(Originally written August 26, 2007 in Notebook 18)
Beyond Good & Evil
Friedrich Nietzsche
248
There are two types of genius:
1) That which wants to beget (man)
2) That which wants to give birth (woman)
These two types of peoples and genius search for one another looking to combine (as with man and woman) but, as with man and woman they often misunderstand one another.
249
"What is best in us we do not know - we cannot know" (Nietzsche 375).
250
Europe owes many things to the Jews, both good and bad.
Above all Europe owes the grand style of morality, infinite demands, infinite meanings; these we owe to the Jews and it is both the best and worst they have offered.
Nietzsche seeks to initiate a revolution process. He uses the Jews as a model on how to do so while disagreeing with the values they have set.
251
The Jews are the strongest and purest race in all of Europe. They prevail in hardships and change when they wish to.
The Jews have a faith that stands unembarrassed in the presence of modern ideas.
The Jews, if they wished, could take over all of Europe.
But rather than conquering the Jews wish only to be admitted and assimilated into a nation's culture.
The task which Nietzsche is serious about is the cultivation of a new caste that will rule Europe.
252
The English are unphilosophic as a race. Bacon is an attack on the philosophical spirit. Hobbes, Hume and Locke have amounted to a debasement of the value of philosophy.
His characteristic of an unphilosophical race is to cling to Christianity. The English need Christianity for its discipline, its power to moralize and its power to humanize.
The English person lacks a musical sense. The movements of their bodies and souls completely lack rhythm and dance.
253
There are truths that are recognized by mediocre minds at best.
The spirit of respectable, albeit mediocre, English minds like Darwin, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer is becoming fashionable in middle Europe.
These mediocre minds are necessary at times. For they are knowledgeable, but the higher man is a man who "can"
The disparity between 'know' and 'can' is great. In fact, a high mind must be able to do something starkly new and innovative. Their focus on new and can may demand that he not know as much.
254
The French are a semi-successful blending of the North and South cultures.
255
We must rise above the good and evil, and as the sun sets on the moral world it becomes hospitable and profound enough for fugitives.
256
"Europe wants to become one" (Nietzsche, 386).
Showing posts with label Mill. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mill. Show all posts
Sunday, August 26, 2007
Monday, March 5, 2007
Notes Theistic Proofs, Teleological emphasis
(Originally written March 5, 2007 in Book 13)
It seems implausible that all religious people have been deceived completely. The existence of a Transcendent God is more plausible than a completely skeptical outlook on life.
"It seems much more likely that such self-analyzing and self-critical men as Augustine, Blaise Pascal and Kierkegaard were not totally deceived than that total skepticism is right. Unless it is true that no person in the history of the world has ever really been truly critical of his religious experience, then it follows that the reality of God has been critically established from human experience" (76).
Part 2: God & Reason
5 The Function of Theistic Proofs
Most theists are not satisfied with proving God's existence on experience alone. They went to establish rational proofs.
The Modern attitude toward proofs for God
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have offered proofs for the existence of God.
There are four basic categories of theistic proofs:
1) Teleological - argument from telos (design or purpose)
2) Cosmological (aetiological) arguments from causation
3) Ontological - argument from onto (being)
4) Moral - argument from morality
Peter Koëstenbaum stated that theistic proofs are "logically invalid, epistemologically defective and axiologically misplaced" (80).
Proofs are Psychologically Unconvincing
Rational proofs are generally unpersuasive to non-believers.
Some argue that the mystical theology, not rational theology is the draw for religion. William James thought this was so because human needs are deeper than the rational.
"Psychological persuasion precedes rational demonstration" (81).
Proofs are logically invalid
If God does not appear in any of the premises he cannot appear in the conclusion because a conclusion cannot be broader than the premises.
Also, if God appears in the premises than the argument begs the question.
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective
This argument holds that even if God exists we cannot rationally know that he exists.
Kant held that we can only know the thing as it appears to us and not the thing in and of itself.
Proofs are ontologically inadequate
This argues that what is rationally inescapable may not be real. We may be able to devise a rational argument for there existence of God, but that does not mean God exists.
The inescapability of a rational argument is based on the principle of non-contradiction but the principle of non-contradiction, while being rationally inescapable has not been proven to be necessarily true.
Proofs are Axiologically Misplaced
The proof for the existence of God should not be the prime importance of one's religious experience.
Relating to the Modern Attitude Toward Proofs
Modern criticism are of value to theists today, but should not warrant a retreat to fideism.
Proof or Persuasion?
If people are never persuaded by proof then there is not intellectual integrity in the world.
While a rational proof may not play as crucial a role as Rene Descartes held it to, it does not follow that it plays no role at all. Even if if were true that people always believed in God apart from evidence, it does not follow that they believed against the evidence.
A proof for God, if it is successful, leads only to the belief that there is a God, not necessarily a belief in that God.
Disbelief does not always indicate disbelief.
Why do some great minds reject theistic proofs?
1) Some atheists accept no kinds of proof.
2) Some do not allow the types of arguments for God that they allow elsewhere.
3) Some choose not to commit themselves to God despite the evidence.
A lack of persuasion by a theistic proof is not necessarily a fault of that proof, it is a result of a personal choice.
Proofs and logical validity
A formal invalidity of a single proof does not mean all proofs are invalid.
Even if no one has stated a formally valid proof yet, it does not follow that one won't ever be stated.
Logical validity is not purely objective.
Not all rationally acceptable demonstration need to be valid deductions.
Are all Theistic Proofs Epistemologically Defective?
Kant's objections are rested on the unfounded assumption that all true knowledge is modeled after the empirical/mathematical knowledge of Newtonian science.
Kant's consistent agnosticism is not livable because it is self-defeating.
The dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is an unfounded assumption.
Each argument or theistic proof must be examined on its own grounds. One cannot reject all theistic proofs a priori.
Is the Rationally Inescapable Real?
Admitting that theistic proofs are rationally inescapable would be a triumph for theism. Because if theism is rational than atheism is irrational.
People believe that reality is rational and to deny that a rational argument is valid, but not real is to state that a reality is not rational.
To deny that rational is real is to deny that logic or reason has any place in reality.
To state that logic does not apply to reality is self-defeating.
Are proofs Axiologically Misplaced?
Proofs can play a practical and a critical role.
Theoretical proofs should not be used to replace immediate help for immediate needs, but immediate needs should not eliminate theoretical proofs altogether.
6. Theological and Moral Arguments
4 Kinds of attempts to prove the existence of God:
1) Teleological
2) Moral
3) Ontological
4) Cosmological
Teleological Proofs and Problems
The teleological argument in a nutshell is this: the apparent design of the universe is evidence of an intelligent architect
Paley's Watchmaker
William Paley (1743-1805), the archdeacon of Carlisle, gave one of the most popular forms of the teleological argument: Paley argued that if one were to come across a watch in an empty field one would rightly conclude that it had a maker because of its design. The world is even more complexly designed; thus, there must be a world maker.
Cleanthes' Greater Machine Maker
In Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' the theist Clenches offers this teleological argument:
1) All design implies a designer
2) Great design implies a great designer
3) There is great design in the world (like that of a great machine)
4) Therefore, there must be a great Designer of the world
Cleanthes' argument extends beyond Paley's in four ways:
1) He uses other illustrations of design (human eye, male-flame relation, a book, and a voice from Heaven)
2) Makes it clear that the teleological argument is an argument from analogy and that like effects have like causes
3) Denies that chance could cause a voice from heaven
4) Insists that irregularities in nature do not detract from the argument
Mill's objection to the Watchmaker's Argument
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) objected to Paley's argument and then posited one he considered better.
Mill weakened Paley's argument but did not destroy it.
He argued that Paley's argument is built on an analogy. He stated that analogy is weak when there are dissimilarities. Also there is a significant difference between a watch and the world. Thus, Paley's argument is weak.
Mill built his argument on his "method of agreement".
Mill's argument:
1) There is an amazing concurrence of many diverse elements in a human eye.
2) It is impossible that random selection brought this concurrence.
3) The method of agreement argues for a common cause of the eye.
4) The cause was a final (purposing) cause, not an efficient (producing) cause
Mill admitted that if evolution were true, then this argument would be weak.
Hackett's rejoinder on Analogy
Stuart C. Hackett argues:
1) All composites that involve the relation of complex means so as to produce a significant result are composites of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
2) The space-time universe is a composite in which complex means are so heated as to produce significant results.
3) Therefore, the space-time universe is a composite of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
Alvin Plantinga, while not a proponent of the teleological argument points out that criticism of analogy principles is not as strong as it appears to be.
Russell's Evolutionary Disproof
Bertrand Russell offered a disproof of the teleological argument from evolution:
1) The adaptation of means to end in the world is either the result of evolution or else the result of design.
2) This adaptation is the result of evolution.
3) Therefore, this adaptation is not the result of design.
Russell's argument does not disprove the teleological argument. It (at best) forces a modification because:
1) There is no logical reason why adaptation cannot be the result of both evolution and design.
2) Natural selection has not been shown to fully account for all adaptation.
