(Originally Written December 6, 2006 in Epistemology)
Zagzebski:
Gettier Problems:
Knowledge = Justified True Belief + ?? (no false belief, reliabilist element, indefeasibility, etc.)
The gap/independence of truth and justification between truth and justification.
2 Alternatives to escape Gettier Problems:
1. Eliminate the independence of justification/truth
2. Disconnect justification and truth
Knowledge is cognitive contact with reality arisiong from acts of intellectual virtue
Showing posts with label Gettier. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gettier. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 6, 2006
Tuesday, December 5, 2006
Gettier & Reliabilism - Zagzebski
(Originally written December 5, 2006 in Book 12)
A person is praiseworthy (justified) for doing an act (having a belief) if it is what a virtuous person probably would do (or believe).
A right act is what a person with phronesis might do. A wrong act is what a person with phronesis would likely not do.
A moral duty is what a person with phronesis would do in specific circumstances.
A justified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, might believe.
An unjustified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, would not believe.
Epistemic duty is what the person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and possesses understanding would believe in a specific situation.
"A belief is an epistemic duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified not to believe it... A belief is an epistemic duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified to disbelieve it" (Zagzebski, 242).
"An act is a moral duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong not to do it. An act is a moral duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong to choose to reject it" (Zagzebski, 243).
A justified belief is what some one with phronesis might believe.
An unjustified belief is what someone with phronesis would not believe.
A belief is a duty when a person with phronesis would believe.
6.2 Acts of Virtue
An act is an act of virtue if it rises out of the motivational component of the virtue, it is something a person with that virtue would do, and it is successful in bringing the end of that specific virtue to fruition.
Part III - The nature of knowledge
2.1 The definition
An act of intellectual virtue is an act that arises out of the motivational component of that virtue, is something a person with that virtue would probably do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the ends of that virtue, and causes the agent to acquire a true belief (cognitive contact with reality)
Definition 1 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 270).
Definition 2 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Definition 3 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Gettier Problems:
The problem for justified true belief theories
"Gettier problems arise when it is only by chance that a justified true belief is true" (Zagzebski, 283).
The Gettier problem has forced knowledge to see one of two things:
1) Justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge and must have an extra component to make it sufficient
2) Justification must be reconciled to make it sufficient
Zagzebski sees both choices as inadequate because neither can escape the Gettier problem.
Internalism and externalism both suffer from the Gettier problem.
Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is an example of a Gettier problem when there is no problem internally, but something causes a false belief, but somehow it is still true.
Reliablism also faces the Getteir problem, in spite of what Alvin Plantinga states.
True beliefs can arise accidentally and thus we have Gettier problems.
Plantinga argues that knowledge is had when the belief warrants it.
Warranty admits degrees, but either the warrant is or is not sufficient for knowledge.
Undefeatable justified belief is immune to Gettier problems because undefeatability entails truth.
Strong defensibility conditions however threaten the assumption of independence of the justification condition and the truth condition for knowledge.
Truth conditions for knowledge must be entailed by the other conditions.
Nearly every contemporary theory of knowledge analyzes knowledge as true belief that is justified or warranted.
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory
Zagzebski states that there are moral analogues of the Gettier problem. She says that a moral act can be performed but it not be virtuous it is moral luck, just like Gettier justified true beef's are epistemic luck.
"Gettier problems in virtue epistemology can be resolved by an analogous move" (Zagzebski, 296).
In Gettier cases the truth is reached by accident. In moral luck cases the right act is done by accident.
"Gettier problems can be avoided if we utilize the concept of an act of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 297).
Acts of intellectual virtues are strictly analogous to acts of moral virtue.
Acts of moral virtue are strongly right in a moral sense; acts of intellectual virtue are strongly justified.
The definition, "knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" is immune to Gettier problems.
4. Reliablisim
Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a combination of externalist and internalist combinations.
Laurence BonJour would call Zagzebski's theory an externalist one. BonJour calls any theory externalism when some of the justifying factors are external to the agent.
Zagzebski claims that her hybrid theory sets it apart from more radical externalist theories like Plantinga's reliablist proper function theory.
