(Originally written December 29, 2006 in Book 7)
Philosophy of Religion 3rd Edition
John H. Hick
Prentice-Hall Inc.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
1983
Little Bobby's Birth Date
It's about 6:30 AM and Kathi ought to be being prepped. It won't be long until there will be a new member added to the Thornton family. Luckily, this one will add some testosterone. Maybe it'll balance this house out.
(Philosophy of Religion continued)
Infinite, Self-Existent
Monotheistic faith finds its primary expressions in the commands, prayers, Psalms, prophecies, parables and teachings of the Bible.
The basis of Christianity has been philosophically elaborated throughout the history of Christian thought.
Christianity is more theological articulated than Judaism.
God is infinite or unlimited.
Paul Tillich stated that we ought not to state that God exists because existence is a limitation. The question of God's existence can neither be asked or answered. He held that God is being-itself, not a being.
Tillich maintains that God has a reality that is not the first or the highest, but a completely separate one that gives birth to all other reality.
The Medieval theologians (echoed by Tillich) stated that the creator and the created cannot be stated to exist in the same sense.
The Christian God is and has unlimited being and the divine attributes are ways in which the divine reality has being.
The 1st attribute is self-existence (aseity).
The concept of self-existence has two elements:
1) God has complete and absolute ontological independence
2) God is without beginning or end
Anselm pointed out that God's divine eternity is more than existence without beginning or end. "Indeed you exist neither yesterday nor tomorrow but are absolutely outside all time" (Hick, 8).
Creator
God is the creator of all things. He created everything ex nihilo.
The notion of creation ex nihilo contains two important corollary ideas:
1) The creation can never become the creator.
2) The created realm is absolutely dependent upon God
Aquinas held that the idea of creation does not necessarily rule out the possibility that the created universe may be eternal. But that the Biblical revelation rules out an eternal universe.
Augustine asserts that creation did not take place in time, but time was likewise a creation of God. If Augustine is correct then the relativity theory, which holds that space-time is internally infinite, is correct.
The Creation story is not regarded as a scientific description by "responsible religious thinkers". "It is seen rather as the classical mythological expression of faith that the whole natural order is a divine creation" (Hick, 10).
Origen saw the creation account as figurative.
Personal
God as a personal deity is deeply rooted in Jewish and Christian tradition. God is not an it. He is a divine thou.
Loving, Good
God's goodness, love and grace are virtually synonymous in the New Testament.
Love of God must be understood, but first the notion of the Greek eros and agape (types of love) must be understood.
Eros - desiring love, love evoked by the desirable qualities of the beloved. This love depends on the lovableness of its objects.
God's love for man in the New Testament is agape love.
Agape love is unconditional. It is not dependent upon the lovableness of the objects.
The ultimate of grace is the ultimate of power.
Friday, December 29, 2006
Thursday, December 28, 2006
Philosophy of Religion - Hick: Ch. 1 (A)
(Originally written December 28, 2006 in Book 7)
Philosophy of Religion 3rd Edition
John H. Hick
Prentice-Hall Inc.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
1983
Ch. 1 - The Judaic-Christian Concept of God
Monotheism
The ways of thinking about God are formed around the Greek word for God, theos. (Latin: deus)
Atheism - the belief that there is no god of any kind
Agnosticism - the belief system that we have neither grounds for affirming or denying the existence of God
Skepticism - merely doubting
Naturalism - everything about human life, including moral and religious aspects are explicable in non-supernatural terms.
Deism has two meanings:
1) The idea of an absentee god who set the universe into motion and then left it alone
2) An historical point of view that the 18th century English deist held
Theism - a belief in a deity (usually synonymous with monotheism)
Polytheism - a belief in many personal gods that govern a specific part of the world
Henotheism - a belief in many gods, but devotion to only one of them
Pantheism - a belief that God is identical with nature or with the world as a whole
Monotheism - a belief in one Supreme Being who is personal and moral
Monotheism was initially started by Judaism, despite a brief introduction of monotheistic worship of the Sun-god in 14th century B.C. in Egypt.
The Old Testament documents the rise of monotheism but does not resolve the struggle between polytheism and henotheism.
Yahweh began as a tribal god but persevered to become the only Supreme Being.
Good night book. Sweet Dreams.
Philosophy of Religion 3rd Edition
John H. Hick
Prentice-Hall Inc.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
1983
Ch. 1 - The Judaic-Christian Concept of God
Monotheism
The ways of thinking about God are formed around the Greek word for God, theos. (Latin: deus)
Atheism - the belief that there is no god of any kind
Agnosticism - the belief system that we have neither grounds for affirming or denying the existence of God
Skepticism - merely doubting
Naturalism - everything about human life, including moral and religious aspects are explicable in non-supernatural terms.
Deism has two meanings:
1) The idea of an absentee god who set the universe into motion and then left it alone
2) An historical point of view that the 18th century English deist held
Theism - a belief in a deity (usually synonymous with monotheism)
Polytheism - a belief in many personal gods that govern a specific part of the world
Henotheism - a belief in many gods, but devotion to only one of them
Pantheism - a belief that God is identical with nature or with the world as a whole
Monotheism - a belief in one Supreme Being who is personal and moral
Monotheism was initially started by Judaism, despite a brief introduction of monotheistic worship of the Sun-god in 14th century B.C. in Egypt.
The Old Testament documents the rise of monotheism but does not resolve the struggle between polytheism and henotheism.
Yahweh began as a tribal god but persevered to become the only Supreme Being.
Good night book. Sweet Dreams.
Philosophy of Religion - Hick: Introduction
(Originally Written December 28, 2006 in Book 7)
Philosophy of Religion 3rd Edition
John H. Hick
Prentice-Hall Inc.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
1983
Introduction
What is philosophy of religion?
It used to be that philosophy of religion was a defense of religion. It was seen as a continuing work of natural theology and not revealed theology. But this classical definition of philosophy of religion is better called 'natural theology' or 'apologetics'.
Philosophy of religion is properly seen as "philosophical thinking about religion" (Hick, 1).
Philosophy of religion is not an organ of religious teaching. It is not a branch of theology.
Philosophy of religion studies the concepts and belief systems of religion. It studies the phenomena of religious experience and the activities of worship.
Philosophy of religion is a second order activity. It is not a part of the religious realm, but it is related to it.
Philosophy of religion analyzes concepts like God, dharma, Brahman, salvation, worship, creation, sacrifice, nirvana, eternal life, etc. It compares these concepts with everyday life concepts, moral concepts, scientific concepts and artistic concepts.
What is religion? There are many definitions:
-phenomenological definitions
-interpretive definitions
-psychological definitions
-sociological definitions
-naturalistic definitions
-religious definitions
Maybe the word 'religion' does not have a single correct meaning.
Definitions of religion
Phenomenological: Concise Oxford Dictionary - Human recognition of a superhuman controlling power and especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and worship.
Psychological: William James - the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine.
Sociological: T. Parsons - a set of beliefs, practices and institutions which men have evolved in various societies.
Naturalistic: Salomon Reinach - a body of scruples which impede the free exercises of our faculties.
Naturalistic: Matthew Arnold - ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling
Religious: Herbert Spencer - humanity's response to the divine
The way that religion may not have a single definition is like the way Wittgenstein showed how the word 'game' has no single definition. The family resemblance model of Wittgenstein can be applied to the concept of religion.
The concept of salvation (liberation), while not a universal in religion, is a very common characteristic.
All the great, developed faiths have a soteriological structure. Their is a fallen man and a chance for salvation (Soteria in Greek). All these religions offer a way to the divine. They have a way of reaching the Ultimate.
Philosophy of Religion 3rd Edition
John H. Hick
Prentice-Hall Inc.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
1983
Introduction
What is philosophy of religion?
It used to be that philosophy of religion was a defense of religion. It was seen as a continuing work of natural theology and not revealed theology. But this classical definition of philosophy of religion is better called 'natural theology' or 'apologetics'.
Philosophy of religion is properly seen as "philosophical thinking about religion" (Hick, 1).
Philosophy of religion is not an organ of religious teaching. It is not a branch of theology.
Philosophy of religion studies the concepts and belief systems of religion. It studies the phenomena of religious experience and the activities of worship.
Philosophy of religion is a second order activity. It is not a part of the religious realm, but it is related to it.
Philosophy of religion analyzes concepts like God, dharma, Brahman, salvation, worship, creation, sacrifice, nirvana, eternal life, etc. It compares these concepts with everyday life concepts, moral concepts, scientific concepts and artistic concepts.
What is religion? There are many definitions:
-phenomenological definitions
-interpretive definitions
-psychological definitions
-sociological definitions
-naturalistic definitions
-religious definitions
Maybe the word 'religion' does not have a single correct meaning.
Definitions of religion
Phenomenological: Concise Oxford Dictionary - Human recognition of a superhuman controlling power and especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and worship.
Psychological: William James - the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine.
Sociological: T. Parsons - a set of beliefs, practices and institutions which men have evolved in various societies.
Naturalistic: Salomon Reinach - a body of scruples which impede the free exercises of our faculties.
Naturalistic: Matthew Arnold - ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling
Religious: Herbert Spencer - humanity's response to the divine
The way that religion may not have a single definition is like the way Wittgenstein showed how the word 'game' has no single definition. The family resemblance model of Wittgenstein can be applied to the concept of religion.
The concept of salvation (liberation), while not a universal in religion, is a very common characteristic.
All the great, developed faiths have a soteriological structure. Their is a fallen man and a chance for salvation (Soteria in Greek). All these religions offer a way to the divine. They have a way of reaching the Ultimate.
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito (F)
(Originally written December 28, 2006 in Book 7)
Crito
Characters: Socrates & Crito
Setting: Socrates' Prison
Socrates is calmly accepting his unjust fate.
Socrates asks why we should worry about public opinion. He states that the public cannot make a man wise or foolish. It acts completely at random.
Crito and many others are willing to provide the finances for Socrates' escape and for a place for him to stay.
Crito states that it is unjust to abandon one's life when one can save it.
Crito also states that it is unjust to orphan his children. He states that if he were to die when he could live then he forgoes the educational duties he has to his children.
Socrates states that life in a corrupted and crippled body is not worth living. So too is a life that is crippled by injustice.
Living well is more valuable than simply living. Living well is living honorably and justly.
Socrates states we ought to never act unjustly. We should never repay injustice with injustice. We should never do evil to anyone.
There is no difference between doing evil to a man and acting unjustly.
Socrates also states we have a duty to see through our just agreements.
The Law and the State are parents to all citizens of the State. Citizens are slaves of the State. The rights of the State supersede the rights of the citizen. But if the citizens should disagree with the laws and the State then they can leave. But, if they stay they must abide by the State and its laws.
Socrates states that if he flees he breaks his contract with the State of Athens and thus he will act unjustly. He will be living a life, but not living well if he runs away.
Phaedo - The death scene
Characters: Socrates, Crito, Phaedo, Echecrates and Apollodorus, the servant of the Eleven and the Executioner
Socrates maintains that they will bury his body, but not him. He will be gone and they will bury only the body that housed Socrates the person. To speak of burying Socrates the person is incorrect and corrupts the soul.
Socrates treats the poison bearer with kindness and praises him for his kindness. He does not hold the person who brought his death in contempt. He does not shoot the messenger.
He took the cup of poison cheerfully, "took it (the poison) quite cheerfully, Echecrates, without trembling, and without any change of color or feature" (Plato, 69).
After drinking the poison, Socrates' friends began to weep uncontrollably. Socrates reproached them for this.
Socrates last words were: "Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius, do not forge it". Asclepius was the god of healing and it was customary to give a cock to him on recovering from illness.
Socrates was, according to Plato, the best, wisest and most just of all men of their time.
Crito
Characters: Socrates & Crito
Setting: Socrates' Prison
Socrates is calmly accepting his unjust fate.
Socrates asks why we should worry about public opinion. He states that the public cannot make a man wise or foolish. It acts completely at random.
Crito and many others are willing to provide the finances for Socrates' escape and for a place for him to stay.
Crito states that it is unjust to abandon one's life when one can save it.
Crito also states that it is unjust to orphan his children. He states that if he were to die when he could live then he forgoes the educational duties he has to his children.
Socrates states that life in a corrupted and crippled body is not worth living. So too is a life that is crippled by injustice.
Living well is more valuable than simply living. Living well is living honorably and justly.
Socrates states we ought to never act unjustly. We should never repay injustice with injustice. We should never do evil to anyone.
There is no difference between doing evil to a man and acting unjustly.
Socrates also states we have a duty to see through our just agreements.
The Law and the State are parents to all citizens of the State. Citizens are slaves of the State. The rights of the State supersede the rights of the citizen. But if the citizens should disagree with the laws and the State then they can leave. But, if they stay they must abide by the State and its laws.
Socrates states that if he flees he breaks his contract with the State of Athens and thus he will act unjustly. He will be living a life, but not living well if he runs away.
Phaedo - The death scene
Characters: Socrates, Crito, Phaedo, Echecrates and Apollodorus, the servant of the Eleven and the Executioner
Socrates maintains that they will bury his body, but not him. He will be gone and they will bury only the body that housed Socrates the person. To speak of burying Socrates the person is incorrect and corrupts the soul.
Socrates treats the poison bearer with kindness and praises him for his kindness. He does not hold the person who brought his death in contempt. He does not shoot the messenger.
He took the cup of poison cheerfully, "took it (the poison) quite cheerfully, Echecrates, without trembling, and without any change of color or feature" (Plato, 69).
After drinking the poison, Socrates' friends began to weep uncontrollably. Socrates reproached them for this.
Socrates last words were: "Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius, do not forge it". Asclepius was the god of healing and it was customary to give a cock to him on recovering from illness.
Socrates was, according to Plato, the best, wisest and most just of all men of their time.
Tuesday, December 26, 2006
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito (E)
(Originally written December 26, 2006 in Book 7)
I can't catch a break on this vacation.
I'm not feeling that great; my throat is a little sore. But, that is the minor problem in this house. She was sick all day yesterday. I was trying to watch some TV, but the four kids here would have none of that. They are truly unbelievable. Wild kids. So I went and laid down about 8:00. But, I fell asleep and woke at 2:00 am. I was just wide awake. I went upstairs to get some food. Kathi was sick and Bob wasn't sure if she wasn't going into early labor, so he took her to the hospital. So, the madness continues. But we must focus on Plato... Maybe.
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Apology Continued...
"Wherever a man's station is, whether he has chosen in of his own will, or whether he has been placed at it by his commander, there it is his duty to remain and face the danger without thinking of death or of any other thing except disgrace" (Plato, 34).
To fear death is to believe one wise when one is not. No one knows if death is the greatest thing that can happen to a man.
Socrates seems to take an ascetic pride in his poverty.
He speaks about an inner voice (a consciousness) that tells him not to do something if he sets out to do it; but, that consciousness never tells him to act or to do something.
He holds that justice is fought for best by private citizens, not politicians.
Socrates is more concerned with not acting unjustly or impiously than with death.
After being condemned to death Socrates explains that his accusers have been condemned to wickedness, a far worse fate.
Death is not necessary an evil.
Death is one of two things:
1) Annihilation
2) the migration of the soul to another place
Annihilation will be like an uninterrupted sleep and good or a "wonderful gain"
The migration of a soul to another place would be an opportunity to continue the search for wisdom.
Face death hopefully.
Believe that no evil can happen to a good man in life or death.
What happens does not do so by chance.
I can't catch a break on this vacation.
I'm not feeling that great; my throat is a little sore. But, that is the minor problem in this house. She was sick all day yesterday. I was trying to watch some TV, but the four kids here would have none of that. They are truly unbelievable. Wild kids. So I went and laid down about 8:00. But, I fell asleep and woke at 2:00 am. I was just wide awake. I went upstairs to get some food. Kathi was sick and Bob wasn't sure if she wasn't going into early labor, so he took her to the hospital. So, the madness continues. But we must focus on Plato... Maybe.
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Apology Continued...
"Wherever a man's station is, whether he has chosen in of his own will, or whether he has been placed at it by his commander, there it is his duty to remain and face the danger without thinking of death or of any other thing except disgrace" (Plato, 34).
To fear death is to believe one wise when one is not. No one knows if death is the greatest thing that can happen to a man.
Socrates seems to take an ascetic pride in his poverty.
He speaks about an inner voice (a consciousness) that tells him not to do something if he sets out to do it; but, that consciousness never tells him to act or to do something.
He holds that justice is fought for best by private citizens, not politicians.
Socrates is more concerned with not acting unjustly or impiously than with death.
After being condemned to death Socrates explains that his accusers have been condemned to wickedness, a far worse fate.
Death is not necessary an evil.
