Thursday, April 19, 2007

Notes on Aquinas' definition of evil

(Originally written April 19, 2007 in Book 25)

Whether evil is found in Things

Objections

A. Whatever is found in things is either something or a privation of something (non-being). Dionysius states, "evil is distant from existence and even more distant from non existence. Therefore, evil is not at all found in things.

B. Being and thing are convertible. If evil is a being in things it follows that evil is a thing which is contrary to what article 1 states.

C. Good unmixed with evil is greater good then good mixed with evil. God only makes what is best. Therefore, in things made by God there is no evil.

Evil consists in the fact that a thing fails in goodness.

Replies to objections

A. Evil is distant from simple being and from simple not-being. It is neither a habit nor a pure negation. It is a privation.

B. In a sense evil (such as blindness) can be called a thing, but it is only ignorance that leads men to conclude that. Therefore, evil has a positive existence.

C. God makes what is best in whole, but parts can fail in goodness. Many good things would not exist if God had not chosen to make good out of evil and evil had not existence.

Whether evil is in god as in its subject?

Objections

A. Good is something that exists. Therefore, Evil is not in good as its subject.

B. Evil is not a being. Good is a being. Non-being does not require being as its subject. Therefore, evil does not require good as its subject.

C. One contrary is not the subject of another. Good and evil are contraries. Therefore, Evil is not in good as in its subject.

D. The subject of evil is evil. If evil is in good as its subject then good is evil.

Augustine states evil exists only in good.

Not every absence of good is evil. A negative absence of good is not evil, otherwise what does not exist would be evil. Only the absence of good in a privative sense is evil.

Replies to the objections

A. Evil does to exist in things as a part or as a natural property of any existing thing.

B. Not-being does not require a subject. Privation is a negation in a subject. only the privation is evil.

C. Good enters into every genus. Thus, one good can coexist with the privation of another good.

D. The prophet is not claiming that good and evil cannot coexist only that woe to those who call a good evil and an evil good.

Whether evil corrupts the whole good?

Objections

A. One contrary is wholly corrupted by another. Good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil corrupts the whole good.

B. Augustine: evil hurts in as much as it takes away good. Good is uniform. Therefore, good is wholly taken away by evil.

C. Evil takes away good. Evil continually takes away from good. Evil can only not fully consume good if that good is infinite. No created good things are infinite. Therefore, evil wholly consume good.

Augustine: evil cannot wholly consume the good.

Good is threefold:
1. One kind of good can be wholly destroyed by evil (i.e. sight is wholly destroyed by blindness)
2. One kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil
3. One kind of good is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away

Replies to objections

A. The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away, but other goods are not wholly removed. (Blindness may steal sight but the blind man can still hear)

B. Good, by its relation to different things, is not wholly diminished by evil

C. If evil diminishes quantitatively it can never diminish fully (half of a half of a half... is never equal to zero)

Whether evil is adequately divided into pain and fault (pain means penalty)

Objections:

A. Every defect is a kind of evil. All creatures possess the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which is neither pain nor a fault. Therefore, evil is not adequately divisible into pain and fault.

B. In irrational creatures there is neither pain nor fault, but are nonetheless corrupted and defective. Therefore, not all evil is pain or fault.

C. Temptation is an evil, but not a fault or pain. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault.

D. Augustine: a thing is evil because it hurts. Whatever hurts is penal. Therefore, every evil is pain.

Evil is the privation of good, consisting in perfection and act.

Act is twofold:
1. The form and integrity of a thing
2. The operation of a thing

Evil is twofold:

Blindness - subtraction of the form
Sin - withdrawal of the due operation

Evil like blindness is pain. Evil like sin is fault. Pain evil is in all creatures. Sin evil is only in those creatures of a rational nature (those with a will).

Replies to the objections

A. Evil is the privation of a good, not merely the negation of a good. Thus, not every defect of good is an evil.

B. Pain and fault divide evil that is found in voluntary things, not all evil.

C. Temptation is evil of fault in the tempter, not the tempted.

D. Pain involves injury of self. Fault involves injury to another.

Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?

Objections

A. Fault is to pain what meet is to reward. Reward has more good than merit. Therefore, pain has more evil than fault.

B. The greater evil is opposed to the greater good. Pain is opposed to the good of the agent. Fault is opposed to the good of action. An agent is a greater good than an action. Therefore, pain is worse than fault.

C. Pain consists of the forfeiting of the vision of God. Fault does not. Therefore, pain is a greater evil than fault.

Divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault.

One becomes evil by the evil of fault, not by the evil of pain.

God is the author of the evil of pain, but not the author of the evil of fault.

Replies to the objections

A. Pain is brought about to avoid fault. Thus, fault is worse than pain.

B. What is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent.

C. One may be deprived resulting in pain and fault in some way.

Summa Continued

The Case of Evil (Question 49)

1. Whether good can be the cause of evil?
2. Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
3. Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?

Whether good can be the cause of evil?

Objections:

A. Matthew 7:18 "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit"

B. One contrary cannot be the cause of another. Evil is the contrary to good.

C. A deficient effet can only proceed from a deficient cause.

D. Dionysius claims evil has no cause.

Augustine states "there is no possible source of evil except good"

Evil in some way has a cause.

Evil has a material cause, but no formal cause. It is a privation of a form.

Evil has no final cause.

Evil has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.

Evil only has an accidental cause, thus good is the cause of evil.

Replies to the objections:

A. A good will does not produce a morally bad act. The movement of an evil will is caused by a rational creature, which is good. Thus, good is the cause of evil.

B. Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself.

C. Fault follows from the will acts on the defect

D. Evil has no direct cause

Whether the supreme good, God is the cause of evil?

Objections:

A. Amos 3:6 "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hat not done?"

B. Good is the cause of evil. God is the cause of good. Therefore, Evil is from God.

C. The cause of danger and safety is the same thing. God is the cause of safety. Therefore, God is the cause of all evil

Augustine: God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of lending to not-being.

God has no defect. Thus any evil resulting from defect cannot be reduced to God as its cause.

The evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reducible to God as the cause. In creating somethings God must destroy others. But God does not will destruction for destructions sake.

God is the author of evil which is penalty (pain), but not the author of evil which is fault.

Replies to the Objections

A. Amos 3:6 refers to evil of pain not evil of fault.

B. Whatever possesses of being has a cause reducible to God, but evil the privation of being cannot be reduced to anything that has Being (God).

C. God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all.

Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?

Objections

A. Contrary effects have contrary causes

B. If one contrary is in nature the other is. The supreme good is in nature. Therefore, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.

C. Good and better are considered to what is best. Thus, for evil and worse to exist they must be considered against some supreme evil.

D. If some supreme evil did not exist, evil would only exist in some, but not the many.

E. The evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause. We cannot proceed to an infinite regress of evil causes. There must be one first evil as the cause of every evil.

The supreme good is the cause of every being. As such there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.

Nothing can be essentially bad.

Evil only lessens a good. It cannot fully consume it.

Replies to the objections

A. All contraries must come to one first common cause.

B. Evil is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.

C. Privation removes a perfection. Evil and worse are not judged against a supreme evil, but in their relation to the supreme good.

D. No being is evil by participation, but in the privation of participation. Thus, it is not reducible to any essential evil.

E. Evil can only have an accidental cause

F. There is no infinite regress. All evils are reduced to some good which causes evil accidentally.

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