(Originally written May 8, 2007 in Book 25)
Soul
There are many theories about the soul that are dualistic, but there are a few that are not.
Thomas Hobbes believed that man was purely physical.
Bishop Berkeley believed that the physical nature was essentially soul.
Plato - essence of man is his soul, which is trapped in the body
Descartes
- Dualist, but not as strict as Plato
- Believed the soul and body interacted
Problems: implied that there is a specific center between physical and soul
How can extended and unextended substances interact?
Augustine
- Soul and physical men make up whole man
- somewhat Platonic
- Believed the soul was immortal
- Soul gives life to the body
Nemesius
- Platonic
- Soul not just a part of a composite man
- Soul is an intelligible substance, incorporeal substance
Problem: if man is a soul that uses the body, what is the body?
Bible rules out some theories:
1. Materialism (Hobbes)
2. Spiritualism (Berkeley) [Not Really]
3. Strict Dualism
Aristotle
- Everything has four causes:
1. Final
2. Material
3. Formal
4. Efficient
Man:
- Soul is the formal Cause
- Mom and Dad is the efficient cause
- Flesh & bones is the material cause
- Happiness is the final cause
Soul is the form of man. Soul is inextricable from the body.
Aristotle's theory allows for a separation of mind and body
Aristotle's theory allows for a separation of mind and body
Does not have the Cartesian problems.
Allows man to be physical and spiritual
His theory is Biblically justifiable
Thomas Aquinas
Soul is the form of man, but differed from Aristotle
God: Ideals -> Exemplar Cause:
- Efficient
- Formal
- Material
- Final
Soul distinguish us from animals.
Soul is not the motor of the body
Soul is indestructible (similar to Plato)
Antony Flew objected:
Why is the new Flew better than the original Flew (post-return of Christ/resurrection of the body)?
Thomas' questions
1. Is the soul a body?
2. Is the soul a man or is the man composite of body and soul?
3. Is the soul composed of matter and form?
4. Is the intellectual principle united to the body as a form?
5. Is the intellectual principle multiplied according to the bodies or a single collective mind?
The soul is moved accidentally, but the body is moved essentially.
The soul is the first principle of life.
The soul is not a body, but is the act of a body.
The intellect is the form of the body. It is separate, but it still exists in matter. The intellect can be united with the body but not an act of the body.
How can the soul influence the body?
Way of power relation:
How does the pot hold the clay together? Power relation. There is no mechanism that holds it together, but it does. So it is how the soul influences the body.
Man: Shape, vegetative soul, sensitive soul and rational soul are the form of man
The soul and body are aspects of the single substance that is man.
String Theory?
Showing posts with label Berkeley. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Berkeley. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 8, 2007
Thursday, December 7, 2006
Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and Universals
(Originally written December 7, 2006 in Book 7)
History of Philosophy I notes
Duns Scotus (1265-1308)
-Prefers univocal regarding language applied to God
Scouts maintained that not only does God's essence play a role in his existence, but individual men's essences play a role in their existence.
Principle of individuation
-Aquinas claimed that matter was what gave individual things their individuality
-Scotus believed it was an individual essence or a "haecceity" that distinguished us from all other things, not mere matter
Natural Theology
- Far less confident in the power of reason to teach us about God then Aquinas was
- Scotus' standards of proof are much more rigorous than Aquinas' standards
Problem of Induction
-First to identify the problem
- His solution was to focus on the cause and effect and state that there is a certain necessity in causal relations
-His solution was satisfactory until David Hume
Freedom of the Will
-Aquinas held that the intellect was primary, not the will
-Scotus held that the will is primary
The will is:
1. Contingent - has the power of contrary choice
2. Self-caused - the will has no other cause than itself (like God
The self-caused will is an early version of the libertarian doctrine of the will
William of Ockham (ca. 1285 - 1349)
-Born in London
-Franciscan, just like Scotus
-Even more negative regarding natural theology than Scotus
-Faith contradicts reason, but we must follow faith
-Regarded omnipotence as God's power to do literally anything
-God could produce the world in such a way that he made it without any matter
-The object of our knowledge is particulars, but we use universals
-Generally he is regarded as a nominalist, but he could be called a conceptualist
-What is explained on X number of principles is needless explained by more (Ockham's razor)
-Other things being equal, the simpler explanation is better or preferred (Ockham's razor)
-Ockham's Razor was useful in the history of Philosophy and the history of Science
Summary of the thoughts on Universals
Schools of thought on Universals
1. Realism (Plato, Anselm, Augustine) - there are eternal ideas, otherwise we couldn't know general things.
Problem: Where are the ideas
2. Nominalism (Stoics, Sophists) - there are no universals, only particulars
Problem: Can't account for use of general terms or general ideas
3. Conceptualism (Peter Abelard, Locke, Berkeley) - Universals exist as mental concepts
History of Philosophy I notes
Duns Scotus (1265-1308)
-Prefers univocal regarding language applied to God
Scouts maintained that not only does God's essence play a role in his existence, but individual men's essences play a role in their existence.
Principle of individuation
-Aquinas claimed that matter was what gave individual things their individuality
-Scotus believed it was an individual essence or a "haecceity" that distinguished us from all other things, not mere matter
Natural Theology
- Far less confident in the power of reason to teach us about God then Aquinas was
- Scotus' standards of proof are much more rigorous than Aquinas' standards
Problem of Induction
-First to identify the problem
- His solution was to focus on the cause and effect and state that there is a certain necessity in causal relations
-His solution was satisfactory until David Hume
Freedom of the Will
-Aquinas held that the intellect was primary, not the will
-Scotus held that the will is primary
The will is:
1. Contingent - has the power of contrary choice
2. Self-caused - the will has no other cause than itself (like God
The self-caused will is an early version of the libertarian doctrine of the will
William of Ockham (ca. 1285 - 1349)
-Born in London
-Franciscan, just like Scotus
-Even more negative regarding natural theology than Scotus
-Faith contradicts reason, but we must follow faith
-Regarded omnipotence as God's power to do literally anything
-God could produce the world in such a way that he made it without any matter
-The object of our knowledge is particulars, but we use universals
-Generally he is regarded as a nominalist, but he could be called a conceptualist
-What is explained on X number of principles is needless explained by more (Ockham's razor)
-Other things being equal, the simpler explanation is better or preferred (Ockham's razor)
-Ockham's Razor was useful in the history of Philosophy and the history of Science
Summary of the thoughts on Universals
Schools of thought on Universals
1. Realism (Plato, Anselm, Augustine) - there are eternal ideas, otherwise we couldn't know general things.
Problem: Where are the ideas
2. Nominalism (Stoics, Sophists) - there are no universals, only particulars
Problem: Can't account for use of general terms or general ideas
3. Conceptualism (Peter Abelard, Locke, Berkeley) - Universals exist as mental concepts
Sunday, October 15, 2006
What is this thing called science? Ch. 1
(Originally written October 15, 2006 in Book 8)
A.F. Chalmers
What is this thing called Science?
3rd Edition
"Like all young men I set out to be a genius, but mercifully laughter intervened."
-Clea Lawerence Durrell
Chapter 1 - Science as Knowledge derived from the facts of experience
(A widely held common sense view of science)
-Science is derived from the facts
-Science is special because it is based on facts
-It is unprejudiced sensory data
-Based on empirical data, not personal opinions
-Science is secure
-Science is objective
-J.J. Davies - "science is a structure built upon facts" (Chalmers, 1)
-H.D. Anthony claims it was as much Galileo's attitude as his experiments that uprooted tradition
-We must accept the facts first, then form theories of everything
-Modern scientists claim the birth of science as knowledge occurred in the 17th century. Prior to this everything was seen through Biblical and/or Aristotelian eyes
-Two groups have attempted to formalize the common view of science:
1. The Empiricists
2. The positivists
Empiricists (17th & 18th Century) Locke, Berkeley, Hume
Logical Positivists (Early 20th century) Followers of Auguste Comte
Both Empiricists and Logical positivists share the belief that scientific knowledge ought to be derived from observational facts.
Two distinct issues in the claim that science is derived from the facts:
1. The nature of the facts and how scientists are meant to have access to them
2. The laws and theories that constitute our knowledge and how they are derived for the obtained facts.
There are three components of the facts assumed to be the basis of common view of science:
"1. Facts are directly given to careful, unprejudiced observers via the senses.
2. Facts are prior and independent of theory.
3. Facts constitute a firm and reliable foundation for scientific knowledge" (Chalmers, 4).
At this point I must admit a prejudice against science. I do not feel swayed by its authority and am consciously or subconsciously looking for ammo to slay the dragon of science.
[Seeing is believing]
-Humans see with their eyes
-The lens and retina are the most important components of the eye
-The eye functions like a camera
-Optic nerves then carry the image to the cerebral cortex
-The brain's recording of data is what produces the culmination of sight
Empiricists use this account of sight in their scientific basis for two reasons:
1. A human observer has more or less direct access to facts
2. Two normal observers will see the same thing when observing the same object
[Visual experiences not determined solely by the object viewed]
Empiricists and common sense scientists hold that all we must do is observe the world and we thus obtain unprejudiced facts.
If this were true than visual experiences would be the basis for facts, but here is strong evidence that simply seeing an object is not the only factor in forming a mental picture and thus obtaining factual datum.
"Two normal observers viewing the same object from the same place under the same physical circumstances do not necessarily have identical visual experiences, even though the images on their respective retinas may be virtually identical" (Chalmers, 5).
The perceptual experiences of the past affect a person's current perceptual experience. Memory shapes vision.
If a face is hidden in a drawing of a tree the observer will see the tree and then upon further inspection will see the face. But, once the face has been seen the tree branches and leaves conform in our mind to the face. The visual data received by our eyeballs do not change, only our conception of the image. The raw data received by our observation cannot be the only basis for observation. Other factors play a part in our seeing the face versus seeing the tree.
