The concept of justification is muddled and too ambiguous
3) The stalemate betwixt internalism and externalism
Some day I may reread Virtues of the Mind, but not for awhile. This was a truly difficult read for me. Right now, I am unconvinced. I am not sure if that is because I don't quite understand it or because there is nothing really there to understand.
Tuesday, December 5, 2006
Gettier & Reliabilism - Zagzebski
(Originally written December 5, 2006 in Book 12)
A person is praiseworthy (justified) for doing an act (having a belief) if it is what a virtuous person probably would do (or believe).
A right act is what a person with phronesis might do. A wrong act is what a person with phronesis would likely not do.
A moral duty is what a person with phronesis would do in specific circumstances.
A justified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, might believe.
An unjustified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, would not believe.
Epistemic duty is what the person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and possesses understanding would believe in a specific situation.
"A belief is an epistemic duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified not to believe it... A belief is an epistemic duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified to disbelieve it" (Zagzebski, 242).
"An act is a moral duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong not to do it. An act is a moral duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong to choose to reject it" (Zagzebski, 243).
A justified belief is what some one with phronesis might believe.
An unjustified belief is what someone with phronesis would not believe.
A belief is a duty when a person with phronesis would believe.
6.2 Acts of Virtue
An act is an act of virtue if it rises out of the motivational component of the virtue, it is something a person with that virtue would do, and it is successful in bringing the end of that specific virtue to fruition.
Part III - The nature of knowledge
2.1 The definition
An act of intellectual virtue is an act that arises out of the motivational component of that virtue, is something a person with that virtue would probably do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the ends of that virtue, and causes the agent to acquire a true belief (cognitive contact with reality)
Definition 1 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 270).
Definition 2 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Definition 3 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Gettier Problems:
The problem for justified true belief theories
"Gettier problems arise when it is only by chance that a justified true belief is true" (Zagzebski, 283).
The Gettier problem has forced knowledge to see one of two things:
1) Justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge and must have an extra component to make it sufficient
2) Justification must be reconciled to make it sufficient
Zagzebski sees both choices as inadequate because neither can escape the Gettier problem.
Internalism and externalism both suffer from the Gettier problem.
Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is an example of a Gettier problem when there is no problem internally, but something causes a false belief, but somehow it is still true.
Reliablism also faces the Getteir problem, in spite of what Alvin Plantinga states.
True beliefs can arise accidentally and thus we have Gettier problems.
Plantinga argues that knowledge is had when the belief warrants it.
Warranty admits degrees, but either the warrant is or is not sufficient for knowledge.
Undefeatable justified belief is immune to Gettier problems because undefeatability entails truth.
Strong defensibility conditions however threaten the assumption of independence of the justification condition and the truth condition for knowledge.
Truth conditions for knowledge must be entailed by the other conditions.
Nearly every contemporary theory of knowledge analyzes knowledge as true belief that is justified or warranted.
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory
Zagzebski states that there are moral analogues of the Gettier problem. She says that a moral act can be performed but it not be virtuous it is moral luck, just like Gettier justified true beef's are epistemic luck.
"Gettier problems in virtue epistemology can be resolved by an analogous move" (Zagzebski, 296).
In Gettier cases the truth is reached by accident. In moral luck cases the right act is done by accident.
"Gettier problems can be avoided if we utilize the concept of an act of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 297).
Acts of intellectual virtues are strictly analogous to acts of moral virtue.
Acts of moral virtue are strongly right in a moral sense; acts of intellectual virtue are strongly justified.
The definition, "knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" is immune to Gettier problems.
4. Reliablisim
Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a combination of externalist and internalist combinations.
Laurence BonJour would call Zagzebski's theory an externalist one. BonJour calls any theory externalism when some of the justifying factors are external to the agent.
Zagzebski claims that her hybrid theory sets it apart from more radical externalist theories like Plantinga's reliablist proper function theory.
Objections to Reliablism
Purely externalist theories imply that the only thing valuable in an instance of knowledge is the value of the truth that is acquired.
Reliablism does not give sufficient conditions for knowing.
Knowledge has more value than true belief.
The value must lie in something in addition to the value of truth and in addition to the reliable mechanism for acquiring true belief.
A person is praiseworthy (justified) for doing an act (having a belief) if it is what a virtuous person probably would do (or believe).
A right act is what a person with phronesis might do. A wrong act is what a person with phronesis would likely not do.
A moral duty is what a person with phronesis would do in specific circumstances.
A justified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, might believe.
An unjustified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, would not believe.
Epistemic duty is what the person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and possesses understanding would believe in a specific situation.