Objections to Reliablism
Purely externalist theories imply that the only thing valuable in an instance of knowledge is the value of the truth that is acquired.
Reliablism does not give sufficient conditions for knowing.
Knowledge has more value than true belief.
The value must lie in something in addition to the value of truth and in addition to the reliable mechanism for acquiring true belief.
A person is praiseworthy (justified) for doing an act (having a belief) if it is what a virtuous person probably would do (or believe).
A right act is what a person with phronesis might do. A wrong act is what a person with phronesis would likely not do.
A moral duty is what a person with phronesis would do in specific circumstances.
A justified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, might believe.
An unjustified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, would not believe.
Epistemic duty is what the person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and possesses understanding would believe in a specific situation.
"A belief is an epistemic duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified not to believe it... A belief is an epistemic duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified to disbelieve it" (Zagzebski, 242).
"An act is a moral duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong not to do it. An act is a moral duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong to choose to reject it" (Zagzebski, 243).
A justified belief is what some one with phronesis might believe.
An unjustified belief is what someone with phronesis would not believe.
A belief is a duty when a person with phronesis would believe.
6.2 Acts of Virtue
An act is an act of virtue if it rises out of the motivational component of the virtue, it is something a person with that virtue would do, and it is successful in bringing the end of that specific virtue to fruition.
Part III - The nature of knowledge
2.1 The definition
An act of intellectual virtue is an act that arises out of the motivational component of that virtue, is something a person with that virtue would probably do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the ends of that virtue, and causes the agent to acquire a true belief (cognitive contact with reality)
Definition 1 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 270).
Definition 2 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Definition 3 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Gettier Problems:
The problem for justified true belief theories
"Gettier problems arise when it is only by chance that a justified true belief is true" (Zagzebski, 283).
The Gettier problem has forced knowledge to see one of two things:
1) Justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge and must have an extra component to make it sufficient
2) Justification must be reconciled to make it sufficient
Zagzebski sees both choices as inadequate because neither can escape the Gettier problem.
Internalism and externalism both suffer from the Gettier problem.
Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is an example of a Gettier problem when there is no problem internally, but something causes a false belief, but somehow it is still true.
Reliablism also faces the Getteir problem, in spite of what Alvin Plantinga states.
True beliefs can arise accidentally and thus we have Gettier problems.
Plantinga argues that knowledge is had when the belief warrants it.
Warranty admits degrees, but either the warrant is or is not sufficient for knowledge.
Undefeatable justified belief is immune to Gettier problems because undefeatability entails truth.
Strong defensibility conditions however threaten the assumption of independence of the justification condition and the truth condition for knowledge.
Truth conditions for knowledge must be entailed by the other conditions.
Nearly every contemporary theory of knowledge analyzes knowledge as true belief that is justified or warranted.
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory
Zagzebski states that there are moral analogues of the Gettier problem. She says that a moral act can be performed but it not be virtuous it is moral luck, just like Gettier justified true beef's are epistemic luck.
"Gettier problems in virtue epistemology can be resolved by an analogous move" (Zagzebski, 296).
In Gettier cases the truth is reached by accident. In moral luck cases the right act is done by accident.
"Gettier problems can be avoided if we utilize the concept of an act of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 297).
Acts of intellectual virtues are strictly analogous to acts of moral virtue.
Acts of moral virtue are strongly right in a moral sense; acts of intellectual virtue are strongly justified.
The definition, "knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" is immune to Gettier problems.
4. Reliablisim
Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a combination of externalist and internalist combinations.
Laurence BonJour would call Zagzebski's theory an externalist one. BonJour calls any theory externalism when some of the justifying factors are external to the agent.
Zagzebski claims that her hybrid theory sets it apart from more radical externalist theories like Plantinga's reliablist proper function theory.
Objections to Reliablism
Purely externalist theories imply that the only thing valuable in an instance of knowledge is the value of the truth that is acquired.
Reliablism does not give sufficient conditions for knowing.
Knowledge has more value than true belief.