Experienced observers of particular objects will see different things than novice observers when looking at the same object.
The common argument against this is that the people see the same thing, but interpret it differently.
But if they argue this than they are self-defeating. They claim that the physical act of sight is all that is needed for fact, but if interpretation is involved in the perception process than the physical act of seeing is not all that composes sight.
Chalmers claims that he is not:
1. Claiming physical images have nothing to do with sight.
2. People are incapable of seeing basically the same thing.
[Observable facts expressed as statements]
Linguistically, the word "fact" is very, very ambiguous.
I hate ambiguity!!! AAH!
Fact can refer to either a statement about "X" or it can refer to the actual state of affairs involving "X"
Scientific knowledge is supposedly based on the circumstances and not the statements.
"For those who wish to claim that knowledge is derived from the facts, they must have statements in mind, and neither perceptions nor objects like mountains and craters" (Chalmers, 10).
Factual statements, if they are based on factual observations as science claims, it still stands that the factual statements made are not derived through a direct experience with the sensory data. Therefore, to claim that science is special because it comes directly from observation is absurd.
Knowledge in a conceptual sense is required prior to making strong observational (factual) statements about observational experiences. Thus the notion that observation precedes knowledge is mistaken. At the very least a concept must be understood prior to knowledgable statements being uttered about a specific observation.
"The recording of observable facts requires more than the reception of the stimuli in the form of light rays that impinge on the eye. It requires the knowledge of the appropriate conceptual scheme and how to apply it. Statements of fact are not determined in a straightforward way by sensual stimuli and observations statements presuppose knowledge, so it cannot be the case that we first establish the facts and then derive our knowledge from them" (Chalmers, 12)
[Why should facts precede theory?]
It would be ridiculous to attempt to go and search for facts without first forming a theory and techniques. If we did this we would not have the slightest of clues where to even begin observation. Thus, theory must precede facts.
The truth or falsity of observational statements can be judged via observation and tested by theory and thus serve as scientific knowledge.
[The fallibility of observational statements]
Observational statements, even if they are factual, must be allowed to be fallible because observation is not always 100% reliable.
Observational facts and thus the scientific knowledge derived from them must be admitted to be fallible and subject to correction via improved scientific theories, methods or "facts".
"Science is derived from the facts" is the slogan that exalts science. Bust as we have seen, there are problems with derivation and the facts themselves.
Perceptions are always exposed to the background and expectations of the perceiver. This can destroy any notion of non-prejudicial observation.
A.F. Chalmers
What is this thing called Science?
3rd Edition
"Like all young men I set out to be a genius, but mercifully laughter intervened."
-Clea Lawerence Durrell
Chapter 1 - Science as Knowledge derived from the facts of experience
(A widely held common sense view of science)
-Science is derived from the facts
-Science is special because it is based on facts
-It is unprejudiced sensory data
-Based on empirical data, not personal opinions
-Science is secure
-Science is objective
-J.J. Davies - "science is a structure built upon facts" (Chalmers, 1)
-H.D. Anthony claims it was as much Galileo's attitude as his experiments that uprooted tradition
-We must accept the facts first, then form theories of everything
-Modern scientists claim the birth of science as knowledge occurred in the 17th century. Prior to this everything was seen through Biblical and/or Aristotelian eyes
-Two groups have attempted to formalize the common view of science:
1. The Empiricists
2. The positivists
Empiricists (17th & 18th Century) Locke, Berkeley, Hume
Logical Positivists (Early 20th century) Followers of Auguste Comte
Both Empiricists and Logical positivists share the belief that scientific knowledge ought to be derived from observational facts.
Two distinct issues in the claim that science is derived from the facts:
1. The nature of the facts and how scientists are meant to have access to them
2. The laws and theories that constitute our knowledge and how they are derived for the obtained facts.
There are three components of the facts assumed to be the basis of common view of science:
"1. Facts are directly given to careful, unprejudiced observers via the senses.
2. Facts are prior and independent of theory.
3. Facts constitute a firm and reliable foundation for scientific knowledge" (Chalmers, 4).
At this point I must admit a prejudice against science. I do not feel swayed by its authority and am consciously or subconsciously looking for ammo to slay the dragon of science.
[Seeing is believing]
-Humans see with their eyes
-The lens and retina are the most important components of the eye
-The eye functions like a camera
-Optic nerves then carry the image to the cerebral cortex
-The brain's recording of data is what produces the culmination of sight
Empiricists use this account of sight in their scientific basis for two reasons:
1. A human observer has more or less direct access to facts
2. Two normal observers will see the same thing when observing the same object
[Visual experiences not determined solely by the object viewed]
Empiricists and common sense scientists hold that all we must do is observe the world and we thus obtain unprejudiced facts.
If this were true than visual experiences would be the basis for facts, but here is strong evidence that simply seeing an object is not the only factor in forming a mental picture and thus obtaining factual datum.
"Two normal observers viewing the same object from the same place under the same physical circumstances do not necessarily have identical visual experiences, even though the images on their respective retinas may be virtually identical" (Chalmers, 5).
The perceptual experiences of the past affect a person's current perceptual experience. Memory shapes vision.
If a face is hidden in a drawing of a tree the observer will see the tree and then upon further inspection will see the face. But, once the face has been seen the tree branches and leaves conform in our mind to the face. The visual data received by our eyeballs do not change, only our conception of the image. The raw data received by our observation cannot be the only basis for observation. Other factors play a part in our seeing the face versus seeing the tree.
Experienced observers of particular objects will see different things than novice observers when looking at the same object.
The common argument against this is that the people see the same thing, but interpret it differently.
But if they argue this than they are self-defeating. They claim that the physical act of sight is all that is needed for fact, but if interpretation is involved in the perception process than the physical act of seeing is not all that composes sight.
Chalmers claims that he is not:
1. Claiming physical images have nothing to do with sight.
2. People are incapable of seeing basically the same thing.
[Observable facts expressed as statements]
Linguistically, the word "fact" is very, very ambiguous.
I hate ambiguity!!! AAH!
Fact can refer to either a statement about "X" or it can refer to the actual state of affairs involving "X"
Scientific knowledge is supposedly based on the circumstances and not the statements.
"For those who wish to claim that knowledge is derived from the facts, they must have statements in mind, and neither perceptions nor objects like mountains and craters" (Chalmers, 10).
Factual statements, if they are based on factual observations as science claims, it still stands that the factual statements made are not derived through a direct experience with the sensory data. Therefore, to claim that science is special because it comes directly from observation is absurd.
Knowledge in a conceptual sense is required prior to making strong observational (factual) statements about observational experiences. Thus the notion that observation precedes knowledge is mistaken. At the very least a concept must be understood prior to knowledgable statements being uttered about a specific observation.
"The recording of observable facts requires more than the reception of the stimuli in the form of light rays that impinge on the eye. It requires the knowledge of the appropriate conceptual scheme and how to apply it. Statements of fact are not determined in a straightforward way by sensual stimuli and observations statements presuppose knowledge, so it cannot be the case that we first establish the facts and then derive our knowledge from them" (Chalmers, 12)
[Why should facts precede theory?]
It would be ridiculous to attempt to go and search for facts without first forming a theory and techniques. If we did this we would not have the slightest of clues where to even begin observation. Thus, theory must precede facts.
The truth or falsity of observational statements can be judged via observation and tested by theory and thus serve as scientific knowledge.
[The fallibility of observational statements]
Observational statements, even if they are factual, must be allowed to be fallible because observation is not always 100% reliable.
Observational facts and thus the scientific knowledge derived from them must be admitted to be fallible and subject to correction via improved scientific theories, methods or "facts".
"Science is derived from the facts" is the slogan that exalts science. Bust as we have seen, there are problems with derivation and the facts themselves.
Perceptions are always exposed to the background and expectations of the perceiver. This can destroy any notion of non-prejudicial observation.
Friday, September 1, 2006
Introductory Epistemology (A)
(Originally written September 1, 2006 in Book 6)
Well, school is back in session and leisurely philosophical time is beginning to slow down and I have some direction again. This semester I am taking Epistemology, Logic and History I. So I will begin with Epistemology.
Classical and Contemporary Readings: The theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
Louis P. Polman
Part I - General Introduction: The theory of knowledge
Epistemology - Greek for 'the science of knowing'
Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge and the justification of belief
Many philosophers hold epistemology to be the central area of philosophy (I believe it to be metaphysics)
To know - "to recognize, to identify, to distinguish, to be acquainted with, to apprehend or comprehend as a fact or truth" - Oxford English Dictionary
This definition is too broad for philosophy.
Typical uses of the verb 'to know'
1) I know John
2) I know how to speak English
3) I know that DC is the capital of the U.S.
1) is knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance provides knowledge of our pains, our beliefs our friends, the town we grew up in, etc.
2) is 'competence knowledge' or 'skill knowledge'. This is knowing how to do 'X'
3) is 'propositional knowledge' or 'descriptive knowledge'. Propositions are true or false. People know propositions. i.e. I know Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492.
Epistemology focuses on propositional knowledge.
Epistemology seeks to illuminate three questions:
1) What is knowledge? What are the essential characteristics of this concept?
2) Can we know anything at all? Or are we doomed to ignorance about the most important subjects in life?
3) How do we obtain knowledge? Through our senses? Through our intellect?
1) What is knowledge?
Propositional knowledge is knowledge of a true proposition.
By claiming to know a proposition one claims that the proposition is in fact true.
"Of course, we may be wrong about our knowledge claims... we often believe falsely that we know" (Polman, 2).
This can happen because;
1) our knowledge is based on inadequate or misleading evidence
2) we remember wrongly
3) we perceive incorrectly
People can disagree, especially on moral, ethical and religious knowledge.
Knowledge involves more than having a true belief.
Knowledge has an adequate justification in addition to a true belief.
What exactly is justification of a belief? Coming later (parts V, VI, VIII, IX, and X)
2) Can we know anything at all?
