(Originally written December 5, 2006 in Book 12)
A person is praiseworthy (justified) for doing an act (having a belief) if it is what a virtuous person probably would do (or believe).
A right act is what a person with phronesis might do. A wrong act is what a person with phronesis would likely not do.
A moral duty is what a person with phronesis would do in specific circumstances.
A justified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, might believe.
An unjustified belief is what a person motivated by intellectual virtue, possessing understanding, would not believe.
Epistemic duty is what the person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and possesses understanding would believe in a specific situation.
"A belief is an epistemic duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified not to believe it... A belief is an epistemic duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is unjustified to disbelieve it" (Zagzebski, 242).
"An act is a moral duty (strong sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong not to do it. An act is a moral duty (weak sense) in certain circumstances if and only if it is wrong to choose to reject it" (Zagzebski, 243).
A justified belief is what some one with phronesis might believe.
An unjustified belief is what someone with phronesis would not believe.
A belief is a duty when a person with phronesis would believe.
6.2 Acts of Virtue
An act is an act of virtue if it rises out of the motivational component of the virtue, it is something a person with that virtue would do, and it is successful in bringing the end of that specific virtue to fruition.
Part III - The nature of knowledge
2.1 The definition
An act of intellectual virtue is an act that arises out of the motivational component of that virtue, is something a person with that virtue would probably do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the ends of that virtue, and causes the agent to acquire a true belief (cognitive contact with reality)
Definition 1 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 270).
Definition 2 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Definition 3 of knowledge: "Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 271).
Gettier Problems:
The problem for justified true belief theories
"Gettier problems arise when it is only by chance that a justified true belief is true" (Zagzebski, 283).
The Gettier problem has forced knowledge to see one of two things:
1) Justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge and must have an extra component to make it sufficient
2) Justification must be reconciled to make it sufficient
Zagzebski sees both choices as inadequate because neither can escape the Gettier problem.
Internalism and externalism both suffer from the Gettier problem.
Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is an example of a Gettier problem when there is no problem internally, but something causes a false belief, but somehow it is still true.
Reliablism also faces the Getteir problem, in spite of what Alvin Plantinga states.
True beliefs can arise accidentally and thus we have Gettier problems.
Plantinga argues that knowledge is had when the belief warrants it.
Warranty admits degrees, but either the warrant is or is not sufficient for knowledge.
Undefeatable justified belief is immune to Gettier problems because undefeatability entails truth.
Strong defensibility conditions however threaten the assumption of independence of the justification condition and the truth condition for knowledge.
Truth conditions for knowledge must be entailed by the other conditions.
Nearly every contemporary theory of knowledge analyzes knowledge as true belief that is justified or warranted.
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory
Zagzebski states that there are moral analogues of the Gettier problem. She says that a moral act can be performed but it not be virtuous it is moral luck, just like Gettier justified true beef's are epistemic luck.
"Gettier problems in virtue epistemology can be resolved by an analogous move" (Zagzebski, 296).
In Gettier cases the truth is reached by accident. In moral luck cases the right act is done by accident.
"Gettier problems can be avoided if we utilize the concept of an act of intellectual virtue" (Zagzebski, 297).
Acts of intellectual virtues are strictly analogous to acts of moral virtue.
Acts of moral virtue are strongly right in a moral sense; acts of intellectual virtue are strongly justified.
The definition, "knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue" is immune to Gettier problems.
4. Reliablisim
Zagzebski calls her theory of knowledge a combination of externalist and internalist combinations.
Laurence BonJour would call Zagzebski's theory an externalist one. BonJour calls any theory externalism when some of the justifying factors are external to the agent.
Zagzebski claims that her hybrid theory sets it apart from more radical externalist theories like Plantinga's reliablist proper function theory.
Objections to Reliablism
Purely externalist theories imply that the only thing valuable in an instance of knowledge is the value of the truth that is acquired.
Reliablism does not give sufficient conditions for knowing.
Knowledge has more value than true belief.
The value must lie in something in addition to the value of truth and in addition to the reliable mechanism for acquiring true belief.
Showing posts with label BonJour. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BonJour. Show all posts
Tuesday, December 5, 2006
Sunday, December 3, 2006
Intellectual Virtues - Zagzebski
(Originally written December 3, 2006 in Book 12)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
4: The two components of intellectual virtues
Each virtue is definable only in terms of its corresponding motivation.
4.1 The motivation for knowledge and reliable success
A distinction between moral and intellectual virtues can be made on their motivational basis.
Intellectual virtues are motivated by motivation for knowledge.
4.1.1 The motivation for knowledge
Hobbes and Spinoza connected the intellectual virtues with the passions and connected them all with a single motivation: self-preservation or power.
The motivation for knowledge is not a basic motive, it is a form of the motivation for power (Hobbes).
Hobbes states that cognitive virtues/vices arise from differences in motivation.
Deficiency in the desire for truth leads to cognitive vices like dogmatism (Ralph Waldo Emerson).
Hobbes implies that excess in desire for truth also leads to cognitive vices.
John Dewey believes that we ought to cultivate attitudes to foster better motivation to think more effectively.
