Showing posts with label Leibniz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Leibniz. Show all posts
Saturday, April 14, 2018
Quick idea FMAG & Leibniz
In reading some old notes on Leibniz I think that I would like to make the alien that picks up the protagonist in the story a Leibniz-like figure. Or at least use some of Leibniz's metaphysical principles to power his space ship.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Class Notes on Spinoza and Leibniz
(Originally written February 27, 2006 in Book 22)
Class Notes: Spinoza
God
-has infinite attributes through which his essence can be conceived, but only two of them are knowable by man: mind and body
- mind and body are different but not of different substances
- god is substances. substance has infinite attributes, those attributes have infinite modes of being
-double aspect monism (one substance, two attributes)
-self=the two attributes of god (mind and body) united
Spinoza = 1 Substance (god)
Descartes = 2 Substances (mind and body)
Linehan - a set of (very high) of created substances. This tiny sub molecular substances form together to create a physical object or possibly could the elements be the smallest "substance" and that everything that is, is created by the combining of them. This set number of substances combined in various ways combine with other combinations that combine again, again and so forth to form complex objects like human beings.
Leibniz (1646-1716)
Leibniz accused Newton (and vice-versa) of stealing his invention of Calculus.
Leibniz was an overall genius.
Leibniz was a Christian (pious Lutheran)
Sought to unify the Christian Church and all of Europe to a single state.
Epistemology - distinguishes between two types of truth:
1) Truths of reason (a priori). True in all possible worlds.
2) Truths of fact (a posteriori). True in this world and other possible worlds, but not all.
Primary truths (first truths)
-They fall into both categories
Primary truths of fact
ex. "I exist", "something other than me exists"
True proposition: one whose predicate is contained in the subject, "a triangle is three-sided", "Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC"
Leibniz: 2 Sources of Knowledge
1) Senses
- Gives us fluctuating data
- Perceive regularities, not necessities
2) Innate ideas
- From the mind's reflecting on its own operations
Examples: unity, plurality
- Equality, differences, etc.
- "Natural inclinations"
- Contra Locke (mind is not tabula rasa)
- Mind is like "veined marble"
Class Notes: Spinoza
God
-has infinite attributes through which his essence can be conceived, but only two of them are knowable by man: mind and body
- mind and body are different but not of different substances
- god is substances. substance has infinite attributes, those attributes have infinite modes of being
-double aspect monism (one substance, two attributes)
-self=the two attributes of god (mind and body) united
Spinoza = 1 Substance (god)
Descartes = 2 Substances (mind and body)
Linehan - a set of (very high) of created substances. This tiny sub molecular substances form together to create a physical object or possibly could the elements be the smallest "substance" and that everything that is, is created by the combining of them. This set number of substances combined in various ways combine with other combinations that combine again, again and so forth to form complex objects like human beings.
Leibniz (1646-1716)
Leibniz accused Newton (and vice-versa) of stealing his invention of Calculus.
Leibniz was an overall genius.
Leibniz was a Christian (pious Lutheran)
Sought to unify the Christian Church and all of Europe to a single state.
Epistemology - distinguishes between two types of truth:
1) Truths of reason (a priori). True in all possible worlds.
2) Truths of fact (a posteriori). True in this world and other possible worlds, but not all.
Primary truths (first truths)
-They fall into both categories
Primary truths of fact
ex. "I exist", "something other than me exists"
True proposition: one whose predicate is contained in the subject, "a triangle is three-sided", "Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC"
Leibniz: 2 Sources of Knowledge
1) Senses
- Gives us fluctuating data
- Perceive regularities, not necessities
2) Innate ideas
- From the mind's reflecting on its own operations
Examples: unity, plurality
- Equality, differences, etc.
- "Natural inclinations"
- Contra Locke (mind is not tabula rasa)
- Mind is like "veined marble"
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
The Visitor
(Originally written 8/22/07 in Notebook 19)
Name: The Visitor
Plot:
A charming, eloquent, charismatic sailor comes to port at an island whose country has reigned uninterrupted for thousands of years. Within two weeks of his arrival he has passed judgment on the nation by observing one of the thousand cities of the nation. His eloquence leads many of the city's inhabitants to drop their religion, speak out against their government and finally revolt. The country collapses and anarchy and barbarism ensures. In the end the peace is restored, but the trust and security that was once enjoyed by the citizens is lost. The visiting sailor is tried and executed for his rash hubris and ill-educated judgment.
Idea:
Defend the best of all possible worlds thesis of Leibniz by showing how we quickly view a corrupt or non-best particular as the complete unraveling of a divinely ordained world. The goal is to show how we, such finite and miserable creatures, have grand illusions of our own foresight.
"It is unjust to make a judgment unless one has examined the entire law" (Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, G.W. Leibniz)
Name: The Visitor
Plot:
A charming, eloquent, charismatic sailor comes to port at an island whose country has reigned uninterrupted for thousands of years. Within two weeks of his arrival he has passed judgment on the nation by observing one of the thousand cities of the nation. His eloquence leads many of the city's inhabitants to drop their religion, speak out against their government and finally revolt. The country collapses and anarchy and barbarism ensures. In the end the peace is restored, but the trust and security that was once enjoyed by the citizens is lost. The visiting sailor is tried and executed for his rash hubris and ill-educated judgment.
Idea:
Defend the best of all possible worlds thesis of Leibniz by showing how we quickly view a corrupt or non-best particular as the complete unraveling of a divinely ordained world. The goal is to show how we, such finite and miserable creatures, have grand illusions of our own foresight.
"It is unjust to make a judgment unless one has examined the entire law" (Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, G.W. Leibniz)
Saturday, June 2, 2007
Preface to the New Essays
(Originally written June 2, 2007 in Book 14)
Preface to the New Essays (1703-1705)
G.W. Leibniz
The senses are necessary for all actual knowledge, but they are not sufficient to five us all of it because they merely provide particular or individual truths.
Proof for general or eternal truths cannot be acquired by the senses because no matter how many instances of particular truths are combined, their totality will never equal the sum of an eternal truth. The proof of such eternal truths (like those of mathematics, morality, logic and metaphysics) must come a priori or innately.
The ideas in us are innate. They are natural inclinations, dispositions, habits or potentialities.
Insensible perceptions are perceptions too minute or too similar for us to notice and yet effect us so greatly.
These insensible perceptions rule out the notion of the soul as tabula rasa, souls without thoughts, substances without action and void space.
All spiritualized beings, all souls, all simple created substances are always joined to a body and souls are never completely separated from the body.
God can do what goes beyond our understanding. "There may be inconceivable mysteries in the articles of faith" (Leibniz, 61).
Preface to the New Essays (1703-1705)
G.W. Leibniz
The senses are necessary for all actual knowledge, but they are not sufficient to five us all of it because they merely provide particular or individual truths.
Proof for general or eternal truths cannot be acquired by the senses because no matter how many instances of particular truths are combined, their totality will never equal the sum of an eternal truth. The proof of such eternal truths (like those of mathematics, morality, logic and metaphysics) must come a priori or innately.
The ideas in us are innate. They are natural inclinations, dispositions, habits or potentialities.
Insensible perceptions are perceptions too minute or too similar for us to notice and yet effect us so greatly.
These insensible perceptions rule out the notion of the soul as tabula rasa, souls without thoughts, substances without action and void space.
All spiritualized beings, all souls, all simple created substances are always joined to a body and souls are never completely separated from the body.
God can do what goes beyond our understanding. "There may be inconceivable mysteries in the articles of faith" (Leibniz, 61).
On the Ultimate Origination of Things
(Originally written June 2, 2007 in Book 14)
On the Ultimate Origination of Things
November 23, 1697
Gottfried Leibniz
Beyond the scope of all finite things exists some One Being who rules the universe which he fashioned and created.
This One Being is the ultimate reason for things.
The present world is physically or hypothetically, but not absolutely or metaphysically necessary.
Ultimate ground must be found in something metaphysically necessary.
Temporal, contingent or physical truths arise from eternal, essential or metaphysical truths.
A certain "Divine Mathematics" or "Metaphysical Mechanism" is used in the origination of things.
Possibility is the foundation of essence. Perfection (degree of essence) is the foundation of existence.
The Author of the World (God) can therefore be free and yet everything happens determinately because He acts from a principle of perfect wisdom.
Whatever exists must be grounded ultimately in metaphysical necessity because any thing or series of things cannot provide its own grounding (unless it is metaphysically necessary). But physical things are not metaphysically necessary. Furthermore only existing things can produce/ground existing things. Therefore, metaphysically necessary truths actually exist, if only in the mind of God.
The ultimate reason for the reality of both essences and existences lie in one source, namely God.
The world is physically, metaphysically and morally the most perfect it could be.
But yet, our experience leads us to doubt this fact. "In the end, the world appears to be a certain confused chaos rather than a thing ordered by some supreme wisdom, especially if one takes note of the conduct of the human race... it is unjust to make judgment unless one has examined the entire law... We know but a small part of the eternity which extends without measure, for how short is the memory of several thousand years which history gives us. But yet, from such meager experience we rashly make judgments about the immense and eternal" (Leibniz, 46).
On the Ultimate Origination of Things
November 23, 1697
Gottfried Leibniz
Beyond the scope of all finite things exists some One Being who rules the universe which he fashioned and created.
This One Being is the ultimate reason for things.
The present world is physically or hypothetically, but not absolutely or metaphysically necessary.
Ultimate ground must be found in something metaphysically necessary.
Temporal, contingent or physical truths arise from eternal, essential or metaphysical truths.
A certain "Divine Mathematics" or "Metaphysical Mechanism" is used in the origination of things.
Possibility is the foundation of essence. Perfection (degree of essence) is the foundation of existence.
The Author of the World (God) can therefore be free and yet everything happens determinately because He acts from a principle of perfect wisdom.
Whatever exists must be grounded ultimately in metaphysical necessity because any thing or series of things cannot provide its own grounding (unless it is metaphysically necessary). But physical things are not metaphysically necessary. Furthermore only existing things can produce/ground existing things. Therefore, metaphysically necessary truths actually exist, if only in the mind of God.
The ultimate reason for the reality of both essences and existences lie in one source, namely God.
The world is physically, metaphysically and morally the most perfect it could be.
But yet, our experience leads us to doubt this fact. "In the end, the world appears to be a certain confused chaos rather than a thing ordered by some supreme wisdom, especially if one takes note of the conduct of the human race... it is unjust to make judgment unless one has examined the entire law... We know but a small part of the eternity which extends without measure, for how short is the memory of several thousand years which history gives us. But yet, from such meager experience we rashly make judgments about the immense and eternal" (Leibniz, 46).
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Notes on Discourse on Metaphysics (C)
(Originally written May 29, 2007 in Book 14)
Discourse on Metaphysics
G.W. Leibniz
(continued)
31.
- God's grace is truly grace
- We do not know how much and in what way God dispenses grace. Nor do we know why he chooses to dispense grace to some and why he chooses to withhold it from others
- Among possible beings there must be a person with a notion or idea contains the entire sequence of ordinary and extraordinary graces
32.
- "Substance contains all its events with all their circumstances" (Leibniz, 35).
- All other substances rely on God.
- God alone acts on other substances
- God alone brings about the communication and connection between other substances
- A soul is sufficient to itself with God
- A soul cannot perish without annihilation, the dissolution of the body cannot destroy that which is indivisible.
33.
- The perceptions of our senses, though they be clear, must necessarily contain some confused feeling because our body receives the impression of other bodies
- Without the ability to reflect, there can be no moral qualities. Thus, the animals cannot be moral entities though they have souls
- The intelligent soul knows what it is, can reflect upon itself and is therefore, a moral agent
- The knowledge of one's self is what renders the intelligent soul capable of merits or demerits, rewards or punishments
34.
- Immortality is required of substance, which is no substance perishes though it may become something different entirely, but for this to have religious/moral implications, one must have memory. This is, "I know I" and makes intelligent soul a desirable position.
35.
- God will always preserve our substance and our person.
- Our person is the memory and the knowledge of what we are
- God is the most perfect of all minds and the greatest of all beings.
- Minds are the closest beings to perfection because they most closely represent the divine
- The difference between intelligent souls and non-intelligent souls is the difference between a person looking into a mirror and their reflection
36.
- Minds are the most perfectible substances
- Minds alone can serve God freely
- The moral quality God possess makes Him the Lord of minds
- It is due to the moral quality God has, "that he humanizes himself, that he is willing to allow anthropomorphism, and that he enters into society with us, as prince with his subjects; and this consideration is so dear to him that the happy and flourishing state of his empire, which consists in the greatest possible happiness of its inhabitants, becomes the highest of his laws" (Leibniz, 40).
- God has ordained everything in such a way that minds live always and that always preserve their moral quality
- To make man perfectly happy, God only works for them to love Him.
37.
- The gospel has entirely changed the course of human history.
- God alone can make souls happy or unhappy.
Discourse on Metaphysics
G.W. Leibniz
(continued)
31.
- God's grace is truly grace
- We do not know how much and in what way God dispenses grace. Nor do we know why he chooses to dispense grace to some and why he chooses to withhold it from others
- Among possible beings there must be a person with a notion or idea contains the entire sequence of ordinary and extraordinary graces
32.
- "Substance contains all its events with all their circumstances" (Leibniz, 35).
- All other substances rely on God.
- God alone acts on other substances
- God alone brings about the communication and connection between other substances
- A soul is sufficient to itself with God
- A soul cannot perish without annihilation, the dissolution of the body cannot destroy that which is indivisible.
33.
- The perceptions of our senses, though they be clear, must necessarily contain some confused feeling because our body receives the impression of other bodies
- Without the ability to reflect, there can be no moral qualities. Thus, the animals cannot be moral entities though they have souls
- The intelligent soul knows what it is, can reflect upon itself and is therefore, a moral agent
- The knowledge of one's self is what renders the intelligent soul capable of merits or demerits, rewards or punishments
34.
- Immortality is required of substance, which is no substance perishes though it may become something different entirely, but for this to have religious/moral implications, one must have memory. This is, "I know I" and makes intelligent soul a desirable position.
35.
- God will always preserve our substance and our person.
- Our person is the memory and the knowledge of what we are
- God is the most perfect of all minds and the greatest of all beings.
- Minds are the closest beings to perfection because they most closely represent the divine
- The difference between intelligent souls and non-intelligent souls is the difference between a person looking into a mirror and their reflection
36.
- Minds are the most perfectible substances
- Minds alone can serve God freely
- The moral quality God possess makes Him the Lord of minds
- It is due to the moral quality God has, "that he humanizes himself, that he is willing to allow anthropomorphism, and that he enters into society with us, as prince with his subjects; and this consideration is so dear to him that the happy and flourishing state of his empire, which consists in the greatest possible happiness of its inhabitants, becomes the highest of his laws" (Leibniz, 40).
- God has ordained everything in such a way that minds live always and that always preserve their moral quality
- To make man perfectly happy, God only works for them to love Him.
37.
- The gospel has entirely changed the course of human history.
- God alone can make souls happy or unhappy.
Wednesday, May 16, 2007
Notes on Discourse on Metaphysics (B)
(Originally Written May 16, 2007 in Book 14)
Discourse on Metaphysics
G.W. Leibniz
(Continued)
18.
- Force is a change that is separate from size, shape or motion
- Thus, not everything that exists in a body exists merely within the extension of that body.
19.
- It is a mistake to banish final causes from physical studies because it would seem to follow that God designed body with no end.
- It is foolish to believe we can decipher the end of everything that God hath mad because He sees all connections at once, but he has made the universe to suit man and man to suit the universe. "There is nothing in the universe which does not affect us and does not also accommodate itself in accordance with his regard for us" (Leibniz, 21).
- God does nothing by chance.
20.
Leibniz agrees with Socrates' criticism of Anaxagoras in Phaedo that philosophy cannot be so materialistic.
21.
- Mechanical rules depend on metaphysics.
- The physical phenomenal world would be entirely different without its metaphysical system.
22.
- Nature operates under natural phenomena, but this natural phenomena only occurs because God has caused it.
- God is so skilled an artisan that He has produced a world that can function completely with God's original simple design.
23.
- There are true and false ideas.
- Ideas precede reasoning about something
- Thus, the proof of God in ontological form states that I reason about God and in order for me to reason about God, I must first have the idea of God. The idea of God entails all perfections and thus, existing is more perfect than not existing and thus, God exists.
- The problem with the ontological argument is that we can have false ideas that do not correspond to reality. Thus, the ontological argument merely proves that if God is possible then He necessarily exists.
24.
- Confused knowledge - the ability to recognize a thing without being able to articulate its differences or properties.
- Distinct knowledge - recognition of a thing and an ability to explain its properties and differences.
- Distinct knowledge has degrees
- Adequate knowledge - a distinct knowledge of a thing down to its primitive notions
- Intuitive knowledge - an adequate knowledge in which all the primitive notions of a thing are known at once, distinctly.
- Intuitive knowledge is extremely rare because most human knowledge is confused or suppositive.
- Suppositive knowledge - "A notion intermediate between intuitive and clear is when I have been deprived of clear knowledge of all surrounding notions"
- Clear knowledge - knowing how a thing is distinguishable from other things but only being able to say, I know not what makes X different than Y, but know that they differ.