Death is one of two things:
1) Annihilation
2) the migration of the soul to another place
Annihilation will be like an uninterrupted sleep and good or a "wonderful gain"
The migration of a soul to another place would be an opportunity to continue the search for wisdom.
Face death hopefully.
Believe that no evil can happen to a good man in life or death.
What happens does not do so by chance.
Monday, December 25, 2006
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito (D)
(Originally written December 25, 2006 in Book 7)
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Apology, Continued.
Merry Christmas
After searching and inquiring of wise men he found that those who were looked up to as wise lacked wisdom, while those looked down upon were often much more intelligent.
Poetry is not wisdom; it is an "instinctive inspiration". The poet is good at writing poetry, but is not wise in other areas.
The Artisans are wise in one skill but this leads them to feel they are wise in others, which makes them unwise.
"Human wisdom is worth little or nothing" (Plato, 20).
Socrates states he is on trial because people are bitter at being exposed as unwise.
Meletus claims it is the laws that make the young better. The judges make the young ones better.
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Apology, Continued.
Merry Christmas
After searching and inquiring of wise men he found that those who were looked up to as wise lacked wisdom, while those looked down upon were often much more intelligent.
Poetry is not wisdom; it is an "instinctive inspiration". The poet is good at writing poetry, but is not wise in other areas.
The Artisans are wise in one skill but this leads them to feel they are wise in others, which makes them unwise.
"Human wisdom is worth little or nothing" (Plato, 20).
Socrates states he is on trial because people are bitter at being exposed as unwise.
Meletus claims it is the laws that make the young better. The judges make the young ones better.
Thursday, December 21, 2006
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito (C)
(Originally written December 21, 2006 in Book 7)
Those who lack a virtue cannot have knowledge of what that virtue is; i.e. a coward could never fully comprehend the virtue of courage.
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Introduction
The Trial and Death of Socrates
Euthyphro
Characters:
Socrates
Euthyphro
Setting:
The Hall of the King
Socrates is being prosecuted for corrupting the youth by "inventing new gods and for not believing in the old ones" (Plato, 2).
Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for murer.
Euthyphro defines piety as prosecuting the wrong and impiety as not prosecuting the wrong.
Socrates doubts the truthfulness of the Zeus/Cronos religious stories. Euthyphro accepts them as true.
Socrates is not satisfied by Euthyphro's definitions and asked him to state a characteristic of piety and impiety.
Euthphro states that what is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing is impious. Piety is pleasing to the gods; pleasing actions and pleasing persons are pious. Impiety is displeasing to the gods; displeasing actions and displeasing persons are impious.
Socrates points out that since the gods war with each other then the same thing, action or person will be both pleasing and displeasing, both pious and impious. But this is a contradiction since piety and impiety are opposite.
Euthyphro further defines piety as what all gods love and impiety as what all gods hate.
Euthphro claims that the gods love things because they are pious, not that things are pious because the gods love them.
Socrates states that piety must be just and that piety is a part of justice, not the sum of it.
Socrates claims that there is always fear where there is reverence, but there is not always reverence when there is fear.
Euthyphro claims that righteousness and piety are that part of justice which deals with the careful attention that ought to be paid to the gods. He claims it is a service to the gods. Piety is being like a slave to the gods.
Socrates boils down Euthyphro's answer to 'what is piety' to the "science of prayer and sacrifice" (Plato, 18).
Socrates spins Euthyphro's answers into a circular argument. It is an eloquent argument, but does he really disprove Euthyphro's arguments or does he merely muddle and confuse?
The Apology
Characters:
Socrates
Meletus
Setting: The court of Justice
Socrates accuses his accusers of speaking falsehoods about him. He claims he is not a clever orator, but only speaks the truth.
The Oracle at Delphi proclaimed to Chaerephon that no one was wiser than Socrates.
Socrates was surprised at their declaration because he knew himself to be unwise. He set out to disprove the Oracle.
He went to a reported wise man and found that he was not wise. Socrates decided that while either had knowledge of anything of worth, Socrates' ability to accept that he had no knowledge made him a little wiser than the reported wise man.
Socrates repeated this task with another 'wise' man and found the same thing. Both were indignant when Socrates declared that they were not wise. Both of their followers became furious with Socrates.
Those who lack a virtue cannot have knowledge of what that virtue is; i.e. a coward could never fully comprehend the virtue of courage.
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Introduction
The Trial and Death of Socrates
Euthyphro
Characters:
Socrates
Euthyphro
Setting:
The Hall of the King
Socrates is being prosecuted for corrupting the youth by "inventing new gods and for not believing in the old ones" (Plato, 2).
Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for murer.
Euthyphro defines piety as prosecuting the wrong and impiety as not prosecuting the wrong.
Socrates doubts the truthfulness of the Zeus/Cronos religious stories. Euthyphro accepts them as true.
Socrates is not satisfied by Euthyphro's definitions and asked him to state a characteristic of piety and impiety.
Euthphro states that what is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing is impious. Piety is pleasing to the gods; pleasing actions and pleasing persons are pious. Impiety is displeasing to the gods; displeasing actions and displeasing persons are impious.
Socrates points out that since the gods war with each other then the same thing, action or person will be both pleasing and displeasing, both pious and impious. But this is a contradiction since piety and impiety are opposite.
Euthyphro further defines piety as what all gods love and impiety as what all gods hate.
Euthphro claims that the gods love things because they are pious, not that things are pious because the gods love them.
Socrates states that piety must be just and that piety is a part of justice, not the sum of it.
Socrates claims that there is always fear where there is reverence, but there is not always reverence when there is fear.
Euthyphro claims that righteousness and piety are that part of justice which deals with the careful attention that ought to be paid to the gods. He claims it is a service to the gods. Piety is being like a slave to the gods.
Socrates boils down Euthyphro's answer to 'what is piety' to the "science of prayer and sacrifice" (Plato, 18).
Socrates spins Euthyphro's answers into a circular argument. It is an eloquent argument, but does he really disprove Euthyphro's arguments or does he merely muddle and confuse?
The Apology
Characters:
Socrates
Meletus
Setting: The court of Justice
Socrates accuses his accusers of speaking falsehoods about him. He claims he is not a clever orator, but only speaks the truth.
The Oracle at Delphi proclaimed to Chaerephon that no one was wiser than Socrates.
Socrates was surprised at their declaration because he knew himself to be unwise. He set out to disprove the Oracle.
He went to a reported wise man and found that he was not wise. Socrates decided that while either had knowledge of anything of worth, Socrates' ability to accept that he had no knowledge made him a little wiser than the reported wise man.
Socrates repeated this task with another 'wise' man and found the same thing. Both were indignant when Socrates declared that they were not wise. Both of their followers became furious with Socrates.
Wednesday, December 20, 2006
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito (B)
(Originally written December 20, 2006 in Book 7)
The plane was impossible to read on...
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Introduction
The Trial and Death of Socrates
Dialogues are written conversationally to show that philosophy is a social undertaking.
Plato uses the dialogue to create a dramatic form of philosophy.
Socrates (thus, Plato) claims that all knowledge is born out of self-knowledge.
Too tired. Too tired.
The plane was impossible to read on...
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Introduction
The Trial and Death of Socrates
Dialogues are written conversationally to show that philosophy is a social undertaking.
Plato uses the dialogue to create a dramatic form of philosophy.
Socrates (thus, Plato) claims that all knowledge is born out of self-knowledge.
Too tired. Too tired.
Tuesday, December 19, 2006
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito (A)
(Originally written December 19, 2006 in Book 7)
From high up in the air, somewhere over Southern Ohio or Indiana, I bring you... Plato
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Introduction
The Trial and Death of Socrates
From high up in the air, somewhere over Southern Ohio or Indiana, I bring you... Plato
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
Plato
Translation F. J. Church
Bobby-Merrill Co., Inc. Indianapolis, 1956
Introduction
The Trial and Death of Socrates
Wednesday, December 13, 2006
Notes on John Scotus and Abelard
(Originally Written December 13, 2006 in Book 11)
Medieval Realism
John Scotus Erigena was a medieval realist in that he believed universals to be real in their own right.
Erigena distinguished between 3 real entities:
1) The independently real universe
2) The sense object
3) The Memory image
Erigena's solution seemed plausible for the 11th and 12th century thinkers like Odo of Tournai, Anselm of Canterbury and William of Champeaux. It helped solve problems like Original Sin in Christian doctrines. But it has a pantheistic element that is incompatible with Christianity.
Nominalism
Extreme nominalism is no solution to the problem of universals. Nominalism has difficulties explaining the doctrine of the Trinity. Either there are three Gods or God is one in nominalism, which is heresy.
Conceptualism
Neither realism (independent universals) nor nominalism (no objective of universals) was adequate.
Aristotle was a compromise between the two and the medieval compromise was strikingly similar to Aristotle.
Abelard
Peter Abelard devised conceptualism, which is the nominalist theory that universals are mental concepts, but have objective value because they are conceived by multiple human minds.
Abelard was born in 1079 in Nantes, France. He was educated in Paris by the realist of William of Champeaux.
Abelard became a rival and set up a rival school of William of Champeaux.
Abelard had an affair with he daughter of the Canon of Notre Dame. The affair led to Abelard's de-nutting and he retired to St. Denis.
But Abelard continued to stir up trouble wherever he went. He was finally condemned in 1142. He never fell out of love with Heloïse, the Canon's daughter.
Abelard was a prototype for the scholastic method.
Abelard would attack and ridicule his rival's views and philosophically beat them into submission or frustration.
A universal is an abstraction and it is real as it is abstracted.
Abelard shifted the emphasis of the problem of universals from metaphysics to logic and psychology.
A universal exists in two ways:
1) It exists in the individual particulars as a common likeness.
2) It exists in the human intellect as a concept formed as a result of the intellect's shaving focused it attention on the likeness.
The Faith-Reason Controversy
At first faith and reason can be supposed to not be in conflict, they yield the same results.
John Scots Erigena held their optimistic view, but the churchmen began to see faith as being threatened by reason.
Final Exam Study!
Augustine
1. Epistemology and philosophy of mind
Medieval Realism
John Scotus Erigena was a medieval realist in that he believed universals to be real in their own right.
Erigena distinguished between 3 real entities:
1) The independently real universe
2) The sense object
3) The Memory image
Erigena's solution seemed plausible for the 11th and 12th century thinkers like Odo of Tournai, Anselm of Canterbury and William of Champeaux. It helped solve problems like Original Sin in Christian doctrines. But it has a pantheistic element that is incompatible with Christianity.
Nominalism
Extreme nominalism is no solution to the problem of universals. Nominalism has difficulties explaining the doctrine of the Trinity. Either there are three Gods or God is one in nominalism, which is heresy.
Conceptualism
Neither realism (independent universals) nor nominalism (no objective of universals) was adequate.
Aristotle was a compromise between the two and the medieval compromise was strikingly similar to Aristotle.
Abelard
Peter Abelard devised conceptualism, which is the nominalist theory that universals are mental concepts, but have objective value because they are conceived by multiple human minds.
Abelard was born in 1079 in Nantes, France. He was educated in Paris by the realist of William of Champeaux.
Abelard became a rival and set up a rival school of William of Champeaux.
Abelard had an affair with he daughter of the Canon of Notre Dame. The affair led to Abelard's de-nutting and he retired to St. Denis.
But Abelard continued to stir up trouble wherever he went. He was finally condemned in 1142. He never fell out of love with Heloïse, the Canon's daughter.
Abelard was a prototype for the scholastic method.
Abelard would attack and ridicule his rival's views and philosophically beat them into submission or frustration.
A universal is an abstraction and it is real as it is abstracted.
Abelard shifted the emphasis of the problem of universals from metaphysics to logic and psychology.
A universal exists in two ways:
1) It exists in the individual particulars as a common likeness.
2) It exists in the human intellect as a concept formed as a result of the intellect's shaving focused it attention on the likeness.
The Faith-Reason Controversy
At first faith and reason can be supposed to not be in conflict, they yield the same results.
John Scots Erigena held their optimistic view, but the churchmen began to see faith as being threatened by reason.
Final Exam Study!
Augustine
1. Epistemology and philosophy of mind
Monday, December 11, 2006
Introduction to Logic: Ch. 7
(Originally written December 11, 2006 in Book 9)
Introduction to Logic
Harry J. Gensler
Chapter 7: Basic Modal Logic
Modal logic studies arguments whose validity depends on 'necessary' and 'possible' notions.
7.1 Translations
1) ◊A = it's possible that A = A is true in some possible world
2) A = It's true that A = A is true in the actual world
3)□A = It's necessary that A = A is true in all possible worlds
"Possible" is weaker then calling something true.
"Necessary" is stronger than calling something true.
Possible means logically possible (not self-contradictory).
Necessary means logically necessary (self-contradictory to deny).
A possible world is a consistent and complete description of how things might have been or might in fact be.
The actual world is the description of how things actually are.
Done' use parentheses with ◊ or □
right: ◊A □A
wrong: ◊(A) □(A) (◊A) (□A)
~◊A = A couldn't be true
□~A = A has to be false
◊(A·B) - it's possible that A and B are true. A is compatible with B.
□(A⊃B) - it's necessary that if A then B. A entails B.
"entails" is a stronger claim then an "if-then"
~◊(A·B) - A is inconsistent with B. It's not possible that A and B are both true.
~□(A⊃B) - A doesn't entail B. It's not necessary that if A then B
(◊A·~◊A) - A is a contingent statement. A is possible and not-A is possible.
(A·◊~A) - A is true but could have been false. A is a contingent truth.
Statements are necessary, impossible or contingent. Truths are only necessary or contingent.
Necessary not = □~
not necessary = ~□
necessary if = □(
if necessary = (□
English sentences can be ambiguous
"If A is true, then its necessary that B" could mean:
1) (A⊃□B) or
2) □(A⊃B)
"If A is true, then it's impossible that B" could mean:
1) (A⊃□~B) or
2) □(A⊃~B)
Inherent necessity: given that the antecedent is true it is necessarily true.
Relative necessity: given that the X is true then the relation between X and Y is true.
Inherent necessity is the "necessity of the consequent". Relative necessity is the "necessity of the consequence"
If A, then B (by itself) is necessary. (A⊃□B)
A entails B. □(A⊃B)
Necessarily, if A then B: □(A⊃B)
It's necessary that if A then B: □(A⊃B)
If A then B is a necessary truth: □(A⊃B)
7.2 Proofs
A world prefix is a string of zero or more instances of "W"
A derived step is now of a line consisting of a world prefix and then "therefore"
An assumption is now a line consisting of a world prefix and 'asm':
Therefore, A (A is true in the actual world)
asm: A (Assume A is true in world W)
WW Therefore, A (A is true in World W)
W asm: A (Assume A is true in world W)
WW therefore, A (A is true in the world WW)
WW asm: A (assume A is ture in world WW)
Reverse squiggle ~□A -> ◊~A
~◊A -> □~A
drop diamond: ◊A -> W therefore, A
drop box - □A -> W therefore, A
Introduction to Logic
Harry J. Gensler
Chapter 7: Basic Modal Logic
Modal logic studies arguments whose validity depends on 'necessary' and 'possible' notions.
7.1 Translations
1) ◊A = it's possible that A = A is true in some possible world
2) A = It's true that A = A is true in the actual world
3)□A = It's necessary that A = A is true in all possible worlds
"Possible" is weaker then calling something true.
"Necessary" is stronger than calling something true.
Possible means logically possible (not self-contradictory).
Necessary means logically necessary (self-contradictory to deny).
A possible world is a consistent and complete description of how things might have been or might in fact be.
The actual world is the description of how things actually are.
Done' use parentheses with ◊ or □
right: ◊A □A
wrong: ◊(A) □(A) (◊A) (□A)
~◊A = A couldn't be true
□~A = A has to be false
◊(A·B) - it's possible that A and B are true. A is compatible with B.
□(A⊃B) - it's necessary that if A then B. A entails B.
"entails" is a stronger claim then an "if-then"
~◊(A·B) - A is inconsistent with B. It's not possible that A and B are both true.
~□(A⊃B) - A doesn't entail B. It's not necessary that if A then B
(◊A·~◊A) - A is a contingent statement. A is possible and not-A is possible.
(A·◊~A) - A is true but could have been false. A is a contingent truth.
Statements are necessary, impossible or contingent. Truths are only necessary or contingent.
Necessary not = □~
not necessary = ~□
necessary if = □(
if necessary = (□
English sentences can be ambiguous
"If A is true, then its necessary that B" could mean:
1) (A⊃□B) or
2) □(A⊃B)
"If A is true, then it's impossible that B" could mean:
1) (A⊃□~B) or
2) □(A⊃~B)
Inherent necessity: given that the antecedent is true it is necessarily true.