"A belief is an epistemic duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified not to believe it... A belief is an epistemic duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified to disbelieve it" (Zagzebski, 242).
"An act is a moral duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong not to do it. An act is a moral duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong to choose to reject it" (Zagzebski, 243).
A justified belief is what some one with phronesis might believe.
An unjustified belief is what someone with phronesis would not believe.
A belief is a duty when a person with phronesis would believe.
6.2 Acts of Virtue
An act is an act of virtue if it rises out of the motivational component of the virtue, it is something a person with that virtue would do, and it is successful in bringing the end of that specific virtue to fruition.
Part III - The nature of knowledge
2.1 The definition
An act of intellectual virtue is an act that arises out of the motivational component of that virtue, is something a person with that virtue would probably do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the ends of that virtue, and causes the agent to acquire a true belief (cognitive contact with reality)
Definition 1 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 270).
Definition 2 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Definition 3 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Gettier Problems:
The problem for justified true belief theories
"Gettier problems arise when it is only by chance that a justified true belief is true" (Zagzebski, 283).
The Gettier problem has forced knowledge to see one of two things:
1) Justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge and must have an extra component to make it sufficient
2) Justification must be reconciled to make it sufficient
Zagzebski sees both choices as inadequate because neither can escape the Gettier problem.
Internalism and externalism both suffer from the Gettier problem.
Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is an example of a Gettier problem when there is no problem internally, but something causes a false belief, but somehow it is still true.
Reliablism also faces the Getteir problem, in spite of what Alvin Plantinga states.
True beliefs can arise accidentally and thus we have Gettier problems.
Plantinga argues that knowledge is had when the belief warrants it.
Warranty admits degrees, but either the warrant is or is not sufficient for knowledge.
Undefeatable justified belief is immune to Gettier problems because undefeatability entails truth.
Strong defensibility conditions however threaten the assumption of independence of the justification condition and the truth condition for knowledge.
Truth conditions for knowledge must be entailed by the other conditions.
Nearly every contemporary theory of knowledge analyzes knowledge as true belief that is justified or warranted.
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory
Zagzebski states that there are moral analogues of the Gettier problem. She says that a moral act can be performed but it not be virtuous it is moral luck, just like Gettier justified true beef's are epistemic luck.
"Gettier problems in virtue epistemology can be resolved by an analogous move" (Zagzebski, 296).
In Gettier cases the truth is reached by accident. In moral luck cases the right act is done by accident.
"Gettier problems can be avoided if we utilize the concept of an act of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 297).
Acts of intellectual virtues are strictly analogous to acts of moral virtue.
Acts of moral virtue are strongly right in a moral sense; acts of intellectual virtue are strongly justified.
The definition, "knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" is immune to Gettier problems.
4. Reliablisim
Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a combination of externalist and internalist combinations.
Laurence BonJour would call Zagzebski's theory an externalist one. BonJour calls any theory externalism when some of the justifying factors are external to the agent.
Zagzebski claims that her hybrid theory sets it apart from more radical externalist theories like Plantinga's reliablist proper function theory.
Objections to Reliablism
Purely externalist theories imply that the only thing valuable in an instance of knowledge is the value of the truth that is acquired.
Reliablism does not give sufficient conditions for knowing.
Knowledge has more value than true belief.
The value must lie in something in addition to the value of truth and in addition to the reliable mechanism for acquiring true belief.
Thursday, November 23, 2006
Virtues of the Mind - 1.1-2.1
(Originally written November 23, 2006 in Book 8)
Thanksgiving
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models (continued)
Deontological and reliabilist theories of epistemology are structurally similar to act-based ethical theories.
Ernest Sosa proposed that by focusing on intellectual virtues we can bypass the struggle between foundationalist and coherentists and the whole problem of proper cognitive structure.
Sosa is not a virtue theorist. He speaks about intellectual virtues in a consequentialist backdrop.
The only intellectual virtue that really gets any attention is phronesis (tactical wisdom). Phronesis gets attention because Aristotle connects it to the distinctively moral virtues.
Since Sosa introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into epistemic literature, virtue epistemology has become another name for reliablism. Plantinga's theory of proper function and related theories are prime examples.
Sosa and Greco define intellectual virtue in terms of its propensity to achieve a certain consequence.
Aristotle's intellectual virtues include: sophia (theoretical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom), and nous (insight or understanding). Hobbes includes good wit and discretion. Spinoza's primary intellectual virtue is understanding.
Zagzebski holds that virtue-based epistemology is well suited to analyze justification and knowledge.
Lorraine Code stresses a socialized approach to epistemology, connecting epistemology and moral theory. She shows an epistemological importance to human nature, not just a purely cognitive importance.