Hilary Kornblith and Laurence BonJour introduced a motivational element into the notion of epistemic responsibility. Kornbluth stated, "An epistemically responsible agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have his beliefs produced by processes which lead to true beliefs, his actions are guided by these desires" (Zagzebski, 174).
James Montmarquet connected a large set of intellectual virtues with the desire for truth.
Montmarquet calls the desire for truth "epistemic conscientiousness" and claims that some intellectual virtues are out of this desire.
4.1.2 The success component of the intellectual virtues.
Ok, it's 2:30 am. I have a 1500-2000 word essay due at 9:00 am on pgs. 232-282. I'm on page 176. I'm screwed. I had such an emotional drain. I lost my wedding ring and then we spent hours looking for it. Thank God somebody found it.
Contemporary epistemology has focused extensively on the concept of a truth conducive belief-forming process.
There is a weak connection between motive and success. John Dewey made notice of it.
Intellectual virtues arise from and serve the motivation to know the truth and are crucial in activities like the arts, crafts and games.
The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues and the distinction between intellectual and practical virtues are both artificial.
Amelie Rarty pointed out that the utility and success of intellectual virtues depend on their becoming habits, but habits can become pathological and idiotic.
The motivation for intellectual virtue involves a desire for possessing true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs.
The reliabilist theory of truth-conduciveness focuses on it as a function of the number of true beliefs and on the proportion of true to false beliefs.
Zagzebski points out that processes that put forth a high percentage of false beliefs can still be truth-conducive if that process leads to a new way of discovering truth.
Self-correction is essential in Zagzebski's truth-conduciveness theory.
C.S. Pierce claims that the Scientific Method operates under a truth-conducive theory similar to Zagzebski's model.
4.1.3 Montmarquet on the virtues and truth conduciveness
Are intellectual virtues knowledge conducive?
"The motivation to know leads to the motivation to act in intellectually virtuous ways" (Zagzebski, 185).
Montmarquet objects to [the motion that intellectual virtues are truth conducive and intellectual vices are not] because:
1) Some intellectual virtues may not be truth conducive even though they would be desired by persons who love the truth
2) Some intellectual virtues not only seem to fail to lead to truth but aren't associated with the desire for truth
3) The history of ideas does not fit with this
4) some vices may arise out of desire for knowledge
5) Some intellectual vices appear to be truth conducive
I'm going to skip to what I need right now. Pg. 187-231 need to be read still.
pg 232 - This is a quick, not through reading
6. The definition of Deontic Concepts
Acts and beliefs arise from moral and intellectual traits
An act is right because it is the sort of act a virtuous person might do according to pure virtue-theory.
6.1 Right acts, justified beliefs
"A right act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, might do in like circumstances. A wrong act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would not do in like circumstances. A moral duty is what a person who is virtuously motivated and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would do in like circumstances. That is to say, some thing is a duty if and only if it is wrong not to do it" (Zagzebski, 235)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
4: The two components of intellectual virtues
Each virtue is definable only in terms of its corresponding motivation.
4.1 The motivation for knowledge and reliable success
A distinction between moral and intellectual virtues can be made on their motivational basis.
Intellectual virtues are motivated by motivation for knowledge.
4.1.1 The motivation for knowledge
Hobbes and Spinoza connected the intellectual virtues with the passions and connected them all with a single motivation: self-preservation or power.
The motivation for knowledge is not a basic motive, it is a form of the motivation for power (Hobbes).
Hobbes states that cognitive virtues/vices arise from differences in motivation.
Deficiency in the desire for truth leads to cognitive vices like dogmatism (Ralph Waldo Emerson).
Hobbes implies that excess in desire for truth also leads to cognitive vices.
John Dewey believes that we ought to cultivate attitudes to foster better motivation to think more effectively.
Hilary Kornblith and Laurence BonJour introduced a motivational element into the notion of epistemic responsibility. Kornbluth stated, "An epistemically responsible agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have his beliefs produced by processes which lead to true beliefs, his actions are guided by these desires" (Zagzebski, 174).
James Montmarquet connected a large set of intellectual virtues with the desire for truth.
Montmarquet calls the desire for truth "epistemic conscientiousness" and claims that some intellectual virtues are out of this desire.
4.1.2 The success component of the intellectual virtues.
Ok, it's 2:30 am. I have a 1500-2000 word essay due at 9:00 am on pgs. 232-282. I'm on page 176. I'm screwed. I had such an emotional drain. I lost my wedding ring and then we spent hours looking for it. Thank God somebody found it.
Contemporary epistemology has focused extensively on the concept of a truth conducive belief-forming process.
There is a weak connection between motive and success. John Dewey made notice of it.
Intellectual virtues arise from and serve the motivation to know the truth and are crucial in activities like the arts, crafts and games.
The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues and the distinction between intellectual and practical virtues are both artificial.
Amelie Rarty pointed out that the utility and success of intellectual virtues depend on their becoming habits, but habits can become pathological and idiotic.
The motivation for intellectual virtue involves a desire for possessing true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs.