Hume's Skeptical Alternatives to Teleology
Hume stated that if the world were designed that the design would be either:
1) Different from human designs
2) Finite, since the effect is fine
3) Imperfect, because there are imperfection in nature
4) Multiple
5) Male and female because males and females generate this way
6) Anthropomorphic
Or that there is no design
1) The apparent order in the world arose via chance
Alvin Plantinga agrees with Hume's criticism of the teleological argument stating that there may exist a "smidgin of evidence" for design, but that one ought not infer designer from a minute amount of evidence.
Since the time of Hume a teleological theist must show that both the teleological argument woks and that disproofs of teleological arguments are wrong. (It must show that God exists and that the world did not arise from chance).
Taylor's Anticipatory Design
A.E. Taylor hoped to account for evolutionary and chance alternatives with his argument. His argument states:
1. Nature reveals an anticipatory order; it plans for its own preservation.
2. Nature's advanced planning cannot be accounted for by physical laws alone.
3. Mind or intelligence is the only known condition that can remove these improbabilities against life emerging despite these improbabilities.
4. The mind or intelligence that explains anticipatory adaptations cannot be explained as a result of evolution.
5. Darwinian natural selection cannot explain the advance planning evident in nature.
Clark: Design and Thermodynamics
R.E.D. Clark argues against chance by using the second law of thermodynamics
1. Whatever had a beginning had a beginner
2. The Universe had a beginning (as evidenced by the second law of thermodynamics)
3. Therefore, the universe had a beginner who is intelligent and moral.
Intelligence and morality imply personality, thus the Beginner must be personal.
The New Teleological argument:
1) The Universe resulted from either design or chance
2) It is highly improbable it resulted from chance
3) Therefore, it is highly probable it resulted from design.
A loophole in the Argument Against Chance
There is an immensely small probability that the universe happened solely by chance. But, this is an a priori notion. In actual fact, which is a posteriori, it may have occurred by chance despite the remoteness of that chance.
Julian Huxley, a defender of evolution estimated that the odds against evolution were 3 million zeros (15 pages of zeros) to one. Huxley argued that natural selection was the process of overcoming these odds.
Tennant: Filling in the Loophole of chance
One argument against the teleological argument is that the design in the knowable universe may be only temporary and fragmentary.
F.R. Tennant admits that this is a possibility, but only a highly improbable one.
Tennant states that:
1) Mere possibilities of the unknown or unknowable world cannot be used to refute the probabilities within the knowable world
2) There is no evidence to support that the thesis that the knowable world is a lie to the unknowable world
3) The knowable universe is interwoven and interdependent with the unknown universe
4) Thermodynamics shows complexity; random development to be unlikely
5) Chance rearranging of matter cannot explain mind or intelligence
6) The qualitative greatness of human values outweighs the quantitative immensity of the unknowable world
Kant: Ontological defects in the Teleological Argument
Kant rather than offering a disproof for God or completely disregarding the teleological argument, insisted that it was inconclusive.
He stated that we cannot move from experience of design to the idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary being.
The teleological argument does not provide evidence for a creator, but indicates an architect.
The argument yields the highest cause, but is not a sufficient basis for religion. The sap from the highest actual cause indicated by experience to the highest possible cause demanded by pure reason is an unjustifiable ontological leap.
Ducasse: Cosmological Problems in the Teleological Argument
C.J. Ducasse claims that the teleological argument suffers from a number of defects:
1) It does not prove a perfect creator (evil, waste and disease show a lack of purpose)
2) Designers can be inferior to what they design
3) The teleological argument has the same defects the cosmological argument was:
-If the world needs a designer, then so does that designer (ad infinitum)
-If everything is caused, there can be no first cause
Ducasse offers this in replace of the teleological argument:
1) The most economical explanation is probably the correct one
2) The world is more economically explained by a purposeless craving within man than by some intelligence beyond the world
3) Therefore, it is more probable that the world is the result of purposeless craving than of intelligent design
This argument is lacking in several ways:
1) The principle of economy may not be appropriately applied to the cause of the universe
2) Assuming that the best cause will come from within the universe, but not from beyond it begs the question
3) How is a purposeless craving a more economical explanation than that of a God?
4) How can a purposeless craving result in purposeful activity?
The teleological argument is not definitive as it stands, but it does:
1) Make it probable (not certain) that some kind of intelligence is behind the design of the world (chance is possible, but not probable)
2) Favor the unity of this cause
3) Not demand that the cause be absolutely perfect
4) Does not ipso facto explain the presence of evil and disorder in the world?
5) Is dependent on the cosmological and moral arguments to establish these other aspects of a theistic God
6) Is really a causal argument from effect to cause, only it argues from the intelligence nature of the effect to an intelligent one.
The teleological argument depends on the cosmological argument in that it borrows the principle of causality.
It seems implausible that all religious people have been deceived completely. The existence of a Transcendent God is more plausible than a completely skeptical outlook on life.
"It seems much more likely that such self-analyzing and self-critical men as Augustine, Blaise Pascal and Kierkegaard were not totally deceived than that total skepticism is right. Unless it is true that no person in the history of the world has ever really been truly critical of his religious experience, then it follows that the reality of God has been critically established from human experience" (76).
Part 2: God & Reason
5 The Function of Theistic Proofs
Most theists are not satisfied with proving God's existence on experience alone. They went to establish rational proofs.
The Modern attitude toward proofs for God
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have offered proofs for the existence of God.
There are four basic categories of theistic proofs:
1) Teleological - argument from telos (design or purpose)
2) Cosmological (aetiological) arguments from causation
3) Ontological - argument from onto (being)
4) Moral - argument from morality
Peter Koëstenbaum stated that theistic proofs are "logically invalid, epistemologically defective and axiologically misplaced" (80).
Proofs are Psychologically Unconvincing
Rational proofs are generally unpersuasive to non-believers.
Some argue that the mystical theology, not rational theology is the draw for religion. William James thought this was so because human needs are deeper than the rational.
"Psychological persuasion precedes rational demonstration" (81).
Proofs are logically invalid
If God does not appear in any of the premises he cannot appear in the conclusion because a conclusion cannot be broader than the premises.
Also, if God appears in the premises than the argument begs the question.
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective
This argument holds that even if God exists we cannot rationally know that he exists.
Kant held that we can only know the thing as it appears to us and not the thing in and of itself.
Proofs are ontologically inadequate
This argues that what is rationally inescapable may not be real. We may be able to devise a rational argument for there existence of God, but that does not mean God exists.
The inescapability of a rational argument is based on the principle of non-contradiction but the principle of non-contradiction, while being rationally inescapable has not been proven to be necessarily true.
Proofs are Axiologically Misplaced
The proof for the existence of God should not be the prime importance of one's religious experience.
Relating to the Modern Attitude Toward Proofs
Modern criticism are of value to theists today, but should not warrant a retreat to fideism.
Proof or Persuasion?
If people are never persuaded by proof then there is not intellectual integrity in the world.
While a rational proof may not play as crucial a role as Rene Descartes held it to, it does not follow that it plays no role at all. Even if if were true that people always believed in God apart from evidence, it does not follow that they believed against the evidence.
A proof for God, if it is successful, leads only to the belief that there is a God, not necessarily a belief in that God.
Disbelief does not always indicate disbelief.
Why do some great minds reject theistic proofs?
1) Some atheists accept no kinds of proof.
2) Some do not allow the types of arguments for God that they allow elsewhere.
3) Some choose not to commit themselves to God despite the evidence.
A lack of persuasion by a theistic proof is not necessarily a fault of that proof, it is a result of a personal choice.
Proofs and logical validity
A formal invalidity of a single proof does not mean all proofs are invalid.
Even if no one has stated a formally valid proof yet, it does not follow that one won't ever be stated.
Logical validity is not purely objective.
Not all rationally acceptable demonstration need to be valid deductions.
Are all Theistic Proofs Epistemologically Defective?
Kant's objections are rested on the unfounded assumption that all true knowledge is modeled after the empirical/mathematical knowledge of Newtonian science.
Kant's consistent agnosticism is not livable because it is self-defeating.
The dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is an unfounded assumption.
Each argument or theistic proof must be examined on its own grounds. One cannot reject all theistic proofs a priori.
Is the Rationally Inescapable Real?
Admitting that theistic proofs are rationally inescapable would be a triumph for theism. Because if theism is rational than atheism is irrational.
People believe that reality is rational and to deny that a rational argument is valid, but not real is to state that a reality is not rational.
To deny that rational is real is to deny that logic or reason has any place in reality.
To state that logic does not apply to reality is self-defeating.
Are proofs Axiologically Misplaced?
Proofs can play a practical and a critical role.
Theoretical proofs should not be used to replace immediate help for immediate needs, but immediate needs should not eliminate theoretical proofs altogether.
6. Theological and Moral Arguments
4 Kinds of attempts to prove the existence of God:
1) Teleological
2) Moral
3) Ontological
4) Cosmological
Teleological Proofs and Problems
The teleological argument in a nutshell is this: the apparent design of the universe is evidence of an intelligent architect
Paley's Watchmaker
William Paley (1743-1805), the archdeacon of Carlisle, gave one of the most popular forms of the teleological argument: Paley argued that if one were to come across a watch in an empty field one would rightly conclude that it had a maker because of its design. The world is even more complexly designed; thus, there must be a world maker.