Degrees of Knowledge
Confused - recognition
Clear - Recognition + ...
Distinct - Recognition and some explanatory ability
Adequate - Distinct + ...
Intuitive - immediate full knowledge
Clear, Distinct and Adequate are suppositive knowledge. Suppositive is a combinative knowledge.
Nominal definitions - a definition that leaves one able to still doubt if that which is defined be possible.
Real definition - a definition that includes a property which makes the thing's possibility known
"As long as we have only a nominal definition, we cannot be certain of the consequences we derive, for if it concealed some contradiction or impossibility, the opposite conclusions could be derived from it"
But truths are not dependent on name nor are they arbitrary, contra Hobbes.
Real definitions are twofold:
1) When it is known via experience a thing is real its definition is merely a real one.
2) When the proof of possibly is a priori the definition is real and causal.
An essential proof is perfect, a priori, and sees all the way to its primitive notions
25.
- We can have no idea of a notion when it is impossible
- We cannot contemplate a notion when we have suppositive knowledge of it because it may have some hidden contradiction
- We skip over the contemplation in suppositive knowledge because we suppose we know the thing
- "Only in confused notions when our knowledge is clear or in distinct notions when it is intuitive do we see the entire idea in them" (Leibniz, 28).
26.
- An idea is a quality of our soul.
- Our souls have these qualities in them whether we are thinking on them currently or not
- Our souls express God, the universe, all essences and all existences.
- Nothing can be taught to us whose idea is not already in our mind
- Plato's doctrine of reminiscence is correct so long it is purged of his notion of preexistence.
- "Our soul knows all these things virtually and requires only attention to recognize truths, and that, consequently, it has, at very least, the ideas upon which these truths depend" (Leibniz, 29).
27.
- Some things outside us express things more particularly than our own souls. It is through their more acute expression that we can understand a truth more completely.
- Ideas are expressions in our soul whether we conceive them or not
- Notions or concepts are ideas that we conceive or form
- It is false that all of our conceptions come via the senses, the sensual data we receive merely brings our attention to internal experience
28.
- There is no external cause acting upon us aside from God
- No other external object is capable of touching our soul or perception
- We have ideas of everything in our soul by virtue of God's continual action on us
- "God is our immediate external object and that we see all things by Him" (Leibniz, 30).
29.
- Our ideas however are in us and not in God.
30.
- Ordinarily, God does nothing more than follow the laws He established
- God determines our wills to choose the better option without necessitating it
- God finds it good that certain men should exist despite foreseeing they will sin
- It ought to be enough for us to know this without understanding it while we are yet on this earth
- God is clearly not the cause of evil
Discourse on Metaphysics
G.W. Leibniz
(Continued)
18.
- Force is a change that is separate from size, shape or motion
- Thus, not everything that exists in a body exists merely within the extension of that body.
19.
- It is a mistake to banish final causes from physical studies because it would seem to follow that God designed body with no end.
- It is foolish to believe we can decipher the end of everything that God hath mad because He sees all connections at once, but he has made the universe to suit man and man to suit the universe. "There is nothing in the universe which does not affect us and does not also accommodate itself in accordance with his regard for us" (Leibniz, 21).
- God does nothing by chance.
20.
Leibniz agrees with Socrates' criticism of Anaxagoras in Phaedo that philosophy cannot be so materialistic.
21.
- Mechanical rules depend on metaphysics.
- The physical phenomenal world would be entirely different without its metaphysical system.
22.
- Nature operates under natural phenomena, but this natural phenomena only occurs because God has caused it.
- God is so skilled an artisan that He has produced a world that can function completely with God's original simple design.
23.
- There are true and false ideas.
- Ideas precede reasoning about something
- Thus, the proof of God in ontological form states that I reason about God and in order for me to reason about God, I must first have the idea of God. The idea of God entails all perfections and thus, existing is more perfect than not existing and thus, God exists.
- The problem with the ontological argument is that we can have false ideas that do not correspond to reality. Thus, the ontological argument merely proves that if God is possible then He necessarily exists.
24.
- Confused knowledge - the ability to recognize a thing without being able to articulate its differences or properties.
- Distinct knowledge - recognition of a thing and an ability to explain its properties and differences.
- Distinct knowledge has degrees
- Adequate knowledge - a distinct knowledge of a thing down to its primitive notions
- Intuitive knowledge - an adequate knowledge in which all the primitive notions of a thing are known at once, distinctly.
- Intuitive knowledge is extremely rare because most human knowledge is confused or suppositive.
- Suppositive knowledge - "A notion intermediate between intuitive and clear is when I have been deprived of clear knowledge of all surrounding notions"
- Clear knowledge - knowing how a thing is distinguishable from other things but only being able to say, I know not what makes X different than Y, but know that they differ.
Degrees of Knowledge
Confused - recognition
Clear - Recognition + ...
Distinct - Recognition and some explanatory ability
Adequate - Distinct + ...
Intuitive - immediate full knowledge
Clear, Distinct and Adequate are suppositive knowledge. Suppositive is a combinative knowledge.
Nominal definitions - a definition that leaves one able to still doubt if that which is defined be possible.
Real definition - a definition that includes a property which makes the thing's possibility known
"As long as we have only a nominal definition, we cannot be certain of the consequences we derive, for if it concealed some contradiction or impossibility, the opposite conclusions could be derived from it"
But truths are not dependent on name nor are they arbitrary, contra Hobbes.
Real definitions are twofold:
1) When it is known via experience a thing is real its definition is merely a real one.
2) When the proof of possibly is a priori the definition is real and causal.
An essential proof is perfect, a priori, and sees all the way to its primitive notions
25.
- We can have no idea of a notion when it is impossible
- We cannot contemplate a notion when we have suppositive knowledge of it because it may have some hidden contradiction
- We skip over the contemplation in suppositive knowledge because we suppose we know the thing
- "Only in confused notions when our knowledge is clear or in distinct notions when it is intuitive do we see the entire idea in them" (Leibniz, 28).
26.
- An idea is a quality of our soul.
- Our souls have these qualities in them whether we are thinking on them currently or not
- Our souls express God, the universe, all essences and all existences.
- Nothing can be taught to us whose idea is not already in our mind
- Plato's doctrine of reminiscence is correct so long it is purged of his notion of preexistence.
- "Our soul knows all these things virtually and requires only attention to recognize truths, and that, consequently, it has, at very least, the ideas upon which these truths depend" (Leibniz, 29).
27.
- Some things outside us express things more particularly than our own souls. It is through their more acute expression that we can understand a truth more completely.
- Ideas are expressions in our soul whether we conceive them or not
- Notions or concepts are ideas that we conceive or form
- It is false that all of our conceptions come via the senses, the sensual data we receive merely brings our attention to internal experience
28.
- There is no external cause acting upon us aside from God
- No other external object is capable of touching our soul or perception
- We have ideas of everything in our soul by virtue of God's continual action on us
- "God is our immediate external object and that we see all things by Him" (Leibniz, 30).
29.
- Our ideas however are in us and not in God.
30.
- Ordinarily, God does nothing more than follow the laws He established
- God determines our wills to choose the better option without necessitating it
- God finds it good that certain men should exist despite foreseeing they will sin
- It ought to be enough for us to know this without understanding it while we are yet on this earth
- God is clearly not the cause of evil
Saturday, May 12, 2007
Notes on Discoure on Metaphysics (A)
(Originally written May 12, 2007 in Book 14)
We come back to my mentor and favorite, the much maligned G.W. Leibniz.
Discourse on Metaphysics and other Essays
G.W. Leibniz
Trans. Daniel Garber & Raoger Ariew
Hackett Publishing Co.
Indianapolis, IN
1991
Discourse on Metaphysics 1686
1. On Divine Perfection and that God does everyone in the most desirable way
- God is an absolutely perfect being
- Power & knowledge are perfection and have no limits within God
- The more enlightened we are of God's works the more we'll "be disposed to find them excellent and in complete conformity with what we might have desired" (Leibniz, 1).
2. Against those who claim that there is no goodness in God's works or that the rules of goodness and Beauty are arbitrary
- By looking at the created things we can discover the creator
- All acts of will presuppose a reason for willing
- Reason is prior to the act of will
- Eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry and the rules of goodness, justice and perfection are not merely the effects of the will of God, but the consequences of His understanding.
3. Against those who believe that God might have made things better
- The consequences of believing that God could have made things better are wholly contrary to the glory of God.
- "A lesser evil is relatively good, so a lesser good is relatively evil" (Leibniz, 3).
- To act with less perfection than one could have is to act imperfectly
- The reason many believe that God could have created better is our inadequate knowledge of the general harmony of the universe and the hidden reasons for God's conduct
- "God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified" (Leibniz, 3).
4. That the Love of God requires our complete satisfaction and acquiescence with respect to what he has done without our being quietist as a result
- Those who are dissatisfied with God's creation cannot fully love God
- We must be truly satisfied with everything that comes to us because it is according to His will
- As to regards to future events though we must not be passive and simply await what God will do, but act in accordance to what may be the will of God as best we can. We must strive to contribute to the general good.
- The outcome of our actions may show that God did not wish our good to have immediate effect, but it does not follow that He did not wish us to act
- "He never demands more than the right intention, and it is for Him to know the proper hour and place for letting the good designs succeed"
5. What the rules of the perfection of divine conduct consist in, and that the simplicity of the ways is in balance with the richness of the effects
- To know in detail the reason that could have moved God to choose the order of the universe is beyond the scope of finite minds
- As finite minds we cannot fully comprehend why God allows sin or bestows grace in the way He does, especially prior to attaining the full enjoyment of the vision of God.
- Minds have perfections and these consist of virtues
- The happiness of minds is the principal aim of God
6. God does nothing which is not orderly and it is not even possible to imagine events that are not regular
- The acts of God are commonly divided into ordinary and extraordinary. But everything is in conformity with the universal order.
- In understanding this we understand little other than what happens happens according to the order of harmony that God established.
7. That miracles conform to the General order, even though they may be contrary to the subordinate maxims; and about what God wills or permits by a General volition
- Miracles are as much in the order of things as typical events
8. To distinguish the actions of God from those of Creatures we explain the notion of an individual substance
- Every predicate of a subject must be contained within the subject at least "in-esse"
- One who understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know the predicates which belong to it
- There is something in the being of every substance or in the haecceity (thingness) of a thing, vestiges of everything that has happened to it and that will happen to it and even traces of everyone that happens in the universe. But, God alone is capable of recognizing this and knowing the thing's haecceity perfectly.
9. That each singular substance expresses the whole universe in its own way, and that all its events, together with all their circumstances and the whole sequence of external things are included in its notion
- Two substances cannot resemble each other completely and differ only in number or spatial qualities
- A substance can only begin by creation and end via annihilation
- A substance is not divisible into two. Likewise two substances cannot be combined into one.
- Every substance is like a complete world and a mirror of God
- The glory of God is multiplied by the number of substances in the universe
- Every substance bears in some way the infinite wisdom of God and imitates it insofar it is capable
10. That the belief in substantial forms has some basis, but that these forms do not change anything in the phenomena and must not be used to explain particular effects
- Without using the forms (Platonic forms) we cannot "elevate our minds sufficiently well to the knowledge of incorporeal natures and the wonders of God" (Leibniz, 10).
11. That the Thoughts of Theologians and Philosophers who are called scholastics are not entirely to be disdained
- If we are to look at St. Thomas and the other scholastics we would find a great treasure of demonstrative truths
12. That the notions involved in extension contain something imaginary and cannot constitute the substance of body
- The nature of substance and body does not wholly lie in extension, that is size, shape and motion, but is something related to souls or substantial form
- Souls sustain existence of bodies from moment to moment and preserve the basis for knowledge of what they are
- Souls alone are susceptible to punishment and reward and citizens subject to God.
13.
- The individual notion of each person includes once and for all everything that will ever happen to him but these truths are nonetheless contingent because they are caused by either the Free Will of God or of his creation
- It would appear that if all that happens is included in the nation of a single substance we would be left with complete fatalism. However, there is a big difference between certainty and necessity. Everything that will occur is certain because God foresees all actions, but it does not follow that what happens happens necessarily.
- An effect is necessary when its opposite implies a contradiction. An effect is contingent when its opposite course is not a contradictory one.
- Whatever happens in conformity with the predeterminations is certain, but not necessary, fore he would have done the opposite without it causing a contradiction, despite it being impossible for him to take the opposite action
14.
- Every created substance depends on God who preserves them in the manner we preserve our thoughts, only completely and perfectly.
- Every created substance is independent of everything save for God.
- No substance truly acts upon or is enacted upon by another substance because every substance is sustained by itself and God.
15.
- A substance is of infinitely extension insofar as it expresses everything, but is limited insofar as it expresses everything imperfectly
- Substances act upon one another in only the sense that they serve to limit the extension of one another. When one substance is greatened another must be limited to accommodate the other's growth.
- Whenever a thing acts it improves its efficacy. Thus, when a thing increases its efficacy it achieves more perfection and is strengthened and another substance is weakened.
- Pleasure arises when a perceptional being increases itself and pain occurs when it is decreased.
- One can sin by seeking to increase and thus seeking power and pleasure.
16.
- Miracles and extraordinary influence from God on man seems impossible because all events are consequences according to nature's demands.
- Miracles exist but are always in conformity with the universal law and general order of the universe.
- Miracles are miracles because they cannot be presupposed or foreseen by any created mind.
- What we express is our essence or idea and that is unlimited, but our nature or our power is limited.
- Whatever surpasses the nature or power of created substances is supernatural, but nothing can surpass our essences.
17.
???
We come back to my mentor and favorite, the much maligned G.W. Leibniz.
Discourse on Metaphysics and other Essays
G.W. Leibniz
Trans. Daniel Garber & Raoger Ariew
Hackett Publishing Co.
Indianapolis, IN
1991
Discourse on Metaphysics 1686
1. On Divine Perfection and that God does everyone in the most desirable way
- God is an absolutely perfect being
- Power & knowledge are perfection and have no limits within God
- The more enlightened we are of God's works the more we'll "be disposed to find them excellent and in complete conformity with what we might have desired" (Leibniz, 1).
2. Against those who claim that there is no goodness in God's works or that the rules of goodness and Beauty are arbitrary
- By looking at the created things we can discover the creator
- All acts of will presuppose a reason for willing
- Reason is prior to the act of will
- Eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry and the rules of goodness, justice and perfection are not merely the effects of the will of God, but the consequences of His understanding.
3. Against those who believe that God might have made things better
- The consequences of believing that God could have made things better are wholly contrary to the glory of God.
- "A lesser evil is relatively good, so a lesser good is relatively evil" (Leibniz, 3).
- To act with less perfection than one could have is to act imperfectly
- The reason many believe that God could have created better is our inadequate knowledge of the general harmony of the universe and the hidden reasons for God's conduct
- "God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified" (Leibniz, 3).
4. That the Love of God requires our complete satisfaction and acquiescence with respect to what he has done without our being quietist as a result
- Those who are dissatisfied with God's creation cannot fully love God
- We must be truly satisfied with everything that comes to us because it is according to His will
- As to regards to future events though we must not be passive and simply await what God will do, but act in accordance to what may be the will of God as best we can. We must strive to contribute to the general good.
- The outcome of our actions may show that God did not wish our good to have immediate effect, but it does not follow that He did not wish us to act
- "He never demands more than the right intention, and it is for Him to know the proper hour and place for letting the good designs succeed"
5. What the rules of the perfection of divine conduct consist in, and that the simplicity of the ways is in balance with the richness of the effects
- To know in detail the reason that could have moved God to choose the order of the universe is beyond the scope of finite minds
- As finite minds we cannot fully comprehend why God allows sin or bestows grace in the way He does, especially prior to attaining the full enjoyment of the vision of God.
- Minds have perfections and these consist of virtues
- The happiness of minds is the principal aim of God
6. God does nothing which is not orderly and it is not even possible to imagine events that are not regular
- The acts of God are commonly divided into ordinary and extraordinary. But everything is in conformity with the universal order.
- In understanding this we understand little other than what happens happens according to the order of harmony that God established.
7. That miracles conform to the General order, even though they may be contrary to the subordinate maxims; and about what God wills or permits by a General volition
- Miracles are as much in the order of things as typical events
8. To distinguish the actions of God from those of Creatures we explain the notion of an individual substance
- Every predicate of a subject must be contained within the subject at least "in-esse"
- One who understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know the predicates which belong to it
- There is something in the being of every substance or in the haecceity (thingness) of a thing, vestiges of everything that has happened to it and that will happen to it and even traces of everyone that happens in the universe. But, God alone is capable of recognizing this and knowing the thing's haecceity perfectly.
9. That each singular substance expresses the whole universe in its own way, and that all its events, together with all their circumstances and the whole sequence of external things are included in its notion
- Two substances cannot resemble each other completely and differ only in number or spatial qualities
- A substance can only begin by creation and end via annihilation
- A substance is not divisible into two. Likewise two substances cannot be combined into one.