Relative necessity: given that the X is true then the relation between X and Y is true.
Inherent necessity is the "necessity of the consequent". Relative necessity is the "necessity of the consequence"
If A, then B (by itself) is necessary. (A⊃□B)
A entails B. □(A⊃B)
Necessarily, if A then B: □(A⊃B)
It's necessary that if A then B: □(A⊃B)
If A then B is a necessary truth: □(A⊃B)
7.2 Proofs
A world prefix is a string of zero or more instances of "W"
A derived step is now of a line consisting of a world prefix and then "therefore"
An assumption is now a line consisting of a world prefix and 'asm':
Therefore, A (A is true in the actual world)
asm: A (Assume A is true in world W)
WW Therefore, A (A is true in World W)
W asm: A (Assume A is true in world W)
WW therefore, A (A is true in the world WW)
WW asm: A (assume A is ture in world WW)
Reverse squiggle ~□A -> ◊~A
~◊A -> □~A
drop diamond: ◊A -> W therefore, A
drop box - □A -> W therefore, A
Saturday, December 9, 2006
Quick notes & Barebones Outline of a lost Epistemology Paper
(Originally written December 9, 2006 in Book 12)
Ok, it's Saturday about 1:00 pm. I have a major epistemology paper due at 9:00 am on Monday, which I have not ben diligent in working on. So, it's research time!
Thesis (preliminary) all knowledge is analytic in nature. Synthetic nature is artificial.
Louis Pojman
The Theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
VII.2 An Empiricist Critique of A priori knowledge - A.J. Ayer
No matter of fact can be shown to be logically necessarily or universally true (Hume).
Ayer states that no proposition with factual content is necessarily true.
Every empiricist must accept the thesis that no factual propositions can be necessary truths.
Empiricism faces difficulties with this thesis in dealing with mathematics and logical truths. There are two ways of dealing with this:
1) They are not necessary truths (in this case their universalness must be somehow explained).
2) They have no factual content (in this case they must be able to explain why a proposition without factual content can be true and useful and surprising).
If both of these prove unsatisfactory, empiricism is proven wrong and rationalism is vindicated.
Rationalism states that thought, independent of experience is a more reliable source of knowledge than experience.
John Stuart Mill adopted the thesis that mathematic and logical truths are not necessary. He maintained that they were merely inductive generalizations based on a very large number of experiences. Thus, these mathematical and logical truths were very probable, but not certain.
The difference between Mathematical and logical truths and scientific generalizations was a difference of degree, not kind.
Ayer admits that by rejecting Mill's approach, empiricists are obliged to be somewhat dogmatic.
The Irrefutability of the Propositions of Mathematics and Logic
In every instance when a mathematical or logical truth appears to be refuted we can easily find a way to show that it has not. Truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies.
The Nature of Analytic Propositions
Kant's definition of an analytic proposition, "one in which the predicate B belonged to the subject A as something which was covertly contained in the concept of A" (Pojman, 381).
Analytic judgments add nothing to the subject; whereas synthetic judgments do.
Analytic judgments provide no factual content and it is for this reason no experience can refute them.
Because analytic judgments provide no factual content it does not follow that they are senseless.
Analytic propositions provide us with some new knowledge. They clarify. They show new linguistic usages.
Analytic judgments allow us to make explicit what was implicit.
The Propositions of Geometry
Kant believed that geometry was the study of the properties of physical space.
Non-Euclidean Geometry has proven that geometry is not the study of physical space. We merely use geometry to reason about physical space.
Necessary truths are devoid of factual content. A priori truths are always analytic. They are always tautologies.
How can Tautologies be surprising?
The power of logic or mathematics to surprise us has its origin solely in the limitedness of our minds, not in their content.
All a priori truths are tautologies. Tautologies serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, they do not contain any information about any matter of fact.
Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
translated by: Paul Schrecken and Anne Martin Schrecker
The Unity of Leibniz's philosophic thought
There is a pervasive inner unity that flows through all of Leibniz's work.
Leibniz held a belief in a universal language.
Reflections on knowledge, truth, and ideas
All knowledge is either obscure or clear. Clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. Distinct knowledge is either adequate or inadequate. Distinct knowledge is either symbolic or intuitive.
"The most perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive" (Leibniz, 3).
Knowledge is obscure when it is insufficient to recognize what it represents.
Knowledge is clear when it is sufficient to recognize the object it represents.
Clear knowledge is confused when it cannot be distinguished from other objects in description. It is recognizable, but only to me.
Distinct knowledge is distinguishable and explicable knowledge. It is distinct when we can explain it to others.
Perfect knowledge is both adequate and distinct, but Leibniz doubts whether or not man can give a true account of this, but numbers come close.
Intuitive knowledge occurs when the whole of simple idea is known at once. Symbolic knowledge is knowledge o highly complex notions where the whole is known without full knowledge of all the parts.
There is a difference in definitions:
1) Nominal definitions - contain only marks to distinguish the defined thing from other things
2) Real definitions - actually describing the object in its fullest
By distinguishing these definitions we refute Hobbes' notion that all truths are arbitrary. (Hobbes' assumption rests on all definitions being nominal ones).
An idea is true when it is possible (it is false when it involves a contradiction).
Possibility is known either a priori or a posteriori
Causal definitions are known a priori.
A posteriori possibility is known when we experience a thing in reality.
When we have adequate knowledge we also possess a priori knowledge of a possibility.
Thought experiment - when we perceive green we are unaware that we are actually perceiving blue + yellow. Thus, what is green is known, analytically, as yellow+blue.
On the Universal Science: Characteristic XIV
All certain knowledge is established through demonstration or experiments.
Science is based on reason.
We need some exact language, or a form of truly philosophical writing in which ideas are reducible to a kind of "alphabet of human thought"
Leibnizian demonstrations involve two principles:
1) What implies contradiction is false
**2) Reason can be given for any truth, the predicate concept always inheres in its subject concept, either explicitly or implicitly
Necessary truths can be reduced to identical propositions
Contingent truths require an infinite analysis which can be performed solely by God. Only God can know contingent truths a priori.
Contingent truths are truths of fact.
XV
"All human reasoning uses certain signs or character" (Leibniz, 17).
Knowledge is symbolic.
All human ideas can be reduced into a few primitives. (cogitationes -> primitivas)
Critical remarks concerning the General Part of Descartes' principles
One must, in searching for truth, doubt everyone at some point in one's lifetime.
2. That what is doubtful should be considered false.
-There is no advantage to this.
4. Why one can place in doubt the truth of sensible things.
-All we need to know is that they are consistent among themselves.
Linehan - This is interesting, but unhelpful to my research. I'm skipping it.
On the Improvement of Metaphysics and on the concept of substance
Mathematics possesses clarity; metaphysics possesses obscurity.
The cause of metaphysical obscurity is that the general concepts of metaphysics are ambiguous.
Metaphysics needs clarity and clearness and certitude even more than mathematics.
Force is inherent in substance. Force is the faculty to act, action itself and requires effort.
What is nature? Reflections on the force inherent in created things and on their actions
What does nature consist of?
Do created things posses an energy?
The whole of nature is the perfect work of God's making.
Robert Boyle states that nature is the mechanism of bodies.
Linehan - I think I have exhausted my resources in this book for my epistemology paper. But, just reading a little bit of Leibniz has restored my love and respect for him and rationalism in general.
So now it is time for the paper!
Paper Structure:
I. Thesis
II. Definitions
A. Historical
i. epistemological/metaphysical/semantical categories
1. Kant's 4 Quadrants
2. A.J. Ayer's a priori
3. Leibniz divisions of knowledge
B. Personal
III. Thought Experiments (proofs of I)
1. Logical
2. Mathematical
3. Propositional
IV. Objections and responses
V. Closing
Thesis: Knowledge is...
1) Analytic (semantical)
2) Tautological (semantical)
3) A Priori (epistemological)
4) Necessary (metaphysical)
Knowledge has three major components
1) Epistemological
2) Semantical
3) Metaphysical
Epistemological and semantical knowledge are closely related and focused on together, mainly because of Kant. Metaphysical knowledge has been intertwined with epistemological and semantical, though less explicit.
Definitions of Knowledge
Leibnizian distinctions lead to my definition.
First of the three components: Epistemological
definition of a priori (Pojman, 367)
definition of a posteriori (Pojman, 367)
Kantian definition of analytic propositions
Ayer definition of a priori truths
2nd of the 3 components: Semantical
definition of analytic
definition of synthetic
Ayer's distinction
Leibnizian definition/personal additions
Ayer's truth of logic (mathematics)
Thought experiments
1) Logic
2) Mathematics
3) Empirical (most controversial)
3rd of 3 Components: Metaphysical
definition of necessary truths
definition of contingent truths
Hume's objection (needs more research)
Ayer's factual content necessary truth?
Metaphysical difficulties for the empiricist
Ayer has satisfactory proved factual content but he has not eliminated rationalism. Explain why and you'll be able to demonstrate all three parts of your thesis and vindicate your definition of knowledge (conclusion).
Ok, it's Saturday about 1:00 pm. I have a major epistemology paper due at 9:00 am on Monday, which I have not ben diligent in working on. So, it's research time!
Thesis (preliminary) all knowledge is analytic in nature. Synthetic nature is artificial.
Louis Pojman
The Theory of Knowledge 3rd Edition
VII.2 An Empiricist Critique of A priori knowledge - A.J. Ayer
No matter of fact can be shown to be logically necessarily or universally true (Hume).
Ayer states that no proposition with factual content is necessarily true.
Every empiricist must accept the thesis that no factual propositions can be necessary truths.
Empiricism faces difficulties with this thesis in dealing with mathematics and logical truths. There are two ways of dealing with this:
1) They are not necessary truths (in this case their universalness must be somehow explained).
2) They have no factual content (in this case they must be able to explain why a proposition without factual content can be true and useful and surprising).
If both of these prove unsatisfactory, empiricism is proven wrong and rationalism is vindicated.
Rationalism states that thought, independent of experience is a more reliable source of knowledge than experience.
John Stuart Mill adopted the thesis that mathematic and logical truths are not necessary. He maintained that they were merely inductive generalizations based on a very large number of experiences. Thus, these mathematical and logical truths were very probable, but not certain.
The difference between Mathematical and logical truths and scientific generalizations was a difference of degree, not kind.
Ayer admits that by rejecting Mill's approach, empiricists are obliged to be somewhat dogmatic.
The Irrefutability of the Propositions of Mathematics and Logic
In every instance when a mathematical or logical truth appears to be refuted we can easily find a way to show that it has not. Truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies.
The Nature of Analytic Propositions
Kant's definition of an analytic proposition, "one in which the predicate B belonged to the subject A as something which was covertly contained in the concept of A" (Pojman, 381).
Analytic judgments add nothing to the subject; whereas synthetic judgments do.
Analytic judgments provide no factual content and it is for this reason no experience can refute them.
Because analytic judgments provide no factual content it does not follow that they are senseless.
Analytic propositions provide us with some new knowledge. They clarify. They show new linguistic usages.
Analytic judgments allow us to make explicit what was implicit.
The Propositions of Geometry
Kant believed that geometry was the study of the properties of physical space.
Non-Euclidean Geometry has proven that geometry is not the study of physical space. We merely use geometry to reason about physical space.
Necessary truths are devoid of factual content. A priori truths are always analytic. They are always tautologies.
How can Tautologies be surprising?
The power of logic or mathematics to surprise us has its origin solely in the limitedness of our minds, not in their content.
All a priori truths are tautologies. Tautologies serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, they do not contain any information about any matter of fact.
Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
translated by: Paul Schrecken and Anne Martin Schrecker
The Unity of Leibniz's philosophic thought
There is a pervasive inner unity that flows through all of Leibniz's work.
Leibniz held a belief in a universal language.
Reflections on knowledge, truth, and ideas
All knowledge is either obscure or clear. Clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. Distinct knowledge is either adequate or inadequate. Distinct knowledge is either symbolic or intuitive.
"The most perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive" (Leibniz, 3).
Knowledge is obscure when it is insufficient to recognize what it represents.
Knowledge is clear when it is sufficient to recognize the object it represents.
Clear knowledge is confused when it cannot be distinguished from other objects in description. It is recognizable, but only to me.
Distinct knowledge is distinguishable and explicable knowledge. It is distinct when we can explain it to others.
Perfect knowledge is both adequate and distinct, but Leibniz doubts whether or not man can give a true account of this, but numbers come close.
Intuitive knowledge occurs when the whole of simple idea is known at once. Symbolic knowledge is knowledge o highly complex notions where the whole is known without full knowledge of all the parts.
There is a difference in definitions:
1) Nominal definitions - contain only marks to distinguish the defined thing from other things
2) Real definitions - actually describing the object in its fullest
By distinguishing these definitions we refute Hobbes' notion that all truths are arbitrary. (Hobbes' assumption rests on all definitions being nominal ones).
An idea is true when it is possible (it is false when it involves a contradiction).
Possibility is known either a priori or a posteriori
Causal definitions are known a priori.
A posteriori possibility is known when we experience a thing in reality.
When we have adequate knowledge we also possess a priori knowledge of a possibility.
Thought experiment - when we perceive green we are unaware that we are actually perceiving blue + yellow. Thus, what is green is known, analytically, as yellow+blue.
On the Universal Science: Characteristic XIV
All certain knowledge is established through demonstration or experiments.
Science is based on reason.
We need some exact language, or a form of truly philosophical writing in which ideas are reducible to a kind of "alphabet of human thought"
Leibnizian demonstrations involve two principles:
1) What implies contradiction is false
**2) Reason can be given for any truth, the predicate concept always inheres in its subject concept, either explicitly or implicitly
Necessary truths can be reduced to identical propositions
Contingent truths require an infinite analysis which can be performed solely by God. Only God can know contingent truths a priori.
Contingent truths are truths of fact.
XV
"All human reasoning uses certain signs or character" (Leibniz, 17).
Knowledge is symbolic.
All human ideas can be reduced into a few primitives. (cogitationes -> primitivas)
Critical remarks concerning the General Part of Descartes' principles
One must, in searching for truth, doubt everyone at some point in one's lifetime.
2. That what is doubtful should be considered false.
-There is no advantage to this.
4. Why one can place in doubt the truth of sensible things.
-All we need to know is that they are consistent among themselves.
Linehan - This is interesting, but unhelpful to my research. I'm skipping it.
On the Improvement of Metaphysics and on the concept of substance
Mathematics possesses clarity; metaphysics possesses obscurity.
The cause of metaphysical obscurity is that the general concepts of metaphysics are ambiguous.
Metaphysics needs clarity and clearness and certitude even more than mathematics.
Force is inherent in substance. Force is the faculty to act, action itself and requires effort.
What is nature? Reflections on the force inherent in created things and on their actions
What does nature consist of?
Do created things posses an energy?
The whole of nature is the perfect work of God's making.
Robert Boyle states that nature is the mechanism of bodies.
Linehan - I think I have exhausted my resources in this book for my epistemology paper. But, just reading a little bit of Leibniz has restored my love and respect for him and rationalism in general.
So now it is time for the paper!
Paper Structure:
I. Thesis
II. Definitions
A. Historical
i. epistemological/metaphysical/semantical categories
1. Kant's 4 Quadrants
2. A.J. Ayer's a priori
3. Leibniz divisions of knowledge
B. Personal
III. Thought Experiments (proofs of I)
1. Logical
2. Mathematical
3. Propositional
IV. Objections and responses
V. Closing
Thesis: Knowledge is...
1) Analytic (semantical)
2) Tautological (semantical)
3) A Priori (epistemological)
4) Necessary (metaphysical)
Knowledge has three major components
1) Epistemological
2) Semantical
3) Metaphysical
Epistemological and semantical knowledge are closely related and focused on together, mainly because of Kant. Metaphysical knowledge has been intertwined with epistemological and semantical, though less explicit.
Definitions of Knowledge
Leibnizian distinctions lead to my definition.
First of the three components: Epistemological
definition of a priori (Pojman, 367)
definition of a posteriori (Pojman, 367)
Kantian definition of analytic propositions
Ayer definition of a priori truths
2nd of the 3 components: Semantical
definition of analytic
definition of synthetic
Ayer's distinction
Leibnizian definition/personal additions
Ayer's truth of logic (mathematics)
Thought experiments
1) Logic
2) Mathematics
3) Empirical (most controversial)
3rd of 3 Components: Metaphysical
definition of necessary truths
definition of contingent truths
Hume's objection (needs more research)
Ayer's factual content necessary truth?