Cleanthes' Greater Machine Maker
In Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' the theist Clenches offers this teleological argument:
1) All design implies a designer
2) Great design implies a great designer
3) There is great design in the world (like that of a great machine)
4) Therefore, there must be a great Designer of the world
Cleanthes' argument extends beyond Paley's in four ways:
1) He uses other illustrations of design (human eye, male-flame relation, a book, and a voice from Heaven)
2) Makes it clear that the teleological argument is an argument from analogy and that like effects have like causes
3) Denies that chance could cause a voice from heaven
4) Insists that irregularities in nature do not detract from the argument
Mill's objection to the Watchmaker's Argument
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) objected to Paley's argument and then posited one he considered better.
Mill weakened Paley's argument but did not destroy it.
He argued that Paley's argument is built on an analogy. He stated that analogy is weak when there are dissimilarities. Also there is a significant difference between a watch and the world. Thus, Paley's argument is weak.
Mill built his argument on his "method of agreement".
Mill's argument:
1) There is an amazing concurrence of many diverse elements in a human eye.
2) It is impossible that random selection brought this concurrence.
3) The method of agreement argues for a common cause of the eye.
4) The cause was a final (purposing) cause, not an efficient (producing) cause
Mill admitted that if evolution were true, then this argument would be weak.
Hackett's rejoinder on Analogy
Stuart C. Hackett argues:
1) All composites that involve the relation of complex means so as to produce a significant result are composites of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
2) The space-time universe is a composite in which complex means are so heated as to produce significant results.
3) Therefore, the space-time universe is a composite of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect.
Alvin Plantinga, while not a proponent of the teleological argument points out that criticism of analogy principles is not as strong as it appears to be.
Russell's Evolutionary Disproof
Bertrand Russell offered a disproof of the teleological argument from evolution:
1) The adaptation of means to end in the world is either the result of evolution or else the result of design.
2) This adaptation is the result of evolution.
3) Therefore, this adaptation is not the result of design.
Russell's argument does not disprove the teleological argument. It (at best) forces a modification because:
1) There is no logical reason why adaptation cannot be the result of both evolution and design.
2) Natural selection has not been shown to fully account for all adaptation.
Hume's Skeptical Alternatives to Teleology
Hume stated that if the world were designed that the design would be either:
1) Different from human designs
2) Finite, since the effect is fine
3) Imperfect, because there are imperfection in nature
4) Multiple
5) Male and female because males and females generate this way
6) Anthropomorphic
Or that there is no design
1) The apparent order in the world arose via chance
Alvin Plantinga agrees with Hume's criticism of the teleological argument stating that there may exist a "smidgin of evidence" for design, but that one ought not infer designer from a minute amount of evidence.
Since the time of Hume a teleological theist must show that both the teleological argument woks and that disproofs of teleological arguments are wrong. (It must show that God exists and that the world did not arise from chance).
Taylor's Anticipatory Design
A.E. Taylor hoped to account for evolutionary and chance alternatives with his argument. His argument states:
1. Nature reveals an anticipatory order; it plans for its own preservation.
2. Nature's advanced planning cannot be accounted for by physical laws alone.
3. Mind or intelligence is the only known condition that can remove these improbabilities against life emerging despite these improbabilities.
4. The mind or intelligence that explains anticipatory adaptations cannot be explained as a result of evolution.
5. Darwinian natural selection cannot explain the advance planning evident in nature.
Clark: Design and Thermodynamics
R.E.D. Clark argues against chance by using the second law of thermodynamics
1. Whatever had a beginning had a beginner
2. The Universe had a beginning (as evidenced by the second law of thermodynamics)
3. Therefore, the universe had a beginner who is intelligent and moral.
Intelligence and morality imply personality, thus the Beginner must be personal.
The New Teleological argument:
1) The Universe resulted from either design or chance
2) It is highly improbable it resulted from chance
3) Therefore, it is highly probable it resulted from design.
A loophole in the Argument Against Chance
There is an immensely small probability that the universe happened solely by chance. But, this is an a priori notion. In actual fact, which is a posteriori, it may have occurred by chance despite the remoteness of that chance.
Julian Huxley, a defender of evolution estimated that the odds against evolution were 3 million zeros (15 pages of zeros) to one. Huxley argued that natural selection was the process of overcoming these odds.
Tennant: Filling in the Loophole of chance
One argument against the teleological argument is that the design in the knowable universe may be only temporary and fragmentary.
F.R. Tennant admits that this is a possibility, but only a highly improbable one.
Tennant states that:
1) Mere possibilities of the unknown or unknowable world cannot be used to refute the probabilities within the knowable world
2) There is no evidence to support that the thesis that the knowable world is a lie to the unknowable world
3) The knowable universe is interwoven and interdependent with the unknown universe
4) Thermodynamics shows complexity; random development to be unlikely
5) Chance rearranging of matter cannot explain mind or intelligence
6) The qualitative greatness of human values outweighs the quantitative immensity of the unknowable world
Kant: Ontological defects in the Teleological Argument
Kant rather than offering a disproof for God or completely disregarding the teleological argument, insisted that it was inconclusive.
He stated that we cannot move from experience of design to the idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary being.
The teleological argument does not provide evidence for a creator, but indicates an architect.
The argument yields the highest cause, but is not a sufficient basis for religion. The sap from the highest actual cause indicated by experience to the highest possible cause demanded by pure reason is an unjustifiable ontological leap.
Ducasse: Cosmological Problems in the Teleological Argument
C.J. Ducasse claims that the teleological argument suffers from a number of defects:
1) It does not prove a perfect creator (evil, waste and disease show a lack of purpose)
2) Designers can be inferior to what they design
3) The teleological argument has the same defects the cosmological argument was:
-If the world needs a designer, then so does that designer (ad infinitum)
-If everything is caused, there can be no first cause
Ducasse offers this in replace of the teleological argument:
1) The most economical explanation is probably the correct one
2) The world is more economically explained by a purposeless craving within man than by some intelligence beyond the world
3) Therefore, it is more probable that the world is the result of purposeless craving than of intelligent design
This argument is lacking in several ways:
1) The principle of economy may not be appropriately applied to the cause of the universe
2) Assuming that the best cause will come from within the universe, but not from beyond it begs the question
3) How is a purposeless craving a more economical explanation than that of a God?
4) How can a purposeless craving result in purposeful activity?
The teleological argument is not definitive as it stands, but it does:
1) Make it probable (not certain) that some kind of intelligence is behind the design of the world (chance is possible, but not probable)
2) Favor the unity of this cause
3) Not demand that the cause be absolutely perfect
4) Does not ipso facto explain the presence of evil and disorder in the world?
5) Is dependent on the cosmological and moral arguments to establish these other aspects of a theistic God
6) Is really a causal argument from effect to cause, only it argues from the intelligence nature of the effect to an intelligent one.
The teleological argument depends on the cosmological argument in that it borrows the principle of causality.
Saturday, December 9, 2006
Quick notes & Barebones Outline of a lost Epistemology Paper
(Originally written December 9, 2006 in Book 12)
Ok, it's Saturday about 1:00 pm. I have a major epistemology paper due at 9:00 am on Monday, which I have not ben diligent in working on. So, it's research time!
Thesis (preliminary) all knowledge is analytic in nature. Synthetic nature is artificial.
Louis Pojman
The Theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
VII.2 An Empiricist Critique of A priori knowledge - A.J. Ayer
No matter of fact can be shown to be logically necessarily or universally true (Hume).
Ayer states that no proposition with factual content is necessarily true.
Every empiricist must accept the thesis that no factual propositions can be necessary truths.
Empiricism faces difficulties with this thesis in dealing with mathematics and logical truths. There are two ways of dealing with this:
1) They are not necessary truths (in this case their universalness must be somehow explained).
2) They have no factual content (in this case they must be able to explain why a proposition without factual content can be true and useful and surprising).
If both of these prove unsatisfactory, empiricism is proven wrong and rationalism is vindicated.
Rationalism states that thought, independent of experience is a more reliable source of knowledge than experience.
John Stuart Mill adopted the thesis that mathematic and logical truths are not necessary. He maintained that they were merely inductive generalizations based on a very large number of experiences. Thus, these mathematical and logical truths were very probable, but not certain.
The difference between Mathematical and logical truths and scientific generalizations was a difference of degree, not kind.
Ayer admits that by rejecting Mill's approach, empiricists are obliged to be somewhat dogmatic.
The Irrefutability of the Propositions of Mathematics and Logic
In every instance when a mathematical or logical truth appears to be refuted we can easily find a way to show that it has not. Truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies.
The Nature of Analytic Propositions
Kant's definition of an analytic proposition, "one in which the predicate B belonged to the subject A as something which was covertly contained in the concept of A" (Pojman, 381).
Analytic judgments add nothing to the subject; whereas synthetic judgments do.
Analytic judgments provide no factual content and it is for this reason no experience can refute them.
Because analytic judgments provide no factual content it does not follow that they are senseless.
Analytic propositions provide us with some new knowledge. They clarify. They show new linguistic usages.
Analytic judgments allow us to make explicit what was implicit.