- Every substance is like a complete world and a mirror of God
- The glory of God is multiplied by the number of substances in the universe
- Every substance bears in some way the infinite wisdom of God and imitates it insofar it is capable
10. That the belief in substantial forms has some basis, but that these forms do not change anything in the phenomena and must not be used to explain particular effects
- Without using the forms (Platonic forms) we cannot "elevate our minds sufficiently well to the knowledge of incorporeal natures and the wonders of God" (Leibniz, 10).
11. That the Thoughts of Theologians and Philosophers who are called scholastics are not entirely to be disdained
- If we are to look at St. Thomas and the other scholastics we would find a great treasure of demonstrative truths
12. That the notions involved in extension contain something imaginary and cannot constitute the substance of body
- The nature of substance and body does not wholly lie in extension, that is size, shape and motion, but is something related to souls or substantial form
- Souls sustain existence of bodies from moment to moment and preserve the basis for knowledge of what they are
- Souls alone are susceptible to punishment and reward and citizens subject to God.
13.
- The individual notion of each person includes once and for all everything that will ever happen to him but these truths are nonetheless contingent because they are caused by either the Free Will of God or of his creation
- It would appear that if all that happens is included in the nation of a single substance we would be left with complete fatalism. However, there is a big difference between certainty and necessity. Everything that will occur is certain because God foresees all actions, but it does not follow that what happens happens necessarily.
- An effect is necessary when its opposite implies a contradiction. An effect is contingent when its opposite course is not a contradictory one.
- Whatever happens in conformity with the predeterminations is certain, but not necessary, fore he would have done the opposite without it causing a contradiction, despite it being impossible for him to take the opposite action
14.
- Every created substance depends on God who preserves them in the manner we preserve our thoughts, only completely and perfectly.
- Every created substance is independent of everything save for God.
- No substance truly acts upon or is enacted upon by another substance because every substance is sustained by itself and God.
15.
- A substance is of infinitely extension insofar as it expresses everything, but is limited insofar as it expresses everything imperfectly
- Substances act upon one another in only the sense that they serve to limit the extension of one another. When one substance is greatened another must be limited to accommodate the other's growth.
- Whenever a thing acts it improves its efficacy. Thus, when a thing increases its efficacy it achieves more perfection and is strengthened and another substance is weakened.
- Pleasure arises when a perceptional being increases itself and pain occurs when it is decreased.
- One can sin by seeking to increase and thus seeking power and pleasure.
16.
- Miracles and extraordinary influence from God on man seems impossible because all events are consequences according to nature's demands.
- Miracles exist but are always in conformity with the universal law and general order of the universe.
- Miracles are miracles because they cannot be presupposed or foreseen by any created mind.
- What we express is our essence or idea and that is unlimited, but our nature or our power is limited.
- Whatever surpasses the nature or power of created substances is supernatural, but nothing can surpass our essences.
17.
???
Tuesday, April 24, 2007
Plantinga's transworld depravity
(Originally written April 24, 2007 in Book 25)
Class Notes
The Problem of Evil
God is all-Good
God wants to prevent evil
If there is evil then he can't
Therefore, God is not omnipotent
God is omnipotent
God can prevent evil
If there is evil then he doesn't want to prevent it
Therefore, God is not all-Good
There is no God that is both omnipotent and omni-benevolent
Marilyn McCord Adams
Horrendous evil and the goodness of God
Adams points out that the notion of an omnipotent and omni-benevolent eliminating all evil may be a strong perennial philosophical problem but that this notion is found nowhere in theistic beliefs.
1. God
2. Evil
The existence of God and the existence of evil are inconsistencies, not contradictions.
Inconsistency: both cannot be true, but both could be false
Contradictory - one is true, but both cannot be false. One must be true; one must be false.
1. There is an omniscient and omni-benevolent God
2. There is evil.
The inconsistency comes to play only if there is no way for both to be true, but there may be a way to show that both could be true.
Alvin Plantinga's Free-Will Defense
Logically it is always possible to reconcile inconsistencies
There must be a third proposition which is consistent with one and they jointly imply the other:
1. There is an omnipotent and omni-benevolent God
2. There is evil
3. An omnipotent and omni-benevolent Being gives us an unlimited supply of candy
Propositions one and three will lead to evil, but the inconsistency of propositions one and two is resolved.
Plantinga takes the extraordinary position that it does not matter if the resolving propositions is plausible or not, only that it is conceptually possible to resolve the inconsistency. Plantinga feels secure in knowing that the inconsistency is conceptually resolvable whereas most seek a plausible or true resolution of the inconsistency.
God created the best of all possible worlds
The best of all possible worlds contains evil.
The evil in the best of all possible worlds must enhance the total goodness.
World A is without evil and 10 to the 13th power merits.
World B has 10 to the 7th power terps of evil and 10 to the 18th power merits
Merits - measurement of goodness
Terps - measurement of evil (Plantinga)
World B (the world God creates) is better than world A because of Free Will.
Plantinga builds on Leibnizian principles.
Plantinga states Leibniz was right but forgot about something very vital. He calls it Leibniz's lapse. This is that God created the world but has not fully actualized it.
1. God created å (actual world)
2. God did not actualize the current state of affairs of å
World å was created by God, but not necessarily actualized by God
World W was created by God, but not actualized at all
If we have genuine freedom then God (although created the world) did not actualize the world.
W1 (Free Will but no evil). It is logically possible for a possible world to exist that possesses individuals with free will that never do evil.
Transworld depravity - depravity of man in all possible worlds because depravity is a part of man's essence.
No matter what logically possible world I am in I will misuse my free will in some manner.
Planting claims that all humans are under the curse of transworld depravity.
This makes W1 (the world with free will but no evil) logically impossible.
God exists and creates å and creates free beings
The free beings suffer from transworld depravity
Evil Exists
Therefore, there is no inconsistency because free beings misuse this free will to actualize evil.
Class Notes
The Problem of Evil
God is all-Good
God wants to prevent evil
If there is evil then he can't
Therefore, God is not omnipotent
God is omnipotent
God can prevent evil
If there is evil then he doesn't want to prevent it
Therefore, God is not all-Good
There is no God that is both omnipotent and omni-benevolent
Marilyn McCord Adams
Horrendous evil and the goodness of God
Adams points out that the notion of an omnipotent and omni-benevolent eliminating all evil may be a strong perennial philosophical problem but that this notion is found nowhere in theistic beliefs.
1. God
2. Evil
The existence of God and the existence of evil are inconsistencies, not contradictions.
Inconsistency: both cannot be true, but both could be false
Contradictory - one is true, but both cannot be false. One must be true; one must be false.
1. There is an omniscient and omni-benevolent God
2. There is evil.
The inconsistency comes to play only if there is no way for both to be true, but there may be a way to show that both could be true.
Alvin Plantinga's Free-Will Defense
Logically it is always possible to reconcile inconsistencies
There must be a third proposition which is consistent with one and they jointly imply the other:
1. There is an omnipotent and omni-benevolent God
2. There is evil
3. An omnipotent and omni-benevolent Being gives us an unlimited supply of candy
Propositions one and three will lead to evil, but the inconsistency of propositions one and two is resolved.
Plantinga takes the extraordinary position that it does not matter if the resolving propositions is plausible or not, only that it is conceptually possible to resolve the inconsistency. Plantinga feels secure in knowing that the inconsistency is conceptually resolvable whereas most seek a plausible or true resolution of the inconsistency.
God created the best of all possible worlds
The best of all possible worlds contains evil.
The evil in the best of all possible worlds must enhance the total goodness.
World A is without evil and 10 to the 13th power merits.
World B has 10 to the 7th power terps of evil and 10 to the 18th power merits
Merits - measurement of goodness
Terps - measurement of evil (Plantinga)
World B (the world God creates) is better than world A because of Free Will.
Plantinga builds on Leibnizian principles.
Plantinga states Leibniz was right but forgot about something very vital. He calls it Leibniz's lapse. This is that God created the world but has not fully actualized it.
1. God created å (actual world)
2. God did not actualize the current state of affairs of å
World å was created by God, but not necessarily actualized by God
World W was created by God, but not actualized at all
If we have genuine freedom then God (although created the world) did not actualize the world.
W1 (Free Will but no evil). It is logically possible for a possible world to exist that possesses individuals with free will that never do evil.
Transworld depravity - depravity of man in all possible worlds because depravity is a part of man's essence.
No matter what logically possible world I am in I will misuse my free will in some manner.
Planting claims that all humans are under the curse of transworld depravity.
This makes W1 (the world with free will but no evil) logically impossible.
God exists and creates å and creates free beings
The free beings suffer from transworld depravity
Evil Exists
Therefore, there is no inconsistency because free beings misuse this free will to actualize evil.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Cosmological Arguments and Rebuttals
(Originally written March 13, 2007 in Book 13)
Al-Farabi's Necessary Existence Argument
Arabian and Jewish forms of the cosmological argument later influenced Christian arguments
The Islamic Philosopher Al-Farabi distinguished between existence and essence. He argued:
1) There exists beings whose essence is distinct from their existence. These are possible beings.
2) These beings have existence only accidentally. It is not part of their very essence to exist. It is logically possible that they might not have existed.
3) Anything that exists accidentally (not essentially) must have derived their existence from another.
4) There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of existence.
5) Therefore, there must be a first cause of existence whose essence and existence are identical. This being must be a necessary being because the First Cause cannot be a mere possible being since all possible beings do not explain their own existence.
Avicenna's First Cause Argument
1) There are possible beings
2) Whatever possible beings exist have a cause for their being
3) There cannot be an infinite series of being.
4) Therefore, there must be a first cause for all possible things.
5) This first Cause must be a necessary Being because that which is the cause of all possible beings cannot itself be a possible being.
6) Whatever is essentially One can create immediately only one effect (intelligence)
7) Thinking is creating and God necessarily thinks, since he is a necessary being
8) Therefore, there is an necessary emanation from God of ten intelligences (Angels) that control the various spheres of the universe and the last of which (called Agent Intellect) forms the four elements of the cosmos and by which the human mind (possible intellect) is informed of all truth.
Avicenna's God was a necessary being who created 10 gods who created everything else.
The Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) argued for a first mover, a first Cause and a Necessary Being.
He argued that "I AM" implied absolute existence which applied to God alone.
Thomas Aquinas: Five Ways to Prove God's Existence
Aquinas' arguments were not entirely new
1) Maimonides had arguments similar to the first three
2) Al-Farabi and Avicenna had the first two
3) Anselm had an argument similar to the 4th argument
4) Aquinas' 5th argument was similar to Thierry of Chartes and William of Conches' adaptation of Plato's Timaeus argument
Aquinas was much more Aristotelian in his thought than any of his Christian predecessors.
He argued from:
1) Motion
2) Efficient Causality
3) Possibility and necessity
4) Gradation (perfection)
5) to a First Cause
Duns Scotus: Argument from Producibility
John Duns Scotus modified Aquinas' argument in two ways:
1) He began with the producibility of being, not merely from produced beings
2) He amplified the argument against an invite regress of dependent causes
Duns Scotus' arg.
1) Some being is produced
a) This is learned via experience
b) This is true independent of experience
c) It would be true even if God had not willed to create anything
2) What is produced is producible either by itself, by nothing or by something else
3) No being can produce itself
4) Something cannot be caused by nothing
5) Therefore, being is producible only by some being that is productive
6) There cannot be an infinite regress of productive beings, each producing the being of the one following it because
a) this is an essentially related series of causes, not an accidentally related one
-where the primary cause is more nearly perfect than the secondary one
-where the secondary cause depends on the primary one for its very causality
-where the cause must be simultaneously present to the effect
b) An infinite series of essentially related causes is impossible because:
-if the whole series is dependent for its causalities then there must be something beyond the series that counts for the causality in the series
-If the infinite series were causing the effect, then there would have to be an infinite number of causes simultaneously causing a single effect, and this is impossible
-where ever there are prior causes there must be a prime cause
-higher causes are more nearly perfect than lower causes and this implies a perfect cause at the head of all other less-than-perfect causes
-an infinite regress of causes implies imperfection. But an imperfect series implies something perfect beyond the series as ground for the imperfect
7) Therefore, there must be a first productive cause of all producible beings
8) This first Cause of all producible beings must be one because:
-It is perfect in knowledge and there cannot be two beings that know everything perfectly
-It is perfect in will, hence it loves itself more completely than anything else
-It is infinitely good and there cannot be two as such because one would be more than infinitely good which is impossible
-It is infinite in power. If there were two that were infinite in power than there would be two primary causes of the same effect, and this is impossible
-Absolutely infinite cannot be excelled in perfection because there cannot be anything more perfect than that which is wholly perfect
-There cannot be two necessary beings because one would possess what the other lacked and if it lacked any perfection it would not be necessary
-Omnipotent will cannot be in two beings because then one could render the other impotent
Ockham's Reservations about the Cosmological Argument
William of Ockham (1290-1350) raised three objections to the cosmological argument:
1) He denied that an essentially related infinite series was impossible
2) He argued that efficient causes are only known via experience. (Causality is "that whose existence or presence is followed by something")
3) He denied that one could prove that there was only one God in the absolute sense of the word. Christian theists insist that the unity of God refers to the "most perfect" Being possible. But the proposition "God exists" is not self evident because a self-evident proposition cannot be doubted and "God exists" is doubted. Since God's unity rests on the proposition "God exists" and it is impossible to know via experience and it is not self-evident there is no way to demonstrate that God is absolutely one.
Descartes' A posteriori Proof for God
Descartes' Proof
1) I am doubting
2) If I am doubting, I am thinking
3) Doubt is an imperfect form of thinking
4) But if I know the imperfect, then I must be aware of the perfect
5) But my imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of perfection that I have
6) Only a perfect Mind is an adequate cause for the idea of perfection
7) Therefore, a perfect mind must exist as the cause of this perfection.
Both Augustine and Descartes have a posteriori arguments for the existence of God which is platonic and has an affinity for the ontological argument.
Leibniz: The argument from Sufficient Reason
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) provided the most influential form of the cosmological argument in modern times. He argued:
1. The entire world is changing
2. Whatever is changing lacks within itself the reason for its own existence.
3. There is a sufficient reason for its own existence.
4. Therefore, there must be a cause beyond this world for its existence.
5. This cause is either its own sufficient cause or beyond it.
6. There cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons.
7. Therefore, there must be a first Cause that is its own sufficient reason.
Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Leibniz's disciple offered the proof that became the pattern of the cosmological argument for the modern world.
1. The human soul exists.
2. Nothing exists without a sufficient reason why it exists.
3. The reason for our existence must be contained in ourselves or beyond ourselves.
4. The reason for our existence is not in ourselves.
5. The reason for our existence thus lies beyond ourselves.
6. One does not arrive at sufficient reason for his existence until he reaches a being that has its reason for existence within itself.
7. A being that has its reason for existence within itself is a necessary being.
8. Therefore, there must be a necessary being beyond us that is the sufficient reason for our existence.
9. It is logically impossible for a necessary being not to exist.
10. Therefore, this necessary being is identical with the self-existent God of Scripture.
Leibniz's argument (and Wolff's) rests on the principle of sufficient reason which posits itself as a self-evidently true analytic principle.
The argument is a posteriori, but not existential. The necessity of its conclusion is based on a conceptually certainty, not an existential (actual) certainty.
Hume's Skeptical Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument
David Hume (1711-1776) laid down the most fundamental arguments against the cosmological argument:
1) Only a finite cause need be inferred from finite effects
2) No propositions about existence can be logically necessary
3) The words "necessary being" have no consistent meaning. It is possible to think of anything of not existing, even God; and, what might not exist does not need to exist.
4) If "necessary being" means only imperishable, then the universe may be the necessary being.
5) An infinite series is possible. An eternal series cannot have a cause because causes imply priority in time, but nothing can be prior in time to an eternal series. Thus, an eternal series is possible.
6) There is no way to establish the principle of causality
7) The universe as a whole does not need a cause, only the parts do.
8) Theistic argument convince only those who like abstract reasoning.
Kant's Agnosticism on Theistic Argumentation
1) The cosmological argument depends on the invalid ontological argument
2) Existential statements are not necessary
3) A noumenal (real) cause cannot be derived from a phenomenal effect
4) What is logically necessary is not ontologically necessary
5) The cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions
6) The concept of a "necessary being" is not self-clarifying
7) An infinite regress is logically possible
Taylor's restatement of the cosmological argument:
1) The Universe as a whole does not explain its own existence
2) Whatever does not explain its own existence calls for an explanation beyond itself.
3) An infinite regress of reasons is impossible
4) Therefore, there must be a first self-sufficient (independent)_ cause of the whole universe
Taylor's conclusion is rationally inescapable, but it is Leibnizian in that it relies on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, it is open to similar criticisms.
Hackett's Arguments Based on Explanation
Samuel C. Hackett offered two arguments in the Leibnizian tradition.
The first conceptual argument:
1) The world order is possible only on the basis of several necessary conditions:
- There need to be objective a priori principles of knowledge
- There need to objective essences that define the properties of things in the world
- There needs to be a reason why of all the possible worlds this is the one that exists
2) These realities show all of the properties that are associated with the structuring activity of a mind
3) Therefore, these realities can be understood as the workings of an absolute mind.