Metaphysical difficulties for the empiricist
Ayer has satisfactory proved factual content but he has not eliminated rationalism. Explain why and you'll be able to demonstrate all three parts of your thesis and vindicate your definition of knowledge (conclusion).
Friday, December 8, 2006
Class notes on Modal Logic
(Originally written December 8, 2006 in Book 9)
Class note
Modal Logic
(W⊃T) 'if today is Wednesday then I need to take out the trash
(S⊃F) 'if this figure is a square then it has four sides
The second statement is necessarily true. The first statement is contingently true.
Modal logic acknowledges that some statements are just plain true (they are actual) and that there are necessary truths.
Modal Logic
True - Actual
True - Necessary
True - Possible
False - Actual
False - impossible, necessarily false
False - possible
A statement that is necessarily rue has something in front of the well formed formula.
□(S⊃F)
But a possible truth has something in front of the well formed formula as well
◊(R⊃T)
□ - necessarily so
◊ - possibly so
~□(F⊃S) - It is not necessarily the case that a four-sided object is a square
◊~(F⊃S) - It is possible that a four-sided object is not a square
□ & ◊ are modal operators
True:
Actual - P
Necessary - □P
Possibly - ◊P
False:
Actual - ~P
Not necessarily true - ~□P
Impossible - ~◊P
Problem with modal logic is ◊□P ≡ □P
Modal logic deals with possible worlds.
Possible statements must be true in at least one possible world.
Necessary statements must be true in all possible worlds.
W.V.O. Quine flat out rejected modal logic because it entails essences.
Alvin Plantinga asserts that there are essences and therefore modal logic is a good system.
In modal logic a possible world cannot contradict the essence of the object of the actual world.
Class note
Modal Logic
(W⊃T) 'if today is Wednesday then I need to take out the trash
(S⊃F) 'if this figure is a square then it has four sides
The second statement is necessarily true. The first statement is contingently true.
Modal logic acknowledges that some statements are just plain true (they are actual) and that there are necessary truths.
Modal Logic
True - Actual
True - Necessary
True - Possible
False - Actual
False - impossible, necessarily false
False - possible
A statement that is necessarily rue has something in front of the well formed formula.
□(S⊃F)
But a possible truth has something in front of the well formed formula as well
◊(R⊃T)
□ - necessarily so
◊ - possibly so
~□(F⊃S) - It is not necessarily the case that a four-sided object is a square
◊~(F⊃S) - It is possible that a four-sided object is not a square
□ & ◊ are modal operators
True:
Actual - P
Necessary - □P
Possibly - ◊P
False:
Actual - ~P
Not necessarily true - ~□P
Impossible - ~◊P
Problem with modal logic is ◊□P ≡ □P
Modal logic deals with possible worlds.
Possible statements must be true in at least one possible world.
Necessary statements must be true in all possible worlds.
W.V.O. Quine flat out rejected modal logic because it entails essences.
Alvin Plantinga asserts that there are essences and therefore modal logic is a good system.
In modal logic a possible world cannot contradict the essence of the object of the actual world.
Final Notes on Virtue Epistemology
(Originally written December 8, 2006 in Book 12)
4.2 Anticipated objections to my theory from the perspective of reliablilism
Intellectual virtues are reliably truth conducive, but they are not virtue simply because they are reliable.
To have knowledge one needn't possess intellectual virtues, but that person must imitate the behavior of intellectually virtuous persons and must be virtuously motivated.
The value of reliability rests on the value of motive for knowledge in motivation-based virtue epistemology.
There is no special value of a true belief that formed via a reliable mechanism.
Doesn't knowledge sometimes come out of intellectual vices?
Zagzebski answers this in two ways:
1) These instances are not knowledge at all
2) These instances satisfy her definition of knowledge (this is her preferred stance).
Beliefs formed out of intellectual vices may occasionally prove true, but something will be amiss in their doxastic structure. Knowledge cannot arise out of a wrong doxastic structure.
Zagzebski' preferred argument begins with Aristotle's distinction of good people (agathos) and good and noble people (kalos kagathos).
Even people, when acting from a vice, can use some virtuous motivation. Even the Nazi showed the virtue of courage in his viciousness. Because some virtue is a partial motivation, the true belief can be knowledge.
5. Plantinga's theory of proper function
Alvin Plantinga's theory of proper function has been labeled as a kind of virtue epistemology.
Planting's theory is more externalist than is defensible and susceptible to common arguments against reliablism.
Planting's definition of knowledge makes reliability a necessity for knowledge, but not a sufficient criteria for it.
Planting's theory has advantages over externalism, but faces the same problems.
One problem is that the proper function of faculties is manipulatable.
Another problem is that it is atomistic like belief-based epistemologies.
A virtue theory has an advantage over proper function theories in solving the generality problem.
The conviction of a belief in a problematic thing to base an epistemology on.
6. Harmonizing Internal and External Aspects of knowing
Planting's theory can be distorted. Zagzebski states hers can be twisted to be more extanerlist than she intends.
Contemporary epistemology faces some serious problems:
1) The concept of knowledge has been overlooked and the idea of understanding has been neglected.
2) The concept of justification is muddled and too ambiguous
3) The stalemate betwixt internalism and externalism
Some day I may reread Virtues of the Mind, but not for awhile. This was a truly difficult read for me. Right now, I am unconvinced. I am not sure if that is because I don't quite understand it or because there is nothing really there to understand.
4.2 Anticipated objections to my theory from the perspective of reliablilism
Intellectual virtues are reliably truth conducive, but they are not virtue simply because they are reliable.
To have knowledge one needn't possess intellectual virtues, but that person must imitate the behavior of intellectually virtuous persons and must be virtuously motivated.
The value of reliability rests on the value of motive for knowledge in motivation-based virtue epistemology.
There is no special value of a true belief that formed via a reliable mechanism.
Doesn't knowledge sometimes come out of intellectual vices?
Zagzebski answers this in two ways:
1) These instances are not knowledge at all
2) These instances satisfy her definition of knowledge (this is her preferred stance).
Beliefs formed out of intellectual vices may occasionally prove true, but something will be amiss in their doxastic structure. Knowledge cannot arise out of a wrong doxastic structure.
Zagzebski' preferred argument begins with Aristotle's distinction of good people (agathos) and good and noble people (kalos kagathos).
Even people, when acting from a vice, can use some virtuous motivation. Even the Nazi showed the virtue of courage in his viciousness. Because some virtue is a partial motivation, the true belief can be knowledge.
5. Plantinga's theory of proper function
Alvin Plantinga's theory of proper function has been labeled as a kind of virtue epistemology.
Planting's theory is more externalist than is defensible and susceptible to common arguments against reliablism.
Planting's definition of knowledge makes reliability a necessity for knowledge, but not a sufficient criteria for it.
Planting's theory has advantages over externalism, but faces the same problems.
One problem is that the proper function of faculties is manipulatable.
Another problem is that it is atomistic like belief-based epistemologies.
A virtue theory has an advantage over proper function theories in solving the generality problem.
The conviction of a belief in a problematic thing to base an epistemology on.
6. Harmonizing Internal and External Aspects of knowing
Planting's theory can be distorted. Zagzebski states hers can be twisted to be more extanerlist than she intends.
Contemporary epistemology faces some serious problems:
1) The concept of knowledge has been overlooked and the idea of understanding has been neglected.
2) The concept of justification is muddled and too ambiguous
3) The stalemate betwixt internalism and externalism
Some day I may reread Virtues of the Mind, but not for awhile. This was a truly difficult read for me. Right now, I am unconvinced. I am not sure if that is because I don't quite understand it or because there is nothing really there to understand.
Thursday, December 7, 2006
Medieval Notes, Including John Scotus
(Originally written December 7, 2006 in Book 11)
The History of Philosophy vol. 2
Chapter 5 - The Medieval Interval
Plato and Aristotle dominated the Classical period. Augustine and Aquinas dominated the Medieval period; but, lived 8 centuries apart. Augustine and Aquinas dealt with different problems, whereas Plato and Aristotle dealt with the same problems.
The Dark Ages
The barbarian conquering of Rome caused enormous stress. The barbarians were incapable of sustaining such a complex culture like Rome's.
The collapse of a uniform society caused man to primarily focus on staying alive.
The Classical philosophy was lost to Europe in the Dark Ages.
Literacy declined to the point that Charlemagne complained that the clergy did not know enough Latin to interpret the Scriptures.
The Church
Anything surviving from the Roman World in the Dark Ages was due to the Church.
Christianity made converts out of the pagan and Arian barbarians.
"By the end of the Dark Ages, Christianity was more widely spread and Orthodoxy more firmly entrenched than before the barbarian invasions began" (Jones, 142).
The Rise of the Papacy
The early Church was ruled by bishops, not by the Pope.
The doctrine of Papal primacy made the Pope the head of the Church and gave it temporal authority.
A Christian king was subject to the Pope.
Pope Gregory VII in the 11th century pulled papal primacy to its extreme. The power of the Popes stopped Europe from instituting a unified government until the rise of nationalism in the early Modern period.
Monasticism
While the Papacy drove the Church to become a secular power, the spiritual nature was preserved by two things:
1) Monasticism
2) The Friars
Monasticism began in the 5th and 6th centuries A.D.
Monasticism got its credibility from St. Benedict.
Humility was the top virtue in monastic life.
The monastic movement constantly reformed to maintain a spiritual primacy over a temporal primacy. Though it wasn't perfect it worked well enough.
The Friars of St. Francis
Francis of Assisi (1182-1226)
Francis of Assisi was a mystic reformer and founded the Order of the Friars Minor.
He was dedicated to poverty, simplicity and good works.
He achieved a large measure of success in inflaming the hearts of the average man with the love of God.
The main difference between now and the Dark Ages is that men in the Dark Ages were ready at any moment to be touched by the otherworldly.
Feudalism
Particularism began to grow in the fragmented ruins of the old Empire.
Men with property gained power as central governments were too weak to perform duties.
"Immunity" was granted to land owners by the central government which gave them the power of controlling their lands with no government interference.
Small peasant farmers would "commend" their lands to these large land owners. "Commendation" was the act of giving up one's land for protection and security. The ones who commended their lands would live on them and work them still, but they would no longer own the land.
Charlemagne (742-814) organized a strong central government and was crowned Emperor by the Pope. But his kingdom collapsed shortly after his death.
Feudalism was born out of the rapid commending process that followed the collapse of Charlemagne.
Authority and power and administration became inextricable from land ownership.
Medieval society was dominated by the concept of status, not the concept of citizenship.
The Middle Ages had a very fragmented society.
Chivalry
Chivalry was an ideal that emphasized private honor and public service.
Along with the Church and feudalism Chivalry marked the culture of the Middle Ages.
St. Louis, King of France
Louis IX was born in 1214 and set out to recapture Jerusalem in 1248. It failed, but he tried again in 1270.
Louis IX described chivalry as "upright" and "worthy".
Uprightness involved courage, modesty, charitableness, sobriety, faithfulness and justice.
Louis IX saw sin as a disease, much like Augustine.
Louis IX did not extend his notions of charity and humility to the Jews.
Louis IX distrusted education. As St. Francis, Louis IX was satisfied with simple faith.
Louis IX saw outward dignity as vital in society. His count was elaborate and attendants were lavishly dressed to show their rank.
Feudalism was so deeply entrenched in Louis IX's society that his closest friend and biographer, Sire de Joinville would not swear an oath of allegiance to Louis' family in the event he died in Crusade because Joinville was not his liegeman.
Art and Letters
Architecture
The 12th and 13th centuries were a period of great artistic blossoming.
Vaulted circling and stained glass windows marked the new Gothic style. The abbey church of St. Denis, the Cathedral of Noyon, Enlis, Paris, Rheims and the Sainte Chapelle are perfect examples of the Gothic style. The architecture reflected Christian piety.
Painting and Poetry
Painting and poetry moved from static, unmoving depictions to depictions of living, breathing men in nature.
It focused on the world, but their was still an otherworldly element: case in point - Dante.
The chasm between the otherworld and this world was removed. The two worlds were no longer bitter hostiles at war with each other.
Science
Bartholomew the Englishmen
Bartholomew was one of the most popular science writers of the Middle Ages.
He used Aristotle only in a way to describe it in a very confusing manner.
Science was mixed with heresy and old wives tales.
Aristotle and Medieval Science
It took time to assimilate Aristotle to science.
Men in the Middle Ages were more concerned with salvation, not with accumulating the facts.
Vincent Beauvais
Bartholomew and Vincent Beauvais were very unscientific.
The Universities
Some monastic and cathedral schools popped up after Charlemagne's renaissance.
The Universities slowly arose over Europe to satisfy the new hunger for knowledge slowly awakened over the 8th-11th centuries.
Philosophy during the Medieval Interval
The cultural problem for the 13th century philosopher was to find a place for these this-worldly ends in a scheme of life that still had a basically otherworldly orientation. The success of Aquinas lies in solving this central problem.
There was virtually no philosophical development in the 8 centuries between Augustine and Aquinas, save for Boethius, Isidore of Seville and John Scotus Erigena.
John Scotus Erigena
John Scotus Erigena (ca. 810-877) was born in Ireland. He studied Greek in an Irish monastery at a time when Greek was nearly lost in all the west.
He travels to France in 847 and taught at Paris in the palace school that Charlemagne founded.
He was involved in deep theological topics like Free Will and the Eucharist. He avoided the extreme forms of predestination, but went too far and was condemned as a Pealagian. His views were condemned in 855. Then his views on the Eucharist were condemned (he denied the Doctrine of Transubstantiation)
He decided to take a safer task of translating Greek into Latin.
John Scotus Erigena was deeply concerned with synthesis. As a Christian, Erigena must have a synthesis, an overarching philosophy that fit with the Catholic dogma.
Nature
John began with the nature of reality.
He believed that things fall into two classes:
1) Things that are
2) Things that are not
Things that are not have different modes, they are modes of non-being
1) Sinful man
2) Changing particulars
3) Potential being
4) Things that are "beyond our intellect"
Things that are are those things that we can comprehend.
John Scotus Erigena's divisions are influence by Plato (most of the texts he translated were neoplatonic ones)
Like Plato and the Neoplatonists, John identified the form of the Good with God.
God
According to John, God is "beyond being" and thus, not to be. John had a problem in attempting to reconcile Neoplatonic metaphysics and Christian dogma.
John held that there were two ways for finite minds to approach God:
1) An affirmative way
2) A negative way
The affirmative way consists of stating things like God is being, God is good, etc. These assertions are neither wholly true nor wholly false.
Every positive or affirmative statement about God must be supplemented by a negative statement.
Instead of stating the negative and positive about God as "God is being and not-being" he stated then like "God is super being"
John Scotus Erigena believed that God was truly Good, but to say that God was good was misleading because it wasn't the whole truth.
Creation
John Scotus Erigena started with a paradox in dealing with creation. If God made the world He must move, but how can He who is immutable move?
John asserted that the concepts of making and creation (like the concepts of being and goodness) applied to God in only a metaphorical sense.
He also asserted that the transcendence of the the Creator and the dependence of the creature (Two vitally important Church doctrines) were contradictory.
Theophanies
John held the world to be a "theophany" of God (an appearance of God). It is not an illusion, but the chosen method of God to reveal Himself to man. Human minds are a part of this theophany and thus their understanding is a part of God's theophany.
Knowledge is Illumination
"Everything that exists is an aspect of the divine nature reflected from some perspective or other" (Jones, 179).
Knowledge is fundamentally an act of grace by God in which He illumines our mind.
Four-Fold Division of Nature
While nature is truly one and beyond being, the human mind divides and classifies as was God's intention. There are four divisions of nature:
1) God - the nature that creates and is uncreated
2) The Platonic archetypes - the nature that creates and is created
3) The Physical World - the nature that does not create and is created
4) God - The nature that does not create and is not created
"God issues into the world and returns from it to Himself" (Jones, 180).
God is not conscious until he creates His mind. The archetypes are the divine images of God. They do not exist independently. They are the divine mind.
The archetypes (primordial causes) are the sources of the essences of the particulars in the physical world.
The primordial causes are: goodness, being, life, wisdom, truth, intelligence, reason, virtue, justice, health, greatness, omnipotence, eternity and peace. While we view them as a plurality, they are really a unity.
Anything that exists in the physical world that is describable as one of these primordial causes is so because it takes part (a finite part) in them.
The physical world has being by participating in the various primordial substances.
Is John's view Christian?
There are some Neoplatonic interpretations of nature that readily fit within the framework of Catholic Christianity.
John's metaphysics is a rational system, but is in danger of collapsing into subjectivism and mysticism.
The mystic elements were too strong for a Christian standard at his time. A private mystical basis was not the solution the Church as an institution was looking for.