Skepticism is the theory that we do not have any knowledge. Radical skepticism believes we cannot even be certain of the belief that we cannot be completely certain that any of our beliefs are true. We can't even know that we don't have any knowledge.
3) How do we obtain knowledge?
Rationalism holds that reason alone is sufficient to discover truth.
Empiricism - knowledge originates through sense perception.
Descartes holds that the mind discovers truth apart from experience.
Kant, and A.C. Ewing and Roderick Chisholm argue for the reality of a priori knowledge.
Locke and Berkeley attacked innate ideas and a priori knowledge as empiricists. Locke proposes a representational theory of knowledge that claims that the core of our knowledge is caused by the world, whereas some qualities are the products of the way our perceptual mechanisms are affected by the world.
Primary qualities (motion, size, shape and number) are accurate representatives of the objective features of the world.
Secondary qualities are modes of apprehending the primary qualities (like taste, color, odor and sound).
Primary qualities are objective, and while primary qualities cause secondary qualities, secondary qualities are subjective.
How do we acquire ideas?
Rationalism - some non-analytical propositions are innate or known a priori.
Empiricism - all propositions are acquired from experience. No non-analytical propositions are known a priori.
How is knowledge organized in the mind?
Rationalism - The mind brings to experience principles of order from the mind's own nature.
Empiricism - The mind arranges and stores materials that are given in experience
Skepticism - Can we have any knowledge at all?
Perception - Can we have knowledge of the external world?
Analysis of knowledge - Is knowledge true justified belief?
Theories of justification - Is the structure of justification foundational or coherentist or neither? Is the correct account of justification one of externalism or internals?
A priori knowledge - Is there synthetic a priori truth? Is the analytic-synthetic distinction itself valid?
Induction - which is the correct solution to the problem of inductive knowledge?
Science, justification and the demarcation problem - The scientific method and the demarcation problem
The ethics of belief - are there epistemic obligations? Are there moral obligations to seek the truth or to have the best set of justified beliefs?
Challenges to Contemporary Epistemology -
Is knowledge social or individual? Is the Cartesian paradigm correct? Etc. Etc.
(Originally written September 1, 2006)
What can we know? Appearance and Reality
Bertrand Russell
Russell (1872-1970)
-one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century
-broad philosophical interests
-spoke on his personal beliefs even at personal risk
"Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?" Russell calls this one of the most difficult questions to answer.
Our immediate experience provides us with knowledge that is very likely to be wrong.
Russell exams a table, which appears to be a solid color, but his perception can cause it to seem lighter in some areas. So it is reasonable to doubt that the table is one solid color.
There is a difference between appearances and reality. Appearance is how things seem. Reality is how things really are.
Color, texture and shape are perceived by the senses, but we have been conditioned to change them in our mind's eye to the "real" color, texture or shape.
Touch and sound are the same way.
The real object is not known to us. It is inferred from what experience tells us. This leads to two difficult questions:
1) Is there a real object at all?
2) If so, what sort of object can it be?
Sense-Data - Things that are immediately known in sensation: color, sound, smell, hardness, roughness, etc.
Physical object - the 'real' object
We become aware of sense data, not the physical object. If there is a real object, a problem arises between the relation of sense-data to the physical object.
Matter - the collection of all physical objects.
Considering the relation between sense data and physical objects (and thus matter) raises two question:
1) Is there anything as matter?
2) If so, what is its nature?
Berkeley claims that there is no such thing as matter. Berkeley showed that the existence of matter can be denied without absurdity and that if anything exists independently of us that they cannot be the immediate objects of our sensations. Berkeley held that we perceived the sense-data, and the real object was an idea in the mind of God. Since it is an idea it is not wholly unknowable, like matter would be.
Idealists believe that nothing exists except minds and their ideas. Ideas are whatever a mind can think of. What is inconceivable, cannot exist.
Idealists:
Berkeley - matter is a collection of ideas
Leibniz - matter is actually aggregates of more or less rudimentary minds
Both claim that matter is a mere appearance
The Problem of Criterion
Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999)
-one of the most influential American Epistemologicians
"To know anything...we need a method or criterion, a process that guarantees that what we claim to knows truly knowledge" (Polman, 9).
Before a method or criterion is found to be reliable, particular instances of knowledge must be recognized. Right? Particularists find knowledge instances first, then criterion. Methodists find methods first, then identify knowledge. Chisholm calls the 'problem of the criterion' one of the most important and most difficult problems of philosophy.It is the ancient problem of 'the dialectus', 'the wheel', or 'the vicious cycle'. Montaigne put the problem neatly in his Essays.
There must be a procedure for distinguishing true appearances from false ones.
To know whether a procedure is a good procedure one must know whether it succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from ones that are false. But, we can't know if a procedure is successful without having knowledge of true and false appearances. Thus, we have a circle.
Well, school is back in session and leisurely philosophical time is beginning to slow down and I have some direction again. This semester I am taking Epistemology, Logic and History I. So I will begin with Epistemology.
Classical and Contemporary Readings: The theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
Louis P. Polman
Part I - General Introduction: The theory of knowledge
Epistemology - Greek for 'the science of knowing'
Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge and the justification of belief
Many philosophers hold epistemology to be the central area of philosophy (I believe it to be metaphysics)
To know - "to recognize, to identify, to distinguish, to be acquainted with, to apprehend or comprehend as a fact or truth" - Oxford English Dictionary
This definition is too broad for philosophy.
Typical uses of the verb 'to know'
1) I know John
2) I know how to speak English
3) I know that DC is the capital of the U.S.
1) is knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance provides knowledge of our pains, our beliefs our friends, the town we grew up in, etc.
2) is 'competence knowledge' or 'skill knowledge'. This is knowing how to do 'X'
3) is 'propositional knowledge' or 'descriptive knowledge'. Propositions are true or false. People know propositions. i.e. I know Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492.
Epistemology focuses on propositional knowledge.
Epistemology seeks to illuminate three questions:
1) What is knowledge? What are the essential characteristics of this concept?
2) Can we know anything at all? Or are we doomed to ignorance about the most important subjects in life?
3) How do we obtain knowledge? Through our senses? Through our intellect?
1) What is knowledge?
Propositional knowledge is knowledge of a true proposition.
By claiming to know a proposition one claims that the proposition is in fact true.
"Of course, we may be wrong about our knowledge claims... we often believe falsely that we know" (Polman, 2).
This can happen because;
1) our knowledge is based on inadequate or misleading evidence
2) we remember wrongly
3) we perceive incorrectly
People can disagree, especially on moral, ethical and religious knowledge.
Knowledge involves more than having a true belief.
Knowledge has an adequate justification in addition to a true belief.
What exactly is justification of a belief? Coming later (parts V, VI, VIII, IX, and X)
2) Can we know anything at all?
Skepticism is the theory that we do not have any knowledge. Radical skepticism believes we cannot even be certain of the belief that we cannot be completely certain that any of our beliefs are true. We can't even know that we don't have any knowledge.
3) How do we obtain knowledge?
Rationalism holds that reason alone is sufficient to discover truth.
Empiricism - knowledge originates through sense perception.
Descartes holds that the mind discovers truth apart from experience.
Kant, and A.C. Ewing and Roderick Chisholm argue for the reality of a priori knowledge.
Locke and Berkeley attacked innate ideas and a priori knowledge as empiricists. Locke proposes a representational theory of knowledge that claims that the core of our knowledge is caused by the world, whereas some qualities are the products of the way our perceptual mechanisms are affected by the world.
Primary qualities (motion, size, shape and number) are accurate representatives of the objective features of the world.
Secondary qualities are modes of apprehending the primary qualities (like taste, color, odor and sound).
Primary qualities are objective, and while primary qualities cause secondary qualities, secondary qualities are subjective.
How do we acquire ideas?
Rationalism - some non-analytical propositions are innate or known a priori.
Empiricism - all propositions are acquired from experience. No non-analytical propositions are known a priori.
How is knowledge organized in the mind?
Rationalism - The mind brings to experience principles of order from the mind's own nature.
Empiricism - The mind arranges and stores materials that are given in experience
Skepticism - Can we have any knowledge at all?
Perception - Can we have knowledge of the external world?
Analysis of knowledge - Is knowledge true justified belief?
Theories of justification - Is the structure of justification foundational or coherentist or neither? Is the correct account of justification one of externalism or internals?
A priori knowledge - Is there synthetic a priori truth? Is the analytic-synthetic distinction itself valid?
Induction - which is the correct solution to the problem of inductive knowledge?
Science, justification and the demarcation problem - The scientific method and the demarcation problem
The ethics of belief - are there epistemic obligations? Are there moral obligations to seek the truth or to have the best set of justified beliefs?
Challenges to Contemporary Epistemology -
Is knowledge social or individual? Is the Cartesian paradigm correct? Etc. Etc.
(Originally written September 1, 2006)
What can we know? Appearance and Reality
Bertrand Russell
Russell (1872-1970)
-one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century
-broad philosophical interests
-spoke on his personal beliefs even at personal risk
"Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?" Russell calls this one of the most difficult questions to answer.
Our immediate experience provides us with knowledge that is very likely to be wrong.
Russell exams a table, which appears to be a solid color, but his perception can cause it to seem lighter in some areas. So it is reasonable to doubt that the table is one solid color.
There is a difference between appearances and reality. Appearance is how things seem. Reality is how things really are.
Color, texture and shape are perceived by the senses, but we have been conditioned to change them in our mind's eye to the "real" color, texture or shape.
Touch and sound are the same way.
The real object is not known to us. It is inferred from what experience tells us. This leads to two difficult questions:
1) Is there a real object at all?
2) If so, what sort of object can it be?
Sense-Data - Things that are immediately known in sensation: color, sound, smell, hardness, roughness, etc.
Physical object - the 'real' object
We become aware of sense data, not the physical object. If there is a real object, a problem arises between the relation of sense-data to the physical object.
Matter - the collection of all physical objects.
