Philosophy and Language - A.J. Ayer

(Originally written July 28, 2006 in Book 7)

Philosophy and Language

An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 3 November, 1960
by A.J. Ayer

He thanks H.H. Price and states that all the philosophers of his generation are in his debt.

Philosophy's conception comes from a variety of sources:

1. A legacy of logical positivism

The job of a philosopher is to tell us what statements mean, not to tell us whether or not they are true.

Linehan - what's the point then? Are we merely commentators announcing the game of life?

"A philosopher wh had no mastery of language would be as helpless as a mathematician who could not handle numbers" (Ayer, 7).

Linehan - I'm going to finish this lecture although it is very dry and cumbersome.

How I hate linguistic philosophy!

A point to study: A. Tarski: "The concept of Truth in Formalized Languages"

Based on Tarski's logical theory of language, establishing truth in a sentence is basically establishing a sentence.

Philosophers have attempted to answer the questions of meaning and testability in developing theories of truth.

Point to study: Goodman's paradox (Nelson Goodman)

Reductive analysis is the product of rational empiricism (reductive analysis is breaking everything down to its smallest components, I think?)

Reductionism did not have enough respect for language.

And now the question I've been waiting for!!

"Why should this be of any philosophical interest?" (Ayer, 16).

1) It will free us of any deep perplexities that arise from our misinterpretations of language

2) "A careful examination of the workings of our language will give us an insight into the structure of the world which it describes" (Ayer, 16).

Linehan - I don't see how, All I see is that it will give us is an insight into how we interpret the world.

Analysis of words like 'inadvertently', 'deliberately', 'mistakenly', and 'intentionally' may dispose of the problem of free-will.

Ayer denies that language though can or will solve problems like that of free-will.

"The difficulty here is that the distinction between questions of fact and questions of analysis is not so easily drawn as most philosophers now seem to think" (Ayer, 20).

Logical positivists eliminated metaphysics. (This alone is enough for me to doubt their propositions). They did so by the verification principle.

When philosophy produces facts it becomes an empirical science and thus no longer having anything to do with philosophy (which is purely conceptual).

Linehan - Is philosophy purely conceptual? Have I dedicated my life to something completely devoid of facts? Ayer has a way of making a positive conclusion, the doubting it leaving you with nothing. It is infuriating to attempt to pin down his position on a given point. I feel he admits logical positivism, but is unwilling to follow them as a logical positivist himself. He seems to me to be playing both sides of the fence soon not to step on any toes.

Ayer

The verification principle serves two purposes.
1) Plays an essential part in the vindication of ordinary language
2) Sustains the doctrine that the meaning of an expression is to be identified with its use

12 more pages!! Only 12!

Point to study: G. Ryle "The Concept of the Mind" and "The Myth of the ghost in the machine"

Linehan - Is there really a point to distinguishing between statements like:
1. He intended to do it
2. He meant to do it
3. He designed to do it

If he did it intentionally, (and that it is not disputed) then why study the language usage of someone describing it? Would it not be more fruitful to study the action (whatever it is) or the consequences of the action or why he did it intentionally?

Ayer finally explains a position to me in his final sentence. He vouches for analytic philosophy and warns agains the threat from scholasticism.

Linehan - for my part, I find a study of linguistic philosophy to be completely unfruitful. It seems pointless. A 'hat' would be the same thing even if language calls it a 'shoe'. What difference does it make what we call it? It would be the same thing no matter its title. Language does not constitute what a thing is, it only gives us a tool to facilitate communication about objects. Objects are objects, regardless of language's involvement.

Philosophy and Language
A.J. Ayer
Oxford University Press
London, England 1966