Tuesday, November 7, 2006

What is this thing called science? Ch. 7

(Originally written November 7, 2006 in Book 8)

What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers

Chapter 7 - The limits of falsificationism

[Problems stemming from the logical situation]

Scientific laws cannot be logically deduced from a set of observable facts.

The falsity of a law can be logically deduced from a single observable fact.

Falsificationism begins to experience problems in complex situations because it is impossible to deduce from logic whether a law or a theory is false or if the evidence used to debunk the theory/law is false.

Straightforward, conclusive falsifications of theories are not achievable.

Scientific theories are super complex and consist of various universal statements.

All theories need to be augmented by auxiliary assumptions.

Auxiliary assumptions include laws and theories governing the use of instruments in experimentation.

Experimentation also involves many extra set of premises and auxiliary assumptions.

So when an experiment proves something false who can be sure that the scientific law or an auxiliary assumption or a condition is what is false. No one can say for certain.

When a theory cannot be conclusively falsified because the possibility that the auxiliary assumption or a part of the experiment is faulty, falsificationism proves to be inadequate. When this happens it is called the Duhem/Quine thesis.

Falsifications of a theory can also be avoided by deflecting the falsification to some other part of the complex theory. The objectivity of science goes out the window as scientists cling to their precious theories.

[Falsificationism inadequate on historical grounds]

Falsificationism fails to be represented by the history of science. If it had been strictly adhered to then some of our most important scientific theories would have been abandoned in their infancy. Some of these are:

  • Newton's gravitational theory
  • Bohr's theory of the atom
  • Kinetic theory
  • Copernican Revolution
The Copernican Revolution

The Copernican Astronomy system of the 16th century challenged the Aristotelian system (4th century B.C.) and the Ptolemaic system (2nd century).

Copernicus could not adequately defend his system against the scientific community.

Falsificationism would have ruled out Copernicus' system from the onset.

Galileo's addition to the Copernicus system through the verification of Copernicus' predictions via the use of a telescope chipped away at the dogmatic belief in the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic system.

The use of a telescope also raised serious epistemological questions. Why should the data collected via the telescope be more reliable than data collected through the naked eye?

Kepler further defended the Copernican theory using Galileo's mechanics, Copernicus' astronomical theory and Tyco Brahe's recording of planetary positions and made a strong defense of Copernican theory.

Newton then furthered the theory. 

Neither inductivism nor falsificationism gives an account of science that is compatible with the Copernican Revolution.

The Copernican Revolution took hold in spite of the many falsifications in the early, imprecise theory formulations.

[Inadequacies of the falsificationist demarcation criteria and Popper's response]

"Popper made a seductive case for his criterion of demarcation between science and non or pseudo-science" (Chalmers, 101-102).

Popper claimed that non-qualified falsificationism was too broad. Popper claims that theories must be falsifiable and must not be falsified. Popper claims the modifications to falsified theory is acceptable in his sophisticated falsificationism.

Dogmatic science is allowed in Popper's theory.

If dogmatism becomes part of falsificationism then what role does falsificationism really play?

"It would be ironic if the highly qualified version of falsificationism became so weak as to rule out nothing, thereby clashing with the main intuition that led Popper to formulate it" (Chalmers, 103).

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