What is this thing called science? Ch. 9

(Originally written November 8, 2006 in Book 8)

What is this thing called science?
Alan Chalmers

Chapter 9 - Theories as Structures II: research programs

[Introducing Imre Lakatos]

Lakatos was an Hungarian who moved to England and was influenced by Popper. Although an avid Popper supporter, Lakatos was able to recognize the problems of falsificationism. He grafted some of Kuhn's work into sophisticated falsificationism.

[Lakatos' Research Programs]

Main problem with Popper's falsificationism was no clear guidance in determining what was falsified in an experiment.

Lakatos claimed that not all laws are equal in science. Some laws are so fundamental to be the nature of a science. These cannot be falsified.

The fundamental principles are the "hard core" of a research program to Lakatos.

Lakatos called all additions to the hard core as the protective belt. Thus, things falsified in the protective belt do not harm the hard core.

Lakatos made free usage of a heuristic. A heuristic is a set of rules or hints to aid discovery or invention.

The positive heuristic of a program stresses what one should do.

Lakatos emphasized the development of research programs as the progress of science.

He stressed the fact that observational statements become relevant in late stages of development.

Lakatos states that it is not the early falsification of observations, but late, mature confirmations of observations that truly matter.

The merits of a research program come from both the extent it leads to novel predictions and the extent it actually affects a program.

A progressive research program will retain its coherence and lead to confirmation of novel predictions.

A degenerating research program will be one that loses its coherence and will be one that loses its coherence and/or fail to lead to novel predictions' confirmations.

"The replacement of a degenerating program by a progressive one constitutes Lakatos' version of a scientific revolution" (Chalmers, 135-136).

[Methodology within a program and the comparison of programs]

A modification or addition to any field's protective belt is the purpose of science, so long as they are not ad hoc.

Modifications to the hard core are strictly prohibited by Lakatos.

Lakatos was dissatisfied with Kuhn's relativist account of scientific revolution and proposed that progressive replacing degenerating programs was not relative.

[Novel Predictions] pg 138

Lakatos' progress relied heavily on novel predictions.

Novel predictions as defined by Popper would not fit into Lakatos' system.

Lakatos' methodology states that a program is progressive to the extent that it makes natural, not novel or contrived or ad hoc predictions.

[Testing the methodology against history]

Lakatos was concerned with the history of science.

A theory of science must match an historical account of science.

Popper and Lakatos regarded Kuhn's analysis of science as mere description and thus, not a viable philosophy of science.

Lakatos criticizes positivist and falsficationist models for philosophy of science because they do not fit in with the facts of the history of science.

Research programs are given time to mature and develop despite early falsifications.

But Lakatos does not give a guideline to scientists who need to choose between two rival programs. There is no objective way of choosing.

[Problems with Lakatos' Methodology]

Lakatos' method is not an accurate description of science? Where are the historical hard cores?

Lakatos insists that program shifts must be via rational inquiry, but there is no historical or contemporary factual basis for this.

Lakatos simplicity suggests that his methodology answers the question of what, if anything, constitutes scientific knowledge.

Lakatos claims that the central problem in the philosophy of science is stating universal conditions under which a theory is scientific.

Lakatos' claim of solving these problems proved to be a farce and his criteria inadequate for objectively determining when a program is progressive, degenerative or in need of replacement.

His theory worked well in hindsight, but was not capable of foresight.

Another major flaw of Lakatos' theory was that he emphasized the historical significance and studied only physics. He then applied it to other studies. Thus, he stated only that a study is not science if it does not match physics' criteria. But if something is not physics does that make it not science?