John's fourth level (not-created and non-creating) seems to destroy individuality. Man's eternal salvation is done through a return to God by all souls. It is not exactly Kosher with the Church. It is blasphemy and heresy.
John's neoplatonism also renders sin and evil as unreal.
John also had to interpret the Scriptures rather loosely.
He also used the writings of St. Dionysius the Areopagite as an almost canonical authority. Unfortunately, St. Dionysius the Areopagite was later shown to be a fake.
The Neoplatonic Problem
Neoplatonic metaphysics and Christian Dogma are antagonistic. The problem was to include some deeply entrenched Neoplatonic ideals of the Middle Ages into Christianity.
The Controversy over Universals
The thinkers of the 11th century were logicians, not metaphysicians. They focused their energy on two very technical problems:
1) The status of universals
2) the relation between the spheres of faith and reason
It was desirable, if only for pragmatic reasons, to prove the Christian truths.
Reason was an indispensable weapon agains infidels and heretics.
Men of the Middle Ages basically agreed there were three modes of cognition
1) Revelation
2) Reason
3) Perception
The problem of universals and the scope of faith and reason was (and is) an interrelated problem.
The History of Philosophy vol. 2
Chapter 5 - The Medieval Interval
Plato and Aristotle dominated the Classical period. Augustine and Aquinas dominated the Medieval period; but, lived 8 centuries apart. Augustine and Aquinas dealt with different problems, whereas Plato and Aristotle dealt with the same problems.
The Dark Ages
The barbarian conquering of Rome caused enormous stress. The barbarians were incapable of sustaining such a complex culture like Rome's.
The collapse of a uniform society caused man to primarily focus on staying alive.
The Classical philosophy was lost to Europe in the Dark Ages.
Literacy declined to the point that Charlemagne complained that the clergy did not know enough Latin to interpret the Scriptures.
The Church
Anything surviving from the Roman World in the Dark Ages was due to the Church.
Christianity made converts out of the pagan and Arian barbarians.
"By the end of the Dark Ages, Christianity was more widely spread and Orthodoxy more firmly entrenched than before the barbarian invasions began" (Jones, 142).
The Rise of the Papacy
The early Church was ruled by bishops, not by the Pope.
The doctrine of Papal primacy made the Pope the head of the Church and gave it temporal authority.
A Christian king was subject to the Pope.
Pope Gregory VII in the 11th century pulled papal primacy to its extreme. The power of the Popes stopped Europe from instituting a unified government until the rise of nationalism in the early Modern period.
Monasticism
While the Papacy drove the Church to become a secular power, the spiritual nature was preserved by two things:
1) Monasticism
2) The Friars
Monasticism began in the 5th and 6th centuries A.D.
Monasticism got its credibility from St. Benedict.
Humility was the top virtue in monastic life.
The monastic movement constantly reformed to maintain a spiritual primacy over a temporal primacy. Though it wasn't perfect it worked well enough.
The Friars of St. Francis
Francis of Assisi (1182-1226)
Francis of Assisi was a mystic reformer and founded the Order of the Friars Minor.
He was dedicated to poverty, simplicity and good works.
He achieved a large measure of success in inflaming the hearts of the average man with the love of God.
The main difference between now and the Dark Ages is that men in the Dark Ages were ready at any moment to be touched by the otherworldly.
Feudalism
Particularism began to grow in the fragmented ruins of the old Empire.
Men with property gained power as central governments were too weak to perform duties.
"Immunity" was granted to land owners by the central government which gave them the power of controlling their lands with no government interference.
Small peasant farmers would "commend" their lands to these large land owners. "Commendation" was the act of giving up one's land for protection and security. The ones who commended their lands would live on them and work them still, but they would no longer own the land.
Charlemagne (742-814) organized a strong central government and was crowned Emperor by the Pope. But his kingdom collapsed shortly after his death.
Feudalism was born out of the rapid commending process that followed the collapse of Charlemagne.
Authority and power and administration became inextricable from land ownership.
Medieval society was dominated by the concept of status, not the concept of citizenship.
The Middle Ages had a very fragmented society.
Chivalry
Chivalry was an ideal that emphasized private honor and public service.
Along with the Church and feudalism Chivalry marked the culture of the Middle Ages.
St. Louis, King of France
Louis IX was born in 1214 and set out to recapture Jerusalem in 1248. It failed, but he tried again in 1270.
Louis IX described chivalry as "upright" and "worthy".
Uprightness involved courage, modesty, charitableness, sobriety, faithfulness and justice.
Louis IX saw sin as a disease, much like Augustine.
Louis IX did not extend his notions of charity and humility to the Jews.
Louis IX distrusted education. As St. Francis, Louis IX was satisfied with simple faith.
Louis IX saw outward dignity as vital in society. His count was elaborate and attendants were lavishly dressed to show their rank.
Feudalism was so deeply entrenched in Louis IX's society that his closest friend and biographer, Sire de Joinville would not swear an oath of allegiance to Louis' family in the event he died in Crusade because Joinville was not his liegeman.
Art and Letters
Architecture
The 12th and 13th centuries were a period of great artistic blossoming.
Vaulted circling and stained glass windows marked the new Gothic style. The abbey church of St. Denis, the Cathedral of Noyon, Enlis, Paris, Rheims and the Sainte Chapelle are perfect examples of the Gothic style. The architecture reflected Christian piety.
Painting and Poetry
Painting and poetry moved from static, unmoving depictions to depictions of living, breathing men in nature.
It focused on the world, but their was still an otherworldly element: case in point - Dante.
The chasm between the otherworld and this world was removed. The two worlds were no longer bitter hostiles at war with each other.
Science
Bartholomew the Englishmen
Bartholomew was one of the most popular science writers of the Middle Ages.
He used Aristotle only in a way to describe it in a very confusing manner.
Science was mixed with heresy and old wives tales.
Aristotle and Medieval Science
It took time to assimilate Aristotle to science.
Men in the Middle Ages were more concerned with salvation, not with accumulating the facts.
Vincent Beauvais
Bartholomew and Vincent Beauvais were very unscientific.
The Universities
Some monastic and cathedral schools popped up after Charlemagne's renaissance.
The Universities slowly arose over Europe to satisfy the new hunger for knowledge slowly awakened over the 8th-11th centuries.
Philosophy during the Medieval Interval
The cultural problem for the 13th century philosopher was to find a place for these this-worldly ends in a scheme of life that still had a basically otherworldly orientation. The success of Aquinas lies in solving this central problem.
There was virtually no philosophical development in the 8 centuries between Augustine and Aquinas, save for Boethius, Isidore of Seville and John Scotus Erigena.
John Scotus Erigena
John Scotus Erigena (ca. 810-877) was born in Ireland. He studied Greek in an Irish monastery at a time when Greek was nearly lost in all the west.
He travels to France in 847 and taught at Paris in the palace school that Charlemagne founded.
He was involved in deep theological topics like Free Will and the Eucharist. He avoided the extreme forms of predestination, but went too far and was condemned as a Pealagian. His views were condemned in 855. Then his views on the Eucharist were condemned (he denied the Doctrine of Transubstantiation)
He decided to take a safer task of translating Greek into Latin.
John Scotus Erigena was deeply concerned with synthesis. As a Christian, Erigena must have a synthesis, an overarching philosophy that fit with the Catholic dogma.
Nature
John began with the nature of reality.
He believed that things fall into two classes:
1) Things that are
2) Things that are not
Things that are not have different modes, they are modes of non-being
1) Sinful man
2) Changing particulars
3) Potential being
4) Things that are "beyond our intellect"
Things that are are those things that we can comprehend.
John Scotus Erigena's divisions are influence by Plato (most of the texts he translated were neoplatonic ones)
Like Plato and the Neoplatonists, John identified the form of the Good with God.
God
According to John, God is "beyond being" and thus, not to be. John had a problem in attempting to reconcile Neoplatonic metaphysics and Christian dogma.
John held that there were two ways for finite minds to approach God:
1) An affirmative way
2) A negative way
The affirmative way consists of stating things like God is being, God is good, etc. These assertions are neither wholly true nor wholly false.
Every positive or affirmative statement about God must be supplemented by a negative statement.
Instead of stating the negative and positive about God as "God is being and not-being" he stated then like "God is super being"
John Scotus Erigena believed that God was truly Good, but to say that God was good was misleading because it wasn't the whole truth.
Creation
John Scotus Erigena started with a paradox in dealing with creation. If God made the world He must move, but how can He who is immutable move?
John asserted that the concepts of making and creation (like the concepts of being and goodness) applied to God in only a metaphorical sense.
He also asserted that the transcendence of the the Creator and the dependence of the creature (Two vitally important Church doctrines) were contradictory.
Theophanies
John held the world to be a "theophany" of God (an appearance of God). It is not an illusion, but the chosen method of God to reveal Himself to man. Human minds are a part of this theophany and thus their understanding is a part of God's theophany.
Knowledge is Illumination
"Everything that exists is an aspect of the divine nature reflected from some perspective or other" (Jones, 179).
Knowledge is fundamentally an act of grace by God in which He illumines our mind.
Four-Fold Division of Nature
While nature is truly one and beyond being, the human mind divides and classifies as was God's intention. There are four divisions of nature:
1) God - the nature that creates and is uncreated
2) The Platonic archetypes - the nature that creates and is created
3) The Physical World - the nature that does not create and is created
4) God - The nature that does not create and is not created
"God issues into the world and returns from it to Himself" (Jones, 180).
God is not conscious until he creates His mind. The archetypes are the divine images of God. They do not exist independently. They are the divine mind.
The archetypes (primordial causes) are the sources of the essences of the particulars in the physical world.
The primordial causes are: goodness, being, life, wisdom, truth, intelligence, reason, virtue, justice, health, greatness, omnipotence, eternity and peace. While we view them as a plurality, they are really a unity.
Anything that exists in the physical world that is describable as one of these primordial causes is so because it takes part (a finite part) in them.
The physical world has being by participating in the various primordial substances.
Is John's view Christian?
There are some Neoplatonic interpretations of nature that readily fit within the framework of Catholic Christianity.
John's metaphysics is a rational system, but is in danger of collapsing into subjectivism and mysticism.
The mystic elements were too strong for a Christian standard at his time. A private mystical basis was not the solution the Church as an institution was looking for.
John's fourth level (not-created and non-creating) seems to destroy individuality. Man's eternal salvation is done through a return to God by all souls. It is not exactly Kosher with the Church. It is blasphemy and heresy.
John's neoplatonism also renders sin and evil as unreal.
John also had to interpret the Scriptures rather loosely.
He also used the writings of St. Dionysius the Areopagite as an almost canonical authority. Unfortunately, St. Dionysius the Areopagite was later shown to be a fake.
The Neoplatonic Problem
Neoplatonic metaphysics and Christian Dogma are antagonistic. The problem was to include some deeply entrenched Neoplatonic ideals of the Middle Ages into Christianity.
The Controversy over Universals
The thinkers of the 11th century were logicians, not metaphysicians. They focused their energy on two very technical problems:
1) The status of universals
2) the relation between the spheres of faith and reason
It was desirable, if only for pragmatic reasons, to prove the Christian truths.
Reason was an indispensable weapon agains infidels and heretics.
Men of the Middle Ages basically agreed there were three modes of cognition
1) Revelation
2) Reason
3) Perception
The problem of universals and the scope of faith and reason was (and is) an interrelated problem.
Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and Universals
(Originally written December 7, 2006 in Book 7)
History of Philosophy I notes
Duns Scotus (1265-1308)
-Prefers univocal regarding language applied to God
Scouts maintained that not only does God's essence play a role in his existence, but individual men's essences play a role in their existence.
Principle of individuation
-Aquinas claimed that matter was what gave individual things their individuality
-Scotus believed it was an individual essence or a "haecceity" that distinguished us from all other things, not mere matter
Natural Theology
- Far less confident in the power of reason to teach us about God then Aquinas was
- Scotus' standards of proof are much more rigorous than Aquinas' standards
Problem of Induction
-First to identify the problem
- His solution was to focus on the cause and effect and state that there is a certain necessity in causal relations
-His solution was satisfactory until David Hume
Freedom of the Will
-Aquinas held that the intellect was primary, not the will
-Scotus held that the will is primary
The will is:
1. Contingent - has the power of contrary choice
2. Self-caused - the will has no other cause than itself (like God
The self-caused will is an early version of the libertarian doctrine of the will
William of Ockham (ca. 1285 - 1349)
-Born in London
-Franciscan, just like Scotus
-Even more negative regarding natural theology than Scotus
-Faith contradicts reason, but we must follow faith
-Regarded omnipotence as God's power to do literally anything
-God could produce the world in such a way that he made it without any matter
-The object of our knowledge is particulars, but we use universals
-Generally he is regarded as a nominalist, but he could be called a conceptualist
-What is explained on X number of principles is needless explained by more (Ockham's razor)
-Other things being equal, the simpler explanation is better or preferred (Ockham's razor)
-Ockham's Razor was useful in the history of Philosophy and the history of Science
Summary of the thoughts on Universals
Schools of thought on Universals
1. Realism (Plato, Anselm, Augustine) - there are eternal ideas, otherwise we couldn't know general things.
Problem: Where are the ideas
2. Nominalism (Stoics, Sophists) - there are no universals, only particulars
Problem: Can't account for use of general terms or general ideas
3. Conceptualism (Peter Abelard, Locke, Berkeley) - Universals exist as mental concepts
History of Philosophy I notes
Duns Scotus (1265-1308)
-Prefers univocal regarding language applied to God
Scouts maintained that not only does God's essence play a role in his existence, but individual men's essences play a role in their existence.
Principle of individuation
-Aquinas claimed that matter was what gave individual things their individuality
-Scotus believed it was an individual essence or a "haecceity" that distinguished us from all other things, not mere matter
Natural Theology
- Far less confident in the power of reason to teach us about God then Aquinas was
- Scotus' standards of proof are much more rigorous than Aquinas' standards
Problem of Induction
-First to identify the problem
- His solution was to focus on the cause and effect and state that there is a certain necessity in causal relations
-His solution was satisfactory until David Hume
Freedom of the Will
-Aquinas held that the intellect was primary, not the will
-Scotus held that the will is primary
The will is:
1. Contingent - has the power of contrary choice
2. Self-caused - the will has no other cause than itself (like God
The self-caused will is an early version of the libertarian doctrine of the will
William of Ockham (ca. 1285 - 1349)
-Born in London
-Franciscan, just like Scotus
-Even more negative regarding natural theology than Scotus
-Faith contradicts reason, but we must follow faith
-Regarded omnipotence as God's power to do literally anything
-God could produce the world in such a way that he made it without any matter
-The object of our knowledge is particulars, but we use universals
-Generally he is regarded as a nominalist, but he could be called a conceptualist
-What is explained on X number of principles is needless explained by more (Ockham's razor)
-Other things being equal, the simpler explanation is better or preferred (Ockham's razor)
-Ockham's Razor was useful in the history of Philosophy and the history of Science
Summary of the thoughts on Universals
Schools of thought on Universals
1. Realism (Plato, Anselm, Augustine) - there are eternal ideas, otherwise we couldn't know general things.
Problem: Where are the ideas
2. Nominalism (Stoics, Sophists) - there are no universals, only particulars
Problem: Can't account for use of general terms or general ideas
3. Conceptualism (Peter Abelard, Locke, Berkeley) - Universals exist as mental concepts
William of Ockham
(Originally written December 7, 2006 in Book 7)
Classics of Philosophy 2nd Ed.
Louis P. Pojman
William of Ockham
-born in Ockham, England circa 1285
-Joined the Franciscan order
-Studied at Oxford
-Accused of heresy in 1324
-Fled to Munich to be protected by the Emperor Ludwig of Bavaria
-Best known for the 'Law of Parsimony' or 'Ockham's Razor' - we should always adopt the simpler explanation if we can
Ockham applied this to the problem of universals and particulars
He held that all there was was particulars or substances and that universal were unnecessary inventions.
He was an advocate of Nominalism. He has been viewed as the founder of that school of thought.
Summa Logicae
William of Ockham
Part 1:
Ch. 14: On the Universal
The term 'particular' has two senses:
1) A particular is that which is one and not many. Universals are actually particulars in this sense. Though they are represented in many things they are actually still one thing and not many.
2) A particular is that which one and not many and which cannot function as a sign of many.
Ockham holds that if we take the term 'universal' to mean that which is not one in number, then there is no such thing as a universal.
A universal is one particular thing and is only universal in signification.
There are two kinds of universals:
1) Universals by nature
2) Universals by convention (i.e. language)
Chapter 15: That the Universal is not a thing outside the mind
No universal is a particular substance.