Code argues for a "responsiblist epistemology", emphasizing the active nature of the knower: A knower/believer has a choice of cognitive structuring, and is then accountable for these choices.
Code denounces reliabilism because she feels it makes knowers too passive. "A reliable knower could simply be an accurate, and relatively passive, recorder of experience" (Zagzebski, 12).
Code still only structures her epistemological theory on deontological and consequentialist ethics, not virtue-theory.
James Montmarquet takes epistemic virtue in the classical sense and connects epistemic works with moral virtue literature.
Montmarquet labels virtues of impartiality:
-openness to the ideas of others
-willingness to exchange ideas
-lack of jealousy
-lack of personal bias
-a lively sense of one's own fallibility
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual sobriety:
- sober-minded inquiry, not won't to embrace what is not really warranted.
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual courage:
-the willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held beliefs
-perseverance in the face of opposition from others
-determination to see a project through to completion
Montmarquet holds that any one desiring the truth must have these traits. But he holds that the intellectual virtues, even if they are not conductive and that some epistemic virtues function as regulators of the desire for truth.
Montmarquet's approach is vaguely Aristotelian. His epistemology is belief-based. Montmarquet does not connect his theory with aretaic moral theory.
Alvin Goldman accepts a form of virtue epistemology that is similar to Sosa. He explicitly links justification to intellectual virtue.
Zagzebski states that, while many epistemic theories recognize the desirability of an epistemological theory based on a carefully developed virtue theory, none have fully articulated a theory.
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories
The mark of a virtue theory is that the primary object of evaluation is inner traits of a person, rather than acts of that person.
"To describe a good person is to describe that person's virtues, and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible neither to the performance of acts independently identified as right nor to a moral virtue than a disposition to act in the right way" (Zagzebski, 15).
There is more and less to a disposition to act in a right way to moral virtues.
A virtue includes a disposition to:
1) Characteristic emotions
2) Desires
3) Motives
4) Attitudes
There is less to moral virtues then the disposition to act right because a virtuous person does not invariably act in a way that can be fully captured by any independent set of normative criteria.
Agent-focused virtue theories focus on the agent and her traits as a way of determining what is right, but do not maintain that what is right is right because it is what a virtuous person would do. What a virtuous person would do is the best criterion for what is right. Zagzebski calls this weak virtue-theory.
Pure virtue-theory treats act-evaluation as a derivative from the character of an agent. An act is right because it is what a virtuous person might do.
Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) was probably the first major attempt in recent philosophy to show the advantages of virtue ethics over act-based ethics.
Anscombe argues that the principal notions of modern moral discourse (right, wrong, obligation and moral duty) lack content, but concepts of virtue (justice, chastity, courage and truth) are conceptually rich.
Anscombe also argues that right, wrong, obligation and duty are legal concepts and worthless without judge and jury. Since ethics is not rooted in theism (as it was when God was judge and jury) they are worthless terms.
Anscombe argues that we should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which doesn't hold to a blanket concept of wrong or a concept of duty.
The idea that there can be no exhaustive set of rules for how to act in every situation is showing more and more philosophers that a virtue-based theory of ethics is advantageous to cover all bases.
Virtue theory ethics can better explain the moral value of personal goods like love and friendship.
Duty-based ethics does not clearly show that their hierarchical approach is correct.
Another reason for favoring virtue-based ethics is that some virtues are not reducible to specific acts or disposition.
Modern epistemology is belief-based. A positively evaluated belief is called justified.
Legalistic language makes very little sense in epistemology. What does it mean to be epistemically guilty?
Linehan - does this notion give better fuel for virtue-based epistemology or does it glorify the ignorance of epistemology in ordinary people? One should not be swayed by the ignorance or fervor of the masses.
Wisdom is the unification of propositional and other types of knowledge. Knowledge can be misused but wisdom cannot be. Wisdom unifies knowledge and desires and values.
The focus on belief in epistemology has led to the neglect of wisdom. Also, a belief-based theory cannot explain the connection between wisdom and moral goodness.
Consequentialism is an externalist moral theory. A good is something that is produced.
Externalist moral theories face all sorts of problems. Reliabilism, which is structurally similar to consequentialism, faces similar problems.
Reliabilism's epistemic goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false ones. It is quantitative.
In Reliabilism, an accumulation of propositional knowledge is the goal, regardless of how that knowledge is gained. It can be done ignorantly or in a vicious manner.
Because of the difficulties faced by reliabilism and its basis of consequentialism, it is a good idea to search for an alternative ethical mode for epistemology.
Act-based ethics label right as merely not-wrong. Right means permissible. Virtue ethics focus on praiseworthiness.