The Propositions of Geometry
Kant believed that geometry was the study of the properties of physical space.
Non-Euclidean Geometry has proven that geometry is not the study of physical space. We merely use geometry to reason about physical space.
Necessary truths are devoid of factual content. A priori truths are always analytic. They are always tautologies.
How can Tautologies be surprising?
The power of logic or mathematics to surprise us has its origin solely in the limitedness of our minds, not in their content.
All a priori truths are tautologies. Tautologies serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, they do not contain any information about any matter of fact.
Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
translated by: Paul Schrecken and Anne Martin Schrecker
The Unity of Leibniz's philosophic thought
There is a pervasive inner unity that flows through all of Leibniz's work.
Leibniz held a belief in a universal language.
Reflections on knowledge, truth, and ideas
All knowledge is either obscure or clear. Clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. Distinct knowledge is either adequate or inadequate. Distinct knowledge is either symbolic or intuitive.
"The most perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive" (Leibniz, 3).
Knowledge is obscure when it is insufficient to recognize what it represents.
Knowledge is clear when it is sufficient to recognize the object it represents.
Clear knowledge is confused when it cannot be distinguished from other objects in description. It is recognizable, but only to me.
Distinct knowledge is distinguishable and explicable knowledge. It is distinct when we can explain it to others.
Perfect knowledge is both adequate and distinct, but Leibniz doubts whether or not man can give a true account of this, but numbers come close.
Intuitive knowledge occurs when the whole of simple idea is known at once. Symbolic knowledge is knowledge o highly complex notions where the whole is known without full knowledge of all the parts.
There is a difference in definitions:
1) Nominal definitions - contain only marks to distinguish the defined thing from other things
2) Real definitions - actually describing the object in its fullest
By distinguishing these definitions we refute Hobbes' notion that all truths are arbitrary. (Hobbes' assumption rests on all definitions being nominal ones).
An idea is true when it is possible (it is false when it involves a contradiction).
Possibility is known either a priori or a posteriori
Causal definitions are known a priori.
A posteriori possibility is known when we experience a thing in reality.
When we have adequate knowledge we also possess a priori knowledge of a possibility.
Thought experiment - when we perceive green we are unaware that we are actually perceiving blue + yellow. Thus, what is green is known, analytically, as yellow+blue.
On the Universal Science: Characteristic XIV
All certain knowledge is established through demonstration or experiments.
Science is based on reason.
We need some exact language, or a form of truly philosophical writing in which ideas are reducible to a kind of "alphabet of human thought"
Leibnizian demonstrations involve two principles:
1) What implies contradiction is false
**2) Reason can be given for any truth, the predicate concept always inheres in its subject concept, either explicitly or implicitly
Necessary truths can be reduced to identical propositions
Contingent truths require an infinite analysis which can be performed solely by God. Only God can know contingent truths a priori.
Contingent truths are truths of fact.
XV
"All human reasoning uses certain signs or character" (Leibniz, 17).
Knowledge is symbolic.
All human ideas can be reduced into a few primitives. (cogitationes -> primitivas)
Critical remarks concerning the General Part of Descartes' principles
One must, in searching for truth, doubt everyone at some point in one's lifetime.
2. That what is doubtful should be considered false.
-There is no advantage to this.
4. Why one can place in doubt the truth of sensible things.
-All we need to know is that they are consistent among themselves.
Linehan - This is interesting, but unhelpful to my research. I'm skipping it.
On the Improvement of Metaphysics and on the concept of substance
Mathematics possesses clarity; metaphysics possesses obscurity.
The cause of metaphysical obscurity is that the general concepts of metaphysics are ambiguous.
Metaphysics needs clarity and clearness and certitude even more than mathematics.
Force is inherent in substance. Force is the faculty to act, action itself and requires effort.
What is nature? Reflections on the force inherent in created things and on their actions
What does nature consist of?
Do created things posses an energy?
The whole of nature is the perfect work of God's making.
Robert Boyle states that nature is the mechanism of bodies.
Linehan - I think I have exhausted my resources in this book for my epistemology paper. But, just reading a little bit of Leibniz has restored my love and respect for him and rationalism in general.
So now it is time for the paper!
Paper Structure:
I. Thesis
II. Definitions
A. Historical
i. epistemological/metaphysical/semantical categories
1. Kant's 4 Quadrants
2. A.J. Ayer's a priori
3. Leibniz divisions of knowledge
B. Personal
III. Thought Experiments (proofs of I)
1. Logical
2. Mathematical
3. Propositional
IV. Objections and responses
V. Closing
Thesis: Knowledge is...
1) Analytic (semantical)
2) Tautological (semantical)
3) A Priori (epistemological)
4) Necessary (metaphysical)
Knowledge has three major components
1) Epistemological
2) Semantical
3) Metaphysical
Epistemological and semantical knowledge are closely related and focused on together, mainly because of Kant. Metaphysical knowledge has been intertwined with epistemological and semantical, though less explicit.
Definitions of Knowledge
Leibnizian distinctions lead to my definition.
First of the three components: Epistemological
definition of a priori (Pojman, 367)
definition of a posteriori (Pojman, 367)
Kantian definition of analytic propositions
Ayer definition of a priori truths
2nd of the 3 components: Semantical
definition of analytic
definition of synthetic
Ayer's distinction
Leibnizian definition/personal additions
Ayer's truth of logic (mathematics)
Thought experiments
1) Logic
2) Mathematics
3) Empirical (most controversial)
3rd of 3 Components: Metaphysical
definition of necessary truths
definition of contingent truths
Hume's objection (needs more research)
Ayer's factual content necessary truth?
Metaphysical difficulties for the empiricist
Ayer has satisfactory proved factual content but he has not eliminated rationalism. Explain why and you'll be able to demonstrate all three parts of your thesis and vindicate your definition of knowledge (conclusion).
Ok, it's Saturday about 1:00 pm. I have a major epistemology paper due at 9:00 am on Monday, which I have not ben diligent in working on. So, it's research time!
Thesis (preliminary) all knowledge is analytic in nature. Synthetic nature is artificial.
Louis Pojman
The Theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
VII.2 An Empiricist Critique of A priori knowledge - A.J. Ayer
No matter of fact can be shown to be logically necessarily or universally true (Hume).
Ayer states that no proposition with factual content is necessarily true.
Every empiricist must accept the thesis that no factual propositions can be necessary truths.
Empiricism faces difficulties with this thesis in dealing with mathematics and logical truths. There are two ways of dealing with this:
1) They are not necessary truths (in this case their universalness must be somehow explained).
2) They have no factual content (in this case they must be able to explain why a proposition without factual content can be true and useful and surprising).
If both of these prove unsatisfactory, empiricism is proven wrong and rationalism is vindicated.
Rationalism states that thought, independent of experience is a more reliable source of knowledge than experience.
John Stuart Mill adopted the thesis that mathematic and logical truths are not necessary. He maintained that they were merely inductive generalizations based on a very large number of experiences. Thus, these mathematical and logical truths were very probable, but not certain.
The difference between Mathematical and logical truths and scientific generalizations was a difference of degree, not kind.
Ayer admits that by rejecting Mill's approach, empiricists are obliged to be somewhat dogmatic.
The Irrefutability of the Propositions of Mathematics and Logic
In every instance when a mathematical or logical truth appears to be refuted we can easily find a way to show that it has not. Truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies.
The Nature of Analytic Propositions
Kant's definition of an analytic proposition, "one in which the predicate B belonged to the subject A as something which was covertly contained in the concept of A" (Pojman, 381).
Analytic judgments add nothing to the subject; whereas synthetic judgments do.
Analytic judgments provide no factual content and it is for this reason no experience can refute them.
Because analytic judgments provide no factual content it does not follow that they are senseless.
Analytic propositions provide us with some new knowledge. They clarify. They show new linguistic usages.
Analytic judgments allow us to make explicit what was implicit.
The Propositions of Geometry
Kant believed that geometry was the study of the properties of physical space.
Non-Euclidean Geometry has proven that geometry is not the study of physical space. We merely use geometry to reason about physical space.
Necessary truths are devoid of factual content. A priori truths are always analytic. They are always tautologies.
How can Tautologies be surprising?
The power of logic or mathematics to surprise us has its origin solely in the limitedness of our minds, not in their content.
All a priori truths are tautologies. Tautologies serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, they do not contain any information about any matter of fact.
Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
translated by: Paul Schrecken and Anne Martin Schrecker
The Unity of Leibniz's philosophic thought
There is a pervasive inner unity that flows through all of Leibniz's work.
Leibniz held a belief in a universal language.
Reflections on knowledge, truth, and ideas
All knowledge is either obscure or clear. Clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. Distinct knowledge is either adequate or inadequate. Distinct knowledge is either symbolic or intuitive.
"The most perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive" (Leibniz, 3).
Knowledge is obscure when it is insufficient to recognize what it represents.
Knowledge is clear when it is sufficient to recognize the object it represents.
Clear knowledge is confused when it cannot be distinguished from other objects in description. It is recognizable, but only to me.
Distinct knowledge is distinguishable and explicable knowledge. It is distinct when we can explain it to others.