The value must lie in something in addition to the value of truth and in addition to the reliable mechanism for acquiring true belief.
Thursday, November 23, 2006
Virtues of the Mind - 1.1-2.1
(Originally written November 23, 2006 in Book 8)
Thanksgiving
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models (continued)
Deontological and reliabilist theories of epistemology are structurally similar to act-based ethical theories.
Ernest Sosa proposed that by focusing on intellectual virtues we can bypass the struggle between foundationalist and coherentists and the whole problem of proper cognitive structure.
Sosa is not a virtue theorist. He speaks about intellectual virtues in a consequentialist backdrop.
The only intellectual virtue that really gets any attention is phronesis (tactical wisdom). Phronesis gets attention because Aristotle connects it to the distinctively moral virtues.
Since Sosa introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into epistemic literature, virtue epistemology has become another name for reliablism. Plantinga's theory of proper function and related theories are prime examples.
Sosa and Greco define intellectual virtue in terms of its propensity to achieve a certain consequence.
Aristotle's intellectual virtues include: sophia (theoretical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom), and nous (insight or understanding). Hobbes includes good wit and discretion. Spinoza's primary intellectual virtue is understanding.
Zagzebski holds that virtue-based epistemology is well suited to analyze justification and knowledge.
Lorraine Code stresses a socialized approach to epistemology, connecting epistemology and moral theory. She shows an epistemological importance to human nature, not just a purely cognitive importance.
Code argues for a "responsiblist epistemology", emphasizing the active nature of the knower: A knower/believer has a choice of cognitive structuring, and is then accountable for these choices.
Code denounces reliabilism because she feels it makes knowers too passive. "A reliable knower could simply be an accurate, and relatively passive, recorder of experience" (Zagzebski, 12).
Code still only structures her epistemological theory on deontological and consequentialist ethics, not virtue-theory.
James Montmarquet takes epistemic virtue in the classical sense and connects epistemic works with moral virtue literature.
Montmarquet labels virtues of impartiality:
-openness to the ideas of others
-willingness to exchange ideas
-lack of jealousy
-lack of personal bias
-a lively sense of one's own fallibility
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual sobriety:
- sober-minded inquiry, not won't to embrace what is not really warranted.
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual courage:
-the willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held beliefs
-perseverance in the face of opposition from others
-determination to see a project through to completion
Montmarquet holds that any one desiring the truth must have these traits. But he holds that the intellectual virtues, even if they are not conductive and that some epistemic virtues function as regulators of the desire for truth.
Montmarquet's approach is vaguely Aristotelian. His epistemology is belief-based. Montmarquet does not connect his theory with aretaic moral theory.
Alvin Goldman accepts a form of virtue epistemology that is similar to Sosa. He explicitly links justification to intellectual virtue.
Zagzebski states that, while many epistemic theories recognize the desirability of an epistemological theory based on a carefully developed virtue theory, none have fully articulated a theory.
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories
The mark of a virtue theory is that the primary object of evaluation is inner traits of a person, rather than acts of that person.
"To describe a good person is to describe that person's virtues, and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible neither to the performance of acts independently identified as right nor to a moral virtue than a disposition to act in the right way" (Zagzebski, 15).
There is more and less to a disposition to act in a right way to moral virtues.
A virtue includes a disposition to:
1) Characteristic emotions
2) Desires
3) Motives
4) Attitudes
There is less to moral virtues then the disposition to act right because a virtuous person does not invariably act in a way that can be fully captured by any independent set of normative criteria.
Agent-focused virtue theories focus on the agent and her traits as a way of determining what is right, but do not maintain that what is right is right because it is what a virtuous person would do. What a virtuous person would do is the best criterion for what is right. Zagzebski calls this weak virtue-theory.
Pure virtue-theory treats act-evaluation as a derivative from the character of an agent. An act is right because it is what a virtuous person might do.
Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) was probably the first major attempt in recent philosophy to show the advantages of virtue ethics over act-based ethics.
Anscombe argues that the principal notions of modern moral discourse (right, wrong, obligation and moral duty) lack content, but concepts of virtue (justice, chastity, courage and truth) are conceptually rich.
