(Originally written November 26, 2006 in Book 8)
Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski
2.1
Internists often try to relativize epistemic justification. A justification in internalism is one that justifies an individual's belief
2.2 The neglect of understanding and wisdom
Arguments against contemporary epistemology have shown that it is favorable to adapting a virtue epistemology.
Some philosophers have complained that contemporary epistemology is insufficiently attentive to the social aspects of cognitive activity.
Virtue is more adaptable to social context than reliabilist positions like reliable belief-forming mechanism (Goldman) or belief forming faculty (Sosa).
Aristotle understand the acquisition of virtue as fundamentally social.
Jonathon Kvanvig objects to the focus on one belief in one person in epistemology. If it is impossible to abstract a single belief from a core of beliefs, a belief-based epistemological theory appears less attractive.
Contemporary epistemology is concerned with amassing the most propositional knowledge as possible.
In post-Aristotelian ancient philosophy and modern philosophy certitude has been favored over wisdom. Wisdom was the focus of Plato, Aristotle, the Middle Age philosophies by the latter two, Spinoza and Locke.
Propositional knowledge was secondary to wisdom and understanding in Greek philosophy. Plato (according to Julius Moravcsik) sees propositional knowledge as a derivative of the process of understanding.
Moravcsik maintains that the increasing complexity of modern social and scientific theories has created a need to return to the concept of understanding in epistemology.
Gai Fine holds that Plato's focus on understanding in his epistemology leads to a less atomistic approach in epistemology.
Understanding ought to be a major point in epistemology. It has been ignored for too long
A belief-based epistemology is incapable of explaining the nature of understanding involving the comprehension of structures of reality, rather than its propositional structure.
Wisdom, like understanding has been neglected in modern epistemology.
Wisdom is tough to define, but whatever it is, it is qualitatively different than the accumulation of propositional knowledge.
Wisdom is not a property of propositional beliefs or a matter of relations between propositional beliefs.
Wisdom is concerned with grasping reality as a whole.
3. More reasons to try a virtue approach: the relations between believing and feeling
The advantages of virtue-based epistemology have been shown from:
1) Ethics and corresponding epistemic theories
2) Problems within epistemology
Now, 3) Philosophy of mind
"The treatment of belief as a psychic state independent of non-cognitive states is happily nearing its demise" (Zagzebski, 51).
Stephen Stich argues that the concept of belief is a useless figment of folk psychology.
Psychic states conventionally assigned to epistemologists are not that distinct from psychic states assigned to ethicists.
Many philosophers tend to think of the influence of feeling as an embarrassment, a defect, that needs to be eliminated.
William James held feelings in high regards, stating that belief is more allied to the emotions than anything else.
James defined belief as "the sense of reality". Hume defined belief as to believe is to have a vivid impression.
Without going as fas as James or Hume we can find supporting evidence that vividness of conception is causally connected with belief.
Belief comes in degrees. Belief is closely connected with states like wanting, hoping and expecting.
Wanting and hoping are emotive states, whereas belief and expecting are usually not considered emotive. But, are the emotive states truly distinguishable from cognitive states?
Emotion is either a component of belief or has a direct causal relationship with belief.
It is a widely held false notion that a belief influenced by desire makes it a belief acquired independent of facts.
If beliefs and emotions are intimately connected then we should be motivated to search for connections between moral and intellectual values.
4. An objection to modeling evaluation in epistemology on ethics: the dispute over the voluntariness of belief
The widespread assumption that human actions are voluntary, whereas cognitive activity is involuntary could completely undermine the connection of theoretical ethics and normative epistemology.
Believing is thought to be involuntary and this is the strongest argument against evaluating beliefs like moral evaluation.
Beliefs often seem to be the outcome of instinctive processes.
If beliefs are involuntary, then it is inappropriate to evaluate them from a moral standpoint.
It is wrong to blame a person for a belief if it is involuntary.
4.1 The irrelevance of the objection to virtue theory
Since belief is not the focal point of virtue epistemology, the voluntary or involuntary nature of a belief is less important than a person's disposition to virtue or vice.
The question is then: are our intellectual virtues and vices as voluntary as our moral virtues and vices?
Intellectual courage, perseverance, honesty and sincerity appear to be voluntary. But perceptiveness, insight and ability to form theories appear to be less voluntary and based on natural ability.
But, the intellectual virtues based on natural ability are at least as voluntary to the moral virtues of generosity or the vice of envy.
4.2 The voluntariness of belief
The difference between acts and beliefs is less great than what is thought.
Hume is one of the strongest adherents of involuntary belief. James and Descartes are voluntary belief supporters.
The Cartesian position is that the Will, not the intellect assists in one's belief.
Pascal held that the will is one of the chief organs in belief.
Modern cognitive voluntarism theories come from Murray Clarke, Christopher Hookway, Jonathon Cohen and Lorraine Code.
Zagzebski hold that beliefs are like acts in that they arrange themselves on a continuum of degrees of voluntariness.
Perceptual beliefs which are on the low end of the scale of voluntariness should not be used as paradigm cases for human rationality and justification any more than sneezing or scratching an itch should be used as paradigm cases for moral evaluation
4.3 Moral and Epistemic Luck
Sometimes we blame or praise a person more than is deserved because of moral luck or moral unluckiness.
The Kantian attempt to ground moral evaluation in something free of luck is problematic.
Moral luck is relevant to virtue-based epistemology in two ways:
1. It makes the attempt to model epistemology after ethics easier
2. The rejection of the Kantian position that our moral status is completely within our control takes away one of the motivations for wanting the Kantian theory in the first place
A virtue-based epistemology, because it focuses on inner traits, does not have to pay much attention to moral luck.
Even though few, if any, beliefs are objects of direct choice, they are as voluntary as many acts or omissions of acts for which we are responsible.
5. Conclusion to Part I: Why center epistemology on the virtues?
Be open-minded to see the outcome!
No comments:
Post a Comment