Perfect knowledge is both adequate and distinct, but Leibniz doubts whether or not man can give a true account of this, but numbers come close.
Intuitive knowledge occurs when the whole of simple idea is known at once. Symbolic knowledge is knowledge o highly complex notions where the whole is known without full knowledge of all the parts.
There is a difference in definitions:
1) Nominal definitions - contain only marks to distinguish the defined thing from other things
2) Real definitions - actually describing the object in its fullest
By distinguishing these definitions we refute Hobbes' notion that all truths are arbitrary. (Hobbes' assumption rests on all definitions being nominal ones).
An idea is true when it is possible (it is false when it involves a contradiction).
Possibility is known either a priori or a posteriori
Causal definitions are known a priori.
A posteriori possibility is known when we experience a thing in reality.
When we have adequate knowledge we also possess a priori knowledge of a possibility.
Thought experiment - when we perceive green we are unaware that we are actually perceiving blue + yellow. Thus, what is green is known, analytically, as yellow+blue.
On the Universal Science: Characteristic XIV
All certain knowledge is established through demonstration or experiments.
Science is based on reason.
We need some exact language, or a form of truly philosophical writing in which ideas are reducible to a kind of "alphabet of human thought"
Leibnizian demonstrations involve two principles:
1) What implies contradiction is false
**2) Reason can be given for any truth, the predicate concept always inheres in its subject concept, either explicitly or implicitly
Necessary truths can be reduced to identical propositions
Contingent truths require an infinite analysis which can be performed solely by God. Only God can know contingent truths a priori.
Contingent truths are truths of fact.
XV
"All human reasoning uses certain signs or character" (Leibniz, 17).
Knowledge is symbolic.
All human ideas can be reduced into a few primitives. (cogitationes -> primitivas)
Critical remarks concerning the General Part of Descartes' principles
One must, in searching for truth, doubt everyone at some point in one's lifetime.
2. That what is doubtful should be considered false.
-There is no advantage to this.
4. Why one can place in doubt the truth of sensible things.
-All we need to know is that they are consistent among themselves.
Linehan - This is interesting, but unhelpful to my research. I'm skipping it.
On the Improvement of Metaphysics and on the concept of substance
Mathematics possesses clarity; metaphysics possesses obscurity.
The cause of metaphysical obscurity is that the general concepts of metaphysics are ambiguous.
Metaphysics needs clarity and clearness and certitude even more than mathematics.
Force is inherent in substance. Force is the faculty to act, action itself and requires effort.
What is nature? Reflections on the force inherent in created things and on their actions
What does nature consist of?
Do created things posses an energy?
The whole of nature is the perfect work of God's making.
Robert Boyle states that nature is the mechanism of bodies.
Linehan - I think I have exhausted my resources in this book for my epistemology paper. But, just reading a little bit of Leibniz has restored my love and respect for him and rationalism in general.
So now it is time for the paper!
Paper Structure:
I. Thesis
II. Definitions
A. Historical
i. epistemological/metaphysical/semantical categories
1. Kant's 4 Quadrants
2. A.J. Ayer's a priori
3. Leibniz divisions of knowledge
B. Personal
III. Thought Experiments (proofs of I)
1. Logical
2. Mathematical
3. Propositional
IV. Objections and responses
V. Closing
Thesis: Knowledge is...
1) Analytic (semantical)
2) Tautological (semantical)
3) A Priori (epistemological)
4) Necessary (metaphysical)
Knowledge has three major components
1) Epistemological
2) Semantical
3) Metaphysical
Epistemological and semantical knowledge are closely related and focused on together, mainly because of Kant. Metaphysical knowledge has been intertwined with epistemological and semantical, though less explicit.
Definitions of Knowledge
Leibnizian distinctions lead to my definition.
First of the three components: Epistemological
definition of a priori (Pojman, 367)
definition of a posteriori (Pojman, 367)
Kantian definition of analytic propositions
Ayer definition of a priori truths
2nd of the 3 components: Semantical
definition of analytic
definition of synthetic
Ayer's distinction
Leibnizian definition/personal additions
Ayer's truth of logic (mathematics)
Thought experiments
1) Logic
2) Mathematics
3) Empirical (most controversial)
3rd of 3 Components: Metaphysical
definition of necessary truths
definition of contingent truths
Hume's objection (needs more research)
Ayer's factual content necessary truth?
Metaphysical difficulties for the empiricist
Ayer has satisfactory proved factual content but he has not eliminated rationalism. Explain why and you'll be able to demonstrate all three parts of your thesis and vindicate your definition of knowledge (conclusion).
Monday, September 11, 2006
Types of knowledge and propositions
(Originally Written September 11, 2006 in Epistemology)
A priori knowledge
Necessary truths - propositions that cannot be false
contingent truths - propositions that are true, but could be false
The distinction betwixt necessary truths and contingent truths is a metaphysical one.
Analytic propositions - true by way of their meaning
Synthetic propositions - true through their relation to the world
The distinction betwixt analytic and synthetic propositions is a semantic one.
A priori knowledge - knowledge prior to experience
A posteriori knowledge - knowledge through experience
The distinction betwixt the two is an epistemological one.
Kant:
Analytic a priori - i.e. Triangles are three sided
Synthetic a priori - i.e. 5+7=12, causality
Synthetic a posteriori - i.e. the house is brown
There is no a posteriori analytic propositions
A.J. Ayer
-a strong empiricist
-a logical positivist
-Held that in order for a statement to be cognitively meaningful it had to be either analytically true or empirically meaningful.
-Held that an en empiricists must regard analytic propositions as either:
1) Not necessary (John Stuart Mill)
2) Devoid of factual content (Ayer)
A priori knowledge
Necessary truths - propositions that cannot be false
contingent truths - propositions that are true, but could be false
The distinction betwixt necessary truths and contingent truths is a metaphysical one.
Analytic propositions - true by way of their meaning
Synthetic propositions - true through their relation to the world
The distinction betwixt analytic and synthetic propositions is a semantic one.
A priori knowledge - knowledge prior to experience
A posteriori knowledge - knowledge through experience
The distinction betwixt the two is an epistemological one.
Kant:
Analytic a priori - i.e. Triangles are three sided
Synthetic a priori - i.e. 5+7=12, causality
Synthetic a posteriori - i.e. the house is brown
There is no a posteriori analytic propositions
A.J. Ayer
-a strong empiricist
-a logical positivist
-Held that in order for a statement to be cognitively meaningful it had to be either analytically true or empirically meaningful.
-Held that an en empiricists must regard analytic propositions as either:
1) Not necessary (John Stuart Mill)
2) Devoid of factual content (Ayer)
Sunday, September 10, 2006
Book notes on Ayer
(Originally written September 10, 2006 in Book 8)
VII. 2 An Empiricist Critique of A priori Knowledge
AJ Ayer (1910 - 1989)
-Oxford University
-Argues against synthetic a priori knowledge because all supposed synthetic a priori truths are reducible to tautologies or as an analytical truths
This is a section from Ayer's early work: Language, Truth and Logic
How can empiricists account for necessary truths? Truths of empirical nature cannot ever be proven logically necessary. This, although appears to lead to utter skepticism, doesn't force one there. It is not irrational to hold beliefs that are not logical certainties; what is irrational is to search for certitude where there can be none and to demand certainty when probability will suffice.
The trouble empiricists face is dealing with necessary truths like mathematics and logic. The empiricist must deal with it in one of two ways:
1) He must state that they are not necessary truths and somehow account for their apparent universal nature.
Or, 2) He must state that they have no factual content and account for their truth, practical use, and surprising nature.
If one or two is unsatisfactory, then we are obliged to abandon empiricism and become rationalists.
Or if we opt out of rationalism we will have to adopt Kantian theory despite epistemological difficulties.
If empiricists show either 1) or 2) then, 'we shall have destroyed the foundations of rationalism'.
Mill adopted the theory that truths of logic and mathematics are not necessary truths. He held that these were inductive generalizations based on a huge amount of instances. The large number of instances was what Mill said made us think that they are necessary. He held that they were similar to empirical hypotheses, only much more probable.
Ayer does not think that this is at all acceptable. "In rejecting Mill's theory, we are obliged to be somewhat dormant" (Pojman, 371).
The Irrefutability of the Propositions of Mathematics and Logic
The truths of logic and mathematics are tautologies. If we state that any one is wrong then we contradict ourselves.
Any instance in which we think that we have an empirical situation that seems to refute a logical or mathematic truth we find error in our empirical judgment, not in the logical or mathematical truth.
The Nature of Analytic Propositions
Ayer gives an account of Kant's definitions of analytic and synthetic propositions, but contends that he does not succeed in making the distinction clear.
Kant does not give one straightforward criterion for making the distinction between Analytic propositions and synthetic propositions. He employs a psychological criterion for synthetic propositions and a logical criterion for analytic propositions and takes the criterions equivalence for granted.
Ayer defines an analytic proposition as one whose validity depends entirely on the definition of the symbols it contains; and, synthetic propositions when its validity is determined by facts of experience.
Analytic propositions never provide us any information about matters of fact. Thus, no experience can refute analytic propositions.