Anscombe also argues that right, wrong, obligation and duty are legal concepts and worthless without judge and jury. Since ethics is not rooted in theism (as it was when God was judge and jury) they are worthless terms.
Anscombe argues that we should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which doesn't hold to a blanket concept of wrong or a concept of duty.
The idea that there can be no exhaustive set of rules for how to act in every situation is showing more and more philosophers that a virtue-based theory of ethics is advantageous to cover all bases.
Virtue theory ethics can better explain the moral value of personal goods like love and friendship.
Duty-based ethics does not clearly show that their hierarchical approach is correct.
Another reason for favoring virtue-based ethics is that some virtues are not reducible to specific acts or disposition.
Modern epistemology is belief-based. A positively evaluated belief is called justified.
Legalistic language makes very little sense in epistemology. What does it mean to be epistemically guilty?
Linehan - does this notion give better fuel for virtue-based epistemology or does it glorify the ignorance of epistemology in ordinary people? One should not be swayed by the ignorance or fervor of the masses.
Wisdom is the unification of propositional and other types of knowledge. Knowledge can be misused but wisdom cannot be. Wisdom unifies knowledge and desires and values.
The focus on belief in epistemology has led to the neglect of wisdom. Also, a belief-based theory cannot explain the connection between wisdom and moral goodness.
Consequentialism is an externalist moral theory. A good is something that is produced.
Externalist moral theories face all sorts of problems. Reliabilism, which is structurally similar to consequentialism, faces similar problems.
Reliabilism's epistemic goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false ones. It is quantitative.
In Reliabilism, an accumulation of propositional knowledge is the goal, regardless of how that knowledge is gained. It can be done ignorantly or in a vicious manner.
Because of the difficulties faced by reliabilism and its basis of consequentialism, it is a good idea to search for an alternative ethical mode for epistemology.
Act-based ethics label right as merely not-wrong. Right means permissible. Virtue ethics focus on praiseworthiness.
Belief based epistemology see justification as analogous to epistemic blamelessness. It isn't really praiseworthy.
Virtue theory can evaluate virtue, vice and their intermediate states; whereas act-based/belief-based can only offer black and white cases
2. Difficulties in contemporary epistemology
Contemporary epistemology is too atomistic and the value of understanding has been neglected.
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification
For centuries, maybe as far back as Plato, knowledge has been considered to be a justified true belief. Then Gettier screwed everything up.
Justification has been the primary focus of Anlgo-American philosophers in epistemology.
Justification is a hot topic in epistemology, but it is a very vague and ambiguous term used in connection with countless theories.
Planting claims that:
1) The traditional view of justification originated with Locke and Descartes and identifies justification with a component of knowledge and to true belief and to performing one's epistemic duty.
2) The traditional view is incoherent equivocation and responsible for the externalist and internalist impasse
3) The remedy to the impasse is to dissolve the connections between justification and epistemic duty and justification and warrant.
Planting too readily connects moral and deontological concepts. Then by arguing against deontology he denounces internalism.
But, Zagzebski feels Plantinga's historical and conceptual points fail to make a convincing argument against internalism
William Alston goes further than Plantinga. He identifies six candidates for necessary conditions for justification:
1) Must be based on adequate ground
2) what justices a belief must probabalize it
3) a justification must be cognitively accessible to the subject
4) A justified belief must fit into a coherent system of beliefs
5) It must satisfy certain higher-level conditions
6) The believer must satisfy intellectual obligations in forming and maintaining the belief
Alston holds that justification cannot bear all the conceptual weight that has been given to it.
Alston points out that the issue between externalists and internists cannot be resolved because justification is in such different context in these two theories.
Thanksgiving
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models (continued)
Deontological and reliabilist theories of epistemology are structurally similar to act-based ethical theories.
Ernest Sosa proposed that by focusing on intellectual virtues we can bypass the struggle between foundationalist and coherentists and the whole problem of proper cognitive structure.
Sosa is not a virtue theorist. He speaks about intellectual virtues in a consequentialist backdrop.