1) Every substance is numerically one
2) There is no good reason why one substance should be a universal and not another
3) Therefore, no particular substance is a universal
1) If some substance is several things, then it is either several universal things or several particular things.
2) Either there will be an infinite regress to follow or it will be granted that no substance is a universal in a way that is incompatible with it being a particular too.
3) Therefore, no substance is a universal.
If universals were substances then no creation would happen.
After presenting his own argument to appeal to Aristotle who says that, "it is impossible that substance be something that can be predicated universally" (Pojman, 489).
Every universal is an invention of the mind. All propositions are composed of universals.
Ch. 16: Against Scotus' account of the universal
The view that universals and particulars differ only formally, not really is not a view Ockham endorses.
There can be no distinction in the mind if there is no distinction in reality.
There is no such thing as a formal distinction. All distinct things are really distinct.
Classics of Philosophy 2nd Ed.
Louis P. Pojman
William of Ockham
-born in Ockham, England circa 1285
-Joined the Franciscan order
-Studied at Oxford
-Accused of heresy in 1324
-Fled to Munich to be protected by the Emperor Ludwig of Bavaria
-Best known for the 'Law of Parsimony' or 'Ockham's Razor' - we should always adopt the simpler explanation if we can
Ockham applied this to the problem of universals and particulars
He held that all there was was particulars or substances and that universal were unnecessary inventions.
He was an advocate of Nominalism. He has been viewed as the founder of that school of thought.
Summa Logicae
William of Ockham
Part 1:
Ch. 14: On the Universal
The term 'particular' has two senses:
1) A particular is that which is one and not many. Universals are actually particulars in this sense. Though they are represented in many things they are actually still one thing and not many.
2) A particular is that which one and not many and which cannot function as a sign of many.
Ockham holds that if we take the term 'universal' to mean that which is not one in number, then there is no such thing as a universal.
A universal is one particular thing and is only universal in signification.
There are two kinds of universals:
1) Universals by nature
2) Universals by convention (i.e. language)
Chapter 15: That the Universal is not a thing outside the mind
No universal is a particular substance.
1) Every substance is numerically one
2) There is no good reason why one substance should be a universal and not another
3) Therefore, no particular substance is a universal
1) If some substance is several things, then it is either several universal things or several particular things.
2) Either there will be an infinite regress to follow or it will be granted that no substance is a universal in a way that is incompatible with it being a particular too.
3) Therefore, no substance is a universal.
If universals were substances then no creation would happen.
After presenting his own argument to appeal to Aristotle who says that, "it is impossible that substance be something that can be predicated universally" (Pojman, 489).
Every universal is an invention of the mind. All propositions are composed of universals.
Ch. 16: Against Scotus' account of the universal
The view that universals and particulars differ only formally, not really is not a view Ockham endorses.
There can be no distinction in the mind if there is no distinction in reality.
There is no such thing as a formal distinction. All distinct things are really distinct.
Wednesday, December 6, 2006
Introduction to Logic - Ch. 5b
(Originally written December 6, 2006 in Book 9)
Introduction to Logic
Harry J. Gensler
Chapter 5: Basic Quantificational Logic
Quantificational Logic concerned with arguments whose valid depends on "all", "no", "some", and similar notions.
5.1 Easier Translations
Ir - Romeo is Italian
Ix - x is Italian
(x)Ix - For all x, x is Italian
(∃x)Ix - For some x, x is Italian
Capital letters are used for general terms or categories.
Small letters are used for singular terms or specific things or particulars.
Introduction to Logic
Harry J. Gensler
Chapter 5: Basic Quantificational Logic
Quantificational Logic concerned with arguments whose valid depends on "all", "no", "some", and similar notions.
5.1 Easier Translations
Ir - Romeo is Italian
Ix - x is Italian
(x)Ix - For all x, x is Italian
(∃x)Ix - For some x, x is Italian
Capital letters are used for general terms or categories.
Small letters are used for singular terms or specific things or particulars.
- Single capital letters denote statements = S
- Capital letters followed by a small letter denote a general term = Ir
- Capital letters followed by two or more small letters denote a relation = Lrj
- a small letter can stand as either a constant or a variable
A quantifier is a sequence in the form of either:
1) (x)
2) (∃x)
(x) is a universal quantifier. It claims that the formula that follows is true for all values of x. i.e.
(x)Ix - for all x, x is Italian (All are Italian)
(∃x) is an existential quantifier. It claims that the formula that follows is true for at least one value of x. i.e.
(∃x)Ix - for some x, x is Italian. (Some are Italian)
English - Quantificational Language
all (every) - (x)
not all (not every) - ~(x)
some - (∃x)
no - ~(∃x)
All A is B - (x)(Ax⊃Bx)
Some A is B - (∃x)(Ax·Bx)
No A is B - ~(∃x)(Ax·Bx)
5.2 Easier Proofs
Reverse squiggle rule
~(x)Fx - (∃x)~Fx
~(∃x)Fx - (x)~Fx
Existential Instantiation
(∃x)Fx - Fa
The variable 'x' is substituted as the constant 'a'. 'a' is a hypothetical reality.
When there is more than one existential quantifier: i.e.
(∃x)Mx
(∃x)Fx
More than one hypothetical must be used: i.e.
(∃x)Mx - Ma
(∃x)Fx - Fb
Universal Instantiation
Since (x)Fx states all x is Fx any constant can be instantiated. Thus if a problem looks like this:
(x)Fx - Fa
(x)Rx - Ra
(x)Gx - Ga
(x)Lx - La
Since it is universal it is true (or false) for all.
In doing a proof the order now looks like this:
1. asm: the opposite of the conclusion
2. reverse squiggle
3. existential instantiation
4. universal instantiation
Notes on Taylor University Symphony Orchestra
(Originally written December 6, 2006 in Book 7)
1. Hector Berlioz's Rakoczy March
-Hungarian tune adapted for orchestra. Very good! But, a bit to horn heavy and too 'nice' to represent the ancient war hymn of the glorious Hungarian
2. Cape Breton Postcard - Catherine McMichael's Nova Scotian Folk, Gaelic Overtones
A. The Dawn - ho hum, nice use of the reverse cymbal, fiddle music not adapted well
B. The Mist - excellent violin solo at the front. The ethereal quality is much more refined in this piece's opening part then in the Dawn
The quality of the strings is vastly superior to that of the horns.
I like the "rain drum"
The wind section, especially the Oboe plays well.
C. The Thunder - Frantic, chaotic, not as crisp or clean as the short burst ought to be. Pizzicato section, a bass is noticeably absent. The ethereal, Gaelic quality was lost in this piece.
3. Christmas Concerto - Arcangelo Corelli
Baroque Composer
A. Vivace -Grave - sloppy opening
B. Allegro - absolutely gorgeous string section. Running bass line on cello. The violins come in exquisite in their high lines and trills. The stops and starts (common in Baroque) are much sharper
C. Allegro - Magnificent piece, a bit flat and dysjuncted in violin duet. Nailed it second time round.
4. Symphony Number 5 - Ludwig van Beethoven
A. Allegro con brio - played well, french horn struggled a bit, got it second time. Marvelous.
B. Andante con molto - sloppy string open. An open string shrills out. Who played that? Of course it was cellist (it was the A-Strong). The horns to the rescue! Wonderful trumpet/french horn countermelody. Strong ending.
C. Allegro (Scherzo)
Redemption for the French Horn. Love the build up, very powerful. Cellos were not in unison. Great bassoon line. Perfect tremolo from the violas in final build up.
Masterful ending.
D. Allegro - Triumphant, exuberant, inspiring finale.
1. Hector Berlioz's Rakoczy March
-Hungarian tune adapted for orchestra. Very good! But, a bit to horn heavy and too 'nice' to represent the ancient war hymn of the glorious Hungarian
2. Cape Breton Postcard - Catherine McMichael's Nova Scotian Folk, Gaelic Overtones
A. The Dawn - ho hum, nice use of the reverse cymbal, fiddle music not adapted well
B. The Mist - excellent violin solo at the front. The ethereal quality is much more refined in this piece's opening part then in the Dawn
The quality of the strings is vastly superior to that of the horns.
I like the "rain drum"
The wind section, especially the Oboe plays well.
C. The Thunder - Frantic, chaotic, not as crisp or clean as the short burst ought to be. Pizzicato section, a bass is noticeably absent. The ethereal, Gaelic quality was lost in this piece.
3. Christmas Concerto - Arcangelo Corelli
Baroque Composer
A. Vivace -Grave - sloppy opening
B. Allegro - absolutely gorgeous string section. Running bass line on cello. The violins come in exquisite in their high lines and trills. The stops and starts (common in Baroque) are much sharper
C. Allegro - Magnificent piece, a bit flat and dysjuncted in violin duet. Nailed it second time round.
4. Symphony Number 5 - Ludwig van Beethoven
A. Allegro con brio - played well, french horn struggled a bit, got it second time. Marvelous.
B. Andante con molto - sloppy string open. An open string shrills out. Who played that? Of course it was cellist (it was the A-Strong). The horns to the rescue! Wonderful trumpet/french horn countermelody. Strong ending.
C. Allegro (Scherzo)
Redemption for the French Horn. Love the build up, very powerful. Cellos were not in unison. Great bassoon line. Perfect tremolo from the violas in final build up.
Masterful ending.
D. Allegro - Triumphant, exuberant, inspiring finale.
Zagzebski and Gettier Problems
(Originally Written December 6, 2006 in Epistemology)
Zagzebski:
Gettier Problems:
Knowledge = Justified True Belief + ?? (no false belief, reliabilist element, indefeasibility, etc.)
The gap/independence of truth and justification between truth and justification.
2 Alternatives to escape Gettier Problems:
1. Eliminate the independence of justification/truth
2. Disconnect justification and truth
Knowledge is cognitive contact with reality arisiong from acts of intellectual virtue
Zagzebski:
Gettier Problems:
Knowledge = Justified True Belief + ?? (no false belief, reliabilist element, indefeasibility, etc.)
The gap/independence of truth and justification between truth and justification.
2 Alternatives to escape Gettier Problems:
1. Eliminate the independence of justification/truth
2. Disconnect justification and truth
Knowledge is cognitive contact with reality arisiong from acts of intellectual virtue
Tuesday, December 5, 2006
Class and Book notes on Aquinas
(Originally written December 5, 2006 in Book 7)
Classics of Philosophy 2nd Edition
Louis P. Pojman
Summa Theologica - Thomas Aquinas
Question LXXXV: The Mode and Order of Understanding
8 Points of inquiry
1. Whether our intellect understands by abstracting species from phantasms?
2. Whether the intelligible species abstracted are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
3. Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?
4. Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?
5. Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?
6. Whether the intellect can err?
7. Whether one intellect can understand the same thing better than another?
8. Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?
History of Philosophy I Notes
[Thomas Aquinas]
Problem of Divine Predication
1. Univocal use of language - same sense
-Riggs is a dog
-Shelby is a dog
2. Equivocal use of language - different sense
-The sun is a star
-Mel Gibson is a star
God is good. Matt is good. Is the term "good" used univocally or equivocally?
3. Analogical use of language
-The same sense in some degree but also in a different sense or degree
Immortality of the Soul
Soul is the form of the body (Aristotelian view)
Argument from desire:
All natural desires are capable of being fulfilled
We all naturally desire immortality
Therefore, immortality is capable of being fulfilled.
The soul is not dependent upon the body.
Aquinas' Psychology
The Soul has three main aspects:
1. Nutritive - nutrition, growth, reproduction
2. Sensitive - enables awareness via the senses
3. Rational - Reason and will (cognition and volition)
Aquinas' ethics
1. Happiness
- To know and contemplate God
- Complete union with God. Immediate, non discursive knowledge of God
Happiness is only possible in Heaven, but we should seek it in this life
2. Virtue
- an excellence, an act in accordance with reason, acquired by experience
Kinds of virtue
1. Moral
2. Intellectual
3. Ascetic - virtues of self-denial
4. Theological - Faith, Hope and Love
Aristotle only ascribed to Moral and Intellectual virtues
3. Law
- the ordinance of Reason for the common good, promulgated by one who has care of a community
Types of law
1. Eternal Law (governs the whole) - the sum of God's decrees
2. Natural law - that aspect of eternal law which we can know via reason
3. Divine Law - special commands given to us in Scripture
4. Human Law - man-made laws not in natural or divine law
Human laws are not necessarily moral laws. They are created merely to order society.
The first principle of Natural law is to seek the good.
Classics of Philosophy 2nd Edition
Louis P. Pojman
Summa Theologica - Thomas Aquinas
Question LXXXV: The Mode and Order of Understanding
8 Points of inquiry
1. Whether our intellect understands by abstracting species from phantasms?
2. Whether the intelligible species abstracted are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
3. Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?
4. Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?
5. Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?
6. Whether the intellect can err?
7. Whether one intellect can understand the same thing better than another?
8. Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?
History of Philosophy I Notes
[Thomas Aquinas]
Problem of Divine Predication
1. Univocal use of language - same sense
-Riggs is a dog
-Shelby is a dog
2. Equivocal use of language - different sense
-The sun is a star
-Mel Gibson is a star
God is good. Matt is good. Is the term "good" used univocally or equivocally?
3. Analogical use of language
-The same sense in some degree but also in a different sense or degree
Immortality of the Soul
Soul is the form of the body (Aristotelian view)
Argument from desire:
All natural desires are capable of being fulfilled
We all naturally desire immortality
Therefore, immortality is capable of being fulfilled.
The soul is not dependent upon the body.
Aquinas' Psychology
The Soul has three main aspects:
1. Nutritive - nutrition, growth, reproduction
2. Sensitive - enables awareness via the senses
3. Rational - Reason and will (cognition and volition)
Aquinas' ethics
1. Happiness
- To know and contemplate God
- Complete union with God. Immediate, non discursive knowledge of God
Happiness is only possible in Heaven, but we should seek it in this life
2. Virtue
- an excellence, an act in accordance with reason, acquired by experience
Kinds of virtue
1. Moral
2. Intellectual
3. Ascetic - virtues of self-denial
4. Theological - Faith, Hope and Love
Aristotle only ascribed to Moral and Intellectual virtues
3. Law
- the ordinance of Reason for the common good, promulgated by one who has care of a community
Types of law
1. Eternal Law (governs the whole) - the sum of God's decrees
2. Natural law - that aspect of eternal law which we can know via reason
3. Divine Law - special commands given to us in Scripture
4. Human Law - man-made laws not in natural or divine law
Human laws are not necessarily moral laws. They are created merely to order society.
The first principle of Natural law is to seek the good.
Gettier & Reliabilism - Zagzebski
(Originally written December 5, 2006 in Book 12)
A person is praiseworthy (justified) for doing an act (having a belief) if it is what a virtuous person probably would do (or believe).
A right act is what a person with phronesis might do. A wrong act is what a person with phronesis would likely not do.
A moral duty is what a person with phronesis would do in specific circumstances.
A justified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, might believe.
An unjustified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, would not believe.
Epistemic duty is what the person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and possesses understanding would believe in a specific situation.
"A belief is an epistemic duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified not to believe it... A belief is an epistemic duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified to disbelieve it" (Zagzebski, 242).
"An act is a moral duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong not to do it. An act is a moral duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong to choose to reject it" (Zagzebski, 243).
A justified belief is what some one with phronesis might believe.
An unjustified belief is what someone with phronesis would not believe.
A belief is a duty when a person with phronesis would believe.
6.2 Acts of Virtue
An act is an act of virtue if it rises out of the motivational component of the virtue, it is something a person with that virtue would do, and it is successful in bringing the end of that specific virtue to fruition.
Part III - The nature of knowledge
2.1 The definition
An act of intellectual virtue is an act that arises out of the motivational component of that virtue, is something a person with that virtue would probably do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the ends of that virtue, and causes the agent to acquire a true belief (cognitive contact with reality)
Definition 1 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 270).
Definition 2 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Definition 3 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Gettier Problems:
The problem for justified true belief theories
"Gettier problems arise when it is only by chance that a justified true belief is true" (Zagzebski, 283).
The Gettier problem has forced knowledge to see one of two things:
1) Justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge and must have an extra component to make it sufficient
2) Justification must be reconciled to make it sufficient
Zagzebski sees both choices as inadequate because neither can escape the Gettier problem.
Internalism and externalism both suffer from the Gettier problem.
Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is an example of a Gettier problem when there is no problem internally, but something causes a false belief, but somehow it is still true.
Reliablism also faces the Getteir problem, in spite of what Alvin Plantinga states.
True beliefs can arise accidentally and thus we have Gettier problems.
Plantinga argues that knowledge is had when the belief warrants it.
Warranty admits degrees, but either the warrant is or is not sufficient for knowledge.
Undefeatable justified belief is immune to Gettier problems because undefeatability entails truth.