Analytic propositions therefore are devoid of factual content. They say nothing. "We are not suggesting they are senseless in the way that metaphysical utterances are senseless" (Jones, 382).
Linehan - Bitchsmack! Cheap shot. Though fairly strong. I admit that it stings.
Linehan - AJ Ayer has made me wary of synthetic propositions. Could I prove that there are only analytic propositions and everything is contained in the definition of the objects? i.e. The physical object 'apple'. An analytic judgment (Ayer's definition) would be that "This apple is an apple". A synthetic proposition would be "This apple is red". Could I reasonably argue (if I hold that there are forms) that the object apple in our mind is one that contains the notion of "red", "sweet/tart", "Grannysmith/other breed", etc. I don't know if I could make it plausible, but I am attracted to this theory.
Ayer - Analytic tautologies give us a way to explicitly state what we mean. It gives us clarification, but not any additional knowledge.
The Propositions of Geometry
While geometry seems the most plausible area for there to be a priori synthetic knowledge, the invention of non-Euclidean geometry has proven this wrong.
The self-evident principles of Euclidean geometry have been shown to be reducible to tautologies.
Geometry is not a study of space, though geometry can be used to reason about space.
Since geometry is analytic we can reject Kant's notion of space being synthetic a priori; since arithmetic is analytic we can reject Kant's notion of time being synthetic a priori.
We have a priori knowledge of necessary truths; they are all tautologies.
How can tautologies be surprising?
They are surprising because our intellects are not as superior as we believe they are.
Complex tautologies can easily surprise us because we are not as smart as we think.
VII. 2 An Empiricist Critique of A priori Knowledge
AJ Ayer (1910 - 1989)
-Oxford University
-Argues against synthetic a priori knowledge because all supposed synthetic a priori truths are reducible to tautologies or as an analytical truths
This is a section from Ayer's early work: Language, Truth and Logic
How can empiricists account for necessary truths? Truths of empirical nature cannot ever be proven logically necessary. This, although appears to lead to utter skepticism, doesn't force one there. It is not irrational to hold beliefs that are not logical certainties; what is irrational is to search for certitude where there can be none and to demand certainty when probability will suffice.
The trouble empiricists face is dealing with necessary truths like mathematics and logic. The empiricist must deal with it in one of two ways:
1) He must state that they are not necessary truths and somehow account for their apparent universal nature.
Or, 2) He must state that they have no factual content and account for their truth, practical use, and surprising nature.
If one or two is unsatisfactory, then we are obliged to abandon empiricism and become rationalists.
Or if we opt out of rationalism we will have to adopt Kantian theory despite epistemological difficulties.
If empiricists show either 1) or 2) then, 'we shall have destroyed the foundations of rationalism'.
Mill adopted the theory that truths of logic and mathematics are not necessary truths. He held that these were inductive generalizations based on a huge amount of instances. The large number of instances was what Mill said made us think that they are necessary. He held that they were similar to empirical hypotheses, only much more probable.
Ayer does not think that this is at all acceptable. "In rejecting Mill's theory, we are obliged to be somewhat dormant" (Pojman, 371).
The Irrefutability of the Propositions of Mathematics and Logic
The truths of logic and mathematics are tautologies. If we state that any one is wrong then we contradict ourselves.
Any instance in which we think that we have an empirical situation that seems to refute a logical or mathematic truth we find error in our empirical judgment, not in the logical or mathematical truth.
The Nature of Analytic Propositions
Ayer gives an account of Kant's definitions of analytic and synthetic propositions, but contends that he does not succeed in making the distinction clear.
Kant does not give one straightforward criterion for making the distinction between Analytic propositions and synthetic propositions. He employs a psychological criterion for synthetic propositions and a logical criterion for analytic propositions and takes the criterions equivalence for granted.
Ayer defines an analytic proposition as one whose validity depends entirely on the definition of the symbols it contains; and, synthetic propositions when its validity is determined by facts of experience.
Analytic propositions never provide us any information about matters of fact. Thus, no experience can refute analytic propositions.
Analytic propositions therefore are devoid of factual content. They say nothing. "We are not suggesting they are senseless in the way that metaphysical utterances are senseless" (Jones, 382).
Linehan - Bitchsmack! Cheap shot. Though fairly strong. I admit that it stings.
Linehan - AJ Ayer has made me wary of synthetic propositions. Could I prove that there are only analytic propositions and everything is contained in the definition of the objects? i.e. The physical object 'apple'. An analytic judgment (Ayer's definition) would be that "This apple is an apple". A synthetic proposition would be "This apple is red". Could I reasonably argue (if I hold that there are forms) that the object apple in our mind is one that contains the notion of "red", "sweet/tart", "Grannysmith/other breed", etc. I don't know if I could make it plausible, but I am attracted to this theory.
Ayer - Analytic tautologies give us a way to explicitly state what we mean. It gives us clarification, but not any additional knowledge.
The Propositions of Geometry
While geometry seems the most plausible area for there to be a priori synthetic knowledge, the invention of non-Euclidean geometry has proven this wrong.
The self-evident principles of Euclidean geometry have been shown to be reducible to tautologies.
Geometry is not a study of space, though geometry can be used to reason about space.
Since geometry is analytic we can reject Kant's notion of space being synthetic a priori; since arithmetic is analytic we can reject Kant's notion of time being synthetic a priori.
We have a priori knowledge of necessary truths; they are all tautologies.
How can tautologies be surprising?
They are surprising because our intellects are not as superior as we believe they are.
Complex tautologies can easily surprise us because we are not as smart as we think.
Sunday, August 13, 2006
Metaphysics - Ch. 11
(Originally written August 13, 2006 in Book 11)
Life is shit. It will always be shit. Dress it as nice as you can, but never allow hope to fill you because then the shit tastes worse than ever.
Metaphysics - Peter van Inwagen
Chapter 11 - The powers of Rational Beings & the Freedom of the Will
Determinism vs. Free-Will
Common opinion holds that free-will is required by morality.
Free Will is the possibility of having choices then consciously making a choice between alternatives. Determinism holds that there is only one possibility and thus, no choice.
Determinism holds that while it appears that choices are being made between alternatives there are not really alternatives because the laws of nature demand a set future.
Incompatiblists hold that free will and determinism are incompatible. Compatibilsts hold that free-will and determinism are in fact, compatible.
Hobbes, Hume and John Stuart Mill were compatabilists. Kant was not a compatibilist.
Humean cause and effect declares that causes and effects are always events (also called event-causation).
Agent-causation states that events can be caused by agents, i.e. a person.
Life is shit. It will always be shit. Dress it as nice as you can, but never allow hope to fill you because then the shit tastes worse than ever.
Metaphysics - Peter van Inwagen
Chapter 11 - The powers of Rational Beings & the Freedom of the Will
Determinism vs. Free-Will
Common opinion holds that free-will is required by morality.
Free Will is the possibility of having choices then consciously making a choice between alternatives. Determinism holds that there is only one possibility and thus, no choice.
Determinism holds that while it appears that choices are being made between alternatives there are not really alternatives because the laws of nature demand a set future.
Incompatiblists hold that free will and determinism are incompatible. Compatibilsts hold that free-will and determinism are in fact, compatible.
Hobbes, Hume and John Stuart Mill were compatabilists. Kant was not a compatibilist.
Humean cause and effect declares that causes and effects are always events (also called event-causation).
Agent-causation states that events can be caused by agents, i.e. a person.
Thursday, February 16, 2006
Brief notes on Ethics
(Originally written February 16, 2006)
Ethics
Essence of modernism: scientific reasoning provides all truth
Thomas Hobbes
Egoism: enlightened self-interest is the ultimate moral absolute
Held all people are ethical egoists
How do I react with other human beings as an ethical egoist?
-Social contracts
David Hume
One of the few philosophers to promote ethical relativism; moral relativism is usually promoted by social scientists, not philosophers.
Empiricist
Immanuel Kant
Secular deontology (duty-based ethics)
Kant's ultimate moral principle is the categorical imperative
The categorical imperative is if you can do it and it is good or moral for everyone then it is a moral act
Kant stated that it is immoral to use a person for a means. Humanity must always be treated as an end.
John Stuart Mill
Utilitarian
Teleological systems: emphasis on consequences of actions
-Consequentialists
-Non-consequentialists
-Utilitarianism/Egoism
Deontological systems: duty and principles
All deontology begins with the value of human life. Protects our human integrity.
Moral Choices: Chapter 3 "Major Figures in the History of Ethics"
Ethics was dominated historically by Christian ethics: Augustine in the early dark ages, Aquinas in the Middle Ages. Christian ethics' influence declined as the influence of religion declined during the Renaissance and Enlightenment.
Secular ethics are not totally bad. Aquinas fused Aristotle and Augustine to develop Medieval Roman Catholic Morality. Jewish and Muslim contemporaries of Aquinas attempted to blend their religion with Aristotelian ethics as well.
Ethics
Essence of modernism: scientific reasoning provides all truth
Thomas Hobbes
Egoism: enlightened self-interest is the ultimate moral absolute
Held all people are ethical egoists
How do I react with other human beings as an ethical egoist?
-Social contracts
David Hume
One of the few philosophers to promote ethical relativism; moral relativism is usually promoted by social scientists, not philosophers.