Belief based epistemology see justification as analogous to epistemic blamelessness. It isn't really praiseworthy.
Virtue theory can evaluate virtue, vice and their intermediate states; whereas act-based/belief-based can only offer black and white cases
2. Difficulties in contemporary epistemology
Contemporary epistemology is too atomistic and the value of understanding has been neglected.
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification
For centuries, maybe as far back as Plato, knowledge has been considered to be a justified true belief. Then Gettier screwed everything up.
Justification has been the primary focus of Anlgo-American philosophers in epistemology.
Justification is a hot topic in epistemology, but it is a very vague and ambiguous term used in connection with countless theories.
Planting claims that:
1) The traditional view of justification originated with Locke and Descartes and identifies justification with a component of knowledge and to true belief and to performing one's epistemic duty.
2) The traditional view is incoherent equivocation and responsible for the externalist and internalist impasse
3) The remedy to the impasse is to dissolve the connections between justification and epistemic duty and justification and warrant.
Planting too readily connects moral and deontological concepts. Then by arguing against deontology he denounces internalism.
But, Zagzebski feels Plantinga's historical and conceptual points fail to make a convincing argument against internalism
William Alston goes further than Plantinga. He identifies six candidates for necessary conditions for justification:
1) Must be based on adequate ground
2) what justices a belief must probabalize it
3) a justification must be cognitively accessible to the subject
4) A justified belief must fit into a coherent system of beliefs
5) It must satisfy certain higher-level conditions
6) The believer must satisfy intellectual obligations in forming and maintaining the belief
Alston holds that justification cannot bear all the conceptual weight that has been given to it.
Alston points out that the issue between externalists and internists cannot be resolved because justification is in such different context in these two theories.
Thanksgiving
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models (continued)
Deontological and reliabilist theories of epistemology are structurally similar to act-based ethical theories.
Ernest Sosa proposed that by focusing on intellectual virtues we can bypass the struggle between foundationalist and coherentists and the whole problem of proper cognitive structure.
Sosa is not a virtue theorist. He speaks about intellectual virtues in a consequentialist backdrop.
The only intellectual virtue that really gets any attention is phronesis (tactical wisdom). Phronesis gets attention because Aristotle connects it to the distinctively moral virtues.
Since Sosa introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into epistemic literature, virtue epistemology has become another name for reliablism. Plantinga's theory of proper function and related theories are prime examples.
Sosa and Greco define intellectual virtue in terms of its propensity to achieve a certain consequence.
Aristotle's intellectual virtues include: sophia (theoretical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom), and nous (insight or understanding). Hobbes includes good wit and discretion. Spinoza's primary intellectual virtue is understanding.
Zagzebski holds that virtue-based epistemology is well suited to analyze justification and knowledge.
Lorraine Code stresses a socialized approach to epistemology, connecting epistemology and moral theory. She shows an epistemological importance to human nature, not just a purely cognitive importance.
Code argues for a "responsiblist epistemology", emphasizing the active nature of the knower: A knower/believer has a choice of cognitive structuring, and is then accountable for these choices.
Code denounces reliabilism because she feels it makes knowers too passive. "A reliable knower could simply be an accurate, and relatively passive, recorder of experience" (Zagzebski, 12).
Code still only structures her epistemological theory on deontological and consequentialist ethics, not virtue-theory.
James Montmarquet takes epistemic virtue in the classical sense and connects epistemic works with moral virtue literature.
Montmarquet labels virtues of impartiality:
-openness to the ideas of others
-willingness to exchange ideas
-lack of jealousy
-lack of personal bias
-a lively sense of one's own fallibility
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual sobriety:
- sober-minded inquiry, not won't to embrace what is not really warranted.
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual courage:
-the willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held beliefs
-perseverance in the face of opposition from others
-determination to see a project through to completion
Montmarquet holds that any one desiring the truth must have these traits. But he holds that the intellectual virtues, even if they are not conductive and that some epistemic virtues function as regulators of the desire for truth.
Montmarquet's approach is vaguely Aristotelian. His epistemology is belief-based. Montmarquet does not connect his theory with aretaic moral theory.
Alvin Goldman accepts a form of virtue epistemology that is similar to Sosa. He explicitly links justification to intellectual virtue.
Zagzebski states that, while many epistemic theories recognize the desirability of an epistemological theory based on a carefully developed virtue theory, none have fully articulated a theory.
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories
The mark of a virtue theory is that the primary object of evaluation is inner traits of a person, rather than acts of that person.
"To describe a good person is to describe that person's virtues, and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible neither to the performance of acts independently identified as right nor to a moral virtue than a disposition to act in the right way" (Zagzebski, 15).