4) Therefore, there exists an absolute mind as necessary condition to the logical possibility of this world.
His second, causal argument:
1) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
2) Something exists
3) Therefore, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
Hackett's arguments suffer from an unwarranted assumption that a sufficient cause must be an ultimate cause. A finite cause may suffice.
Ross' argument based on Explanation
James F. Ross provided two versions of the argument based on explanation
First:
1) If something is not the case, there must be an explanation for it not being so.
2) Considering the state of affairs, "God does not exist" cannot be the case.
3) Therefore, since "God dos not exist" cannot be the case, "God exists" must be the case. Thus, God exists.
Craig's Kalam Argument
William Lane Craig has produced an argument based on the need to posit an original cause for the universe. He has three premises:
1) Whatever beings to exist has a cause
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Premise 1 seems intuit, but is questionable and uneasy to prove via demonstration
Premise 2 is completely questionable.
The argument, if it stands, does not prove theism because it does not eliminate pantheism.
Teleological and moral arguments depend on the principle of sufficient reason and/or causality. Both of which are questionable.
The ontological argument depends on the cosmological argument because it is theoretically possible that nothing ever existed at all.
The cosmological argument (in Leibnizian form) is rationally inescapable only if the principle of sufficient reason is rationally inescapable. But the principle of sufficient reason is neither analytically or self-evidently true.
The cosmological arguments leaves the actual for the conceptual at call thing world contingent and stating a necessary Being is one whose non-existence is logically impossible. This opens it to Kant's criticism that it confuses the principle of existential causality with the principle of sufficient reason.
The Kalam argument does not prove a theistic God, but a God that could be pantheistic.
9: The Cosmological Argument Reevaluated
Most attempts to defend the cosmological argument in a non-Leibnizian way emanate from Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas did not base his argument on the principle of sufficient reason, but on existential causality.
The Leibnizian type argument is built on logical necessity, whereas the Thomistic argument is based on existential undeniability.
The Cosmological Argument Restated
1. Some limited, changing being(s) exist
2. The present existence of every limited, changing being is caused by another
3. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of being
4. Therefore, there is a first Cause of the present existence of these beings
5. The first cause must be infinite, necessary, eternal, simple, unchanging and one
6. The first uncaused cause is identical with the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
It is logically possible that nothing ever existed. That is, it is possible to conceive of the nonexistence of everything.
Linehan: But logic is an affirmation of existence, so to conceive of the nonexistence of everything is a logical inference and thus, self-defeating?
Any being that undergoes a change is a contingent being. Necessary Beings are immutable.
Whatever changes in existence must be composed of actuality and potentiality.
The fact that there is change is proof that there is potential and actualization of potential.
No potential actualizes itself.
There must be some actuality outside of composed beings (beings possessing potential and actuality) to explain why they exist.
Actuality is a thing's existence and its potentiality is its essence.
An efficient cause is a necessary and sufficient condition to account for the actualization of a potential.
An infinite regress is a series without a first or beginning cause.
A self-caused thing is impossible because it would have had to exist before it existed in order to cause itself.
A way out of this dilemma is to argue that the infinite regress is circular or mutually dependent.
But this argument is obviously circular and thus, fallacious.
To deny causality within an infinite regress is simply an attempt to explain away the need for an explanation (a real need) on ground for the ungrounded finite being.
A being that needs ground for his own existence cannot be the ground of another being that needs to be grounded. One contingent being cannot ground another contingent being.
There must be a first Cause of the existence of every finite thing that exists.
The first Cause is the efficient Cause.
The Frist Cause is an uncaused cause. It can neither be self-caused (impossible) or caused by another (thus negating its status as the first cause).
The uncaused cause must be an unlimited being. If caused things are limited, uncaused things must be unlimited.
An unlimited Being must be a Necessary Being because it can not be limited by contingency.
God is not a logically necessary Being, He is an ontologically necessary being.
The uncaused Being must be an eternal Being. If nothing ever existed (a logical possibility) then nothing would ever exist because nothing can cause itself.
The uncaused Cause must be a simple, undivided Being. The uncaused Cause is pure actuality with no potentiality.
The uncaused Cause of existence must be immutable. What is changeable possess potentiality, thus pure actuality is unchangeable.
An uncaused Cause must be one Being. There cannot be two pure actualities. Pure actuality is indivisible.
The pure actuality possess all of the perfections of being infinite. Thus, the uncaused cause is the source of all perfections.
Al-Farabi's Necessary Existence Argument
Arabian and Jewish forms of the cosmological argument later influenced Christian arguments
The Islamic Philosopher Al-Farabi distinguished between existence and essence. He argued:
1) There exists beings whose essence is distinct from their existence. These are possible beings.
2) These beings have existence only accidentally. It is not part of their very essence to exist. It is logically possible that they might not have existed.
3) Anything that exists accidentally (not essentially) must have derived their existence from another.
4) There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of existence.
5) Therefore, there must be a first cause of existence whose essence and existence are identical. This being must be a necessary being because the First Cause cannot be a mere possible being since all possible beings do not explain their own existence.
Avicenna's First Cause Argument
1) There are possible beings
2) Whatever possible beings exist have a cause for their being
3) There cannot be an infinite series of being.
4) Therefore, there must be a first cause for all possible things.
5) This first Cause must be a necessary Being because that which is the cause of all possible beings cannot itself be a possible being.
6) Whatever is essentially One can create immediately only one effect (intelligence)
7) Thinking is creating and God necessarily thinks, since he is a necessary being
8) Therefore, there is an necessary emanation from God of ten intelligences (Angels) that control the various spheres of the universe and the last of which (called Agent Intellect) forms the four elements of the cosmos and by which the human mind (possible intellect) is informed of all truth.
Avicenna's God was a necessary being who created 10 gods who created everything else.
The Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) argued for a first mover, a first Cause and a Necessary Being.
He argued that "I AM" implied absolute existence which applied to God alone.
Thomas Aquinas: Five Ways to Prove God's Existence
Aquinas' arguments were not entirely new
1) Maimonides had arguments similar to the first three
2) Al-Farabi and Avicenna had the first two
3) Anselm had an argument similar to the 4th argument
4) Aquinas' 5th argument was similar to Thierry of Chartes and William of Conches' adaptation of Plato's Timaeus argument
Aquinas was much more Aristotelian in his thought than any of his Christian predecessors.
He argued from:
1) Motion
2) Efficient Causality
3) Possibility and necessity
4) Gradation (perfection)
5) to a First Cause
Duns Scotus: Argument from Producibility
John Duns Scotus modified Aquinas' argument in two ways:
1) He began with the producibility of being, not merely from produced beings
2) He amplified the argument against an invite regress of dependent causes
Duns Scotus' arg.
1) Some being is produced
a) This is learned via experience
b) This is true independent of experience
c) It would be true even if God had not willed to create anything
2) What is produced is producible either by itself, by nothing or by something else
3) No being can produce itself
4) Something cannot be caused by nothing
5) Therefore, being is producible only by some being that is productive
6) There cannot be an infinite regress of productive beings, each producing the being of the one following it because
a) this is an essentially related series of causes, not an accidentally related one
-where the primary cause is more nearly perfect than the secondary one
-where the secondary cause depends on the primary one for its very causality
-where the cause must be simultaneously present to the effect
b) An infinite series of essentially related causes is impossible because:
-if the whole series is dependent for its causalities then there must be something beyond the series that counts for the causality in the series
-If the infinite series were causing the effect, then there would have to be an infinite number of causes simultaneously causing a single effect, and this is impossible
-where ever there are prior causes there must be a prime cause
-higher causes are more nearly perfect than lower causes and this implies a perfect cause at the head of all other less-than-perfect causes
-an infinite regress of causes implies imperfection. But an imperfect series implies something perfect beyond the series as ground for the imperfect
7) Therefore, there must be a first productive cause of all producible beings
8) This first Cause of all producible beings must be one because:
-It is perfect in knowledge and there cannot be two beings that know everything perfectly
-It is perfect in will, hence it loves itself more completely than anything else
-It is infinitely good and there cannot be two as such because one would be more than infinitely good which is impossible
-It is infinite in power. If there were two that were infinite in power than there would be two primary causes of the same effect, and this is impossible
-Absolutely infinite cannot be excelled in perfection because there cannot be anything more perfect than that which is wholly perfect
-There cannot be two necessary beings because one would possess what the other lacked and if it lacked any perfection it would not be necessary
-Omnipotent will cannot be in two beings because then one could render the other impotent
Ockham's Reservations about the Cosmological Argument
William of Ockham (1290-1350) raised three objections to the cosmological argument:
1) He denied that an essentially related infinite series was impossible
2) He argued that efficient causes are only known via experience. (Causality is "that whose existence or presence is followed by something")
3) He denied that one could prove that there was only one God in the absolute sense of the word. Christian theists insist that the unity of God refers to the "most perfect" Being possible. But the proposition "God exists" is not self evident because a self-evident proposition cannot be doubted and "God exists" is doubted. Since God's unity rests on the proposition "God exists" and it is impossible to know via experience and it is not self-evident there is no way to demonstrate that God is absolutely one.
Descartes' A posteriori Proof for God
Descartes' Proof
1) I am doubting
2) If I am doubting, I am thinking
3) Doubt is an imperfect form of thinking
4) But if I know the imperfect, then I must be aware of the perfect
5) But my imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of perfection that I have
6) Only a perfect Mind is an adequate cause for the idea of perfection
7) Therefore, a perfect mind must exist as the cause of this perfection.
Both Augustine and Descartes have a posteriori arguments for the existence of God which is platonic and has an affinity for the ontological argument.
Leibniz: The argument from Sufficient Reason
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) provided the most influential form of the cosmological argument in modern times. He argued:
1. The entire world is changing
2. Whatever is changing lacks within itself the reason for its own existence.
3. There is a sufficient reason for its own existence.
4. Therefore, there must be a cause beyond this world for its existence.
5. This cause is either its own sufficient cause or beyond it.
6. There cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons.
7. Therefore, there must be a first Cause that is its own sufficient reason.
Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Leibniz's disciple offered the proof that became the pattern of the cosmological argument for the modern world.
1. The human soul exists.
2. Nothing exists without a sufficient reason why it exists.
3. The reason for our existence must be contained in ourselves or beyond ourselves.
4. The reason for our existence is not in ourselves.
5. The reason for our existence thus lies beyond ourselves.
6. One does not arrive at sufficient reason for his existence until he reaches a being that has its reason for existence within itself.
7. A being that has its reason for existence within itself is a necessary being.
8. Therefore, there must be a necessary being beyond us that is the sufficient reason for our existence.
9. It is logically impossible for a necessary being not to exist.
10. Therefore, this necessary being is identical with the self-existent God of Scripture.
Leibniz's argument (and Wolff's) rests on the principle of sufficient reason which posits itself as a self-evidently true analytic principle.
The argument is a posteriori, but not existential. The necessity of its conclusion is based on a conceptually certainty, not an existential (actual) certainty.
Hume's Skeptical Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument
David Hume (1711-1776) laid down the most fundamental arguments against the cosmological argument:
1) Only a finite cause need be inferred from finite effects
2) No propositions about existence can be logically necessary
3) The words "necessary being" have no consistent meaning. It is possible to think of anything of not existing, even God; and, what might not exist does not need to exist.
4) If "necessary being" means only imperishable, then the universe may be the necessary being.
5) An infinite series is possible. An eternal series cannot have a cause because causes imply priority in time, but nothing can be prior in time to an eternal series. Thus, an eternal series is possible.
6) There is no way to establish the principle of causality
7) The universe as a whole does not need a cause, only the parts do.
8) Theistic argument convince only those who like abstract reasoning.
Kant's Agnosticism on Theistic Argumentation
1) The cosmological argument depends on the invalid ontological argument
2) Existential statements are not necessary
3) A noumenal (real) cause cannot be derived from a phenomenal effect
4) What is logically necessary is not ontologically necessary
5) The cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions
6) The concept of a "necessary being" is not self-clarifying
7) An infinite regress is logically possible
Taylor's restatement of the cosmological argument:
1) The Universe as a whole does not explain its own existence
2) Whatever does not explain its own existence calls for an explanation beyond itself.
3) An infinite regress of reasons is impossible
4) Therefore, there must be a first self-sufficient (independent)_ cause of the whole universe
Taylor's conclusion is rationally inescapable, but it is Leibnizian in that it relies on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, it is open to similar criticisms.
Hackett's Arguments Based on Explanation
Samuel C. Hackett offered two arguments in the Leibnizian tradition.
The first conceptual argument:
1) The world order is possible only on the basis of several necessary conditions:
- There need to be objective a priori principles of knowledge
- There need to objective essences that define the properties of things in the world
- There needs to be a reason why of all the possible worlds this is the one that exists
2) These realities show all of the properties that are associated with the structuring activity of a mind
3) Therefore, these realities can be understood as the workings of an absolute mind.
4) Therefore, there exists an absolute mind as necessary condition to the logical possibility of this world.
His second, causal argument:
1) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
2) Something exists
3) Therefore, an absolutely necessary and transcendent Being exists
Hackett's arguments suffer from an unwarranted assumption that a sufficient cause must be an ultimate cause. A finite cause may suffice.
Ross' argument based on Explanation
James F. Ross provided two versions of the argument based on explanation
First:
1) If something is not the case, there must be an explanation for it not being so.
2) Considering the state of affairs, "God does not exist" cannot be the case.
3) Therefore, since "God dos not exist" cannot be the case, "God exists" must be the case. Thus, God exists.
Craig's Kalam Argument
William Lane Craig has produced an argument based on the need to posit an original cause for the universe. He has three premises:
1) Whatever beings to exist has a cause
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Premise 1 seems intuit, but is questionable and uneasy to prove via demonstration
Premise 2 is completely questionable.
The argument, if it stands, does not prove theism because it does not eliminate pantheism.
Teleological and moral arguments depend on the principle of sufficient reason and/or causality. Both of which are questionable.
The ontological argument depends on the cosmological argument because it is theoretically possible that nothing ever existed at all.
The cosmological argument (in Leibnizian form) is rationally inescapable only if the principle of sufficient reason is rationally inescapable. But the principle of sufficient reason is neither analytically or self-evidently true.
The cosmological arguments leaves the actual for the conceptual at call thing world contingent and stating a necessary Being is one whose non-existence is logically impossible. This opens it to Kant's criticism that it confuses the principle of existential causality with the principle of sufficient reason.
The Kalam argument does not prove a theistic God, but a God that could be pantheistic.
9: The Cosmological Argument Reevaluated
Most attempts to defend the cosmological argument in a non-Leibnizian way emanate from Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas did not base his argument on the principle of sufficient reason, but on existential causality.
The Leibnizian type argument is built on logical necessity, whereas the Thomistic argument is based on existential undeniability.
The Cosmological Argument Restated
1. Some limited, changing being(s) exist
2. The present existence of every limited, changing being is caused by another
3. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of being
4. Therefore, there is a first Cause of the present existence of these beings
5. The first cause must be infinite, necessary, eternal, simple, unchanging and one
6. The first uncaused cause is identical with the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
It is logically possible that nothing ever existed. That is, it is possible to conceive of the nonexistence of everything.
Linehan: But logic is an affirmation of existence, so to conceive of the nonexistence of everything is a logical inference and thus, self-defeating?
Any being that undergoes a change is a contingent being. Necessary Beings are immutable.
Whatever changes in existence must be composed of actuality and potentiality.
The fact that there is change is proof that there is potential and actualization of potential.
No potential actualizes itself.
There must be some actuality outside of composed beings (beings possessing potential and actuality) to explain why they exist.
Actuality is a thing's existence and its potentiality is its essence.
An efficient cause is a necessary and sufficient condition to account for the actualization of a potential.
An infinite regress is a series without a first or beginning cause.
A self-caused thing is impossible because it would have had to exist before it existed in order to cause itself.
A way out of this dilemma is to argue that the infinite regress is circular or mutually dependent.
But this argument is obviously circular and thus, fallacious.
To deny causality within an infinite regress is simply an attempt to explain away the need for an explanation (a real need) on ground for the ungrounded finite being.
A being that needs ground for his own existence cannot be the ground of another being that needs to be grounded. One contingent being cannot ground another contingent being.
There must be a first Cause of the existence of every finite thing that exists.
The first Cause is the efficient Cause.
The Frist Cause is an uncaused cause. It can neither be self-caused (impossible) or caused by another (thus negating its status as the first cause).
The uncaused cause must be an unlimited being. If caused things are limited, uncaused things must be unlimited.
An unlimited Being must be a Necessary Being because it can not be limited by contingency.
God is not a logically necessary Being, He is an ontologically necessary being.
The uncaused Being must be an eternal Being. If nothing ever existed (a logical possibility) then nothing would ever exist because nothing can cause itself.
The uncaused Cause must be a simple, undivided Being. The uncaused Cause is pure actuality with no potentiality.
The uncaused Cause of existence must be immutable. What is changeable possess potentiality, thus pure actuality is unchangeable.