Considering the relation between sense data and physical objects (and thus matter) raises two question:
1) Is there anything as matter?
2) If so, what is its nature?
Berkeley claims that there is no such thing as matter. Berkeley showed that the existence of matter can be denied without absurdity and that if anything exists independently of us that they cannot be the immediate objects of our sensations. Berkeley held that we perceived the sense-data, and the real object was an idea in the mind of God. Since it is an idea it is not wholly unknowable, like matter would be.
Idealists believe that nothing exists except minds and their ideas. Ideas are whatever a mind can think of. What is inconceivable, cannot exist.
Idealists:
Berkeley - matter is a collection of ideas
Leibniz - matter is actually aggregates of more or less rudimentary minds
Both claim that matter is a mere appearance
The Problem of Criterion
Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999)
-one of the most influential American Epistemologicians
"To know anything...we need a method or criterion, a process that guarantees that what we claim to knows truly knowledge" (Polman, 9).
Before a method or criterion is found to be reliable, particular instances of knowledge must be recognized. Right? Particularists find knowledge instances first, then criterion. Methodists find methods first, then identify knowledge. Chisholm calls the 'problem of the criterion' one of the most important and most difficult problems of philosophy.It is the ancient problem of 'the dialectus', 'the wheel', or 'the vicious cycle'. Montaigne put the problem neatly in his Essays.
There must be a procedure for distinguishing true appearances from false ones.
To know whether a procedure is a good procedure one must know whether it succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from ones that are false. But, we can't know if a procedure is successful without having knowledge of true and false appearances. Thus, we have a circle.
Great Epistemological Traditions
(Originally Written September 1, 2006 in Epistemology)
The Great Epistemological Traditions:
1. Rationalism - Parmenides, Zeno, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant
2. Empiricism - Heraclitus, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Berkeley, Hume
Hume (1711-1776)
External objects (a fortiori)
A Fortiori argument - If "x", then how much more "y".
An a fortiori argument is to be used inductively
Hume argued that what we experience is a kind of constancy and a coherence.
He asked how can we know that the box in our mind correlates to anything in the real world?
Why can't our own mind form constancy and coherence? Are not dreams real to us?
The Law of Causality - every effect is necessarily connected to a cause
Hume argued against the law of causality in that you don't see the necessary connection, you see the event after event after event, etc.
Uniformity of nature
Two types of knowledge:
1) Relations of ideas - true by their nature
2) Matters of fact - empirically observed
The Great Epistemological Traditions:
1. Rationalism - Parmenides, Zeno, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant
2. Empiricism - Heraclitus, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Berkeley, Hume
Hume (1711-1776)
External objects (a fortiori)
A Fortiori argument - If "x", then how much more "y".
An a fortiori argument is to be used inductively
Hume argued that what we experience is a kind of constancy and a coherence.
He asked how can we know that the box in our mind correlates to anything in the real world?
Why can't our own mind form constancy and coherence? Are not dreams real to us?
The Law of Causality - every effect is necessarily connected to a cause
Hume argued against the law of causality in that you don't see the necessary connection, you see the event after event after event, etc.
Uniformity of nature
Two types of knowledge:
1) Relations of ideas - true by their nature
2) Matters of fact - empirically observed
Sunday, July 23, 2006
Metaphysics - Ch. 3
(Originally written July 23, 2006 in Book 6)
Metaphysics - Peter van Inwagen
Chapter 3 - Externality
Individual things exist outside of a mind.
Why is it not obvious that an external world exists?
One cannot be mistaken of what one is feeling or what one is presently thinking about. Both thoughts and feelings are of the mind. Feelings or thoughts are either individual things or modifications of individual things. Since they are not physical, but mental, if they are in fact modifications, they must be modifications of a mental individual thing. Thus, if individual things exist, at least one of them must be mental.
Berkeley believed in individual things, but that all individual things were mental. He held that all one senses are properties (color, shape, texture, taste) and properties belong to the mind. Thus, all things with properties belong to the mind. Berkeley asked if there is an external world, how can we know anything of it?
Most people will grant that color is mental, but will balk at the notion that shape is mental.
Berkeley argues that there are two kinds of shape: visual and tactile. Visual shapes exist without tactile shapes when one sees a shape but does not touch it. Tactile shapes exist when one touches a shape but does not see it. Visual shapes and tactile shapes are not the same property and neither can exist independently of the mind. The actual shape (combination of the two) is therefore illusionary. Thus, if something could exist independently of the mind it couldn't have properties of shape or color.
Berkeley instead that since we cannot know anything of the external world we cannot believe it exists either. If we do believe in it we would have to become thorough skeptics and admit that we have no valid reason for believing the external world exists.
Solipsists believe that the source of our sensations come from within us, but Berkeley does not believe this. If our sensations do not come from inside us (our sensations being our experiences and how we experience them) where do they come from? Common Western Metaphysics holds that experiences and how we interact with them (producing sensations) come from the external world. Berkeley holds that these experiences do come from a mind, but not our own. All things that are seemingly a part of the physical world are actually the product of the mind of God. God, like all humans, is an independent mind, but He is the Supreme Mind. God created all other minds and thus they are modifications. The senses are modifications of the mind. God coordinates all individual minds' senses to fit together like a big jigsaw puzzle. Thus, when two people look at the same object their perception is very similar (though not identical). Berkeley states this is how God created "all the furniture of the earth", the thing we perceive as the physical world. "He [God] carefully coordinates the sensations that come to all human minds in such a way that a common world is available to these minds" (van Inwagen, 47).
Linehan - I like this, but it makes me wonder about sin, evil and Evil.
Berkeley does not claim that God created an illusionary world though. He believes that in God creating minds and properties for the minds to perceive He created things that really exist.
A critic of Berkeley once wrote a limerick poking fun at Berkeley's theory. (I had heard this before, but not the response. I understood why it did not really do anything other than misrepresent Berkeley's theory, but like the response a lot).
Msgr. Ronald Knox:
"There was once a man who said, 'God
must think it exceedingly odd
if he finds that this tree
continues to be
when there's no one about it in the Quad"
Basically Knox said if all things are mental and no mind is 'physically' there to perceive it then it would cease to exist. Knox (as do most men) thinks that this would be absurd. But Berkeley argued that the Supreme Mind (God) perceived all 'physical' things at all times. Thus, even when a human mind is not present to perceive the individual tree, it remains, as an object of the mind, specifically the mind of God. Here is the response by an anonymous writer to Ronald Knox.
"Dear Sir,
Your astonishment's odd
I am always in the Quad
And that's why the tree
will continue to be
since observed by
Yours faithfully,
God
Linehan - Brilliant! (Bad beer commercial reference)
An idealist has not choice but to believe in a supreme being since a supreme mind is needed to sustain mental existence (which is all that exists).
Theism is the belief in the Supreme Being.
Externalism is the belief in a physical world, independent of minds.
Realism is the belief that the physical world is what causes our sensations.
Realism is a more plausible option because it requires a simpler explanation.
Occam's Razor was created by William of Ockham. It states basically that if theories compete for acceptance and give full account of all evidence then the theory that requires less speculation should be accepted over the theory that requires more speculation. If Occam's razor suggests that we should accept realism over idealism, why then would anyone accept idealism?
Berkeley claims that we all have minds and we all know our own mind. He claims that to hold to externalism, a belief in things other than the mind, is actually more speculative then to believe in only the existence of minds.
Why?
Well, we all have a mind, so to believe that others have minds that work in a similar way is not much of a stretch. Also, even though God, the Supreme Mind, is much more than our own mind it is nonetheless a mind and to believe it operates in a similar fashion is not much of a stretch. But to believe in the existence of an external world (something minds have no experience of) is more speculative then only believing in minds. Thus, by Occam's razor, Berkeley asserts idealism over realism.
Linehan - I don't know enough about Occam's razor to make a judgment, but the little I do understand of it leads me to question it. Should we always accept a simpler judgment? Yes, in some cases it is better to accept the 'plain' answer, but I don't believe that the razor should be an unquestionable universal procedure.
Van Inwagen argues that Berkeley bases his theory on two very doubtful assumptions:
1) A common object is nothing more than (or nothing apart from) its sensible properties
2) The sensible properties of common objects are the same things as the sensations we have when we see or touch (or hear or taste or smell) common objects
The common western metaphysic believes that properties exists so that they can be 'had' by something. To define an object by its properties and then state that once the list of properties have been exhausted there is nothing left and thus only properties exist is playing word games.
A thing must exist in order for properties to be, according to the common western metaphysic.
Also properties that exist in the mind are different than properties that exist as a feature of the object.
A person experiences a property when one comes into contact with a thing that contains a correlating property. (We experience whiteness when we experience paper, which is white)
Before studying metaphysics we believe in an external world and external objects because it appears to be true. Idealism does not seem to be true to us and in fact, seems to be false. Berkeley has not produced any good reason to accept idealism. Thus, it is best for us to accept realism.
"It may be that the idealists have a better cans than the one I have attributed to them. Students of metaphysics are hereby encouraged to investigate this possibility for themselves" (van Inwagen, 55).
Linehan - challenge?
Metaphysics - Peter van Inwagen
Chapter 3 - Externality
Individual things exist outside of a mind.
Why is it not obvious that an external world exists?
One cannot be mistaken of what one is feeling or what one is presently thinking about. Both thoughts and feelings are of the mind. Feelings or thoughts are either individual things or modifications of individual things. Since they are not physical, but mental, if they are in fact modifications, they must be modifications of a mental individual thing. Thus, if individual things exist, at least one of them must be mental.
Berkeley believed in individual things, but that all individual things were mental. He held that all one senses are properties (color, shape, texture, taste) and properties belong to the mind. Thus, all things with properties belong to the mind. Berkeley asked if there is an external world, how can we know anything of it?
Most people will grant that color is mental, but will balk at the notion that shape is mental.