The reliabilist theory of truth-conduciveness focuses on it as a function of the number of true beliefs and on the proportion of true to false beliefs.
Zagzebski points out that processes that put forth a high percentage of false beliefs can still be truth-conducive if that process leads to a new way of discovering truth.
Self-correction is essential in Zagzebski's truth-conduciveness theory.
C.S. Pierce claims that the Scientific Method operates under a truth-conducive theory similar to Zagzebski's model.
4.1.3 Montmarquet on the virtues and truth conduciveness
Are intellectual virtues knowledge conducive?
"The motivation to know leads to the motivation to act in intellectually virtuous ways" (Zagzebski, 185).
Montmarquet objects to [the motion that intellectual virtues are truth conducive and intellectual vices are not] because:
1) Some intellectual virtues may not be truth conducive even though they would be desired by persons who love the truth
2) Some intellectual virtues not only seem to fail to lead to truth but aren't associated with the desire for truth
3) The history of ideas does not fit with this
4) some vices may arise out of desire for knowledge
5) Some intellectual vices appear to be truth conducive
I'm going to skip to what I need right now. Pg. 187-231 need to be read still.
pg 232 - This is a quick, not through reading
6. The definition of Deontic Concepts
Acts and beliefs arise from moral and intellectual traits
An act is right because it is the sort of act a virtuous person might do according to pure virtue-theory.
6.1 Right acts, justified beliefs
"A right act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, might do in like circumstances. A wrong act is what a person who is virtuously motivated, and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would not do in like circumstances. A moral duty is what a person who is virtuously motivated and who has the understanding of the particular situation that a virtuous person would have, would do in like circumstances. That is to say, some thing is a duty if and only if it is wrong not to do it" (Zagzebski, 235)
Sunday, September 24, 2006
BonJour Dancy...
(Originally Written September 24, 2006 in Epistemology)
BonJour:
Strong foundationalism - foundational beliefs have strong warrant
Weak foundationalism - foundational beliefs have low degree of warrant
Two attempted solutions to solve the regress problem:
1) Externalism
2) Cognitive Givenism
Coherentist theory of justification fits better with actual practice
Coherentist theory of justification offers a better account of the justification principles of inference
Coherentist theory of justification supports the notion that knowledge is a social phenomenon
Dancy:
Beliefs have
1. Antecedent Security
2. Subsequent security
BonJour:
Strong foundationalism - foundational beliefs have strong warrant
Weak foundationalism - foundational beliefs have low degree of warrant
Two attempted solutions to solve the regress problem:
1) Externalism
2) Cognitive Givenism
Coherentist theory of justification fits better with actual practice
Coherentist theory of justification offers a better account of the justification principles of inference
Coherentist theory of justification supports the notion that knowledge is a social phenomenon
Dancy:
Beliefs have
1. Antecedent Security
2. Subsequent security
Friday, September 22, 2006
Audi and Foundationalism
(Originally written September 22, 2006 in Epistemology)
Knowledge - justified true belief
In light of Gettier, knowledge is justified true belief + x (no false belief, indefeasibility, external factor, etc)
Theories of Justification
1. Foundationalism
-Classical (Chisholm, Descartes)
-Moderate (Audi)
2. Coherentism (Dancy, BonJour)
3. Contextualism (Annis)
Externalists deny that justification is necessary.
Audi - Moderate foundationalist - the foundation of knowledge doesn't have to be infallible, but knowledge must have a foundation.
Classical (Cartesian) foundationalism:
A) Axiomatic: foundational beliefs must be indubitable
B) Deductivism: non-foundational beliefs are justified only if deduced ultimately from the foundational beliefs
C) Internalism: We must know that we know when we know (2nd order requirements)
Moderate (fallibilist) foundationalism:
-Rejects a, b, and c of Cartesian foundationalism, but retains all other elements of foundationalism.
Audi's advantages of falibilistic foundationalism:
1. It solves the regress problem
2. It accords with common sense
3. It is psychologically plausible
4. It integrates epistemology with psychology and biology
5. It is not dogmatic
Knowledge - justified true belief
In light of Gettier, knowledge is justified true belief + x (no false belief, indefeasibility, external factor, etc)
Theories of Justification
1. Foundationalism
-Classical (Chisholm, Descartes)
-Moderate (Audi)
2. Coherentism (Dancy, BonJour)
3. Contextualism (Annis)
Externalists deny that justification is necessary.
Audi - Moderate foundationalist - the foundation of knowledge doesn't have to be infallible, but knowledge must have a foundation.
Classical (Cartesian) foundationalism:
A) Axiomatic: foundational beliefs must be indubitable
B) Deductivism: non-foundational beliefs are justified only if deduced ultimately from the foundational beliefs
C) Internalism: We must know that we know when we know (2nd order requirements)
Moderate (fallibilist) foundationalism:
-Rejects a, b, and c of Cartesian foundationalism, but retains all other elements of foundationalism.
Audi's advantages of falibilistic foundationalism:
1. It solves the regress problem
2. It accords with common sense
3. It is psychologically plausible
4. It integrates epistemology with psychology and biology
5. It is not dogmatic
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