An uncaused Cause must be one Being. There cannot be two pure actualities. Pure actuality is indivisible.
The pure actuality possess all of the perfections of being infinite. Thus, the uncaused cause is the source of all perfections.
Cosmological Arguments & Attributes of God
(Originally written March 13, 2007 in Book 25)
Class of Notes
Philosophy of Religion
Principle of Sufficient Reason (Leibniz)
What counts as an explanation is mushy. What counts as a sufficient reason is mush. What is not mushy is the fact of causality.
A Cosmological Argument
Aquinas - Everything that moves is moved by another
Flew - From the Newtonian vantage point we can see this is false. Aquinas used the Aristotelian method of potentiality moving to actuality. But, this concept with all the archaic concepts of Aristotle are shown to be flawed by today's scientific insights.
Aquinas - Everything that moves is moved by another
Modern - Every body continues in its state of rest (or of uniform motion) unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.
Aquinas and Aristotle would have meant "change" by "move". Thus, Aquinas and Newton were really stating the same thing.
Aristotelian metaphysical is not outdated or replaced by modern science.
The Existential Cosmological Argument
Change: When something changes a potential is actualized.
Change is limited by potential.
A contingent thing has the potential to change.
Potential do not actualize themselves. It takes a cause.
Logically there can be change caused by another or an uncaused change, but not a self-caused change.
Anything that exists must be either caused by another thing or totally uncaused
1) Something exists
2) Each thing that exists is either necessary or contingent
Necessary - that which is non-contingent
Contingent - that which is non-necessary
Contingent - dependent, conditioned, caused, sustained, shaped, actualized potential
Necessary - none of the above; independent, unconditioned, uncaused, unsustained, uninfluenced
Properties of a contingent being vs. necessary being
Limited vs. Unlimited
Temporal vs. Eternal
Finite vs. Infinite
Dependent vs. Independent
Caused vs. Uncaused
Changeable vs. Immutable
3) A necessary being has the properties of "God"
- it must have all of its properties, whatever they may be, without limits
4) The world (universe) cannot be a necessary being
5) There can be, at most, one necessary being
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernables
"Cookie Monster Principle"
If you do not differ from Cookie Monster in some respect you are Cookie Monster
In order for two things to differ from each other they must differ in some respect; or, unless two things differ in some property they are identical (they are one and the same thing)
Whether or not we can derive the attributes of God from reason?
Objections:
1. If Divine simplicity is true, there would be no distinctions among any of God's attributes
2. Complex things are better than simple things, God must be the best, therefore, not simple
3. We cannot conceptualize immutability
4. The world is in perpetual flux; God is immutable. How can they relate?
5. If God is unity, how can he be a trinity?
6. God's actions change and they take place in time; therefore, how can he be immutable?
7. God might change, but it takes a long time, just as things in nature seem to be immutable but aren't
8. The concept of "one" is incompatible with God's complete unity
9. Removing all specific attributes from God in order to achieve simplicity leaves you with a God without attributes; therefore, a God who is nothing
10. Applying an attribute to God is to limit God/
Can the Attributes of God be derived by reason?
Aquinas' Attributes of God
- Simplicity
- Perfection
- Goodness
- Infinity
- Immutability
- Eternity
- Unity
God's Simplicity
- Is God a body?
- Does God consist of matter and form?
- Is God the same as his essence?
- Is existence one with God's essence?
- Is God wholly simple?
Is God a body?
arg. 1:
1) No body is in motion unless put in motion
2) Bodies cannot be necessary beings because it could not cause itself
3) God is the first mover, unmoved
4) Therefore, God is not a body
arg. 2:
1) The first Being is pure actuality with no potentiality
2) All bodies have potentiality
3) Therefore, God is not a body
Does God consist of matter and form?
Argument against matter:
1) Matter is potentiality (contingent)
2) God is pure actuality
3) Therefore, God does not consist of matter
Argument Against Form
Is God the same as His essence?
Uses the analogy of man and humanity: individual man has certain skin color, specific flesh and bones, but these 'accidental qualities' are not the same was the form or essence of humanity
Since God is not matter he cannot have 'accidental qualities', therefore God's essence and Being are one.
Is God wholly simple
arg. 1
1) Every composite has a cause (parts do not unite themselves)
2) God is uncaused
3) Therefore, He is simple
arg. 2
1) No single part can predicate a composite of parts
2) Therefore, God must be pure form and in no way composite
God's Immutability
1st arg:
1) God is pure actuality with no potentiality
2) Everything which is in any way potential is changeable
3) Therefore, God is immutable
2nd arg:
1) Everything that moves remains as it was in part and passes away in part
2) God is not a composite
3) There is not multiple parts to remain and pass away in God
4) Therefore, God is immutable
3rd arg:
1) Everything that changes acquires something new
2) God is infinite
3) He cannot acquire anything new
4) Therefore, God is immutable
Immutability belongs only to God
Unity of God
Argument from simplicity:
1) God is a simple being
2) Simple beings have no parts
3) In order to be divisible one must have parts
4) Therefore, God is one
Argument from perfection:
1) God is perfect
2) If there were two or more Gods they would have to differ
3) But an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything
4) Therefore, God is one
Argument from unity of the world
1) World is composed of diverse things
2) Diverse things do not come together unless ordered
3) The world has an ordered unity
4) Therefore, there must be only one God
Objections
Schubert Ogden:
1) Service is doing for God
Aquinas' God is immutably perfect
Therefore, we cannot serve Aquinas' God
Thomistic reply
True, we cannot add anything to God. We serve Him for His glory. God is not "statically completed perfection". He is pure actuality or dynamic act.
2) All genuine relationships involve mutual dependence. Aquinas' God does not depend on the world. Therefore, there is no relationship between God and man.
Thomistic reply
True, God is not dependent on the world. First premise is wrong; all relationships do not involve mutual dependence. This is absurd anthropomorphism.
Can the attributes of God be derived by reason?
Yes, I think so ... - Matt
Divine simplicity
God - One God, no Parts, No divisibility
God is one Being, one Existence, One Nature, One Substance, One essence, Not three Gods, three parts three divisions, three natures, three substances, three beings, three existences, three natures, three substances
He is three modes, persons, appearances, outward manifestations, subsistences
Whatever category God is one in He is not three. Whatever category God is three in He is not one.
"One what and three who's" - Geisler terminology
One God who manifests himself in three ways. The term used for this is "persons" which goes back to "persona" (Latin) which goes back to the Greek word meaning "mask"
Persons are three different ways of the one God manifesting himself.
These manifestations are not sequential (heresy) but eternal. All three occur simultaneously, but it is still only one being.
The three persons subsist in the one existence of God.
Class of Notes
Philosophy of Religion
Principle of Sufficient Reason (Leibniz)
What counts as an explanation is mushy. What counts as a sufficient reason is mush. What is not mushy is the fact of causality.
A Cosmological Argument
Aquinas - Everything that moves is moved by another
Flew - From the Newtonian vantage point we can see this is false. Aquinas used the Aristotelian method of potentiality moving to actuality. But, this concept with all the archaic concepts of Aristotle are shown to be flawed by today's scientific insights.
Aquinas - Everything that moves is moved by another
Modern - Every body continues in its state of rest (or of uniform motion) unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.
Aquinas and Aristotle would have meant "change" by "move". Thus, Aquinas and Newton were really stating the same thing.
Aristotelian metaphysical is not outdated or replaced by modern science.
The Existential Cosmological Argument
Change: When something changes a potential is actualized.
Change is limited by potential.
A contingent thing has the potential to change.
Potential do not actualize themselves. It takes a cause.
Logically there can be change caused by another or an uncaused change, but not a self-caused change.
Anything that exists must be either caused by another thing or totally uncaused
1) Something exists
2) Each thing that exists is either necessary or contingent
Necessary - that which is non-contingent
Contingent - that which is non-necessary
Contingent - dependent, conditioned, caused, sustained, shaped, actualized potential
Necessary - none of the above; independent, unconditioned, uncaused, unsustained, uninfluenced
Properties of a contingent being vs. necessary being
Limited vs. Unlimited
Temporal vs. Eternal
Finite vs. Infinite
Dependent vs. Independent
Caused vs. Uncaused
Changeable vs. Immutable
3) A necessary being has the properties of "God"
- it must have all of its properties, whatever they may be, without limits
4) The world (universe) cannot be a necessary being
5) There can be, at most, one necessary being
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernables
"Cookie Monster Principle"
If you do not differ from Cookie Monster in some respect you are Cookie Monster
In order for two things to differ from each other they must differ in some respect; or, unless two things differ in some property they are identical (they are one and the same thing)
Whether or not we can derive the attributes of God from reason?
Objections:
1. If Divine simplicity is true, there would be no distinctions among any of God's attributes
2. Complex things are better than simple things, God must be the best, therefore, not simple
3. We cannot conceptualize immutability
4. The world is in perpetual flux; God is immutable. How can they relate?
5. If God is unity, how can he be a trinity?
6. God's actions change and they take place in time; therefore, how can he be immutable?
7. God might change, but it takes a long time, just as things in nature seem to be immutable but aren't
8. The concept of "one" is incompatible with God's complete unity
9. Removing all specific attributes from God in order to achieve simplicity leaves you with a God without attributes; therefore, a God who is nothing
10. Applying an attribute to God is to limit God/
Can the Attributes of God be derived by reason?
Aquinas' Attributes of God
- Simplicity
- Perfection
- Goodness
- Infinity
- Immutability
- Eternity
- Unity
God's Simplicity
- Is God a body?
- Does God consist of matter and form?
- Is God the same as his essence?
- Is existence one with God's essence?
- Is God wholly simple?
Is God a body?
arg. 1:
1) No body is in motion unless put in motion
2) Bodies cannot be necessary beings because it could not cause itself
3) God is the first mover, unmoved
4) Therefore, God is not a body
arg. 2:
1) The first Being is pure actuality with no potentiality
2) All bodies have potentiality
3) Therefore, God is not a body
Does God consist of matter and form?
Argument against matter:
1) Matter is potentiality (contingent)
2) God is pure actuality
3) Therefore, God does not consist of matter
Argument Against Form
Is God the same as His essence?
Uses the analogy of man and humanity: individual man has certain skin color, specific flesh and bones, but these 'accidental qualities' are not the same was the form or essence of humanity
Since God is not matter he cannot have 'accidental qualities', therefore God's essence and Being are one.
Is God wholly simple
arg. 1
1) Every composite has a cause (parts do not unite themselves)
2) God is uncaused
3) Therefore, He is simple
arg. 2
1) No single part can predicate a composite of parts
2) Therefore, God must be pure form and in no way composite
God's Immutability
1st arg:
1) God is pure actuality with no potentiality
2) Everything which is in any way potential is changeable
3) Therefore, God is immutable
2nd arg:
1) Everything that moves remains as it was in part and passes away in part
2) God is not a composite
3) There is not multiple parts to remain and pass away in God
4) Therefore, God is immutable
3rd arg:
1) Everything that changes acquires something new
2) God is infinite
3) He cannot acquire anything new
4) Therefore, God is immutable
Immutability belongs only to God
Unity of God
Argument from simplicity:
1) God is a simple being
2) Simple beings have no parts
3) In order to be divisible one must have parts
4) Therefore, God is one
Argument from perfection:
1) God is perfect
2) If there were two or more Gods they would have to differ
3) But an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything
4) Therefore, God is one
Argument from unity of the world
1) World is composed of diverse things
2) Diverse things do not come together unless ordered
3) The world has an ordered unity
4) Therefore, there must be only one God
Objections
Schubert Ogden:
1) Service is doing for God
Aquinas' God is immutably perfect
Therefore, we cannot serve Aquinas' God
Thomistic reply
True, we cannot add anything to God. We serve Him for His glory. God is not "statically completed perfection". He is pure actuality or dynamic act.
2) All genuine relationships involve mutual dependence. Aquinas' God does not depend on the world. Therefore, there is no relationship between God and man.
Thomistic reply
True, God is not dependent on the world. First premise is wrong; all relationships do not involve mutual dependence. This is absurd anthropomorphism.
Can the attributes of God be derived by reason?
Yes, I think so ... - Matt
Divine simplicity
God - One God, no Parts, No divisibility
God is one Being, one Existence, One Nature, One Substance, One essence, Not three Gods, three parts three divisions, three natures, three substances, three beings, three existences, three natures, three substances
He is three modes, persons, appearances, outward manifestations, subsistences
Whatever category God is one in He is not three. Whatever category God is three in He is not one.
"One what and three who's" - Geisler terminology
One God who manifests himself in three ways. The term used for this is "persons" which goes back to "persona" (Latin) which goes back to the Greek word meaning "mask"
Persons are three different ways of the one God manifesting himself.
These manifestations are not sequential (heresy) but eternal. All three occur simultaneously, but it is still only one being.
The three persons subsist in the one existence of God.
Wednesday, March 7, 2007
Ontological Arguments and Objections
(Originally written March 7, 2007 in Book 13)
Anselm's Debate with Gaunilo
Gaunilo objected to Anselm's argument on a few grounds:
1. It is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must exist outside the mind.
2. If God's non-existence were really inconceivable then no one could doubt his existence.
3. We cannot even form the concept of the most perfect being possible.
4. The existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of a perfect Being anymore than the existence of a perfect island can be inferred from the idea of a perfect island.
5. God's nonexistence is no more inconceivable than my own nonexistence. I can conceive of my own nonexistence so I can conceive of God's nonexistence too.
6. God's existence must be proved before we can discuss his essence. Otherwise there is no basis for saying he is the most perfect Being possible.
Anselm's replies:
1. The argument only applies to an absolute perfect Being.
2. God's nonexistence is affirmable, but not conceivable.
3. We do understand the word because of 6 facts:
- It is a common word
- It is a familiar word
- Our faith and conscience provide content for it
- Conceptions do not have to be in terms of sensible images
- God can be understood indirectly
- Those who deny that they can have a conception of God must have a conception of what they cannot conceive
4. The idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything, especially being; whereas, the idea of anything else can lack being.
5. If it is possible for a necessary being a necessary being must exist. It's nonexistence is inconceivable.
6. We can compare ideal characteristics prior to ascertaining their reality.
Anselm charged Gaunilo with misunderstanding the argument as:
1. God is the greatest of all Beings
2. It is greater to exist in reality then merely in the understanding.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
Anselm states this argument confuses the greatest actual Being with the greatest possible being.
Aquinas' objection to the ontological argument
Aquinas understood Anselm to mean:
1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived
2. What exists actually and mentally is greater than that with exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually.
Aquinas had 3 objections to the argument:
1. Not everyone understands the term "God" to mean that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Even if everyone did understand that the term God meant this, it does not follow that God exists actually.
3. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident, but not self-evident to us.
Descartes' formulation of the Ontological Argument
Descartes' argument (2nd form)
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature of that concept.
2. Existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent.
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
"If God by definition cannot exist, then he must exist" (128).
Descartes' argument (1st form)
1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive of something is true.
2. We clearly and distinctly perceive that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being necessitates the existence of that Being.
3. Therefore, it is true that an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack existence.
Descartes qualified his argument in three ways:
1. This argument applies only to an absolutely perfect or necessary being.
2. It is not necessary for anyone to think of God, but if and when he does he must conceive of God as necessarily existing.
3. To conceive of God as a necessary Being is not imaginary, but necessary. The concept of a necessary being must be what it is and cannot be any other way. Thus, the concept of a necessary Being cannot be the product of one's imagination.
The debate between Caters and Descartes
Caters the priest agreed with Thomas Aquinas in that he felt the Ontological Argument proved only a conceptual and not a real existence of God.
Caters contended that the words "existent lion" is conceptually necessary, but it does not prove that a lion exists.
Descartes stated that Aquinas refuted an argument that stated existence is concluded from the meaning of God, not his own argument.
Other reactions to Descartes' proofs
Other 17th century philosophers reacted negatively to Descartes' arguments. They restated his argument this way.
1. If it is not contradictory that God exists, then it is certain that He exists.
2. It is not contradictory that God exists.
3. Therefore, it is certain that God exists.
They objected to Descartes' argument in two ways:
1. The minor premise can be doubted or denied.
2. Descartes admitted that his idea of God was inadequate and thus unclear. By Descartes definition of truth as "clear and distinct" then it is untrue.
Descartes' replies:
1. God's nonexistence is noncontradictory in either of two senses of the word:
- Whatever does not disagree with human thought (God is noncontradictory)
- What cannot be known by the human mind (no one could know anything, thus God's existence is noncontradictory)
2. Even if our concept of God is inadequate it does not follow that it is contradictory. God's necessary existence is a clear concept, thus the argument is unaffected by lack of clarity in other aspects of God's nature.
The debate between Gassendi and Descartes.
Pierre Gassendi, a skeptic, contended that Descartes confused existence with a property. He argued with 7 points:
1. The essence of a thing can be thought of apart from its existence.
2. Existence is not a property.
3. Essence and existence can be distinguished only in thought, not in reality.
4. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as we are to think of Pegasus as not existing.