Berkeley argues that there are two kinds of shape: visual and tactile. Visual shapes exist without tactile shapes when one sees a shape but does not touch it. Tactile shapes exist when one touches a shape but does not see it. Visual shapes and tactile shapes are not the same property and neither can exist independently of the mind. The actual shape (combination of the two) is therefore illusionary. Thus, if something could exist independently of the mind it couldn't have properties of shape or color.
Berkeley instead that since we cannot know anything of the external world we cannot believe it exists either. If we do believe in it we would have to become thorough skeptics and admit that we have no valid reason for believing the external world exists.
Solipsists believe that the source of our sensations come from within us, but Berkeley does not believe this. If our sensations do not come from inside us (our sensations being our experiences and how we experience them) where do they come from? Common Western Metaphysics holds that experiences and how we interact with them (producing sensations) come from the external world. Berkeley holds that these experiences do come from a mind, but not our own. All things that are seemingly a part of the physical world are actually the product of the mind of God. God, like all humans, is an independent mind, but He is the Supreme Mind. God created all other minds and thus they are modifications. The senses are modifications of the mind. God coordinates all individual minds' senses to fit together like a big jigsaw puzzle. Thus, when two people look at the same object their perception is very similar (though not identical). Berkeley states this is how God created "all the furniture of the earth", the thing we perceive as the physical world. "He [God] carefully coordinates the sensations that come to all human minds in such a way that a common world is available to these minds" (van Inwagen, 47).
Linehan - I like this, but it makes me wonder about sin, evil and Evil.
Berkeley does not claim that God created an illusionary world though. He believes that in God creating minds and properties for the minds to perceive He created things that really exist.
A critic of Berkeley once wrote a limerick poking fun at Berkeley's theory. (I had heard this before, but not the response. I understood why it did not really do anything other than misrepresent Berkeley's theory, but like the response a lot).
Msgr. Ronald Knox:
"There was once a man who said, 'God
must think it exceedingly odd
if he finds that this tree
continues to be
when there's no one about it in the Quad"
Basically Knox said if all things are mental and no mind is 'physically' there to perceive it then it would cease to exist. Knox (as do most men) thinks that this would be absurd. But Berkeley argued that the Supreme Mind (God) perceived all 'physical' things at all times. Thus, even when a human mind is not present to perceive the individual tree, it remains, as an object of the mind, specifically the mind of God. Here is the response by an anonymous writer to Ronald Knox.
"Dear Sir,
Your astonishment's odd
I am always in the Quad
And that's why the tree
will continue to be
since observed by
Yours faithfully,
God
Linehan - Brilliant! (Bad beer commercial reference)
An idealist has not choice but to believe in a supreme being since a supreme mind is needed to sustain mental existence (which is all that exists).
Theism is the belief in the Supreme Being.
Externalism is the belief in a physical world, independent of minds.
Realism is the belief that the physical world is what causes our sensations.
Realism is a more plausible option because it requires a simpler explanation.
Occam's Razor was created by William of Ockham. It states basically that if theories compete for acceptance and give full account of all evidence then the theory that requires less speculation should be accepted over the theory that requires more speculation. If Occam's razor suggests that we should accept realism over idealism, why then would anyone accept idealism?
Berkeley claims that we all have minds and we all know our own mind. He claims that to hold to externalism, a belief in things other than the mind, is actually more speculative then to believe in only the existence of minds.
Why?
Well, we all have a mind, so to believe that others have minds that work in a similar way is not much of a stretch. Also, even though God, the Supreme Mind, is much more than our own mind it is nonetheless a mind and to believe it operates in a similar fashion is not much of a stretch. But to believe in the existence of an external world (something minds have no experience of) is more speculative then only believing in minds. Thus, by Occam's razor, Berkeley asserts idealism over realism.
Linehan - I don't know enough about Occam's razor to make a judgment, but the little I do understand of it leads me to question it. Should we always accept a simpler judgment? Yes, in some cases it is better to accept the 'plain' answer, but I don't believe that the razor should be an unquestionable universal procedure.
Van Inwagen argues that Berkeley bases his theory on two very doubtful assumptions:
1) A common object is nothing more than (or nothing apart from) its sensible properties
2) The sensible properties of common objects are the same things as the sensations we have when we see or touch (or hear or taste or smell) common objects
The common western metaphysic believes that properties exists so that they can be 'had' by something. To define an object by its properties and then state that once the list of properties have been exhausted there is nothing left and thus only properties exist is playing word games.
A thing must exist in order for properties to be, according to the common western metaphysic.
Also properties that exist in the mind are different than properties that exist as a feature of the object.
A person experiences a property when one comes into contact with a thing that contains a correlating property. (We experience whiteness when we experience paper, which is white)
Before studying metaphysics we believe in an external world and external objects because it appears to be true. Idealism does not seem to be true to us and in fact, seems to be false. Berkeley has not produced any good reason to accept idealism. Thus, it is best for us to accept realism.
"It may be that the idealists have a better cans than the one I have attributed to them. Students of metaphysics are hereby encouraged to investigate this possibility for themselves" (van Inwagen, 55).
Linehan - challenge?
Saturday, July 22, 2006
Metaphysics - Ch. 2 (B)
(Originally written July 22, 2006 in Book 6)
Metaphysics
Peter van Inwagen
Ch. 2 - Individuality
An individual thing is not a process. Processes start and end and happen. Individual things come into existence and go out of existence.
The Common Western metaphysic holds that the World consists of many individual things. Contrary to the Common Western metaphysic there are those who believe:
1) There are no individual things (nihilism)
2) There is one individual thing (monism)
3) There is more than one individual thing, but there are not many
Dualists believe that there are two types of things, not just two individual things: mental things and physical things. Some dualists hold that there are two things that are either good or evil, or order and disorder.
Nihilism believes in universals and the things that we see are not individual things, but modifications and collections.
Nihilists can also only believe in stuff and no individual things or collections or modifications.
Nihilism that bases its theory that individual things do not exist and only modifications of universals exist is not plausible. Nihilism that bases its theory that individual things do not exist and only collections exist is even less plausible. Nihilism that believes that individual things exist only as stuff is the most plausible but does not match up with modern physics.
Monism believes that there is only one individual thing. "Monists believe that there is only one thing that is at all like things that those who believe that there are many individual things" (van Inwagen, 20). Monists hold that only one non-universal thing can exist. Thus, monists basically hold that only these things exist:
1) Universals
2) Stuffs
3) Modifications
4) The One (the only individual thing)
5) Modifications of the One
6) Collections of modifications of the One
Some monists hold that what individual things (seemingly) are are actually various modifications of the One. (This is Spinoza's version).
Some monists hold that seemingly individual things are appearances and cannot be viewed as reality at all. This school of thought was held by the Absolute Idealists. (Berkeley held this version).
Berkeley believed that minds were actually individual things, so he couldn't be an Absolute Idealist or a true monist.
A third form of monism holds that seemingly individual things are actually how the One portraits itself to himself. The Sun (the One) presents itself to me (the One) in a certain way.
Linehan - Sexual gratification is thus only masturbation. The One is one horny bastard.
Some people stat that Hindus hold this third view.
Monism, while it has various forms believes that individuality is either illusionary at its lowest and not fully real at its best.
Why would anyone be a Monist?
Spinoza - "If a thing is not absolutely independent of everything else, then it must be a mere modification of something that is absolutely independent of everything else" (van Inwagen, 32).
Linehan - While I do not hold to monism or Spinoza at all, this is a very good argument.
When the One is called 'god' it becomes pantheism. Theism is a mean between pantheism (all is God) and atheism (nothing is God). Atheists do not believe in God, thus only the physical universe composes the world.
While theists and atheists disagree profoundly, they both reject pantheism (and monism).
Atheists reject monism on a number of levels:
1) Some hold that there are no independent beings
2) some hold that there are many independent things
Some monists accept monism simply because of a certain experience that has shown them individuality is only an illusion. These experiences do not come from senses (which indicate individual things) but from religious or mystical experience. Whatever triggers these experiences (chance, drugs or rigorous spiritual exercises) they end them with the feeling that one of the mot important pieces of knowledge is that individuality is an illusion. People who have these experiences call them ineffable, impossible to articulate or describe.
Linehan - at the end of chapter 2 I find myself questioning why I ever wished to embark on metaphysical studies. What good can come from questions without answers? I find myself slipping into a metaphysical madness. But, metaphysics and anything in philosophy (save for history) is similar to faith. Faith provides for me the knowledge of God (for me, knowledge is the comprehension of truth). Undoubtedly, truth exists. Just as sure as truth exists, I am incapable of comprehending it all. Thus, I am wholly incapable of comprehending all truth and thus, ill-equipped to handle or possess absolute knowledge. While I do not have absolute knowledge of God, I have enough partial knowledge to assert his existence as real. Faith then provides me with the assurance of God, which I cannot get from my own knowledge.
Metaphysics cannot provide concrete knowledge. Without the assurance of God's existence, provided by faith, anyone would be lost in metaphysical madness, entering endless dark alleys of speculation ultimately leaving him or her with nothing but hopeless skepticism. I will never produce concrete metaphysical facts, but I am assured that any questions I 'answer' will continue to point me towards God. What I cannot produce through metaphysics will undoubtedly be overcome through faith. Questions are a process (one of the many processes) that ultimately lead to God. The final question that they produce is (thankfully) an answerable one. Will you accept God's existence and the mercy he offers or will you deny God and His grace? As for me and my house, I will accept the Lord.
Metaphysics
Peter van Inwagen
Ch. 2 - Individuality
An individual thing is not a process. Processes start and end and happen. Individual things come into existence and go out of existence.
The Common Western metaphysic holds that the World consists of many individual things. Contrary to the Common Western metaphysic there are those who believe:
1) There are no individual things (nihilism)
2) There is one individual thing (monism)
3) There is more than one individual thing, but there are not many
Dualists believe that there are two types of things, not just two individual things: mental things and physical things. Some dualists hold that there are two things that are either good or evil, or order and disorder.
