Aristotle & Akrasia

(Originally Written October 17, 2006 in History I)

Book VII - Moral Weakness

Akrasia - "incontinence", moral weakness

When a person does what s/he believes is wrong.

How is this possible?
Socrates: To know the good is to do it.
Aristotle disagrees.
Aristotle: The morally weak person is temporarily ignorant - the appetite overcomes one's rational faculties.

Moral weakness is not self-indulgence. There is no remorse in self-indulgence.

Is man, from an Aristotelian view innately morally strong, morally weak or self-indulgent?
What about from a Christian view?

Book VIII - Friendships

Three kinds of friendships:
1) Utility - each likes the other for some benefit supplied
2) Pleasure - each likes the other for some amusement, pleasure or activity
3) virtue - "perfect friendship" based on the bond of goodness

Virtue: What is it?

Book X - Happiness

Eudamonia - well being

-Not mere amusement
-The contemplative life

The Divine Life Consists of:
-Not activity to achieve ends
-Contemplation (But what object?)
  -Nothing? No, that would be idle
  -Other things? No, that would be unworthy?
  -Himself? Yes, God is a thinking of thinking

Aristotle's argument for the existence of God from motion:

There is motion
What causes motion?
Infinite regress of causes/movers (no, that is impossible)
Therefore, the unmoved mover must cause motion.
The unmoved mover is Theos/God, a pure actuality