5. We need demonstration that God exists, not merely the assumption that it does.
6. Descartes did not really prove that nonexistence is incompatible with God.
Descartes replied to Gassendi with four points:
1. Existence is a property in that it is attributable to something. Necessary existence is a necessary property of a necessary being.
2. We cannot compare the existence of that which is contingent to the existence of what is necessary.
3. It is not begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent.
4. God's existence and essence are inseparable.
Leibniz's Consideration of the Ontological Argument
Leibniz held that the ontological argument was valid but sensed that it was necessary to demonstrate the concept of God was not contradictory.
He stated
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exists.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.
To support his minor premise Leibniz argued that:
1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limitations.
2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities (they differ in kind).
3. Whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it.
4. Therefore, it is possible for on Being (God) to possess all possible perfections.
Three objections to Leibniz's arg.
1. It assumes that some qualities are essentially positive and others negative, but this may not be the case.
2. Leibniz assumes that some qualities are intrinsically simple, but Wittgenstein showed that what is simple in one conceptual system may be complex in another.
3. It depends on the principle of the actual identity which is conceptually indiscernible.
Spinoza's Ontological Proof
Like Descartes, Spinoza held that God was mathematically demonstrable.
Spinoza's argument:
1. There must be a cause for everything, either for its existence or for its nonexistence.
2. A necessary Being (God) necessarily exists, unless there is an adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
3. There is no adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being, necessarily exists.
One may object to Spinoza's insistence that there must be a cause for nothing because it appears contradictory.
Spinoza's second form:
1. Something necessarily exists.
2. This necessary existence is either finite or infinite.
3. It is possible for this necessary existence to be infinite.
4. There must be a cause as to why this is not an infinite existence.
5. No finite existence can hinder this being (an infinite existence).
6. Therefore, this must be an infinite existence
Spinoza's arguments borrow from the premise that something exists from the cosmological argument.
Spinoza's God is not the theistic God of Leibniz or Anselm, it is a pantheistic God.
The Objections of Hume and Kant
Hume's Objection:
1. Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradictory
2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
3. Whatever we conceive to exist we can conceive as nonexistent
4. There is no being whose existence implies a contradiction
5. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.
Hume argues that no argument for God is rationally inescapable because it always contains premises that are logically deniable.
Kant's critique of the Ontological proof
Kant objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary Being (that which cannot be).
He also contended that necessity applied only to propositions, not existence.
Also, what is logically possible is not always ontologically possible.
Existence (Kant held) is not a predicate of a thing. It is not a perfection.
Supposed Causes of the Ontological Mistake
Opponents of the Ontological argument have blamed many sources of the ontological 'mistake'
1) Platonic Philosophy - Platonic epistemology holds that one can directly and intuitively know essences.
2) Metaphysical thinking - some argue that "is" or "exists" is only logical, not ontological.
3) Confusion of cause and reason - Causes need something outside of itself where a reason can be itself (Schopenhauer)
4) Use of a proper name - the use of a proper name implies existence (Russell)
5) The use of the English conditional. Alvin Plantinga claimed that "If Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" does not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. Likewise, "If God exists, then he Necessarily exists" does not imply "God exists" There may be no God at all.
Linehan - Unfair analogy!
"IF Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" may not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. But there is a bachelor. Likewise, "If God exists, then he necessarily exists" may not imply "God exists" But, there is a necessary existence which must be filled by a necessary Existent, which is God.
Findlay's Ontological Disproof of God.
The ontological argument has been widely rejected in modern times.
J. N. Findlay used the ontological proof against itself:
1. God must be thought of as a necessary Being, for anything else short of this would be unworthy of worship.
2. But existential necessary propositions cannot be true for necessity is merely a logical characteristic of propositions, not of reality.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A simpler, proper form of this argument:
1. The only way a necessary Being could exist is to exist necessarily.
2. The proposition "God exists necessarily" is an existentially necessary proposition.
3. No existentially necessary propositions can be true.
4. Therefore, the proposition "God exists necessarily" cannot be true.
A theist can object to this in 4 ways:
1. Change the proposition "God exists necessarily" to "God exists". Then holding the proposition "God exists" as a logically necessary proposition to hold.
2. Deny that necessity applied to existential propositions makes them untrue. (Existentially necessary propositions can be true). Examples of existentially necessary propositions: "I am I". "There is an infinite number of prime numbers". "Square circles do not exist".
3. "God necessarily exists" is a special case (Anselm and Descartes).
4. Findlay's statement "there are no existentially necessary propositions" is an existentially necessary proposition.
Hartshorne's Restatement of the Ontological Proof.
Charles Hartshorne is one of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument and states it like this:
1. The existence of a necessary being is either:
a) Impossible, and there is no example of it
b) Possible, but there is no example of it
c) Possible, and there is an example of it
2. Possible, but there is no example of it is meaningless because a necessary Being cannot be a possible being.
3. Impossible, and there is no example of it is not eliminated by the ontological argument, but the meaningfulness of the term 'necessary Being' is a justifiable assumption that may be defeated on other grounds.
Hartshorne's Argument:
1. All thought must refer to something beyond itself which is at least possible
2. The necessary existence of a necessary Being is at least possible.
3. With a necessary Being an "at-least-possible" existence is indistinguishable from a "possible and actual" existence. A necessary Being cannot have a "merely possible" existence.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being necessarily has both a possible and an actual existence.
Hartshorne's view of God is neither theistic and pantheistic. It is panentheistic.
Hartshorne states, "Either God is a meaningless term or there exists a divine Being" (141).
All versions of the ontological argument contain the implicit premise that what is rationally inescapable is the real.
Malcolm's restatement of the ontological proof
Malcolm believes that Kant invalidated Anselm's first form, but the second form is immune to all criticism.
Malcolm's restatement of Anselm's 2nd form:
1. The existence of a necessary being must be either:
a) a necessary existence
b) an impossible existence
c) a possible existence
2. The existence of a necessary Being is not an impossible existence
a) No one has ever shown the concept of a necessary being to be contradictory
b) there is a basis in human experience for "a greater than which cannot be thought"
c) Leibniz's attempt to prove that there is no contradiction fails. We cannot show that there cannot be one.
3. The existence of a necessary Being cannot be a possible being because:
a) it is contradictory to the very nature of a necessary being
b) a possible being is dependent, a necessary Being is independent
4. Therefore, A necessary Being Necessarily exists
Plantinga's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Plantinga argues that God could exist without his existence being a necessary one. His existence could be logically contingent but not ontologically so.
Planting states that it is logically possible that God never existed at all. It is logically possible that nothing ever existent including God.
All that proponents of the ontological argument have to do invalidate Plantinga's objections too.
Planting offers an ontological argument that is very cosmological. It has left the a priori realm and moved into the a posteriori realm.
Planting uses modal logic in his argument:
1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a world "W" and an essence "E" such that "E" is exemplified in "W" and "E" entails the property "has maximal greatness in W"
5. For any object X, if X, exemplifies E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
7. If W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified.
8. What is impossible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10 Therefore, the being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.
Plantinga's argument is tight and compelling. It avoids many of the traditional criticism of the ontological argument. However there are a few criticisms:
1. The use of modal logic assumes existence of an actual world. Thus, it is a posteriori, not a priori.
2. Defining a perfect being in theistic terms is gratuitous.
3. The essence E is supposed by Plantinga to havre a real existence.
The ontological argument to be valid must assume that something exists and thus it rests on a cosmological principle.
The ontological argument has not proven God exists by itself. It has in fact yielded four types of God and a possible atheistic conception:
1. Leibniz & Descartes - theistic God
2. Spinoza - pantheistic God
3. Hartshorne - panentheistic God
4. Henle - polytheistic gods
5. Atheism - the universe is necessary, but does not include God
Anselm's Debate with Gaunilo
Gaunilo objected to Anselm's argument on a few grounds:
1. It is built on the false premise that whatever exists in the mind must exist outside the mind.
2. If God's non-existence were really inconceivable then no one could doubt his existence.
3. We cannot even form the concept of the most perfect being possible.
4. The existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of a perfect Being anymore than the existence of a perfect island can be inferred from the idea of a perfect island.
5. God's nonexistence is no more inconceivable than my own nonexistence. I can conceive of my own nonexistence so I can conceive of God's nonexistence too.
6. God's existence must be proved before we can discuss his essence. Otherwise there is no basis for saying he is the most perfect Being possible.
Anselm's replies:
1. The argument only applies to an absolute perfect Being.
2. God's nonexistence is affirmable, but not conceivable.
3. We do understand the word because of 6 facts:
- It is a common word
- It is a familiar word
- Our faith and conscience provide content for it
- Conceptions do not have to be in terms of sensible images
- God can be understood indirectly
- Those who deny that they can have a conception of God must have a conception of what they cannot conceive
4. The idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything, especially being; whereas, the idea of anything else can lack being.
5. If it is possible for a necessary being a necessary being must exist. It's nonexistence is inconceivable.
6. We can compare ideal characteristics prior to ascertaining their reality.
Anselm charged Gaunilo with misunderstanding the argument as:
1. God is the greatest of all Beings
2. It is greater to exist in reality then merely in the understanding.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality.
Anselm states this argument confuses the greatest actual Being with the greatest possible being.
Aquinas' objection to the ontological argument
Aquinas understood Anselm to mean:
1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived
2. What exists actually and mentally is greater than that with exists only mentally.
3. Therefore, God must exist actually.
Aquinas had 3 objections to the argument:
1. Not everyone understands the term "God" to mean that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. Even if everyone did understand that the term God meant this, it does not follow that God exists actually.
3. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident, but not self-evident to us.
Descartes' formulation of the Ontological Argument
Descartes' argument (2nd form)
1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature of that concept.
2. Existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent.
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.
"If God by definition cannot exist, then he must exist" (128).
Descartes' argument (1st form)
1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive of something is true.
2. We clearly and distinctly perceive that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being necessitates the existence of that Being.
3. Therefore, it is true that an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack existence.
Descartes qualified his argument in three ways:
1. This argument applies only to an absolutely perfect or necessary being.
2. It is not necessary for anyone to think of God, but if and when he does he must conceive of God as necessarily existing.
3. To conceive of God as a necessary Being is not imaginary, but necessary. The concept of a necessary being must be what it is and cannot be any other way. Thus, the concept of a necessary Being cannot be the product of one's imagination.
The debate between Caters and Descartes
Caters the priest agreed with Thomas Aquinas in that he felt the Ontological Argument proved only a conceptual and not a real existence of God.
Caters contended that the words "existent lion" is conceptually necessary, but it does not prove that a lion exists.
Descartes stated that Aquinas refuted an argument that stated existence is concluded from the meaning of God, not his own argument.
Other reactions to Descartes' proofs
Other 17th century philosophers reacted negatively to Descartes' arguments. They restated his argument this way.
1. If it is not contradictory that God exists, then it is certain that He exists.
2. It is not contradictory that God exists.
3. Therefore, it is certain that God exists.
They objected to Descartes' argument in two ways:
1. The minor premise can be doubted or denied.
2. Descartes admitted that his idea of God was inadequate and thus unclear. By Descartes definition of truth as "clear and distinct" then it is untrue.
Descartes' replies:
1. God's nonexistence is noncontradictory in either of two senses of the word:
- Whatever does not disagree with human thought (God is noncontradictory)
- What cannot be known by the human mind (no one could know anything, thus God's existence is noncontradictory)
2. Even if our concept of God is inadequate it does not follow that it is contradictory. God's necessary existence is a clear concept, thus the argument is unaffected by lack of clarity in other aspects of God's nature.
The debate between Gassendi and Descartes.
Pierre Gassendi, a skeptic, contended that Descartes confused existence with a property. He argued with 7 points:
1. The essence of a thing can be thought of apart from its existence.
2. Existence is not a property.
3. Essence and existence can be distinguished only in thought, not in reality.
4. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as we are to think of Pegasus as not existing.
5. We need demonstration that God exists, not merely the assumption that it does.
6. Descartes did not really prove that nonexistence is incompatible with God.
Descartes replied to Gassendi with four points:
1. Existence is a property in that it is attributable to something. Necessary existence is a necessary property of a necessary being.
2. We cannot compare the existence of that which is contingent to the existence of what is necessary.
3. It is not begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent.
4. God's existence and essence are inseparable.
Leibniz's Consideration of the Ontological Argument
Leibniz held that the ontological argument was valid but sensed that it was necessary to demonstrate the concept of God was not contradictory.
He stated
1. If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exists.
2. It is possible (noncontradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.
To support his minor premise Leibniz argued that:
1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limitations.
2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities (they differ in kind).
3. Whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it.
4. Therefore, it is possible for on Being (God) to possess all possible perfections.
Three objections to Leibniz's arg.
1. It assumes that some qualities are essentially positive and others negative, but this may not be the case.
2. Leibniz assumes that some qualities are intrinsically simple, but Wittgenstein showed that what is simple in one conceptual system may be complex in another.
3. It depends on the principle of the actual identity which is conceptually indiscernible.
Spinoza's Ontological Proof
Like Descartes, Spinoza held that God was mathematically demonstrable.
Spinoza's argument:
1. There must be a cause for everything, either for its existence or for its nonexistence.
2. A necessary Being (God) necessarily exists, unless there is an adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
3. There is no adequate cause to explain why he does not exist.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being, necessarily exists.
One may object to Spinoza's insistence that there must be a cause for nothing because it appears contradictory.
Spinoza's second form:
1. Something necessarily exists.
2. This necessary existence is either finite or infinite.
3. It is possible for this necessary existence to be infinite.
4. There must be a cause as to why this is not an infinite existence.
5. No finite existence can hinder this being (an infinite existence).
6. Therefore, this must be an infinite existence
Spinoza's arguments borrow from the premise that something exists from the cosmological argument.
Spinoza's God is not the theistic God of Leibniz or Anselm, it is a pantheistic God.
The Objections of Hume and Kant
Hume's Objection:
1. Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradictory
2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
3. Whatever we conceive to exist we can conceive as nonexistent
4. There is no being whose existence implies a contradiction
5. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.
Hume argues that no argument for God is rationally inescapable because it always contains premises that are logically deniable.
Kant's critique of the Ontological proof
Kant objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary Being (that which cannot be).
He also contended that necessity applied only to propositions, not existence.
Also, what is logically possible is not always ontologically possible.
Existence (Kant held) is not a predicate of a thing. It is not a perfection.
Supposed Causes of the Ontological Mistake
Opponents of the Ontological argument have blamed many sources of the ontological 'mistake'
1) Platonic Philosophy - Platonic epistemology holds that one can directly and intuitively know essences.
2) Metaphysical thinking - some argue that "is" or "exists" is only logical, not ontological.
3) Confusion of cause and reason - Causes need something outside of itself where a reason can be itself (Schopenhauer)
4) Use of a proper name - the use of a proper name implies existence (Russell)
5) The use of the English conditional. Alvin Plantinga claimed that "If Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" does not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. Likewise, "If God exists, then he Necessarily exists" does not imply "God exists" There may be no God at all.
Linehan - Unfair analogy!
"IF Jones is a bachelor, then he is necessarily not married" may not imply "Jones is a bachelor". There may be no Jones. But there is a bachelor. Likewise, "If God exists, then he necessarily exists" may not imply "God exists" But, there is a necessary existence which must be filled by a necessary Existent, which is God.
Findlay's Ontological Disproof of God.
The ontological argument has been widely rejected in modern times.
J. N. Findlay used the ontological proof against itself:
1. God must be thought of as a necessary Being, for anything else short of this would be unworthy of worship.
2. But existential necessary propositions cannot be true for necessity is merely a logical characteristic of propositions, not of reality.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A simpler, proper form of this argument:
1. The only way a necessary Being could exist is to exist necessarily.
2. The proposition "God exists necessarily" is an existentially necessary proposition.
3. No existentially necessary propositions can be true.
4. Therefore, the proposition "God exists necessarily" cannot be true.
A theist can object to this in 4 ways:
1. Change the proposition "God exists necessarily" to "God exists". Then holding the proposition "God exists" as a logically necessary proposition to hold.
2. Deny that necessity applied to existential propositions makes them untrue. (Existentially necessary propositions can be true). Examples of existentially necessary propositions: "I am I". "There is an infinite number of prime numbers". "Square circles do not exist".
3. "God necessarily exists" is a special case (Anselm and Descartes).
4. Findlay's statement "there are no existentially necessary propositions" is an existentially necessary proposition.
Hartshorne's Restatement of the Ontological Proof.
Charles Hartshorne is one of the most ardent defenders of the ontological argument and states it like this:
1. The existence of a necessary being is either:
a) Impossible, and there is no example of it
b) Possible, but there is no example of it
c) Possible, and there is an example of it
2. Possible, but there is no example of it is meaningless because a necessary Being cannot be a possible being.
3. Impossible, and there is no example of it is not eliminated by the ontological argument, but the meaningfulness of the term 'necessary Being' is a justifiable assumption that may be defeated on other grounds.
Hartshorne's Argument:
1. All thought must refer to something beyond itself which is at least possible
2. The necessary existence of a necessary Being is at least possible.
3. With a necessary Being an "at-least-possible" existence is indistinguishable from a "possible and actual" existence. A necessary Being cannot have a "merely possible" existence.