Nihilism believes in universals and the things that we see are not individual things, but modifications and collections.
Nihilists can also only believe in stuff and no individual things or collections or modifications.
Nihilism that bases its theory that individual things do not exist and only modifications of universals exist is not plausible. Nihilism that bases its theory that individual things do not exist and only collections exist is even less plausible. Nihilism that believes that individual things exist only as stuff is the most plausible but does not match up with modern physics.
Monism believes that there is only one individual thing. "Monists believe that there is only one thing that is at all like things that those who believe that there are many individual things" (van Inwagen, 20). Monists hold that only one non-universal thing can exist. Thus, monists basically hold that only these things exist:
1) Universals
2) Stuffs
3) Modifications
4) The One (the only individual thing)
5) Modifications of the One
6) Collections of modifications of the One
Some monists hold that what individual things (seemingly) are are actually various modifications of the One. (This is Spinoza's version).
Some monists hold that seemingly individual things are appearances and cannot be viewed as reality at all. This school of thought was held by the Absolute Idealists. (Berkeley held this version).
Berkeley believed that minds were actually individual things, so he couldn't be an Absolute Idealist or a true monist.
A third form of monism holds that seemingly individual things are actually how the One portraits itself to himself. The Sun (the One) presents itself to me (the One) in a certain way.
Linehan - Sexual gratification is thus only masturbation. The One is one horny bastard.
Some people stat that Hindus hold this third view.
Monism, while it has various forms believes that individuality is either illusionary at its lowest and not fully real at its best.
Why would anyone be a Monist?
Spinoza - "If a thing is not absolutely independent of everything else, then it must be a mere modification of something that is absolutely independent of everything else" (van Inwagen, 32).
Linehan - While I do not hold to monism or Spinoza at all, this is a very good argument.
When the One is called 'god' it becomes pantheism. Theism is a mean between pantheism (all is God) and atheism (nothing is God). Atheists do not believe in God, thus only the physical universe composes the world.
While theists and atheists disagree profoundly, they both reject pantheism (and monism).
Atheists reject monism on a number of levels:
1) Some hold that there are no independent beings
2) some hold that there are many independent things
Some monists accept monism simply because of a certain experience that has shown them individuality is only an illusion. These experiences do not come from senses (which indicate individual things) but from religious or mystical experience. Whatever triggers these experiences (chance, drugs or rigorous spiritual exercises) they end them with the feeling that one of the mot important pieces of knowledge is that individuality is an illusion. People who have these experiences call them ineffable, impossible to articulate or describe.
Linehan - at the end of chapter 2 I find myself questioning why I ever wished to embark on metaphysical studies. What good can come from questions without answers? I find myself slipping into a metaphysical madness. But, metaphysics and anything in philosophy (save for history) is similar to faith. Faith provides for me the knowledge of God (for me, knowledge is the comprehension of truth). Undoubtedly, truth exists. Just as sure as truth exists, I am incapable of comprehending it all. Thus, I am wholly incapable of comprehending all truth and thus, ill-equipped to handle or possess absolute knowledge. While I do not have absolute knowledge of God, I have enough partial knowledge to assert his existence as real. Faith then provides me with the assurance of God, which I cannot get from my own knowledge.
Metaphysics cannot provide concrete knowledge. Without the assurance of God's existence, provided by faith, anyone would be lost in metaphysical madness, entering endless dark alleys of speculation ultimately leaving him or her with nothing but hopeless skepticism. I will never produce concrete metaphysical facts, but I am assured that any questions I 'answer' will continue to point me towards God. What I cannot produce through metaphysics will undoubtedly be overcome through faith. Questions are a process (one of the many processes) that ultimately lead to God. The final question that they produce is (thankfully) an answerable one. Will you accept God's existence and the mercy he offers or will you deny God and His grace? As for me and my house, I will accept the Lord.
Wednesday, March 15, 2006
Class notes on Locke
(Originally written March 15, 2006 in 3 Subject)
History of Philosophy II
Locke
Knowledge & the external world
-Our existence is known by introspections or reflection
-God's existence is known through reason
-Physical objects are known by sensations
Why can we trust our senses?
1) Those who lack a sense also lack its ideas.
-Problem: This argument assumes that the external world exists when it is trying to prove that the external world exists. (It assumes that people who lack a sense exist)
2) Some ideas are unavoidable, that is they are not in the control of the will.
-Problems: There could be a hidden faculty or unknown in us, that produces these thoughts.
3) Many painful ideas are remembered without the pain.
-Problems: This is also true in dreams and in hallucinations.
4)Intersensory confirmation. We can see, smell, touch, taste and hear the same physical objects.
-Problems: 1) Dreams can produce the same effects. 2) Berkeley - Heterogenity of the senses
Solipsism - only I exist and thus, the external world is a product of my ideas (metaphysical version)
Solipsism - only I and my thoughts can be known to me (epistemological version)
You cannot notice a working clock that is digital or turn off or on the light switch in dreams.
Hobbes to Hume (Page 252, Locke)
3 Degrees of Cognitive Adequacy:
1) Intuitive knowledge (single intuition) - immediate certainty, the mind sees the necessary connection
2) Demonstrative knowledge (chain of intuitions) - "less easy" or "less clear" than intuitive knowledge. The immediate connection is not seen; the connections is seen by seeing subconnections (which are seen immediately)
3) Sensitive knowledge - no connection is seen. Locke & Descartes define knowledge as "clear and distinct apprehension of a necessary relation" and as such, Locke calls all sensitive knowledge opinion or faith
The objective of knowledge:
The mind knows nothing but itself and what is in it. "Knowledge then seems to me be to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas" (Jones, 253).
Locke side steps the problem of our ideas matching up with reality and simply assumes that they do.
Knowledge of real existence:
3 Real existents:
-selves
-God
-bodies
1) Of the self, one has intuitive knowledge
2) Of God, one has a demonstrative knowledge
3) of other selves and physical objects one has only sensitive knowledge (which are opinions and faith)
Of other selves and physical objects two questions arise:
1) Do they exist while we experience them?
2) Do they exists while we do not experience them?
Locke's Answers
1) "What we see and feel cannot be demonstrated, but nobody can in earnest be so skeptical as to be uncertain" (Jones, 255)
2) It is "highly probable" that they do exist when we do not experience them.
Bodies in motion (in reality) cover two kinds of ideas in us:
1) Ideas that truly resemble existence, i.e. solidity, extensions, figure and mobility (primary qualities of a body)
2) Ideas that do not resemble existence, i.e. sweet, red
Locke denied that essences can be known, but affirmed there existence. His critics then asked how Locke knew that they truly existed.
Knowledge of relations:
Men bring two ideas together without uniting them to view them at the same time. Thus, agreements and disagreements are found between them. There are two types of agreements/disagreements that are most important:
1) Identity and diversity
2) Coexistence
"Blue is not yellow" is an example of identity and diversity. This knowledge is basic. By knowing that blue is blue one knows that blue is not-yellow.
"Iron is susceptible of magnetic attraction" is an example of coexistence. These agreements/disagreements are a set of secondary qualities. All of iron's qualities coexist to form the complex idea of iron. Continental rationalists' science, as being demonstratively certain prepositions is only possible because the Continental rationalists assumed they know the true essences of things. They thought they knew the true essences of things because they were confused about the state of names.
Names:
A name is a device to "abridge discourse". It stands for:
1) a group of coexisting ideas or
2) on of such a coexisting group "apple" is a name for the idea of a "red-spherical-sweet"
"Abstract ideas" are names that we give to ideas that have been isolated or abstracted from its context
History of Philosophy II
Locke
Knowledge & the external world
-Our existence is known by introspections or reflection
-God's existence is known through reason
-Physical objects are known by sensations
Why can we trust our senses?
1) Those who lack a sense also lack its ideas.
-Problem: This argument assumes that the external world exists when it is trying to prove that the external world exists. (It assumes that people who lack a sense exist)
2) Some ideas are unavoidable, that is they are not in the control of the will.
-Problems: There could be a hidden faculty or unknown in us, that produces these thoughts.
3) Many painful ideas are remembered without the pain.
-Problems: This is also true in dreams and in hallucinations.
4)Intersensory confirmation. We can see, smell, touch, taste and hear the same physical objects.
-Problems: 1) Dreams can produce the same effects. 2) Berkeley - Heterogenity of the senses
Solipsism - only I exist and thus, the external world is a product of my ideas (metaphysical version)
Solipsism - only I and my thoughts can be known to me (epistemological version)
You cannot notice a working clock that is digital or turn off or on the light switch in dreams.
Hobbes to Hume (Page 252, Locke)
3 Degrees of Cognitive Adequacy:
1) Intuitive knowledge (single intuition) - immediate certainty, the mind sees the necessary connection
2) Demonstrative knowledge (chain of intuitions) - "less easy" or "less clear" than intuitive knowledge. The immediate connection is not seen; the connections is seen by seeing subconnections (which are seen immediately)
3) Sensitive knowledge - no connection is seen. Locke & Descartes define knowledge as "clear and distinct apprehension of a necessary relation" and as such, Locke calls all sensitive knowledge opinion or faith
The objective of knowledge:
The mind knows nothing but itself and what is in it. "Knowledge then seems to me be to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas" (Jones, 253).
Locke side steps the problem of our ideas matching up with reality and simply assumes that they do.
Knowledge of real existence:
3 Real existents:
-selves
-God
-bodies
1) Of the self, one has intuitive knowledge
2) Of God, one has a demonstrative knowledge
3) of other selves and physical objects one has only sensitive knowledge (which are opinions and faith)
Of other selves and physical objects two questions arise:
1) Do they exist while we experience them?
2) Do they exists while we do not experience them?
Locke's Answers
1) "What we see and feel cannot be demonstrated, but nobody can in earnest be so skeptical as to be uncertain" (Jones, 255)
2) It is "highly probable" that they do exist when we do not experience them.