The only intellectual virtue that really gets any attention is phronesis (tactical wisdom). Phronesis gets attention because Aristotle connects it to the distinctively moral virtues.
Since Sosa introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into epistemic literature, virtue epistemology has become another name for reliablism. Plantinga's theory of proper function and related theories are prime examples.
Sosa and Greco define intellectual virtue in terms of its propensity to achieve a certain consequence.
Aristotle's intellectual virtues include: sophia (theoretical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom), and nous (insight or understanding). Hobbes includes good wit and discretion. Spinoza's primary intellectual virtue is understanding.
Zagzebski holds that virtue-based epistemology is well suited to analyze justification and knowledge.
Lorraine Code stresses a socialized approach to epistemology, connecting epistemology and moral theory. She shows an epistemological importance to human nature, not just a purely cognitive importance.
Code argues for a "responsiblist epistemology", emphasizing the active nature of the knower: A knower/believer has a choice of cognitive structuring, and is then accountable for these choices.
Code denounces reliabilism because she feels it makes knowers too passive. "A reliable knower could simply be an accurate, and relatively passive, recorder of experience" (Zagzebski, 12).
Code still only structures her epistemological theory on deontological and consequentialist ethics, not virtue-theory.
James Montmarquet takes epistemic virtue in the classical sense and connects epistemic works with moral virtue literature.
Montmarquet labels virtues of impartiality:
-openness to the ideas of others
-willingness to exchange ideas
-lack of jealousy
-lack of personal bias
-a lively sense of one's own fallibility
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual sobriety:
- sober-minded inquiry, not won't to embrace what is not really warranted.
Montmarquet labels virtues of intellectual courage:
-the willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held beliefs
-perseverance in the face of opposition from others
-determination to see a project through to completion
Montmarquet holds that any one desiring the truth must have these traits. But he holds that the intellectual virtues, even if they are not conductive and that some epistemic virtues function as regulators of the desire for truth.
Montmarquet's approach is vaguely Aristotelian. His epistemology is belief-based. Montmarquet does not connect his theory with aretaic moral theory.
Alvin Goldman accepts a form of virtue epistemology that is similar to Sosa. He explicitly links justification to intellectual virtue.
Zagzebski states that, while many epistemic theories recognize the desirability of an epistemological theory based on a carefully developed virtue theory, none have fully articulated a theory.
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories
The mark of a virtue theory is that the primary object of evaluation is inner traits of a person, rather than acts of that person.
"To describe a good person is to describe that person's virtues, and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible neither to the performance of acts independently identified as right nor to a moral virtue than a disposition to act in the right way" (Zagzebski, 15).
There is more and less to a disposition to act in a right way to moral virtues.
A virtue includes a disposition to:
1) Characteristic emotions
2) Desires
3) Motives
4) Attitudes
There is less to moral virtues then the disposition to act right because a virtuous person does not invariably act in a way that can be fully captured by any independent set of normative criteria.
Agent-focused virtue theories focus on the agent and her traits as a way of determining what is right, but do not maintain that what is right is right because it is what a virtuous person would do. What a virtuous person would do is the best criterion for what is right. Zagzebski calls this weak virtue-theory.
Pure virtue-theory treats act-evaluation as a derivative from the character of an agent. An act is right because it is what a virtuous person might do.
Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) was probably the first major attempt in recent philosophy to show the advantages of virtue ethics over act-based ethics.
Anscombe argues that the principal notions of modern moral discourse (right, wrong, obligation and moral duty) lack content, but concepts of virtue (justice, chastity, courage and truth) are conceptually rich.
Anscombe also argues that right, wrong, obligation and duty are legal concepts and worthless without judge and jury. Since ethics is not rooted in theism (as it was when God was judge and jury) they are worthless terms.
Anscombe argues that we should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which doesn't hold to a blanket concept of wrong or a concept of duty.
The idea that there can be no exhaustive set of rules for how to act in every situation is showing more and more philosophers that a virtue-based theory of ethics is advantageous to cover all bases.
Virtue theory ethics can better explain the moral value of personal goods like love and friendship.
Duty-based ethics does not clearly show that their hierarchical approach is correct.