Empiricist
Immanuel Kant
Secular deontology (duty-based ethics)
Kant's ultimate moral principle is the categorical imperative
The categorical imperative is if you can do it and it is good or moral for everyone then it is a moral act
Kant stated that it is immoral to use a person for a means. Humanity must always be treated as an end.
John Stuart Mill
Utilitarian
Teleological systems: emphasis on consequences of actions
-Consequentialists
-Non-consequentialists
-Utilitarianism/Egoism
Deontological systems: duty and principles
All deontology begins with the value of human life. Protects our human integrity.
Moral Choices: Chapter 3 "Major Figures in the History of Ethics"
Ethics was dominated historically by Christian ethics: Augustine in the early dark ages, Aquinas in the Middle Ages. Christian ethics' influence declined as the influence of religion declined during the Renaissance and Enlightenment.
Secular ethics are not totally bad. Aquinas fused Aristotle and Augustine to develop Medieval Roman Catholic Morality. Jewish and Muslim contemporaries of Aquinas attempted to blend their religion with Aristotelian ethics as well.
Thursday, February 9, 2006
Structure of Christian Morality & Utilitarian Ethics
(Originally written February 9, 2006 in Book 21)
Class notes
The Structure of Christian Morality
The Hierarchy:
The Glory of God (The social weight that God carries) ->
The image of God in Humanity ->
The principle of the common Good (love your neighbor/do unto others) ->
Moral principles (justice, mercy, etc.) ->
Specific commands
The higher up in the hierarchy the more absolute it becomes. The lower in the hierarchy the more subjective possibilities arise.
Since there is a hierarchy of morality are there levels of evil?
Yes, Moses had different punishments in his law.
Jesus speaks of the "weightier matters" in Matthew 23:27
Some contest this view based on the fact that God is infinitely holy and all sin offends him equally.
Topic 3
I. Plato (early 4th century B.C.)
Virtue = performing 'function' well
A. Internally a virtuous person is one whose internal parts are working well (harmoniously). Reason controlling physical and emotional desires
B. Externally: one's role (function) in society
II. Aristotle (late 4th century BC)
-Student of Plato
-teacher of Alexander the Great
III. Augustine (late 4th/early 5th century AD)
IV. Thomas Aquinas (13th century)
V. Thomas Hobbes (17th century)
VI. David Hume (18th century)
VII. Immanuel Kant (18th century)
VIII. John Stuart Mill (19th century)
S&P Ethics
Can non-consequentialists satisfactorily handle conflicting rights and principles
1) Deliverances of moral common sense still have to be examined critically
2) Non-consequentialists shouldn't rest contently until they figure out the differences in their prima facie principles
Utilitarianism Once More
Act Utilitarianism - only moral obligation is the maximization action of happiness for everyone concerned and every action is judged by how well it lives up to the standard
Rule Utilitarianism - utilitarian code should be applied to moral codes as a whole but not to an individual's actions
The optimal moral code must take into account what rules can reasonably be taught and obeyed, as well as the costs of calculating those rules in people
What will the optimal code look like?
Pluralistic, prima facie
Criticism of rule Utilitarianism
1) Act utilitarians maintain that a utilitarian who cares about happiness should be willing to violate rules in order to maximize happiness
2) Non-consequentialists still balk at seeing morality determined by their consequences
Class notes
The Structure of Christian Morality
The Hierarchy:
The Glory of God (The social weight that God carries) ->
The image of God in Humanity ->
The principle of the common Good (love your neighbor/do unto others) ->
Moral principles (justice, mercy, etc.) ->
Specific commands
The higher up in the hierarchy the more absolute it becomes. The lower in the hierarchy the more subjective possibilities arise.
Since there is a hierarchy of morality are there levels of evil?
Yes, Moses had different punishments in his law.
Jesus speaks of the "weightier matters" in Matthew 23:27
Some contest this view based on the fact that God is infinitely holy and all sin offends him equally.
Topic 3
I. Plato (early 4th century B.C.)
Virtue = performing 'function' well
A. Internally a virtuous person is one whose internal parts are working well (harmoniously). Reason controlling physical and emotional desires
B. Externally: one's role (function) in society
II. Aristotle (late 4th century BC)
-Student of Plato
-teacher of Alexander the Great
III. Augustine (late 4th/early 5th century AD)
IV. Thomas Aquinas (13th century)
V. Thomas Hobbes (17th century)
VI. David Hume (18th century)
VII. Immanuel Kant (18th century)
VIII. John Stuart Mill (19th century)
S&P Ethics
Can non-consequentialists satisfactorily handle conflicting rights and principles
1) Deliverances of moral common sense still have to be examined critically
2) Non-consequentialists shouldn't rest contently until they figure out the differences in their prima facie principles
Utilitarianism Once More
Act Utilitarianism - only moral obligation is the maximization action of happiness for everyone concerned and every action is judged by how well it lives up to the standard
Rule Utilitarianism - utilitarian code should be applied to moral codes as a whole but not to an individual's actions
The optimal moral code must take into account what rules can reasonably be taught and obeyed, as well as the costs of calculating those rules in people
What will the optimal code look like?
Pluralistic, prima facie
Criticism of rule Utilitarianism
1) Act utilitarians maintain that a utilitarian who cares about happiness should be willing to violate rules in order to maximize happiness
2) Non-consequentialists still balk at seeing morality determined by their consequences
Tuesday, February 7, 2006
Normative Theories of Ethics
(Originally written February 7, 2006)
Topic 2: Christian Ethics
3 Types of Mosaic Law
1) Moral - continued and emphasized in New Testament
2) Ritual/Ceremonial - Made obsolete by the resurrection
3) Judicial - ??/Debated
Divine Command Theory
Human morality is ultimately based on the character of God.
Problems with Divine Command Ethics:
1) Competing commands
- Differing moral duties conflict with each other so you choose the lesser evil and ask God to forgive you for your sin
-Some state there is no conflict
-Some believe in a hierarchy of God's laws
Are the following Biblical commands absolute or relative?
- Do not murder
- Do not slander
- Do not rape
- Do not steal
- Kill all the Amalekites
- Greet one another with a holy kiss
- Do not lie
Christian revelation: God is absolute. Jesus' most important commandment is absolute. All other of God's laws are subject to the situation. Case in point: Corrie ten Boom
S&P Ethics: Chapter 1: Normative Theory of Ethics
2 Kinds of normative systems:
1) Consequentialist
2) Non-Consequentialist
Consequentialists decided what is right by the good effects outdoing the bad effects
Non-consequentialists decide what is right by the consequences and other factors. The nature of the action is taken into consideration as well as the consequences of the action (deontological).
Egoism
Egoism believes that an act is only morally right if it is in the best interest of that individual's long-term interests.
2 Types of Egoism:
1) Personal Egoists believe for themselves but are indifferent to others
2) Impersonal Egoists believe everyone should do what is in their best interests.
Misconception haunt both versions of egoism:
1) Egoism is not "eat, drink and be merry" it is concerned with long-term best interest
2) All egoists do not endorse hedonism (belief that only happiness is of intrinsic value)
3) Egoism is not always agains tower's needs or wants. Egoism requires those who are egoists to act in the best interest of others, if it will produce the best long-term outlook for us.
Egoism states that we have no moral obligation to others.
Psychological egoism states that people are inherently selfish. Truly unselfish acts are impossible.
There are strong (and obvious) objections to egoism:
1) Psychological egoism is not a sound theory. Self-interest is not the only thing that governs us.
2) Ethical egoism is not really a moral theory at all
3) Ethical egoism ignores blatant wrongs
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism states we should always act to produce the greatest possibility of good for everyone affected by our actions.
Utilitarianism promotes the happiness of the society above all else.
Bentham held that pleasures and pain are merely sensations.
Utilitarianism's basic form (act utilitarianism) states that we are compelled to ask ourselves what the particular consequence of a particular act in a particular situation will be for all those affected. The morally right act is the one that will produce the most happiness in all who are affected.
Acts should be decided based on their being the one which produces the most quantitative happiness.
The rightness of the act is determined by the ratio of happiness to unhappiness in all parties affected through quantitative measure (which is based on the qualitative feeling of happiness/unhappiness)
Utilitarianism is a case by case ethical standard (no absolute)
Utilitarianism is focused on long-term happiness.
Utilitarianism must forecast to come at a decision of what is going to happen: happiness vs. unhappiness.
An utilitarian has a moral duty to maximize happiness.
Personal happiness is a part of utilitarianism but is an equal part of all parties (no special favor).
Utilitarianism isn't really workable.
"Some critics of act utilitarianism have contended that... to follow the basic utilitarian principle would not promote happiness because of the difficulties in applying utilitarianism accurately" (20).
Utilitarianism is not just and does not always distribute happiness to everyone.
Kant's ethics
Non-consequentialist
Moral rules can be known as a result of reason alone, no observation is needed.
Morality is an a priori knowledge to Kant.
Nothin is good in and of itself, save good will.
Moral acts spring from acting upon our duty to be moral.
Duty is determined by the categorical imperative.
The categorical imperative states that we should always act in such a way that we can will the maxim of our action to become a universal law.