Bodies in motion (in reality) cover two kinds of ideas in us:
1) Ideas that truly resemble existence, i.e. solidity, extensions, figure and mobility (primary qualities of a body)
2) Ideas that do not resemble existence, i.e. sweet, red
Locke denied that essences can be known, but affirmed there existence. His critics then asked how Locke knew that they truly existed.
Knowledge of relations:
Men bring two ideas together without uniting them to view them at the same time. Thus, agreements and disagreements are found between them. There are two types of agreements/disagreements that are most important:
1) Identity and diversity
2) Coexistence
"Blue is not yellow" is an example of identity and diversity. This knowledge is basic. By knowing that blue is blue one knows that blue is not-yellow.
"Iron is susceptible of magnetic attraction" is an example of coexistence. These agreements/disagreements are a set of secondary qualities. All of iron's qualities coexist to form the complex idea of iron. Continental rationalists' science, as being demonstratively certain prepositions is only possible because the Continental rationalists assumed they know the true essences of things. They thought they knew the true essences of things because they were confused about the state of names.
Names:
A name is a device to "abridge discourse". It stands for:
1) a group of coexisting ideas or
2) on of such a coexisting group "apple" is a name for the idea of a "red-spherical-sweet"
"Abstract ideas" are names that we give to ideas that have been isolated or abstracted from its context
Monday, March 13, 2006
Class Notes on Locke and some reflections
(Originally written March 13, 2006 in Book 1)
These are notes from History of Philosophy I dated 3/13/06
Locke: Doctrine of Substance
In what do qualities inhere? Locke's answer: material substratum.
Two reasons for supposing the material substratum:
1. Unity of Qualities
2. Cause & Effect
Berkley's Criticism:
1. Material substratum is never sensed.
2. Material substratum is not necessary as a causal explanation (God will do)
3. Material substratum is unintelligible
Numbers 1 and 3 were refuted by Locke, but number 2 really pins Locke down.
Locke's Compatibilism (soft determinism)
2 Powers in the mind
1. Understanding - power of perception (sensory and mental)
2. Will - power to choose
Volition is the actual exercising of the will
Is the will free?
Locke's answer: Meaningless question. It is meaningless to ask if power is free. The right question is, "is man free?" A man is free if they are able to carry out what the will chooses.
Liberty - the ability to execute what is willed.
Locke defines a person as a thinking-intelligent being.
Personal identity - sameness of rational thought or being or sameness of consciousness
This comes from previous notes on Locke:
Free Will - Chris Linehan
Is there free will in man? This question is irrelevant. A will is always determined to perform some action. A being is free if it has the power to act according to its determined will. Thus, a relevant question would then be "what or who determines the will of man?"
This also comes from reflection of those Locke notes
Questions that need to be answered:
Who am I?
-Chris Linehan, a 22 year-old male in Upland, IN. I am a Christian, a philosopher, a writer, a lover, a son, a brother, a nephew and a grandson. I am, that is I exist. I have a form, one which is constantly in motion, and subject to internal and external changes. I have solidity, that is I cannot be reached through. I have texture. I can be seen. I have a taste and odor, which is frequently pointed out to me. I can be sensed. I can sense. I can sense physical things, as physical objects that I see, and touch, taste, smell and hear. But I can also sense other things that are not physical in nature. I sense feelings, emotions and a sense of God.
Who is God? (or what?)
How do God, if it exists, and I interact?
These are notes from History of Philosophy I dated 3/13/06
Locke: Doctrine of Substance
In what do qualities inhere? Locke's answer: material substratum.
Two reasons for supposing the material substratum:
1. Unity of Qualities
2. Cause & Effect
Berkley's Criticism:
1. Material substratum is never sensed.
2. Material substratum is not necessary as a causal explanation (God will do)
3. Material substratum is unintelligible
Numbers 1 and 3 were refuted by Locke, but number 2 really pins Locke down.
Locke's Compatibilism (soft determinism)
2 Powers in the mind
1. Understanding - power of perception (sensory and mental)
2. Will - power to choose
Volition is the actual exercising of the will
Is the will free?
Locke's answer: Meaningless question. It is meaningless to ask if power is free. The right question is, "is man free?" A man is free if they are able to carry out what the will chooses.
Liberty - the ability to execute what is willed.
Locke defines a person as a thinking-intelligent being.
Personal identity - sameness of rational thought or being or sameness of consciousness
This comes from previous notes on Locke:
Free Will - Chris Linehan
Is there free will in man? This question is irrelevant. A will is always determined to perform some action. A being is free if it has the power to act according to its determined will. Thus, a relevant question would then be "what or who determines the will of man?"
This also comes from reflection of those Locke notes
Questions that need to be answered:
Who am I?
-Chris Linehan, a 22 year-old male in Upland, IN. I am a Christian, a philosopher, a writer, a lover, a son, a brother, a nephew and a grandson. I am, that is I exist. I have a form, one which is constantly in motion, and subject to internal and external changes. I have solidity, that is I cannot be reached through. I have texture. I can be seen. I have a taste and odor, which is frequently pointed out to me. I can be sensed. I can sense. I can sense physical things, as physical objects that I see, and touch, taste, smell and hear. But I can also sense other things that are not physical in nature. I sense feelings, emotions and a sense of God.
Who is God? (or what?)
How do God, if it exists, and I interact?
Friday, February 3, 2006
Leviathan Ch. 13-15
(Originally written February 3, 2006)
Continental Rationalism
-Descartes
-Spinoza
-Leibniz
British Empiricism
-Locke
-Berkeley
-Hume
Rationalism (early Modern)
1) Built a system by using math and geometry as a model
2) Believed in innate ideas (certain inborn ideas, conceptions, knowledge we have at the time of birth)
3) The explainability thesis: everything is susceptible to some rational explanation
Empiricism (early modern)
1) The source of ideas come from sense data (experience)
2) Justification of their beliefs must produce evidence of that belief
The Scientific Revolution
- Preceded and concurrent with the births of rationalism and empiricism
The pre-scientific revolution cosmology included:
1) geocentricism
2) the heavenly vault
3) the heterogeneity of the universe (terrestrial and celestial bodies moved differently)
4) Aristotelian doctrine of change/motion (demands a cause for motion, that cause also has to have a purpose)
-Efficient Cause - Mechanical
-Telic cause - giver of purpose
Galileo's science did not defeat the Church or Church theology. Galileo's sound theory deposed a bad influence of Aristotelianism on an uncritical theology.
Keys in Scientific Revolution
-Copernican Revolution (heliocentric)
-Kepler's law of planetary motion
-Bruno's infinite cosmos
-Galileo's kinetics
What are the implications of these on philosophy?
1) Universe is rational
2) The world is comprehensible
3) The cosmos is homogenous
4) Fruitfulness of systematic inquiry
5) Teleological (purpose oriented) explanation is no longer necessary
Classics of Philosophy
Ch. 13 of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan
Ch. 13 "of the natural condition of mankind as concerning their felicity, and misery"
Men are made equal. No one can claim to be greater by birth alone. "The weakest has the strength to kill the strongest" (Pojman, 542)
All men believe they are smarter than other men
From the fact that all men are equal in ability, all men have equal hope to achieve a goal. When these goals become conflicting then the men become enemies and both are capable in one way or another of destroying their enemy.
All men want to have their value assessed by their companions (equal, which is all men) assessed at what they have assessed it as.
In the nature of man we find three principles to quarrels
1) Competition
2) Diffidence
3) Glory
Competition makes men invade for gain, use violence for that gain
Diffidence makes men defend their position for safety
Glory makes men fight for glorify and trifles
Without a power to stop them, man is constantly at war with all other men.
The war exists in the act of fighting and in the knowledge that tensions are there that could ignite and inspire fighting. When there is no fighting and no intention of fighting there is peace.
When man is at war, there is no time for life, art, wealth, knowledge or worst of all, society. In times of war there is "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Pojman, 543).
Hobbes condemns men with words, other men condemn them with acts of locking doors and securing themselves.
Sin is not found in man's nature, passions or desires. It is not found even in his actions until he breaks the law.
Where there is no power to fear there is no law. Where there is no law there is no justice.
Justice and injustice do not lie in man or his nature; they lie in society.
The passions or desires that make men want peace are:
1) Fear of death
2) Desire for commodious living
3) The hope for the means to secure the commodious living
Chapter 14: Of the first and second natural law of contracts
The right of nature is the liberty of man to preserve his own life through any means necessary
Liberty is the absence of anything that would stop him from using his power.
A law of nature is a general rule that forbids man to destroy himself.
Right is the liberty to do something.
Law is what forbids them to do something
The first law of nature is to seek peace because it is good for him.
The second law of nature is to defend ourselves by any means necessary when the first law cannot be achieved.
This law is from the Gospel: "do whatever you wish done unto yourself"
If man insists on keeping the right to do whatever he wishes he is constantly at war; but, if he renounces that right and others renounce theirs they are at peace with each other. But not only one man can renounce his right and all others retain theirs for the man who renounced his right in the face of the others retaining theirs breaks the second law of nature by not employing all means to defend himself.
The bonds by which men transfer or renounce their rights to pursue peace are strengthened by the fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture of this agreement. They are not strengthened by the word of men because nothing is so easily broken as the word of man.
The renunciation or transfer of rights by a man is done so for a right being renounced by another or transferred to him by another or in the hopes of good that will come to him.
The mutual transferring of a right is a contract.
If a contract is made when one man's right is immediately transferred for the future transfer of another's right it is called a pact or a covenant.
When one transfers his right in hope of some future good to come to him it is called a gift, free gift or grace and is not a contract.
When a contract is made for both parties to transfer at a future date upon a power over them is needed to quash their constant tendency to return to state of war.
To make a covenant with God is impossible because we cannot know whether or not our covenants have been accepted.