Another reason for favoring virtue-based ethics is that some virtues are not reducible to specific acts or disposition.
Modern epistemology is belief-based. A positively evaluated belief is called justified.
Legalistic language makes very little sense in epistemology. What does it mean to be epistemically guilty?
Linehan - does this notion give better fuel for virtue-based epistemology or does it glorify the ignorance of epistemology in ordinary people? One should not be swayed by the ignorance or fervor of the masses.
Wisdom is the unification of propositional and other types of knowledge. Knowledge can be misused but wisdom cannot be. Wisdom unifies knowledge and desires and values.
The focus on belief in epistemology has led to the neglect of wisdom. Also, a belief-based theory cannot explain the connection between wisdom and moral goodness.
Consequentialism is an externalist moral theory. A good is something that is produced.
Externalist moral theories face all sorts of problems. Reliabilism, which is structurally similar to consequentialism, faces similar problems.
Reliabilism's epistemic goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false ones. It is quantitative.
In Reliabilism, an accumulation of propositional knowledge is the goal, regardless of how that knowledge is gained. It can be done ignorantly or in a vicious manner.
Because of the difficulties faced by reliabilism and its basis of consequentialism, it is a good idea to search for an alternative ethical mode for epistemology.
Act-based ethics label right as merely not-wrong. Right means permissible. Virtue ethics focus on praiseworthiness.
Belief based epistemology see justification as analogous to epistemic blamelessness. It isn't really praiseworthy.
Virtue theory can evaluate virtue, vice and their intermediate states; whereas act-based/belief-based can only offer black and white cases
2. Difficulties in contemporary epistemology
Contemporary epistemology is too atomistic and the value of understanding has been neglected.
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification
For centuries, maybe as far back as Plato, knowledge has been considered to be a justified true belief. Then Gettier screwed everything up.
Justification has been the primary focus of Anlgo-American philosophers in epistemology.
Justification is a hot topic in epistemology, but it is a very vague and ambiguous term used in connection with countless theories.
Planting claims that:
1) The traditional view of justification originated with Locke and Descartes and identifies justification with a component of knowledge and to true belief and to performing one's epistemic duty.
2) The traditional view is incoherent equivocation and responsible for the externalist and internalist impasse
3) The remedy to the impasse is to dissolve the connections between justification and epistemic duty and justification and warrant.
Planting too readily connects moral and deontological concepts. Then by arguing against deontology he denounces internalism.
But, Zagzebski feels Plantinga's historical and conceptual points fail to make a convincing argument against internalism
William Alston goes further than Plantinga. He identifies six candidates for necessary conditions for justification:
1) Must be based on adequate ground
2) what justices a belief must probabalize it
3) a justification must be cognitively accessible to the subject
4) A justified belief must fit into a coherent system of beliefs
5) It must satisfy certain higher-level conditions
6) The believer must satisfy intellectual obligations in forming and maintaining the belief
Alston holds that justification cannot bear all the conceptual weight that has been given to it.
Alston points out that the issue between externalists and internists cannot be resolved because justification is in such different context in these two theories.
Friday, October 6, 2006
Steup and his internalism
(Originally written October 06, 2006 in Book 8)
Class Notes
Step
-Defends internalism
-Justification is introspective and a priori
-"J-Factors" refers to those things that justify beliefs
-Internalism is about justification, not knowledge
Knowledge involves four aspects:
1) Belief
2) Truth
3) Justification
4) Degettierization
Truth and Degettierization are external. Belief and justification are internal.
The concept of justification is deontological (a matter of duty, obligation, etc.)
A person is epistemically justified if and only if she fluffs her epistemic duties.
Prove that you believe that I am not holding chalk at this moment and I will give you $100.
Alston's objection - Our beliefs are non-voluntary
Steup's replies:
1) Our beliefs are indirectly under our control
2) beliefs are no different than actions in this regard.
Class Notes
Step
-Defends internalism
-Justification is introspective and a priori
-"J-Factors" refers to those things that justify beliefs
-Internalism is about justification, not knowledge
Knowledge involves four aspects:
1) Belief
2) Truth
3) Justification
4) Degettierization
Truth and Degettierization are external. Belief and justification are internal.