Kant defines maxim as a subjective principle of an action that people formulate in determining their conduct.
A categorical imperative is universally binding.
Universal acceptability
The categorical imperative can be stated also as each person, through their own acts of will, legislate moral law.
Moral beings give themselves moral laws through the use of reason. All rational beings will give themselves the same moral law because they too use reason.
To check if an act is moral we simply ask if other rational beings would do the same. It is important to look at the act both from the actor's point of view and who the act is done to. If you are comfortable with doing the act and having it done to you then it is moral.
Humanity as an End, Never as a Means
According to Kant's categorical imperative rational beings should always treat other rational beings as ends, never solely as means.
Kant maintained that an act can only be deemed moral if we can will it to be a universal law.
Critical inquiries of Kant's ethics
What has moral worth?
Kant believed that only an act done out of a sense of duty is moral. If the act is done in self-interest it is not moral (which seems plausible). But Kant also maintained that if an act is done out of habit, instinct or sympathy it is not moral (this is where many ethicists believe Kant was too harsh and severe with his interpretation of moral acts).
Is the categorical imperative an adequate test of right?
Kant leaves no room for exceptions. A qualified rule such as "never steal unless you are starving" seems as universal as "never steal" but Kant would probably have rejected it because the implications could have spread to justifying rule breaking.
What does it mean to treat people as means?
It is difficult to discern when people are being used solely as means and not the end. Presumably all employers use workers as a mean to accomplish an end, but are the employers acting immorally?
Other Non-Consequentialists Perspectives
Prima facie Principles (W.D. Ross 1877-1971)
This is where we have moral obligations that stem from relationships. We have differing moral obligations to all the differing people we encounter.
Obligations can conflict, overtly, or just through a time-space issue. Obligations must be weighed to their importance and then acted upon.
A prima facie obligation is an obligation that can be overridden by a more important obligation.
Prima facie obligations can be divided into seven categories
1) Duties of fidelity
2) duties of reparation
3) duties of gratitude
4) duties of justice
5) duties of beneficence
6) duties of self-improvement
7) duties not to injure others
Assisting others
Utilitarianism makes us slaves to the betterment of others. Non-consequentialists hold a principle that states that actions would be good to do, but not immoral not to do them, these are called supererogatory action.
-The entitlement to do something is the right
-Legal right is the entitlement to do something under the law
-Moral rights are human rights.
-Human rights are universal; they re equal rights, not transferable or relinquish able, they are natural rights
Human rights can be divided into two categories
1) Negative Rights - rights to be free of interference
2) Positive Rights - rights to receive benefits
Once moral rights have been established they are in individual's hands, not society's
Critical inquires of Non-Consequentialism
How well justified are these non-consequentialist principles and moral rights?
They seem self-evident in context of culture or history
Topic 2: Christian Ethics
3 Types of Mosaic Law
1) Moral - continued and emphasized in New Testament
2) Ritual/Ceremonial - Made obsolete by the resurrection
3) Judicial - ??/Debated
Divine Command Theory
Human morality is ultimately based on the character of God.
Problems with Divine Command Ethics:
1) Competing commands
- Differing moral duties conflict with each other so you choose the lesser evil and ask God to forgive you for your sin
-Some state there is no conflict
-Some believe in a hierarchy of God's laws
Are the following Biblical commands absolute or relative?
- Do not murder
- Do not slander
- Do not rape
- Do not steal
- Kill all the Amalekites
- Greet one another with a holy kiss
- Do not lie
Christian revelation: God is absolute. Jesus' most important commandment is absolute. All other of God's laws are subject to the situation. Case in point: Corrie ten Boom
S&P Ethics: Chapter 1: Normative Theory of Ethics
2 Kinds of normative systems:
1) Consequentialist
2) Non-Consequentialist
Consequentialists decided what is right by the good effects outdoing the bad effects
Non-consequentialists decide what is right by the consequences and other factors. The nature of the action is taken into consideration as well as the consequences of the action (deontological).
Egoism
Egoism believes that an act is only morally right if it is in the best interest of that individual's long-term interests.
2 Types of Egoism:
1) Personal Egoists believe for themselves but are indifferent to others
2) Impersonal Egoists believe everyone should do what is in their best interests.
Misconception haunt both versions of egoism:
1) Egoism is not "eat, drink and be merry" it is concerned with long-term best interest
2) All egoists do not endorse hedonism (belief that only happiness is of intrinsic value)
3) Egoism is not always agains tower's needs or wants. Egoism requires those who are egoists to act in the best interest of others, if it will produce the best long-term outlook for us.
Egoism states that we have no moral obligation to others.
Psychological egoism states that people are inherently selfish. Truly unselfish acts are impossible.
There are strong (and obvious) objections to egoism:
1) Psychological egoism is not a sound theory. Self-interest is not the only thing that governs us.
2) Ethical egoism is not really a moral theory at all
3) Ethical egoism ignores blatant wrongs
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism states we should always act to produce the greatest possibility of good for everyone affected by our actions.
Utilitarianism promotes the happiness of the society above all else.
Bentham held that pleasures and pain are merely sensations.
Utilitarianism's basic form (act utilitarianism) states that we are compelled to ask ourselves what the particular consequence of a particular act in a particular situation will be for all those affected. The morally right act is the one that will produce the most happiness in all who are affected.
Acts should be decided based on their being the one which produces the most quantitative happiness.
The rightness of the act is determined by the ratio of happiness to unhappiness in all parties affected through quantitative measure (which is based on the qualitative feeling of happiness/unhappiness)
Utilitarianism is a case by case ethical standard (no absolute)
Utilitarianism is focused on long-term happiness.
Utilitarianism must forecast to come at a decision of what is going to happen: happiness vs. unhappiness.
An utilitarian has a moral duty to maximize happiness.
Personal happiness is a part of utilitarianism but is an equal part of all parties (no special favor).
Utilitarianism isn't really workable.
"Some critics of act utilitarianism have contended that... to follow the basic utilitarian principle would not promote happiness because of the difficulties in applying utilitarianism accurately" (20).
Utilitarianism is not just and does not always distribute happiness to everyone.
Kant's ethics
Non-consequentialist
Moral rules can be known as a result of reason alone, no observation is needed.
Morality is an a priori knowledge to Kant.
Nothin is good in and of itself, save good will.
Moral acts spring from acting upon our duty to be moral.
Duty is determined by the categorical imperative.
The categorical imperative states that we should always act in such a way that we can will the maxim of our action to become a universal law.
Kant defines maxim as a subjective principle of an action that people formulate in determining their conduct.
A categorical imperative is universally binding.
Universal acceptability
The categorical imperative can be stated also as each person, through their own acts of will, legislate moral law.
Moral beings give themselves moral laws through the use of reason. All rational beings will give themselves the same moral law because they too use reason.
To check if an act is moral we simply ask if other rational beings would do the same. It is important to look at the act both from the actor's point of view and who the act is done to. If you are comfortable with doing the act and having it done to you then it is moral.
Humanity as an End, Never as a Means
According to Kant's categorical imperative rational beings should always treat other rational beings as ends, never solely as means.
Kant maintained that an act can only be deemed moral if we can will it to be a universal law.
Critical inquiries of Kant's ethics
What has moral worth?
Kant believed that only an act done out of a sense of duty is moral. If the act is done in self-interest it is not moral (which seems plausible). But Kant also maintained that if an act is done out of habit, instinct or sympathy it is not moral (this is where many ethicists believe Kant was too harsh and severe with his interpretation of moral acts).
Is the categorical imperative an adequate test of right?
Kant leaves no room for exceptions. A qualified rule such as "never steal unless you are starving" seems as universal as "never steal" but Kant would probably have rejected it because the implications could have spread to justifying rule breaking.
What does it mean to treat people as means?
It is difficult to discern when people are being used solely as means and not the end. Presumably all employers use workers as a mean to accomplish an end, but are the employers acting immorally?
Other Non-Consequentialists Perspectives
Prima facie Principles (W.D. Ross 1877-1971)
This is where we have moral obligations that stem from relationships. We have differing moral obligations to all the differing people we encounter.
Obligations can conflict, overtly, or just through a time-space issue. Obligations must be weighed to their importance and then acted upon.
A prima facie obligation is an obligation that can be overridden by a more important obligation.
Prima facie obligations can be divided into seven categories
1) Duties of fidelity
2) duties of reparation
3) duties of gratitude
4) duties of justice
5) duties of beneficence
6) duties of self-improvement
7) duties not to injure others
Assisting others
Utilitarianism makes us slaves to the betterment of others. Non-consequentialists hold a principle that states that actions would be good to do, but not immoral not to do them, these are called supererogatory action.
-The entitlement to do something is the right
-Legal right is the entitlement to do something under the law
-Moral rights are human rights.
-Human rights are universal; they re equal rights, not transferable or relinquish able, they are natural rights
Human rights can be divided into two categories
1) Negative Rights - rights to be free of interference
2) Positive Rights - rights to receive benefits
Once moral rights have been established they are in individual's hands, not society's
Critical inquires of Non-Consequentialism
How well justified are these non-consequentialist principles and moral rights?
They seem self-evident in context of culture or history
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