Men are freed of their covenant in 2 ways:
1) by preforming: natural end of an obligation
2) by being forgive: restoration of a liberty
Chapter 15 "of other laws of nature"
The third natural law is that men perform the covenants that they make, otherwise their covenants are in vain and we are still in the condition of war.
Without any covenants there can be no covenants broken and if no covenant is broken than no injustice has been done.
The definition of justice is simply performing no unjust acts (not breaking any covenants)
To be justice their must be no war, because in a state of war there are no unjust acts. To be no war there must be a coercive power to force men to perform their covenants and thus be justice.
To enforce covenants (justice) the punishment of breaking covenants (injustice) must be greater than the anticipated gain of breaking the covenant.
The foolish man states that there is no justice and that there is no God.
The just man is the man who has taken all reasonable care to keep his covenants, the unjust man is the man who has neglected this reasonable care.
A just man does not by one or a few mistakes or unjust acts caused by sudden passion become unjust.
Injury is done to the man who breaks a covenant. Damage is done to the man whose covenant is broken by the other man.
No man gives without the intention of good to himself.
Compliance is a law of nature that states every man must strive to accommodate himself to the rest.
If a man retains what is superfluous to himself, yet necessary to others he should be cast out of society because he has become cumbersome to that society.
Forgiveness is another law of nature. A man should grant forgiveness for offenses past to another man that desires it.
Pardon is a granting of peace.
Another law of nature is that revenge should be forgone for the greatness of good that will follow a lack of revenge.
Avoidance of hatred is a natural law because hatred breeds war.
Another natural law is that all men must acknowledge one another as equal.
Equity is the distributive justice
There can be no unequal share given to different then, for that is contrary to equity.
Where there can be no equal distribution it is determined first by agreement, second by first seizure or first possession
An arbitrator should decide any dispute of covenant.
Continental Rationalism
-Descartes
-Spinoza
-Leibniz
British Empiricism
-Locke
-Berkeley
-Hume
Rationalism (early Modern)
1) Built a system by using math and geometry as a model
2) Believed in innate ideas (certain inborn ideas, conceptions, knowledge we have at the time of birth)
3) The explainability thesis: everything is susceptible to some rational explanation
Empiricism (early modern)
1) The source of ideas come from sense data (experience)
2) Justification of their beliefs must produce evidence of that belief
The Scientific Revolution
- Preceded and concurrent with the births of rationalism and empiricism
The pre-scientific revolution cosmology included:
1) geocentricism
2) the heavenly vault
3) the heterogeneity of the universe (terrestrial and celestial bodies moved differently)
4) Aristotelian doctrine of change/motion (demands a cause for motion, that cause also has to have a purpose)
-Efficient Cause - Mechanical
-Telic cause - giver of purpose
Galileo's science did not defeat the Church or Church theology. Galileo's sound theory deposed a bad influence of Aristotelianism on an uncritical theology.
Keys in Scientific Revolution
-Copernican Revolution (heliocentric)
-Kepler's law of planetary motion
-Bruno's infinite cosmos
-Galileo's kinetics
What are the implications of these on philosophy?
1) Universe is rational
2) The world is comprehensible
3) The cosmos is homogenous
4) Fruitfulness of systematic inquiry
5) Teleological (purpose oriented) explanation is no longer necessary
Classics of Philosophy
Ch. 13 of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan
Ch. 13 "of the natural condition of mankind as concerning their felicity, and misery"
Men are made equal. No one can claim to be greater by birth alone. "The weakest has the strength to kill the strongest" (Pojman, 542)
All men believe they are smarter than other men
From the fact that all men are equal in ability, all men have equal hope to achieve a goal. When these goals become conflicting then the men become enemies and both are capable in one way or another of destroying their enemy.
All men want to have their value assessed by their companions (equal, which is all men) assessed at what they have assessed it as.
In the nature of man we find three principles to quarrels
1) Competition
2) Diffidence
3) Glory
Competition makes men invade for gain, use violence for that gain
Diffidence makes men defend their position for safety
Glory makes men fight for glorify and trifles
Without a power to stop them, man is constantly at war with all other men.
The war exists in the act of fighting and in the knowledge that tensions are there that could ignite and inspire fighting. When there is no fighting and no intention of fighting there is peace.
When man is at war, there is no time for life, art, wealth, knowledge or worst of all, society. In times of war there is "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Pojman, 543).
Hobbes condemns men with words, other men condemn them with acts of locking doors and securing themselves.
Sin is not found in man's nature, passions or desires. It is not found even in his actions until he breaks the law.
Where there is no power to fear there is no law. Where there is no law there is no justice.
Justice and injustice do not lie in man or his nature; they lie in society.
The passions or desires that make men want peace are:
1) Fear of death
2) Desire for commodious living
3) The hope for the means to secure the commodious living
Chapter 14: Of the first and second natural law of contracts
The right of nature is the liberty of man to preserve his own life through any means necessary
Liberty is the absence of anything that would stop him from using his power.
A law of nature is a general rule that forbids man to destroy himself.
Right is the liberty to do something.
Law is what forbids them to do something
The first law of nature is to seek peace because it is good for him.
The second law of nature is to defend ourselves by any means necessary when the first law cannot be achieved.
This law is from the Gospel: "do whatever you wish done unto yourself"
If man insists on keeping the right to do whatever he wishes he is constantly at war; but, if he renounces that right and others renounce theirs they are at peace with each other. But not only one man can renounce his right and all others retain theirs for the man who renounced his right in the face of the others retaining theirs breaks the second law of nature by not employing all means to defend himself.
The bonds by which men transfer or renounce their rights to pursue peace are strengthened by the fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture of this agreement. They are not strengthened by the word of men because nothing is so easily broken as the word of man.
The renunciation or transfer of rights by a man is done so for a right being renounced by another or transferred to him by another or in the hopes of good that will come to him.
The mutual transferring of a right is a contract.
If a contract is made when one man's right is immediately transferred for the future transfer of another's right it is called a pact or a covenant.
When one transfers his right in hope of some future good to come to him it is called a gift, free gift or grace and is not a contract.
When a contract is made for both parties to transfer at a future date upon a power over them is needed to quash their constant tendency to return to state of war.
To make a covenant with God is impossible because we cannot know whether or not our covenants have been accepted.
Men are freed of their covenant in 2 ways:
1) by preforming: natural end of an obligation
2) by being forgive: restoration of a liberty
Chapter 15 "of other laws of nature"
The third natural law is that men perform the covenants that they make, otherwise their covenants are in vain and we are still in the condition of war.
Without any covenants there can be no covenants broken and if no covenant is broken than no injustice has been done.
The definition of justice is simply performing no unjust acts (not breaking any covenants)
To be justice their must be no war, because in a state of war there are no unjust acts. To be no war there must be a coercive power to force men to perform their covenants and thus be justice.
To enforce covenants (justice) the punishment of breaking covenants (injustice) must be greater than the anticipated gain of breaking the covenant.
The foolish man states that there is no justice and that there is no God.
The just man is the man who has taken all reasonable care to keep his covenants, the unjust man is the man who has neglected this reasonable care.
A just man does not by one or a few mistakes or unjust acts caused by sudden passion become unjust.
Injury is done to the man who breaks a covenant. Damage is done to the man whose covenant is broken by the other man.
No man gives without the intention of good to himself.
Compliance is a law of nature that states every man must strive to accommodate himself to the rest.
If a man retains what is superfluous to himself, yet necessary to others he should be cast out of society because he has become cumbersome to that society.
Forgiveness is another law of nature. A man should grant forgiveness for offenses past to another man that desires it.
Pardon is a granting of peace.
Another law of nature is that revenge should be forgone for the greatness of good that will follow a lack of revenge.
Avoidance of hatred is a natural law because hatred breeds war.
Another natural law is that all men must acknowledge one another as equal.
Equity is the distributive justice
There can be no unequal share given to different then, for that is contrary to equity.
Where there can be no equal distribution it is determined first by agreement, second by first seizure or first possession
An arbitrator should decide any dispute of covenant.
Sunday, September 18, 2005
The Problems of Philosophy - Chapter Four
(Originally written September 18, 2005 in Book 2)
The Problems of Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
1912
Chapter Four - Idealism
Whatever can be known to exist must in some sense be mental.
Bishop Berkeley contends that nothing exists that is not of mind. All things perceived are originated in the mind or else they would not exist. Things exist continually because they exist in God's mind. That is why a tree will still exist after we stop perceiving it through one of our senses.
Knowledge is based on the mind being to be in relationship with something outside the mind.
The knowledge of truths is the sort of knowledge that prevents error. It is tied into our beliefs, convictions and judgments.
The second meaning of the word 'know' is a knowledge of things, which is called acquaintance.
It is truth to say: "If I am acquainted with a thing that exists, may acquaintance gives me the knowledge that a thing exists". It is not however true to say that, "If I am not acquainted with a thing that exists, my lack of acquaintance gives me the knowledge that the thing does not exist".
When there is no acquaintance with a thing it is known by description. Description is the knowledge of a thing by an inference.
The Problems of Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
1912
Chapter Four - Idealism
Whatever can be known to exist must in some sense be mental.
Bishop Berkeley contends that nothing exists that is not of mind. All things perceived are originated in the mind or else they would not exist. Things exist continually because they exist in God's mind. That is why a tree will still exist after we stop perceiving it through one of our senses.
Knowledge is based on the mind being to be in relationship with something outside the mind.
The knowledge of truths is the sort of knowledge that prevents error. It is tied into our beliefs, convictions and judgments.
The second meaning of the word 'know' is a knowledge of things, which is called acquaintance.
It is truth to say: "If I am acquainted with a thing that exists, may acquaintance gives me the knowledge that a thing exists". It is not however true to say that, "If I am not acquainted with a thing that exists, my lack of acquaintance gives me the knowledge that the thing does not exist".
When there is no acquaintance with a thing it is known by description. Description is the knowledge of a thing by an inference.
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