The concept of justification is deontological (a matter of duty, obligation, etc.)
A person is epistemically justified if and only if she fluffs her epistemic duties.
Prove that you believe that I am not holding chalk at this moment and I will give you $100.
Alston's objection - Our beliefs are non-voluntary
Steup's replies:
1) Our beliefs are indirectly under our control
2) beliefs are no different than actions in this regard.
Wednesday, October 4, 2006
Internalism vs. Externalism
(Originally Written October 4, 2006 in Epistemology)
Internalism: one can only have knowledge if and only if one has solid evidence (justification). This is known as 'time slice' or synchronic
Externalism: the view that one has knowledge if one's beliefs are the result of a reliable process (reliabilism). This is known as 'genetic' or dischronic
Problems with the externalism approach arise from trying to give "reliable processes" and that it disregards all justification. It could lead to epistemological relativism. But, externalism escape the Gettier Problems altogether, which drive internalists to madness.
Goldman:
Belief forming process (functional operation)
-Reasoning
-Memory process
-perceptual processes
Qualifications:
1. Content neutrality
2. Conditional reliability
Objections:
1. Intuitions and phenomenal beliefs (response: there is a causal history, albeit brief)
2. Benevolent Demon and wishful thinking (responses: wishful thinking may not be true in this world, but it is in the made-up world)
Internalism: one can only have knowledge if and only if one has solid evidence (justification). This is known as 'time slice' or synchronic
Externalism: the view that one has knowledge if one's beliefs are the result of a reliable process (reliabilism). This is known as 'genetic' or dischronic
Problems with the externalism approach arise from trying to give "reliable processes" and that it disregards all justification. It could lead to epistemological relativism. But, externalism escape the Gettier Problems altogether, which drive internalists to madness.
Goldman:
Belief forming process (functional operation)
-Reasoning
-Memory process
-perceptual processes
Qualifications:
1. Content neutrality
2. Conditional reliability
Objections:
1. Intuitions and phenomenal beliefs (response: there is a causal history, albeit brief)
2. Benevolent Demon and wishful thinking (responses: wishful thinking may not be true in this world, but it is in the made-up world)
Thursday, September 21, 2006
A defect in Gettier counter examples?
(Originally written September 21, 2006 in Book 8)
IV. 2 An alleged defect in Gettier Counter Examples
Richard Feldman
Gutter's counter examples have been criticized because they fail due to the belief being based on false propositions. People who criticize this way then accept knowledge as being a justified true belief. But Feldman concludes that other counter examples can be given to show that one can reason from proposition 1 which they now to be true to proposition 2 (also known to be true) to the truth "A", but not have any knowledge of A.
IV. 2 An alleged defect in Gettier Counter Examples
Richard Feldman
Gutter's counter examples have been criticized because they fail due to the belief being based on false propositions. People who criticize this way then accept knowledge as being a justified true belief. But Feldman concludes that other counter examples can be given to show that one can reason from proposition 1 which they now to be true to proposition 2 (also known to be true) to the truth "A", but not have any knowledge of A.
Friday, September 15, 2006
Book notes on Gettier
(Originally written September 15, 2006 in Book 8)
Part IV The Analysis of Knowledge
IV. 1 Is justified true belief knowledge?
Edmund Gettier (1927 - )
Plato:
S knows P if
1) P is true
2) S believes P
3) S is justified in believing P
Chisholm:
S knows P if
1) S accepts P
2) S has adequate evidence that P is true
3) P is true
Ayer:
S knows P if
1) P is true
2) S is sure that P is true
3) S has the right to be sure that P is true
Case I: Suppose S & J have each applied for the same position.
S has strong evidence for proposition "D".
"D" - Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
Proposition "D" entails the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
But in fact S gets the job and buy chance he has ten coins in his pocket.
Proposition "D" turns out to be true and despite knowing with a justified belief that "D" is true he couldn't have possibly had knowledge of it.
Case II: S has strong evidence for proposition "F", Jones owns a Ford.