Strong defensibility conditions however threaten the assumption of independence of the justification condition and the truth condition for knowledge.
Truth conditions for knowledge must be entailed by the other conditions.
Nearly every contemporary theory of knowledge analyzes knowledge as true belief that is justified or warranted.
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory
Zagzebski states that there are moral analogues of the Gettier problem. She says that a moral act can be performed but it not be virtuous it is moral luck, just like Gettier justified true beef's are epistemic luck.
"Gettier problems in virtue epistemology can be resolved by an analogous move" (Zagzebski, 296).
In Gettier cases the truth is reached by accident. In moral luck cases the right act is done by accident.
"Gettier problems can be avoided if we utilize the concept of an act of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 297).
Acts of intellectual virtues are strictly analogous to acts of moral virtue.
Acts of moral virtue are strongly right in a moral sense; acts of intellectual virtue are strongly justified.
The definition, "knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" is immune to Gettier problems.
4. Reliablisim
Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a combination of externalist and internalist combinations.
Laurence BonJour would call Zagzebski's theory an externalist one. BonJour calls any theory externalism when some of the justifying factors are external to the agent.
Zagzebski claims that her hybrid theory sets it apart from more radical externalist theories like Plantinga's reliablist proper function theory.
Objections to Reliablism
Purely externalist theories imply that the only thing valuable in an instance of knowledge is the value of the truth that is acquired.
Reliablism does not give sufficient conditions for knowing.
Knowledge has more value than true belief.
The value must lie in something in addition to the value of truth and in addition to the reliable mechanism for acquiring true belief.
A person is praiseworthy (justified) for doing an act (having a belief) if it is what a virtuous person probably would do (or believe).
A right act is what a person with phronesis might do. A wrong act is what a person with phronesis would likely not do.
A moral duty is what a person with phronesis would do in specific circumstances.
A justified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, might believe.
An unjustified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, would not believe.
Epistemic duty is what the person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and possesses understanding would believe in a specific situation.
"A belief is an epistemic duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified not to believe it... A belief is an epistemic duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified to disbelieve it" (Zagzebski, 242).
"An act is a moral duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong not to do it. An act is a moral duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong to choose to reject it" (Zagzebski, 243).
A justified belief is what some one with phronesis might believe.
An unjustified belief is what someone with phronesis would not believe.
A belief is a duty when a person with phronesis would believe.
6.2 Acts of Virtue
An act is an act of virtue if it rises out of the motivational component of the virtue, it is something a person with that virtue would do, and it is successful in bringing the end of that specific virtue to fruition.
Part III - The nature of knowledge
2.1 The definition
An act of intellectual virtue is an act that arises out of the motivational component of that virtue, is something a person with that virtue would probably do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the ends of that virtue, and causes the agent to acquire a true belief (cognitive contact with reality)
Definition 1 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 270).
Definition 2 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Definition 3 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Gettier Problems:
The problem for justified true belief theories
"Gettier problems arise when it is only by chance that a justified true belief is true" (Zagzebski, 283).
The Gettier problem has forced knowledge to see one of two things:
1) Justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge and must have an extra component to make it sufficient
2) Justification must be reconciled to make it sufficient
Zagzebski sees both choices as inadequate because neither can escape the Gettier problem.
Internalism and externalism both suffer from the Gettier problem.
Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is an example of a Gettier problem when there is no problem internally, but something causes a false belief, but somehow it is still true.
Reliablism also faces the Getteir problem, in spite of what Alvin Plantinga states.
True beliefs can arise accidentally and thus we have Gettier problems.
Plantinga argues that knowledge is had when the belief warrants it.
Warranty admits degrees, but either the warrant is or is not sufficient for knowledge.
Undefeatable justified belief is immune to Gettier problems because undefeatability entails truth.
Strong defensibility conditions however threaten the assumption of independence of the justification condition and the truth condition for knowledge.
Truth conditions for knowledge must be entailed by the other conditions.
Nearly every contemporary theory of knowledge analyzes knowledge as true belief that is justified or warranted.
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory
Zagzebski states that there are moral analogues of the Gettier problem. She says that a moral act can be performed but it not be virtuous it is moral luck, just like Gettier justified true beef's are epistemic luck.
"Gettier problems in virtue epistemology can be resolved by an analogous move" (Zagzebski, 296).
In Gettier cases the truth is reached by accident. In moral luck cases the right act is done by accident.
"Gettier problems can be avoided if we utilize the concept of an act of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 297).
Acts of intellectual virtues are strictly analogous to acts of moral virtue.
Acts of moral virtue are strongly right in a moral sense; acts of intellectual virtue are strongly justified.
The definition, "knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" is immune to Gettier problems.
4. Reliablisim
Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a combination of externalist and internalist combinations.
Laurence BonJour would call Zagzebski's theory an externalist one. BonJour calls any theory externalism when some of the justifying factors are external to the agent.
Zagzebski claims that her hybrid theory sets it apart from more radical externalist theories like Plantinga's reliablist proper function theory.
Objections to Reliablism
Purely externalist theories imply that the only thing valuable in an instance of knowledge is the value of the truth that is acquired.
Reliablism does not give sufficient conditions for knowing.
Knowledge has more value than true belief.
The value must lie in something in addition to the value of truth and in addition to the reliable mechanism for acquiring true belief.
Monday, December 4, 2006
Zagzebski's definition of knowledge
(Originally written December 4, 2006 in Epistemology)
Zagzebski:
Justified belief - something that an Intellectually virtuous person might believe
Epistemic duty - something that an intellectually virtuous person would believe
Justified belief mirrors a right act. Epistemic duty mirrors a moral duty.
Criteria for a definition of knowledge:
- Not too rigorous nor too relaxed
- Practically useful
Knowledge - a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue
Knowledge - a true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue
Advantages of Zagzebski's approach:
1. Avoids epistemic atomism
Zagzebski:
Justified belief - something that an Intellectually virtuous person might believe
Epistemic duty - something that an intellectually virtuous person would believe
Justified belief mirrors a right act. Epistemic duty mirrors a moral duty.
Criteria for a definition of knowledge:
- Not too rigorous nor too relaxed
- Practically useful
Knowledge - a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue
Knowledge - a true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue
Advantages of Zagzebski's approach:
1. Avoids epistemic atomism
Sunday, December 3, 2006
Intellectual Virtues - Zagzebski
(Originally written December 3, 2006 in Book 12)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
4: The two components of intellectual virtues
Each virtue is definable only in terms of its corresponding motivation.
4.1 The motivation for knowledge and reliable success
A distinction between moral and intellectual virtues can be made on their motivational basis.
Intellectual virtues are motivated by motivation for knowledge.
4.1.1 The motivation for knowledge
Hobbes and Spinoza connected the intellectual virtues with the passions and connected them all with a single motivation: self-preservation or power.
The motivation for knowledge is not a basic motive, it is a form of the motivation for power (Hobbes).
Hobbes states that cognitive virtues/vices arise from differences in motivation.
Deficiency in the desire for truth leads to cognitive vices like dogmatism (Ralph Waldo Emerson).
Hobbes implies that excess in desire for truth also leads to cognitive vices.
John Dewey believes that we ought to cultivate attitudes to foster better motivation to think more effectively.
Hilary Kornblith and Laurence BonJour introduced a motivational element into the notion of epistemic responsibility. Kornbluth stated, "An epistemically responsible agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have his beliefs produced by processes which lead to true beliefs, his actions are guided by these desires" (Zagzebski, 174).
James Montmarquet connected a large set of intellectual virtues with the desire for truth.
Montmarquet calls the desire for truth "epistemic conscientiousness" and claims that some intellectual virtues are out of this desire.
4.1.2 The success component of the intellectual virtues.
Ok, it's 2:30 am. I have a 1500-2000 word essay due at 9:00 am on pgs. 232-282. I'm on page 176. I'm screwed. I had such an emotional drain. I lost my wedding ring and then we spent hours looking for it. Thank God somebody found it.
Contemporary epistemology has focused extensively on the concept of a truth conducive belief-forming process.
There is a weak connection between motive and success. John Dewey made notice of it.
Intellectual virtues arise from and serve the motivation to know the truth and are crucial in activities like the arts, crafts and games.
The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues and the distinction between intellectual and practical virtues are both artificial.
Amelie Rarty pointed out that the utility and success of intellectual virtues depend on their becoming habits, but habits can become pathological and idiotic.
The motivation for intellectual virtue involves a desire for possessing true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs.
The reliabilist theory of truth-conduciveness focuses on it as a function of the number of true beliefs and on the proportion of true to false beliefs.
Zagzebski points out that processes that put forth a high percentage of false beliefs can still be truth-conducive if that process leads to a new way of discovering truth.
Self-correction is essential in Zagzebski's truth-conduciveness theory.
C.S. Pierce claims that the Scientific Method operates under a truth-conducive theory similar to Zagzebski's model.
4.1.3 Montmarquet on the virtues and truth conduciveness
Are intellectual virtues knowledge conducive?
"The motivation to know leads to the motivation to act in intellectually virtuous ways" (Zagzebski, 185).
Montmarquet objects to [the motion that intellectual virtues are truth conducive and intellectual vices are not] because:
1) Some intellectual virtues may not be truth conducive even though they would be desired by persons who love the truth
2) Some intellectual virtues not only seem to fail to lead to truth but aren't associated with the desire for truth
3) The history of ideas does not fit with this
4) some vices may arise out of desire for knowledge
5) Some intellectual vices appear to be truth conducive
I'm going to skip to what I need right now. Pg. 187-231 need to be read still.
pg 232 - This is a quick, not through reading
6. The definition of Deontic Concepts
Acts and beliefs arise from moral and intellectual traits
An act is right because it is the sort of act a virtuous person might do according to pure virtue-theory.
6.1 Right acts, justified beliefs
"A right act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, might do in like circumstances. A wrong act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would not do in like circumstances. A moral duty is what a person who is virtuously motivated and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would do in like circumstances. That is to say, some thing is a duty if and only if it is wrong not to do it" (Zagzebski, 235)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
4: The two components of intellectual virtues
Each virtue is definable only in terms of its corresponding motivation.
4.1 The motivation for knowledge and reliable success
A distinction between moral and intellectual virtues can be made on their motivational basis.
Intellectual virtues are motivated by motivation for knowledge.
4.1.1 The motivation for knowledge
Hobbes and Spinoza connected the intellectual virtues with the passions and connected them all with a single motivation: self-preservation or power.
The motivation for knowledge is not a basic motive, it is a form of the motivation for power (Hobbes).
Hobbes states that cognitive virtues/vices arise from differences in motivation.
Deficiency in the desire for truth leads to cognitive vices like dogmatism (Ralph Waldo Emerson).
Hobbes implies that excess in desire for truth also leads to cognitive vices.
John Dewey believes that we ought to cultivate attitudes to foster better motivation to think more effectively.
Hilary Kornblith and Laurence BonJour introduced a motivational element into the notion of epistemic responsibility. Kornbluth stated, "An epistemically responsible agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have his beliefs produced by processes which lead to true beliefs, his actions are guided by these desires" (Zagzebski, 174).
James Montmarquet connected a large set of intellectual virtues with the desire for truth.
Montmarquet calls the desire for truth "epistemic conscientiousness" and claims that some intellectual virtues are out of this desire.
4.1.2 The success component of the intellectual virtues.
Ok, it's 2:30 am. I have a 1500-2000 word essay due at 9:00 am on pgs. 232-282. I'm on page 176. I'm screwed. I had such an emotional drain. I lost my wedding ring and then we spent hours looking for it. Thank God somebody found it.
Contemporary epistemology has focused extensively on the concept of a truth conducive belief-forming process.
There is a weak connection between motive and success. John Dewey made notice of it.
Intellectual virtues arise from and serve the motivation to know the truth and are crucial in activities like the arts, crafts and games.
The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues and the distinction between intellectual and practical virtues are both artificial.
Amelie Rarty pointed out that the utility and success of intellectual virtues depend on their becoming habits, but habits can become pathological and idiotic.
The motivation for intellectual virtue involves a desire for possessing true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs.
The reliabilist theory of truth-conduciveness focuses on it as a function of the number of true beliefs and on the proportion of true to false beliefs.
Zagzebski points out that processes that put forth a high percentage of false beliefs can still be truth-conducive if that process leads to a new way of discovering truth.
Self-correction is essential in Zagzebski's truth-conduciveness theory.
C.S. Pierce claims that the Scientific Method operates under a truth-conducive theory similar to Zagzebski's model.
4.1.3 Montmarquet on the virtues and truth conduciveness
Are intellectual virtues knowledge conducive?
"The motivation to know leads to the motivation to act in intellectually virtuous ways" (Zagzebski, 185).
Montmarquet objects to [the motion that intellectual virtues are truth conducive and intellectual vices are not] because:
1) Some intellectual virtues may not be truth conducive even though they would be desired by persons who love the truth
2) Some intellectual virtues not only seem to fail to lead to truth but aren't associated with the desire for truth
3) The history of ideas does not fit with this
4) some vices may arise out of desire for knowledge
5) Some intellectual vices appear to be truth conducive
I'm going to skip to what I need right now. Pg. 187-231 need to be read still.
pg 232 - This is a quick, not through reading
6. The definition of Deontic Concepts
Acts and beliefs arise from moral and intellectual traits
An act is right because it is the sort of act a virtuous person might do according to pure virtue-theory.
6.1 Right acts, justified beliefs
"A right act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, might do in like circumstances. A wrong act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would not do in like circumstances. A moral duty is what a person who is virtuously motivated and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would do in like circumstances. That is to say, some thing is a duty if and only if it is wrong not to do it" (Zagzebski, 235)
Virtues of the Mind - Ch. 3
(Originally written December 3, 2006 in Book 12)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
3. Intellectual and Moral Virtues
3.1 Aristotle's distinction between intellectual and moral virtues
The human cognitive and feeling processes are regarded as distinct and relatively autonomous by Western Philosophers.
Many Western Philosophers have aimed for what Michael Stocker calls a "purified view of the intellect" despite Philosophers like Hume and James showing the connection between feelings/emotions and cognition.
Few philosophers have openly denied Aristotle's division of feelings and cognition.
Spinoza was an exception, he connected the passions and virtue via the ideas of God. No one have unified intellectual and moral virtue like Spinoza.
David Hume insisted that the difference between moral and intellectual virtues was merely verbal. But, Hume's notion of virtue was broader than most other philosophers.
Zagzebski holds that Aristotle's distinction between virtues and other capacities is an important one; but, his division of moral and intellectual virtue is not an important one.
Aristotle divides intellectual virtues into two classes:
1) Art (techne) - theoretical knowledge
2) Practical wisdom (phronesis) - practical knowledge
Aristotle links the two different types of virtues to the two parts of the soul.
The thinking part of the soul commands and the feelings part obeys.
Pascal saw being full of faults as being an evil, but it was worse to be full of faults and unwilling to recognize it.
Self-love weakens the love of truth and leads to self-deception, hypocrisy and other intellectual vices.
"Feelings are involved in intellectual virtues, and intellectual virtues are involved in handling feelings" (Zagzebski, 148).
In addition to distinguishing intellectual virtues from moral ones on the ground that intellectual virtues regulate feelings (an inadequate argument), Aristotle distinguishes them on the basis of how they are acquired.
He holds that intellectual virtues can be taught, whereas moral virtues can only be acquired by practice and training.
Zagzebski holds that both intellectual and moral virtues are learned in stages.
Young people do not possess virtues or vices. We do not start with vice and work up to a virtue.
William James held that it is bad to be too doubtful and too uncritical in holding a belief. He held that the virtue lies in the mean between the two.
Intellectual akrasia (weakness) is higher than a vice. It exists when one knows the good, but does not intellectually actualize it.
Above akrasia is intellectual self-control. This is not a virtue, but it is knowing the bad and not doing it.
Intellectual and moral states (higher to lower)
1) Virtue
2) Self-Control
3) Akrasia
4) Vice
Zagzebski hold that the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is a real one. She argues that because a person can possess intellectual virtues but no moral virtues (and vice-versa) the distinction is real and not linguistic as Hume and Spinoza held.
Both intellectual and moral virtues are acquired in the same fashion. They both require training and imitation.
Both involve feelings and require one to act virtuously. Both have the states virtue, self-control, akrasia and vice.
3.2 Some connections between intellectual and moral virtues
Zagzebski argues that no-one has offered adequate reason to think moral and intellectual virtues differ any more than one moral virtue differs from another.
The two types of virtue are similar in their natures, similarly acquired and are intimately connected in their operation.
There are logical and causal connections between moral and intellectual virtues.
Moral virtues logically entail some intellectual virtues.
