Metaphysics - Ch. 5

(Originally written July 30, 2006 in Book 6)

Metaphysics - Peter van Inwagen
Ch. 5 - Necessary Beings - The Ontological Argument

Part 2 - Why the World Is

Why is there anything rather than nothing? This seems a completely absurd and a difficult question?

Anselm came up with the ontological argument. Descartes puts it into an easier to follow form. Descartes claims that we can imagine a being that is perfection in every way. Perfection demands existence. Thus, if a being is absolutely perfect it must exist because to exist is better than not to exist.

One argument against the ontological argument was put forth by Kant: A perfection must be a property. Existence is not a property. This argument against the ontological argument was standard for 200 years, but it is not satisfactory. Necessary existence is an existence of a thing that would have existed no matter what. A thing necessarily exists if its non-existence is impossible. While mere existence is not a property, necessary existence is. If a thing is not a property it cannot be part of a concept. Necessary existence is a property of God and thus a part of the concept of God (some philosophers and theologians deny this).

Descartes' ontological argument when necessary existence is substituted for mere existence.

Pt. 1
A perfect being has all perfections.
Necessary existence is a perfection.
Therefore, a perfect being has necessary existence.

Pt. 2
Whatever has necessary existence has existence.
Therefore, a perfect being has existence.

Pt. 3
Whatever has existence exists.
Therefore, a perfect being exists.

This argument is invalid because it can be used to state an obvious falsehood. It is also ambiguous and two arguments wrapped into one. Instead it should read:

Argument 1:

Pt. 1
Anything that is a perfect being has all perfections
Necessary existence is a perfection
Therefore, anything that is a perfect being has necessary existence.

Pt. 2
Whatever has necessary existence has existence.
Therefore, anything that is perfect being has existence.

Pt. 3
Whatever has existence exists.
Therefore anything that is perfect being exists.

Argument 2:

Pt 1
There is a perfect being that has all perfections.
Necessary existence is a perfection.
Therefore anything that is a perfect being has necessary existence.

Pt. 2
Whatever has necessary existence has existence.
Therefore, there is perfect being that has existence.

Pt. 3
Whatever has existence exists
Therefore there is a perfect being that exists

Linehan - I am struggling to stay interested in this topic. It is very dry and technical and while I don't mind difficult topics, when it is leading to a question like "why does anything exist?" (a pretty useless one in my view) it is hard to stay focused.

The first argument proceeds from an obvious premise to a trivial conclusion. The second argument has an important conclusion but it is basically restating the first premise. The ontological argument is basically a failure in persuasiveness.

Linehan - I think that the ontological argument could be valid fi a necessary being is proved to exist. But then what would be the point of restating the truth?

The philosophy of modality has produce an ontological argument that does not fail in the way of Descartes' or Anselm's. Modality is the philosophy of necessity and possibility. The modal ontological argument uses the 'possible worlds' concept. The 'possible worlds' concept is the idea that this world could be different in any way.

The possible worlds demands the concepts of 'truth in' and 'existence in'. 'Truth in' means that in world X, Y is true in X. It doesn't matter if it is false in the real world or false in world Z. 'Existence in' means that in world X, Y exists. From these concepts we can arrive at something being 'possibly true' vs. 'necessarily true'.

A proposition is possibly true if it is true in at least one world. A proposition is necessarily true if it is true in all worlds.

The actual world is the possible world that we exist in.

In order to state the modal ontological argument we need two notions:
1) The notion of a necessary being
2) The notion of something having a property essentially

A necessary being is a being that exists in every possible world. Beings that are not necessary are contingent.

The notion of essential possession of a property is that the property is inextricably entwined with a beings's nature in such a way that if a being did not posses that property it could not exist at all. An essential property will exist in any being that exists in any possible world that that being could possibly exist.

If a thing has a property that it does not possess essentially, it possess it accidentally.

Linehan - what is an essential property that I possess? My name? No, it is possible that I could have a different name in another world? My loves? No, it is possible that I could love other things or enjoy what I actually dislike in this world in other possible worlds? My looks? No, it is possible that I could look different in other possible worlds. My existence? No, I could possibly not exist in other possible worlds. If it is not anything I am defined by (name, title, etc.) or anything mental (loves, passion, likes, etc.) or anything physical (looks, size, etc.) or my very existence, what, if anything do I possess essentially?

van Inwagen asks if the property of humanity is possessed essentially? I would say yes to this one, but not from a mere physical standpoint. What is humanity or what differentiates humans from other beings?

Could I theoretically exist as an ape or a parakeet in another possible world? No, the rationality and faculty of mind demands that I be something of intelligence. This means I cannot be anything that exists in the actual world. What's left then? God, Angel, Demon, Unknown Species? I could not possibly be God in any world because a contingent being cannot be a necessary being. I could not possibly be an Angel because a sinful being cannot be sinless. I could not possibly be a demon because a redeemable being cannot be unredeemable. Thus, I could only be a human or some unknown species. But that unknown species would necessarily possess the same type of soul as a human being and thus could only be physically different than a human being.

Necessary existence is a perfection is a premise of modal ontological arguments. The other premise is a perfect being is not impossible. The modal ontological argument:
A perfect being (a being that possesses all perfections essentially) is not impossible.
Necessary existence is a perfection.
Therefore, a perfect being exists.

This argument is logically valid, in that its conclusion follows logically from its premises.

Premise two, necessary existence is a perfection, can be accepted without much arguing. It is very plausible. Premise one, a perfect being is not impossible, is not as easily accepted.

The best way to prove the existence of a perfect being is to look for instances of it. But, we cannot show any instances of a perfect being. (We can show the existence of dogs by pointing at a dog. An individual dog is an instance of dog).

Leibniz offered a method of abstract metaphysical argument. Leibniz knew that any successful version of the ontological argument would necessarily include proof that shows a perfect being is not impossible. Leibniz's argument:

A perfect being is a being who has all perfections and thus is possible if all perfections are consistent with one another.

Every perfection is a "single positive property.

(A simple property is one that is not complex, i.e. a color, a shape but not a color and a shape)
(A positive property is one that is not negative, i.e. X or Y, but not not-X or not-Y)

Leibniz continued that all simple positive properties are consistent because to be inconsistent they would have to be negations of each other.

Thus, if every perfection is a simple positive property then it is possible for a perfect being to exist.

There are many problems with Leibniz's argument; one is the the concept of simple-positive properties doesn't make any sense.

Some things can be disproved by showing that a concept is impossible. J. N. Findlay claimed that an impossible could be derived from the concept of a perfect being. His argument stated: a perfect being must be a necessary being and an impossibility occurs in the concept of a necessary being. Findlay claimed that in order for there to be a necessary being there must be at least one necessarily true existential proposition. Necessarily true existential propositions are impossible.

An existential proposition is a proposition that asserts the existence of something. Necessary true existential truths are impossible because necessary truths are truths that owe their status as truths to the meaning of words (i.e. all nuns are females because the definition of 'nun' demands that for a person to be a nun they must be female)

Here is Findlay's argument:

There is no such thing as a necessary existential truth.
Thus, there is no such thing as a necessary being.
Thus, there is no such thing as a perfect being.
Thus, the modal ontological argument is invalid because it has a false premise.

The problem with Findlay's argument is that there are necessary existential truths. Mathematics provides many.

The ontological argument throughout its history is at best inconclusive.

Linehan - I am so glad that I wasted my entire afternoon on something that is at best inconclusive. I don't understand why philosophers waste their time on inconclusive evidences and arguments. (Yet, here I am studying it. Irony.)