S has a friend named B, but has no idea where B is.
Therefore S can state
1) J owns a Ford or B is in Boston
2) J owns a Ford or B is in Barcelona
3) J owns a Ford or B is in Bologna
In fact, Jones does not own a Ford and B is in Boston. That makes proposition 1 true, but in spite of his evidence, S had no knowledge of it.
Part IV The Analysis of Knowledge
IV. 1 Is justified true belief knowledge?
Edmund Gettier (1927 - )
Plato:
S knows P if
1) P is true
2) S believes P
3) S is justified in believing P
Chisholm:
S knows P if
1) S accepts P
2) S has adequate evidence that P is true
3) P is true
Ayer:
S knows P if
1) P is true
2) S is sure that P is true
3) S has the right to be sure that P is true
Case I: Suppose S & J have each applied for the same position.
S has strong evidence for proposition "D".
"D" - Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
Proposition "D" entails the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
But in fact S gets the job and buy chance he has ten coins in his pocket.
Proposition "D" turns out to be true and despite knowing with a justified belief that "D" is true he couldn't have possibly had knowledge of it.
Case II: S has strong evidence for proposition "F", Jones owns a Ford.
S has a friend named B, but has no idea where B is.
Therefore S can state
1) J owns a Ford or B is in Boston
2) J owns a Ford or B is in Barcelona
3) J owns a Ford or B is in Bologna
In fact, Jones does not own a Ford and B is in Boston. That makes proposition 1 true, but in spite of his evidence, S had no knowledge of it.
Wednesday, September 13, 2006
Gettier mucking it all up
(Originally Written September 13, 2006 in Epistemology)
Math & Geometry
-involve necessary truths
-can't be conceived to be false
-apply universally
Logical Laws
-law of ideality
-law of the excluded middle
Innate ideas
Plato - encounter with the forms
Descartes - God implanted some innate ideas in us
Kant - we're all hard wired in a similar way
Knowledge = justified true belief. Gettier mucked it all up.
A personal Gettier problem
I have knowledge that my name is Chris. I have strong evidence for this because I have always gone by that name and seen a birth certificate that has the name Chris with my parents' signatures on their. Unbeknownst to me however, two children were born at 11:09 on December 30, 1983 at Holy Cross Hospital. Rob and Vickie Linehan named their son Chris. Rod and Valerie Little named their son Chris. Tragically, baby Chris Linehan and baby Chris Little were accidentally mixed up and given to the wrong parents. My name is Chris is thus, coincidentally true, but my justifying evidence doesn't prove this and therefore, I don't have knowledge that my name is Chris.
Attempted solutions to the Gettier problem:
1. The indefeasibility requirement
2. the conclusive reasons condition
3. the causal condition
4. no false belief
Internalism - in order to know something, I must know how I know it
Externalism - the conditions for knowledge are not necessarily known to the knower
Math & Geometry
-involve necessary truths
-can't be conceived to be false
-apply universally
Logical Laws
-law of ideality
-law of the excluded middle
Innate ideas
Plato - encounter with the forms
Descartes - God implanted some innate ideas in us
Kant - we're all hard wired in a similar way
Knowledge = justified true belief. Gettier mucked it all up.
A personal Gettier problem
I have knowledge that my name is Chris. I have strong evidence for this because I have always gone by that name and seen a birth certificate that has the name Chris with my parents' signatures on their. Unbeknownst to me however, two children were born at 11:09 on December 30, 1983 at Holy Cross Hospital. Rob and Vickie Linehan named their son Chris. Rod and Valerie Little named their son Chris. Tragically, baby Chris Linehan and baby Chris Little were accidentally mixed up and given to the wrong parents. My name is Chris is thus, coincidentally true, but my justifying evidence doesn't prove this and therefore, I don't have knowledge that my name is Chris.
Attempted solutions to the Gettier problem:
1. The indefeasibility requirement
2. the conclusive reasons condition
3. the causal condition
4. no false belief
Internalism - in order to know something, I must know how I know it
Externalism - the conditions for knowledge are not necessarily known to the knower
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