Moral vices can causally inhibit the acquisition of intellectual virtues.
Intellectual failures can be caused by moral failures.
Some virtues have both an intellectual and moral form (i.e. trust and autonomy)
Francis Bacon and John Locke associate intellectual failings with the passions and moral vices.
Francis Bacon states that human understanding is infused by desire and emotion.
Bacon states that there are four types of error in belief formation (he calls the errors 'idols')
1) Idols of the tribe: "The human understanding is like an uneven mirror that cannot truly reflect the rays from objects, but distorts and corrupts the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it (aphorism 41)" (Zagzebski, 164).
2) Idols of the cave: these come from every individual's particularisms, from education, habits and chance
3) Idols of the marketplace: language dictates reason, when reason ought to dictate language. Sometimes language can make philosophy sophistical and inactive.
4) Idols of the theater: errors of this sort come from the fashions of the day. These trends in theology and philosophy can be used to make theory better than truth
Locke's explanation of error comes from his classification of types of men:
1) Those who do not think independently
2) Those who use passion instead of reason as a substitute
3) Those who follow reason, but only seek one source for information and tat source corroborates their opinions
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
3. Intellectual and Moral Virtues
3.1 Aristotle's distinction between intellectual and moral virtues
The human cognitive and feeling processes are regarded as distinct and relatively autonomous by Western Philosophers.
Many Western Philosophers have aimed for what Michael Stocker calls a "purified view of the intellect" despite Philosophers like Hume and James showing the connection between feelings/emotions and cognition.
Few philosophers have openly denied Aristotle's division of feelings and cognition.
Spinoza was an exception, he connected the passions and virtue via the ideas of God. No one have unified intellectual and moral virtue like Spinoza.
David Hume insisted that the difference between moral and intellectual virtues was merely verbal. But, Hume's notion of virtue was broader than most other philosophers.
Zagzebski holds that Aristotle's distinction between virtues and other capacities is an important one; but, his division of moral and intellectual virtue is not an important one.
Aristotle divides intellectual virtues into two classes:
1) Art (techne) - theoretical knowledge
2) Practical wisdom (phronesis) - practical knowledge
Aristotle links the two different types of virtues to the two parts of the soul.
The thinking part of the soul commands and the feelings part obeys.
Pascal saw being full of faults as being an evil, but it was worse to be full of faults and unwilling to recognize it.
Self-love weakens the love of truth and leads to self-deception, hypocrisy and other intellectual vices.
"Feelings are involved in intellectual virtues, and intellectual virtues are involved in handling feelings" (Zagzebski, 148).
In addition to distinguishing intellectual virtues from moral ones on the ground that intellectual virtues regulate feelings (an inadequate argument), Aristotle distinguishes them on the basis of how they are acquired.
He holds that intellectual virtues can be taught, whereas moral virtues can only be acquired by practice and training.
Zagzebski holds that both intellectual and moral virtues are learned in stages.
Young people do not possess virtues or vices. We do not start with vice and work up to a virtue.
William James held that it is bad to be too doubtful and too uncritical in holding a belief. He held that the virtue lies in the mean between the two.
Intellectual akrasia (weakness) is higher than a vice. It exists when one knows the good, but does not intellectually actualize it.
Above akrasia is intellectual self-control. This is not a virtue, but it is knowing the bad and not doing it.
Intellectual and moral states (higher to lower)
1) Virtue
2) Self-Control
3) Akrasia
4) Vice
Zagzebski hold that the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is a real one. She argues that because a person can possess intellectual virtues but no moral virtues (and vice-versa) the distinction is real and not linguistic as Hume and Spinoza held.
Both intellectual and moral virtues are acquired in the same fashion. They both require training and imitation.
Both involve feelings and require one to act virtuously. Both have the states virtue, self-control, akrasia and vice.
3.2 Some connections between intellectual and moral virtues
Zagzebski argues that no-one has offered adequate reason to think moral and intellectual virtues differ any more than one moral virtue differs from another.
The two types of virtue are similar in their natures, similarly acquired and are intimately connected in their operation.
There are logical and causal connections between moral and intellectual virtues.
Moral virtues logically entail some intellectual virtues.
Moral vices can causally inhibit the acquisition of intellectual virtues.
Intellectual failures can be caused by moral failures.
Some virtues have both an intellectual and moral form (i.e. trust and autonomy)
Francis Bacon and John Locke associate intellectual failings with the passions and moral vices.
Francis Bacon states that human understanding is infused by desire and emotion.
Bacon states that there are four types of error in belief formation (he calls the errors 'idols')
1) Idols of the tribe: "The human understanding is like an uneven mirror that cannot truly reflect the rays from objects, but distorts and corrupts the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it (aphorism 41)" (Zagzebski, 164).
2) Idols of the cave: these come from every individual's particularisms, from education, habits and chance
3) Idols of the marketplace: language dictates reason, when reason ought to dictate language. Sometimes language can make philosophy sophistical and inactive.
4) Idols of the theater: errors of this sort come from the fashions of the day. These trends in theology and philosophy can be used to make theory better than truth
Locke's explanation of error comes from his classification of types of men:
1) Those who do not think independently
2) Those who use passion instead of reason as a substitute
3) Those who follow reason, but only seek one source for information and tat source corroborates their opinions
Saturday, December 2, 2006
What a Virtue is - Zagzebski
(Originally written December 2, 2006 in Book 12)
Virtues of the Mind continued...
Happy Birthday Dad!
Sudden, radical change of character cannot foster virtue. "Conversion does not produce instant virtue" (Zagzebski, 123).
Creativity and originality as a virtue is problematic for the theory of virtue acquisition by habit.
Thoroughly original people may have the same virtues as other people, but these virtues may be completely different.
??What??
"Virtues are traits that are vitally connected with a person's identity" (Zagzebski, 125).
Virtue is the result of moral work performed by the virtue's possessor. The moral work is done through habituation.
2.6 Virtues, feelings and motivations
Both virtues and feelings are states of the soul.
Aristotle distinguishes feelings (pathe) from virtues in 2 ways:
1. We don't praise/reproach men for their feelings
2. Virtues are modes of choice or involve choice
Neither of these two arguments is very convincing.
Response to 1: Hatred, envy, bitterness, etc. are blamable feelings regardless of the circumstances and love, sympathy, compassion, etc. are praiseworthy feelings.
Response to 2: It is too strong to state that virtues are modes of choice. Neither feelings nor virtues are direct results of choice, but both are effected by choice or series of choices.
Virtues are voluntary in a way that a habit is voluntary, not the way an act is voluntary.
Feelings and virtues are not the same, but not because of Aristotle's arguments. Virtues are not feelings because feelings are like acts in that they occur at a specific time.
Virtues may not be feelings, but nearly every moral philosopher has connected the two.
Most philosophers have seen emotions/feelings as bad, in that they cloud practical judgment.
Many view virtues as a way to avoid a negative, not as a way to produce a positive.
Philippa Foot holds motives as a form of emotion that is action-guiding.
Zagzebski sees motive as the point where we see the connection between virtues and feelings/emotions.
Motive is more than an aim or a desire. A motive has a bit of desire for "X" in it, but also includes why "X" is desired. Emotions are frequently felt, but differ from mere sensations.
"A 'motive' in the sense relevant to an inquiry into virtue is an emotion or feeling that initiates and directs action towards an end" (Zagzebski, 131).
Motives are emotions that are nearly constantly in effect, doing their work at moderate or weak levels of intensity.
Motives drive behavior
Motivation is a "persistent tendency to be moved by a motive of a certain kind" (Zagzebski, 132).
Each individual virtue is a sort of motivation to itself.
Virtue possession requires success in obtaining the ends of the motivational component of virtue.
Virtue involves knowledge and understanding in its particular area; a virtuous person cannot be systematically wrong in their judgment.
2.7 General account of virtue
It is difficult to distinguish virtues from feelings and to give a full account of virtue theory because the language is ambiguous and inadequate.
A virtue is:
1) An acquired excellence of the soul in a deep and lasting sense. A vice is an acquired defect of the soul.
2) Virtue (vice) is acquired by work of the possessor
3) Virtue is not simply a skill
4) Virtue has a component of motivation
5) Virtue is a success term
6) Virtue requires knowledge of some nonmoral facts about the world
Virtue's motivation component much reach its end, thus becoming a success term. But, to do so it must use knowledge of nonmoral facts.
A virtue has two main elements:
1) A motivational element
2) An element of reliable success in achieving the ends of said motivational element
A virtue is "a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end" (Zagzebski, 137).
Virtues of the Mind continued...
Happy Birthday Dad!
Sudden, radical change of character cannot foster virtue. "Conversion does not produce instant virtue" (Zagzebski, 123).
Creativity and originality as a virtue is problematic for the theory of virtue acquisition by habit.
Thoroughly original people may have the same virtues as other people, but these virtues may be completely different.
??What??
"Virtues are traits that are vitally connected with a person's identity" (Zagzebski, 125).
Virtue is the result of moral work performed by the virtue's possessor. The moral work is done through habituation.
2.6 Virtues, feelings and motivations
Both virtues and feelings are states of the soul.
Aristotle distinguishes feelings (pathe) from virtues in 2 ways:
1. We don't praise/reproach men for their feelings
2. Virtues are modes of choice or involve choice
Neither of these two arguments is very convincing.
Response to 1: Hatred, envy, bitterness, etc. are blamable feelings regardless of the circumstances and love, sympathy, compassion, etc. are praiseworthy feelings.
Response to 2: It is too strong to state that virtues are modes of choice. Neither feelings nor virtues are direct results of choice, but both are effected by choice or series of choices.
Virtues are voluntary in a way that a habit is voluntary, not the way an act is voluntary.
Feelings and virtues are not the same, but not because of Aristotle's arguments. Virtues are not feelings because feelings are like acts in that they occur at a specific time.
Virtues may not be feelings, but nearly every moral philosopher has connected the two.
Most philosophers have seen emotions/feelings as bad, in that they cloud practical judgment.
Many view virtues as a way to avoid a negative, not as a way to produce a positive.
Philippa Foot holds motives as a form of emotion that is action-guiding.
Zagzebski sees motive as the point where we see the connection between virtues and feelings/emotions.
Motive is more than an aim or a desire. A motive has a bit of desire for "X" in it, but also includes why "X" is desired. Emotions are frequently felt, but differ from mere sensations.
"A 'motive' in the sense relevant to an inquiry into virtue is an emotion or feeling that initiates and directs action towards an end" (Zagzebski, 131).
Motives are emotions that are nearly constantly in effect, doing their work at moderate or weak levels of intensity.
Motives drive behavior
Motivation is a "persistent tendency to be moved by a motive of a certain kind" (Zagzebski, 132).
Each individual virtue is a sort of motivation to itself.
Virtue possession requires success in obtaining the ends of the motivational component of virtue.
Virtue involves knowledge and understanding in its particular area; a virtuous person cannot be systematically wrong in their judgment.
2.7 General account of virtue
It is difficult to distinguish virtues from feelings and to give a full account of virtue theory because the language is ambiguous and inadequate.
A virtue is:
1) An acquired excellence of the soul in a deep and lasting sense. A vice is an acquired defect of the soul.
2) Virtue (vice) is acquired by work of the possessor
3) Virtue is not simply a skill
4) Virtue has a component of motivation
5) Virtue is a success term
6) Virtue requires knowledge of some nonmoral facts about the world
Virtue's motivation component much reach its end, thus becoming a success term. But, to do so it must use knowledge of nonmoral facts.
A virtue has two main elements:
1) A motivational element
2) An element of reliable success in achieving the ends of said motivational element
A virtue is "a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end" (Zagzebski, 137).
Friday, December 1, 2006
Epistemic Thoughts - What was I talking about?
(Originally written December 1, 2006 in Book 7)
What is epistemology? It is the study of knowledge.
What is knowledge? A justified true belief? What does that even mean?
How are beliefs and knowledge related? To know something is not to believe something. So why do we associate the two in epistemology?
To discuss epistemology we may have to reinvent the wheel here. Though, the way I see epistemology, the wheel is more like an oval and the whole unit of epistemology is sort of hobbling, bouncing along.
First, we must identify the subject of epistemology, which is knowledge.
Second, we must differentiate knowledge from belief and show how the two are related as brother and sister, not as mother and daughter. A belief does not give birth to a knowledge, but that doesn't mean I can't have a belief and a knowledge about 'X'.
Belief and knowledge are complimentary but not identical. Nor does belief + X equal knowledge. The two are separate realms.
Example 1 - Baseball
I know that baseball exists. I have empirical evidence for it. I have played it (experiential knowledge) I have seen it, and I have pondered about it.
I believe that baseball is a superior sport to basketball and football. I do not have strong empirical evidence for it. I could explain why the art of a sacrifice bunt is more skillful then tackling a runner or dunking a basketball, but that is pure subjective conjecture.
Here we have one difference already. Experiential knowledge (knowing via experience) is empirical, but belief (value judgments) are subjective.
Now there are many types of beliefs and many types of knowledge, so showing one type of knowledge is not synonymous with one type of belief and does not prove my pint, it merely gives us a starting point.
Now, there is a similarity between experiential knowledge and value judgment beliefs: they are both possessed by an agent (me) and they both correspond to something external to this agent (baseball). What is the relationship of the internal possessions of an agent to external realities?
Does baseball cause my belief or knowledge? Does my belief or knowledge cause baseball? Is there a causal relationship at all? is there another party at play here?
I don't know.
But belief-based epistemology has caused too many problems to be plausible and Zagzebski's virtue-based epistemology doesn't sit right with me. So I think there must be something else out there waiting to be discovered. But what?
Knowledge's subject must be something that exists.
What exists?
Belief's subject must be something that exists, but is not the same as knowledge.
I know I believe X. Is this knowledge or belief? I would say that it is a knowledge of a belief. So it would be a metaknowledge. I believe I believe X would be a metabelief. I know I believe I believe X would still be a metaknowledge, but I know I know I know X would be a meta-metaknowledge. This could go on as an infinite regress (theoretically) but it is futile and ridiculously absurd to do so. It's merely a linguistic game, analogous to a child's argument with a classmate: Is too, is not, is too, is not, is not, is too, Ha! told you so. It's pure rhetoric.
What is epistemology? It is the study of knowledge.
What is knowledge? A justified true belief? What does that even mean?
How are beliefs and knowledge related? To know something is not to believe something. So why do we associate the two in epistemology?
To discuss epistemology we may have to reinvent the wheel here. Though, the way I see epistemology, the wheel is more like an oval and the whole unit of epistemology is sort of hobbling, bouncing along.
First, we must identify the subject of epistemology, which is knowledge.
Second, we must differentiate knowledge from belief and show how the two are related as brother and sister, not as mother and daughter. A belief does not give birth to a knowledge, but that doesn't mean I can't have a belief and a knowledge about 'X'.
Belief and knowledge are complimentary but not identical. Nor does belief + X equal knowledge. The two are separate realms.
Example 1 - Baseball
I know that baseball exists. I have empirical evidence for it. I have played it (experiential knowledge) I have seen it, and I have pondered about it.
I believe that baseball is a superior sport to basketball and football. I do not have strong empirical evidence for it. I could explain why the art of a sacrifice bunt is more skillful then tackling a runner or dunking a basketball, but that is pure subjective conjecture.
Here we have one difference already. Experiential knowledge (knowing via experience) is empirical, but belief (value judgments) are subjective.
Now there are many types of beliefs and many types of knowledge, so showing one type of knowledge is not synonymous with one type of belief and does not prove my pint, it merely gives us a starting point.
Now, there is a similarity between experiential knowledge and value judgment beliefs: they are both possessed by an agent (me) and they both correspond to something external to this agent (baseball). What is the relationship of the internal possessions of an agent to external realities?
Does baseball cause my belief or knowledge? Does my belief or knowledge cause baseball? Is there a causal relationship at all? is there another party at play here?
I don't know.
But belief-based epistemology has caused too many problems to be plausible and Zagzebski's virtue-based epistemology doesn't sit right with me. So I think there must be something else out there waiting to be discovered. But what?
Knowledge's subject must be something that exists.
What exists?
Belief's subject must be something that exists, but is not the same as knowledge.
I know I believe X. Is this knowledge or belief? I would say that it is a knowledge of a belief. So it would be a metaknowledge. I believe I believe X would be a metabelief. I know I believe I believe X would still be a metaknowledge, but I know I know I know X would be a meta-metaknowledge. This could go on as an infinite regress (theoretically) but it is futile and ridiculously absurd to do so. It's merely a linguistic game, analogous to a child's argument with a classmate: Is too, is not, is too, is not, is not, is too, Ha! told you so. It's pure rhetoric.
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