4. Therefore, a necessary Being necessarily has both a possible and an actual existence.
Hartshorne's view of God is neither theistic and pantheistic. It is panentheistic.
Hartshorne states, "Either God is a meaningless term or there exists a divine Being" (141).
All versions of the ontological argument contain the implicit premise that what is rationally inescapable is the real.
Malcolm's restatement of the ontological proof
Malcolm believes that Kant invalidated Anselm's first form, but the second form is immune to all criticism.
Malcolm's restatement of Anselm's 2nd form:
1. The existence of a necessary being must be either:
a) a necessary existence
b) an impossible existence
c) a possible existence
2. The existence of a necessary Being is not an impossible existence
a) No one has ever shown the concept of a necessary being to be contradictory
b) there is a basis in human experience for "a greater than which cannot be thought"
c) Leibniz's attempt to prove that there is no contradiction fails. We cannot show that there cannot be one.
3. The existence of a necessary Being cannot be a possible being because:
a) it is contradictory to the very nature of a necessary being
b) a possible being is dependent, a necessary Being is independent
4. Therefore, A necessary Being Necessarily exists
Plantinga's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Plantinga argues that God could exist without his existence being a necessary one. His existence could be logically contingent but not ontologically so.
Planting states that it is logically possible that God never existed at all. It is logically possible that nothing ever existent including God.
All that proponents of the ontological argument have to do invalidate Plantinga's objections too.
Planting offers an ontological argument that is very cosmological. It has left the a priori realm and moved into the a posteriori realm.
Planting uses modal logic in his argument:
1. The property "has maximal greatness" entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world"
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a world "W" and an essence "E" such that "E" is exemplified in "W" and "E" entails the property "has maximal greatness in W"
5. For any object X, if X, exemplifies E then X exemplifies the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
6. E entails the property "has maximal excellence in every possible world".
7. If W had been actual, it would be impossible that E fail to be exemplified.
8. What is impossible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10 Therefore, the being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.
Plantinga's argument is tight and compelling. It avoids many of the traditional criticism of the ontological argument. However there are a few criticisms:
1. The use of modal logic assumes existence of an actual world. Thus, it is a posteriori, not a priori.
2. Defining a perfect being in theistic terms is gratuitous.
3. The essence E is supposed by Plantinga to havre a real existence.
The ontological argument to be valid must assume that something exists and thus it rests on a cosmological principle.
The ontological argument has not proven God exists by itself. It has in fact yielded four types of God and a possible atheistic conception:
1. Leibniz & Descartes - theistic God
2. Spinoza - pantheistic God
3. Hartshorne - panentheistic God
4. Henle - polytheistic gods
5. Atheism - the universe is necessary, but does not include God
Thursday, March 1, 2007
Class notes on the Cosmological Argument
(Originally written March 1, 2007 in Book 13)
Class Notes
Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God
Support for cosmological argument:
1) Absolutely perfect: something exists, therefore must be explained
2) Either unmoved mover or infinite regress of causation, which the latter is irrational
Basic Cosmological Argument
1) Every being (that exists or ever did exit) is either a dependent being or a self-existent being
2) Not every being can be a dependent being
3) Therefore, there exists a self-existent being.
Proponents of the Cosmological Arguments
Plato
Aristotle - "unmoved mover"
St. Thomas Aquinas - 3 of 5 Theistic proofs are cosmological arguments
1) argues from change to an unchanging cause of change
2) argued from uncaused change
Descartes
Samuel Clarke
Gottfried Leibniz
William Lane Craig
Dependent being - beings caused by other
Self-existence being - beings caused by there own self (self-caused)
Principle of sufficient reason
1) There must be an explanation of the existence of any being
2) There must be an explanation of any positive fact
Proponents of the principal of sufficient Reason
- Leibniz
- Clarke
Even if the idea of an infinite regress is a coherent one, it does not follow that it is a true one. The idea of me having blue skin is a coherent idea, but it is not a true one.
An infinite regress may be logically possible but if time is finite then there is no way that an infinite regress can exist within a finite time.
Is the principle of sufficient reason true?
The principle of sufficient reason can be restated to say that all contingent facts can be explained.
Side Note -
Contingent - that which is but could have been another way or could have been not; or, that which is possible.
If that which is possible is sufficient for contingency then there are no true contingent facts, only contingent possibilities.
Class Notes
Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God
Support for cosmological argument:
1) Absolutely perfect: something exists, therefore must be explained
2) Either unmoved mover or infinite regress of causation, which the latter is irrational
Basic Cosmological Argument
1) Every being (that exists or ever did exit) is either a dependent being or a self-existent being
2) Not every being can be a dependent being
3) Therefore, there exists a self-existent being.
Proponents of the Cosmological Arguments
Plato
Aristotle - "unmoved mover"
St. Thomas Aquinas - 3 of 5 Theistic proofs are cosmological arguments
1) argues from change to an unchanging cause of change
2) argued from uncaused change
Descartes
Samuel Clarke
Gottfried Leibniz
William Lane Craig
Dependent being - beings caused by other
Self-existence being - beings caused by there own self (self-caused)
Principle of sufficient reason
1) There must be an explanation of the existence of any being
2) There must be an explanation of any positive fact
Proponents of the principal of sufficient Reason
- Leibniz
- Clarke
Even if the idea of an infinite regress is a coherent one, it does not follow that it is a true one. The idea of me having blue skin is a coherent idea, but it is not a true one.
An infinite regress may be logically possible but if time is finite then there is no way that an infinite regress can exist within a finite time.
Is the principle of sufficient reason true?
The principle of sufficient reason can be restated to say that all contingent facts can be explained.
Side Note -
Contingent - that which is but could have been another way or could have been not; or, that which is possible.
If that which is possible is sufficient for contingency then there are no true contingent facts, only contingent possibilities.
Saturday, December 9, 2006
Quick notes & Barebones Outline of a lost Epistemology Paper
(Originally written December 9, 2006 in Book 12)
Ok, it's Saturday about 1:00 pm. I have a major epistemology paper due at 9:00 am on Monday, which I have not ben diligent in working on. So, it's research time!
Thesis (preliminary) all knowledge is analytic in nature. Synthetic nature is artificial.
Louis Pojman
The Theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
VII.2 An Empiricist Critique of A priori knowledge - A.J. Ayer
No matter of fact can be shown to be logically necessarily or universally true (Hume).
Ayer states that no proposition with factual content is necessarily true.
Every empiricist must accept the thesis that no factual propositions can be necessary truths.
Empiricism faces difficulties with this thesis in dealing with mathematics and logical truths. There are two ways of dealing with this:
1) They are not necessary truths (in this case their universalness must be somehow explained).
2) They have no factual content (in this case they must be able to explain why a proposition without factual content can be true and useful and surprising).
If both of these prove unsatisfactory, empiricism is proven wrong and rationalism is vindicated.
Rationalism states that thought, independent of experience is a more reliable source of knowledge than experience.
John Stuart Mill adopted the thesis that mathematic and logical truths are not necessary. He maintained that they were merely inductive generalizations based on a very large number of experiences. Thus, these mathematical and logical truths were very probable, but not certain.
The difference between Mathematical and logical truths and scientific generalizations was a difference of degree, not kind.
Ayer admits that by rejecting Mill's approach, empiricists are obliged to be somewhat dogmatic.
The Irrefutability of the Propositions of Mathematics and Logic
In every instance when a mathematical or logical truth appears to be refuted we can easily find a way to show that it has not. Truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies.
The Nature of Analytic Propositions
Kant's definition of an analytic proposition, "one in which the predicate B belonged to the subject A as something which was covertly contained in the concept of A" (Pojman, 381).
Analytic judgments add nothing to the subject; whereas synthetic judgments do.
Analytic judgments provide no factual content and it is for this reason no experience can refute them.
Because analytic judgments provide no factual content it does not follow that they are senseless.
Analytic propositions provide us with some new knowledge. They clarify. They show new linguistic usages.
Analytic judgments allow us to make explicit what was implicit.
The Propositions of Geometry
Kant believed that geometry was the study of the properties of physical space.
Non-Euclidean Geometry has proven that geometry is not the study of physical space. We merely use geometry to reason about physical space.
Necessary truths are devoid of factual content. A priori truths are always analytic. They are always tautologies.
How can Tautologies be surprising?
The power of logic or mathematics to surprise us has its origin solely in the limitedness of our minds, not in their content.
All a priori truths are tautologies. Tautologies serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, they do not contain any information about any matter of fact.
Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
translated by: Paul Schrecken and Anne Martin Schrecker
The Unity of Leibniz's philosophic thought
There is a pervasive inner unity that flows through all of Leibniz's work.
Leibniz held a belief in a universal language.
Reflections on knowledge, truth, and ideas
All knowledge is either obscure or clear. Clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. Distinct knowledge is either adequate or inadequate. Distinct knowledge is either symbolic or intuitive.
"The most perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive" (Leibniz, 3).
Knowledge is obscure when it is insufficient to recognize what it represents.
Knowledge is clear when it is sufficient to recognize the object it represents.
Clear knowledge is confused when it cannot be distinguished from other objects in description. It is recognizable, but only to me.
Distinct knowledge is distinguishable and explicable knowledge. It is distinct when we can explain it to others.
Perfect knowledge is both adequate and distinct, but Leibniz doubts whether or not man can give a true account of this, but numbers come close.
Intuitive knowledge occurs when the whole of simple idea is known at once. Symbolic knowledge is knowledge o highly complex notions where the whole is known without full knowledge of all the parts.
There is a difference in definitions:
1) Nominal definitions - contain only marks to distinguish the defined thing from other things
2) Real definitions - actually describing the object in its fullest
By distinguishing these definitions we refute Hobbes' notion that all truths are arbitrary. (Hobbes' assumption rests on all definitions being nominal ones).
An idea is true when it is possible (it is false when it involves a contradiction).
Possibility is known either a priori or a posteriori
Causal definitions are known a priori.
A posteriori possibility is known when we experience a thing in reality.
When we have adequate knowledge we also possess a priori knowledge of a possibility.
Thought experiment - when we perceive green we are unaware that we are actually perceiving blue + yellow. Thus, what is green is known, analytically, as yellow+blue.
On the Universal Science: Characteristic XIV
All certain knowledge is established through demonstration or experiments.
Science is based on reason.
We need some exact language, or a form of truly philosophical writing in which ideas are reducible to a kind of "alphabet of human thought"
Leibnizian demonstrations involve two principles:
1) What implies contradiction is false
**2) Reason can be given for any truth, the predicate concept always inheres in its subject concept, either explicitly or implicitly
Necessary truths can be reduced to identical propositions
Contingent truths require an infinite analysis which can be performed solely by God. Only God can know contingent truths a priori.
Contingent truths are truths of fact.
XV
"All human reasoning uses certain signs or character" (Leibniz, 17).
Knowledge is symbolic.
All human ideas can be reduced into a few primitives. (cogitationes -> primitivas)
Critical remarks concerning the General Part of Descartes' principles
One must, in searching for truth, doubt everyone at some point in one's lifetime.
2. That what is doubtful should be considered false.
-There is no advantage to this.
4. Why one can place in doubt the truth of sensible things.
-All we need to know is that they are consistent among themselves.
Linehan - This is interesting, but unhelpful to my research. I'm skipping it.
On the Improvement of Metaphysics and on the concept of substance
Mathematics possesses clarity; metaphysics possesses obscurity.
The cause of metaphysical obscurity is that the general concepts of metaphysics are ambiguous.
Metaphysics needs clarity and clearness and certitude even more than mathematics.
Force is inherent in substance. Force is the faculty to act, action itself and requires effort.
What is nature? Reflections on the force inherent in created things and on their actions
What does nature consist of?
Do created things posses an energy?
The whole of nature is the perfect work of God's making.
Robert Boyle states that nature is the mechanism of bodies.
Linehan - I think I have exhausted my resources in this book for my epistemology paper. But, just reading a little bit of Leibniz has restored my love and respect for him and rationalism in general.
So now it is time for the paper!
Paper Structure:
I. Thesis
II. Definitions
A. Historical
i. epistemological/metaphysical/semantical categories
1. Kant's 4 Quadrants
2. A.J. Ayer's a priori
3. Leibniz divisions of knowledge
B. Personal
III. Thought Experiments (proofs of I)
1. Logical
2. Mathematical
3. Propositional
IV. Objections and responses
V. Closing
Thesis: Knowledge is...
1) Analytic (semantical)
2) Tautological (semantical)
3) A Priori (epistemological)
4) Necessary (metaphysical)
Knowledge has three major components
1) Epistemological
2) Semantical
3) Metaphysical
Epistemological and semantical knowledge are closely related and focused on together, mainly because of Kant. Metaphysical knowledge has been intertwined with epistemological and semantical, though less explicit.
Definitions of Knowledge
Leibnizian distinctions lead to my definition.
First of the three components: Epistemological
definition of a priori (Pojman, 367)
definition of a posteriori (Pojman, 367)
Kantian definition of analytic propositions
Ayer definition of a priori truths
2nd of the 3 components: Semantical
definition of analytic
definition of synthetic
Ayer's distinction
Leibnizian definition/personal additions
Ayer's truth of logic (mathematics)
Thought experiments
1) Logic
2) Mathematics
3) Empirical (most controversial)
3rd of 3 Components: Metaphysical
definition of necessary truths
definition of contingent truths
Hume's objection (needs more research)
Ayer's factual content necessary truth?
Metaphysical difficulties for the empiricist
Ayer has satisfactory proved factual content but he has not eliminated rationalism. Explain why and you'll be able to demonstrate all three parts of your thesis and vindicate your definition of knowledge (conclusion).
Ok, it's Saturday about 1:00 pm. I have a major epistemology paper due at 9:00 am on Monday, which I have not ben diligent in working on. So, it's research time!
Thesis (preliminary) all knowledge is analytic in nature. Synthetic nature is artificial.
Louis Pojman
The Theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
VII.2 An Empiricist Critique of A priori knowledge - A.J. Ayer
No matter of fact can be shown to be logically necessarily or universally true (Hume).
Ayer states that no proposition with factual content is necessarily true.
Every empiricist must accept the thesis that no factual propositions can be necessary truths.
Empiricism faces difficulties with this thesis in dealing with mathematics and logical truths. There are two ways of dealing with this:
1) They are not necessary truths (in this case their universalness must be somehow explained).
2) They have no factual content (in this case they must be able to explain why a proposition without factual content can be true and useful and surprising).
If both of these prove unsatisfactory, empiricism is proven wrong and rationalism is vindicated.
Rationalism states that thought, independent of experience is a more reliable source of knowledge than experience.
John Stuart Mill adopted the thesis that mathematic and logical truths are not necessary. He maintained that they were merely inductive generalizations based on a very large number of experiences. Thus, these mathematical and logical truths were very probable, but not certain.
The difference between Mathematical and logical truths and scientific generalizations was a difference of degree, not kind.
Ayer admits that by rejecting Mill's approach, empiricists are obliged to be somewhat dogmatic.
The Irrefutability of the Propositions of Mathematics and Logic
In every instance when a mathematical or logical truth appears to be refuted we can easily find a way to show that it has not. Truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies.
The Nature of Analytic Propositions
Kant's definition of an analytic proposition, "one in which the predicate B belonged to the subject A as something which was covertly contained in the concept of A" (Pojman, 381).
Analytic judgments add nothing to the subject; whereas synthetic judgments do.
Analytic judgments provide no factual content and it is for this reason no experience can refute them.
Because analytic judgments provide no factual content it does not follow that they are senseless.
Analytic propositions provide us with some new knowledge. They clarify. They show new linguistic usages.
Analytic judgments allow us to make explicit what was implicit.
The Propositions of Geometry
Kant believed that geometry was the study of the properties of physical space.
Non-Euclidean Geometry has proven that geometry is not the study of physical space. We merely use geometry to reason about physical space.
Necessary truths are devoid of factual content. A priori truths are always analytic. They are always tautologies.
How can Tautologies be surprising?
The power of logic or mathematics to surprise us has its origin solely in the limitedness of our minds, not in their content.
All a priori truths are tautologies. Tautologies serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, they do not contain any information about any matter of fact.
Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
translated by: Paul Schrecken and Anne Martin Schrecker
The Unity of Leibniz's philosophic thought
There is a pervasive inner unity that flows through all of Leibniz's work.
Leibniz held a belief in a universal language.
Reflections on knowledge, truth, and ideas
All knowledge is either obscure or clear. Clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. Distinct knowledge is either adequate or inadequate. Distinct knowledge is either symbolic or intuitive.
"The most perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive" (Leibniz, 3).
Knowledge is obscure when it is insufficient to recognize what it represents.
Knowledge is clear when it is sufficient to recognize the object it represents.
Clear knowledge is confused when it cannot be distinguished from other objects in description. It is recognizable, but only to me.
Distinct knowledge is distinguishable and explicable knowledge. It is distinct when we can explain it to others.
Perfect knowledge is both adequate and distinct, but Leibniz doubts whether or not man can give a true account of this, but numbers come close.