There is more and less to a disposition to act in a right way to moral virtues.
A virtue includes a disposition to:
1) Characteristic emotions
2) Desires
3) Motives
4) Attitudes
There is less to moral virtues then the disposition to act right because a virtuous person does not invariably act in a way that can be fully captured by any independent set of normative criteria.
Agent-focused virtue theories focus on the agent and her traits as a way of determining what is right, but do not maintain that what is right is right because it is what a virtuous person would do. What a virtuous person would do is the best criterion for what is right. Zagzebski calls this weak virtue-theory.
Pure virtue-theory treats act-evaluation as a derivative from the character of an agent. An act is right because it is what a virtuous person might do.
Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) was probably the first major attempt in recent philosophy to show the advantages of virtue ethics over act-based ethics.
Anscombe argues that the principal notions of modern moral discourse (right, wrong, obligation and moral duty) lack content, but concepts of virtue (justice, chastity, courage and truth) are conceptually rich.
Anscombe also argues that right, wrong, obligation and duty are legal concepts and worthless without judge and jury. Since ethics is not rooted in theism (as it was when God was judge and jury) they are worthless terms.
Anscombe argues that we should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which doesn't hold to a blanket concept of wrong or a concept of duty.
The idea that there can be no exhaustive set of rules for how to act in every situation is showing more and more philosophers that a virtue-based theory of ethics is advantageous to cover all bases.
Virtue theory ethics can better explain the moral value of personal goods like love and friendship.
Duty-based ethics does not clearly show that their hierarchical approach is correct.
Another reason for favoring virtue-based ethics is that some virtues are not reducible to specific acts or disposition.
Modern epistemology is belief-based. A positively evaluated belief is called justified.
Legalistic language makes very little sense in epistemology. What does it mean to be epistemically guilty?
Linehan - does this notion give better fuel for virtue-based epistemology or does it glorify the ignorance of epistemology in ordinary people? One should not be swayed by the ignorance or fervor of the masses.
Wisdom is the unification of propositional and other types of knowledge. Knowledge can be misused but wisdom cannot be. Wisdom unifies knowledge and desires and values.
The focus on belief in epistemology has led to the neglect of wisdom. Also, a belief-based theory cannot explain the connection between wisdom and moral goodness.
Consequentialism is an externalist moral theory. A good is something that is produced.
Externalist moral theories face all sorts of problems. Reliabilism, which is structurally similar to consequentialism, faces similar problems.
Reliabilism's epistemic goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false ones. It is quantitative.
In Reliabilism, an accumulation of propositional knowledge is the goal, regardless of how that knowledge is gained. It can be done ignorantly or in a vicious manner.
Because of the difficulties faced by reliabilism and its basis of consequentialism, it is a good idea to search for an alternative ethical mode for epistemology.
Act-based ethics label right as merely not-wrong. Right means permissible. Virtue ethics focus on praiseworthiness.
Belief based epistemology see justification as analogous to epistemic blamelessness. It isn't really praiseworthy.
Virtue theory can evaluate virtue, vice and their intermediate states; whereas act-based/belief-based can only offer black and white cases
2. Difficulties in contemporary epistemology
Contemporary epistemology is too atomistic and the value of understanding has been neglected.
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification
For centuries, maybe as far back as Plato, knowledge has been considered to be a justified true belief. Then Gettier screwed everything up.
Justification has been the primary focus of Anlgo-American philosophers in epistemology.
Justification is a hot topic in epistemology, but it is a very vague and ambiguous term used in connection with countless theories.
Planting claims that:
1) The traditional view of justification originated with Locke and Descartes and identifies justification with a component of knowledge and to true belief and to performing one's epistemic duty.
2) The traditional view is incoherent equivocation and responsible for the externalist and internalist impasse
3) The remedy to the impasse is to dissolve the connections between justification and epistemic duty and justification and warrant.
Planting too readily connects moral and deontological concepts. Then by arguing against deontology he denounces internalism.
But, Zagzebski feels Plantinga's historical and conceptual points fail to make a convincing argument against internalism
William Alston goes further than Plantinga. He identifies six candidates for necessary conditions for justification:
1) Must be based on adequate ground
2) what justices a belief must probabalize it
3) a justification must be cognitively accessible to the subject
4) A justified belief must fit into a coherent system of beliefs
5) It must satisfy certain higher-level conditions
6) The believer must satisfy intellectual obligations in forming and maintaining the belief
Alston holds that justification cannot bear all the conceptual weight that has been given to it.
Alston points out that the issue between externalists and internists cannot be resolved because justification is in such different context in these two theories.
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