Intuitive knowledge occurs when the whole of simple idea is known at once. Symbolic knowledge is knowledge o highly complex notions where the whole is known without full knowledge of all the parts.
There is a difference in definitions:
1) Nominal definitions - contain only marks to distinguish the defined thing from other things
2) Real definitions - actually describing the object in its fullest
By distinguishing these definitions we refute Hobbes' notion that all truths are arbitrary. (Hobbes' assumption rests on all definitions being nominal ones).
An idea is true when it is possible (it is false when it involves a contradiction).
Possibility is known either a priori or a posteriori
Causal definitions are known a priori.
A posteriori possibility is known when we experience a thing in reality.
When we have adequate knowledge we also possess a priori knowledge of a possibility.
Thought experiment - when we perceive green we are unaware that we are actually perceiving blue + yellow. Thus, what is green is known, analytically, as yellow+blue.
On the Universal Science: Characteristic XIV
All certain knowledge is established through demonstration or experiments.
Science is based on reason.
We need some exact language, or a form of truly philosophical writing in which ideas are reducible to a kind of "alphabet of human thought"
Leibnizian demonstrations involve two principles:
1) What implies contradiction is false
**2) Reason can be given for any truth, the predicate concept always inheres in its subject concept, either explicitly or implicitly
Necessary truths can be reduced to identical propositions
Contingent truths require an infinite analysis which can be performed solely by God. Only God can know contingent truths a priori.
Contingent truths are truths of fact.
XV
"All human reasoning uses certain signs or character" (Leibniz, 17).
Knowledge is symbolic.
All human ideas can be reduced into a few primitives. (cogitationes -> primitivas)
Critical remarks concerning the General Part of Descartes' principles
One must, in searching for truth, doubt everyone at some point in one's lifetime.
2. That what is doubtful should be considered false.
-There is no advantage to this.
4. Why one can place in doubt the truth of sensible things.
-All we need to know is that they are consistent among themselves.
Linehan - This is interesting, but unhelpful to my research. I'm skipping it.
On the Improvement of Metaphysics and on the concept of substance
Mathematics possesses clarity; metaphysics possesses obscurity.
The cause of metaphysical obscurity is that the general concepts of metaphysics are ambiguous.
Metaphysics needs clarity and clearness and certitude even more than mathematics.
Force is inherent in substance. Force is the faculty to act, action itself and requires effort.
What is nature? Reflections on the force inherent in created things and on their actions
What does nature consist of?
Do created things posses an energy?
The whole of nature is the perfect work of God's making.
Robert Boyle states that nature is the mechanism of bodies.
Linehan - I think I have exhausted my resources in this book for my epistemology paper. But, just reading a little bit of Leibniz has restored my love and respect for him and rationalism in general.
So now it is time for the paper!
Paper Structure:
I. Thesis
II. Definitions
A. Historical
i. epistemological/metaphysical/semantical categories
1. Kant's 4 Quadrants
2. A.J. Ayer's a priori
3. Leibniz divisions of knowledge
B. Personal
III. Thought Experiments (proofs of I)
1. Logical
2. Mathematical
3. Propositional
IV. Objections and responses
V. Closing
Thesis: Knowledge is...
1) Analytic (semantical)
2) Tautological (semantical)
3) A Priori (epistemological)
4) Necessary (metaphysical)
Knowledge has three major components
1) Epistemological
2) Semantical
3) Metaphysical
Epistemological and semantical knowledge are closely related and focused on together, mainly because of Kant. Metaphysical knowledge has been intertwined with epistemological and semantical, though less explicit.
Definitions of Knowledge
Leibnizian distinctions lead to my definition.
First of the three components: Epistemological
definition of a priori (Pojman, 367)
definition of a posteriori (Pojman, 367)
Kantian definition of analytic propositions
Ayer definition of a priori truths
2nd of the 3 components: Semantical
definition of analytic
definition of synthetic
Ayer's distinction
Leibnizian definition/personal additions
Ayer's truth of logic (mathematics)
Thought experiments
1) Logic
2) Mathematics
3) Empirical (most controversial)
3rd of 3 Components: Metaphysical
definition of necessary truths
definition of contingent truths
Hume's objection (needs more research)
Ayer's factual content necessary truth?
Metaphysical difficulties for the empiricist
Ayer has satisfactory proved factual content but he has not eliminated rationalism. Explain why and you'll be able to demonstrate all three parts of your thesis and vindicate your definition of knowledge (conclusion).
Sunday, September 10, 2006
Class and book notes on Kant
(Originally written September 10, 2006 in Book 8)
A priori knowledge
Classifications and Definitions
"The problem of synthetic a priori knowledge involves epistemological, metaphysical and semantic considerations" (Pojman, 367).
"A priori and a posteriori are latin terms that were first developed in the Middle Ages by scholastic philosophers.
Leibniz used both to prove knowledge. Kant further developed the notions.
Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? Kant held that it was necessary from a logic standpoint.
"A. Epistemological Categories
1. A priori knowledge does not depend on evidence from sense experience. (Plato's innate ideas and Leibniz's 'truths of reason') for example, mathematics and logic.
2. A posteriori knowledge depends on evidence from Sense experience. (Plato's 'appearance' and Leibniz's 'truths of fact') - empirical knowledge.
B. Metaphysical Categories
1. Necessary truths 'are' true in all possible worlds (for example, the statement that, 'God exists' according to the ontological argument).
2. Contingent truths 'are' true in the actual world but not in all possible worlds (for example, the fact you exist and were born after January 1, 1800)
C. Semantical categories
1. Analytic-predicate is contained in the subject, explicative, not ampliative (for example, 'all mothers are women')
2. Synthetic - predicate is not contained in the subject but adds something to the subject ampliative, not explicative (for example, Mary is a mother)" (Pojman, 367-8)
Combinations
Synthetic a priori knowledge is affirmed by rationalists and denied by empiricists.
Neither believe that there are such things as analytic a posteriori knowledge because that implies a contradiction.
Kant, a radical rationalist, held that all knowledge was grounded in a priori knowledge.
"The essential claim of those who hold to synthetic a priori knowledge is that the mind can grasp connexions between ideas (concepts) that are not strictly analytical related" (Pojman, 368).
Kant's Chart of Knowledge
(clarifications are for my own sake)
Synthetic a priori knowledge
-Math, i.e. 5+7=12
-Exclusionary: i.e. nothing red is green
-Presuppositions of experience: space, time and causality
-Moral judgments - the categorical imperative
-The Laws of Logic: i.e. The principle of non-contradiction
-Metaphysical - The existence of God, Free-Will
Until Kant, people believed our knowledge must conform to objects. This had led to a failure to establish a priori knowledge. Kant switched it around so that objects conform to out knowledge, making a priori knowledge possible. This is Kant's so-called Copernican revolution.
Prolegomena: Preamble on the Peculiarities of all Metaphysical Knowledge
S1. Of the Sources of Metaphysics
Sciences differ from one another based on one or all of these:
1) object
2) sources of knowledge
3) kind of knowledge
As for metaphysics and its knowledge, it can never be, or come from things, empirical.
It can not be from external experiences because that is physics; nor can it e from internal experiences because that is psychology. Therefore, ti must come from a priori knowledge. It comes from pure understanding and pure reason.
Metaphysics is pure philosophical knowledge.
S2. Concerning the kind of knowledge which can alone be called metaphysical
Metaphysical judgments are judgments that are explicative, that is, they add nothing to their content.
Synthetical judgments are judgments that are expansive, that is, they increase the knowledge.
Analytical judgments merely analyze the subject in the predicate: 'All bodies are extended'.
Synthetical judgments add something to the subject in the predicate: 'All bodies have weight'
The common principle in all analytical judgments is the law of contradiction.
A priori knowledge
Classifications and Definitions
"The problem of synthetic a priori knowledge involves epistemological, metaphysical and semantic considerations" (Pojman, 367).
"A priori and a posteriori are latin terms that were first developed in the Middle Ages by scholastic philosophers.
Leibniz used both to prove knowledge. Kant further developed the notions.
Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? Kant held that it was necessary from a logic standpoint.
"A. Epistemological Categories
1. A priori knowledge does not depend on evidence from sense experience. (Plato's innate ideas and Leibniz's 'truths of reason') for example, mathematics and logic.
2. A posteriori knowledge depends on evidence from Sense experience. (Plato's 'appearance' and Leibniz's 'truths of fact') - empirical knowledge.
B. Metaphysical Categories
1. Necessary truths 'are' true in all possible worlds (for example, the statement that, 'God exists' according to the ontological argument).
2. Contingent truths 'are' true in the actual world but not in all possible worlds (for example, the fact you exist and were born after January 1, 1800)
C. Semantical categories
1. Analytic-predicate is contained in the subject, explicative, not ampliative (for example, 'all mothers are women')
2. Synthetic - predicate is not contained in the subject but adds something to the subject ampliative, not explicative (for example, Mary is a mother)" (Pojman, 367-8)
Combinations
Synthetic a priori knowledge is affirmed by rationalists and denied by empiricists.
Neither believe that there are such things as analytic a posteriori knowledge because that implies a contradiction.
Kant, a radical rationalist, held that all knowledge was grounded in a priori knowledge.
"The essential claim of those who hold to synthetic a priori knowledge is that the mind can grasp connexions between ideas (concepts) that are not strictly analytical related" (Pojman, 368).
Kant's Chart of Knowledge
Analytic
|
Synthetic
|
|
A Priori
|
-Entailments
-Identity Statements
-Tautologies
-Definitions
|
-Mathematics
-Exclusionary
-Presuppositions of experience
-Moral Judgments
-Laws of Logic
-Metaphysical
|
A Posteriori
|
XX
|
-Empirical
“All bodies are heavy”
“John is a bachelor”
|
The Kantian Theory About Synthetic A Priori Knowledge
The question: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? This is Kant's primary concern in his Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant (via Ewing) makes four claims about synthetic a priori judgments
1. They are logically necessary - wholes that determine their own parts
2. They are not derivable from particular sensations (but empirical experience is the trigger to cause them to arise)
3. They are presupposed in all of our experience
4. They are contributed by our minds.
Synthetic a priori knowledge is of the conditions of experience, not of reality.
A.J. Ayer critiques the notion of the synthetic a priori knowledge from a conventionalist's point of view. He believes that all the supposed a priori knowledge can actually be reduced to analytic truths.
A.C. Ewing counters Ayer and is in favor of it. Maintaining that if nothing else, the laws of logic are a priori.
W.V. Quine denies the notion of containment being meaningful. (Containment is the notion of an idea being expressed in the definition of the word: bachelor contains the ideas 'unmarried' and 'man'). Since Quine denies containment then he makes no distinction betwixt analytic and synthetic judgments. This also rids him of a priori judgments.
H.P. Grace and P.F. Stranson disagree with Quine.
Roderick Chisholm defends a priori and analytic knowledge.
Saul Kripke throws a major curveball, contending that is possible to have a posteriori necessary truths and non-necessary a priori knowledge.
VII.1. A Priori Knowledge
Immanuel Kant
Kant (1724-1804) was born in Königsberg and never left the town.
He was deeply pious and Lutheran
He was inhuman in his orderliness. Some citizens of Königsberg set their clocks by Kant's walks.
The Critique of Pure Reason started a revolution in theory of knowledge.
He was "woke from his dogmatic slumber" by Hume.
Kant held that we have incredible structured minds that interpret and categorize all experiences that we have. This is the "Kant's Copernican Revolution"
Kant's distinctions between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is famous.
A priori knowledge is what we know prior to experience. A posteriori is knowledge we gain through experience.
Hume considered all knowledge of matters of fact a posteriori and only analytic statements a priori.
Kant rejects Hume's theory and states that it is possible to have a priori knowledge of matters of fact.
Kant holds that all knowledge begins with experience, but it does not mean that all knowledge arises out of experience.
Kant also holds that mathematical truth is synthetic (the predicate ads something to the subject) not analytical.
Other synthetic a priori knowledge is knowledge of time, of space and of causality.
A priori
|
A Posteriori
|
|
Analytic
|
Tautologies & entailments
|
None
|
Synthetic
|
Causality, Space and time, 5+7=12, and the moral law
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Empirical judgments
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Basically, an analytic judgment explicitly states a subject and its definition in the predicate. If an analytic statement contradicts itself it is false.
There are two types of synthetical judgments:
1) a priori
2) a posteriori
Synthetical judgments cannot be deduced solely from the Law of Contradiction, but they are still subject to it.
Judgments of experience are always synthetical by nature.
Mathematical judgments are synthetical. This is a fact that eluded people for years.
All mathematical judgments are a priori because they are necessarily true.
Arithmetic judgments like 5+7=12 are definitely true because there is nothing in the notions '5', +, '7' that demands the sum of 12.
Linehan - I think I disagree. The concept of '12', if we truly know it can be analyzed and known as, '0+12, 1+11, 2+10, 3+9, 4+8, 5+7, 6+6, and so forth, provided that we know the notion of '7".
Geometrical judgments are likewise synthetical because they require us to use intuition tadas.
"the essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical knolsedge among all after a priori knowledge is that it cannot proceed from concepts, but only from construction of concepts" (Pojman, 373).
Kant criticizes Hume for believing mathematics contained only analytical propositions and metaphysics having only synthetical a priori propositions. But, had Hume realized that mathematics were a priori synthetical propositions he would not have discarded metaphysics.
Metaphysical judgments are synthetical. But, judgments pertaining to metaphysics are analytical.
Definitions like a substance is that which exists as a subject is an analytical judgment pertaining to metaphysics. The concept "substance" is metaphysical but the judgment is analytical and therefore, not a metaphysical judgment.
Metaphysics is different from every other science in the way it produces its a priori cognitions.
Metaphysics receives from outside itself analytic judgments, but uses those analytic judgments to accomplish its end, which is to form a priori synthetical judgments.
"The generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as concepts, in fine, of synthetical propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics" (Pojman, 374).
S3. A remark on the general division of judgment into analytical and synthetical:
The distinction is extremely important, but it is difficult to find in other men's work. It is obscure, and difficult to put into words. Once one discovers it though, they will be able to see the difference in places where they never saw it before.
S4. The General Question of the Prolegomena: Is Metaphysics Possible?
We cannot assume that metaphysics exists as a science, but we can confidently state that there are a priori synthetical cognitions (i.e. pure mathematics).
The question is not whether, but how is metaphysics possible?
S5. The General Problem: How is knowledge from pure reason possible?
Metaphysics stands or falls on the ability or inability to have synthetic a priori knowledge.
There can be an incredibly well put together metaphysical system with tons of truths, but if the architect of that system has not given an account to how one comes to know a priori synthetic judgments then, "to all that which thou protest me thus, I refuse to give credence, and hate"
If we did not see true synthetical a priori judgments in life then we would see that the question of how to come by that knowledge as insoluble.
To solve this we must divide it into four parts:
1) How is pure mathematics possible?
2) How is pure natural science possible?
3) How is metaphysics in general possible?
4) How is metaphysics as a science possible?
I am so irritated! Kant spends this entire last section suspending others from metaphysics but gives no definite answer. Ahh! I am thoroughly agitated right now. This is on e of the biggest disappointments in my brief (about fourteen months now) investigation into philosophy!
Metaphysical judgments are synthetical. But, judgments pertaining to metaphysics are analytical.
Definitions like a substance is that which exists as a subject is an analytical judgment pertaining to metaphysics. The concept "substance" is metaphysical but the judgment is analytical and therefore, not a metaphysical judgment.
Metaphysics is different from every other science in the way it produces its a priori cognitions.
Metaphysics receives from outside itself analytic judgments, but uses those analytic judgments to accomplish its end, which is to form a priori synthetical judgments.
"The generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as concepts, in fine, of synthetical propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics" (Pojman, 374).
S3. A remark on the general division of judgment into analytical and synthetical:
The distinction is extremely important, but it is difficult to find in other men's work. It is obscure, and difficult to put into words. Once one discovers it though, they will be able to see the difference in places where they never saw it before.
S4. The General Question of the Prolegomena: Is Metaphysics Possible?
We cannot assume that metaphysics exists as a science, but we can confidently state that there are a priori synthetical cognitions (i.e. pure mathematics).
The question is not whether, but how is metaphysics possible?
S5. The General Problem: How is knowledge from pure reason possible?
Metaphysics stands or falls on the ability or inability to have synthetic a priori knowledge.
There can be an incredibly well put together metaphysical system with tons of truths, but if the architect of that system has not given an account to how one comes to know a priori synthetic judgments then, "to all that which thou protest me thus, I refuse to give credence, and hate"
If we did not see true synthetical a priori judgments in life then we would see that the question of how to come by that knowledge as insoluble.
To solve this we must divide it into four parts:
1) How is pure mathematics possible?
2) How is pure natural science possible?
3) How is metaphysics in general possible?
4) How is metaphysics as a science possible?
I am so irritated! Kant spends this entire last section suspending others from metaphysics but gives no definite answer. Ahh! I am thoroughly agitated right now. This is on e of the biggest disappointments in my brief (about fourteen months now) investigation into philosophy!
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