What is this thing called science? Ch. 6

(Originally written November 3, 2006 in Book 8)

What is this thing called Science?
Alan Chalmers

Chapter 6 - Sophisticated falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science

Relative rather than absolute degrees of falsifiability

Sophisticated falsificationism admits that "the more falsifiable the better" is insufficient

Sophisticated falsificationism holds that a theory must be more falsifiable than the one it is replacing.

Sophisticated falsificationism emphasizes the growth of science

It takes a more holistic view than naive falsificationism

Increasing falsifiability and ad hoc modifications

As a science progresses its theories ought to become more falsifiable

Any modification to a theory that is not independently testable is ad hoc and rejected by falsficationism

Popper claims that independently falsifiable modifications are acceptable is falsificationism

Confirmation in the falsifications account of science

Popper claims that advances in science are due to falsifications. Chalmers claims that confirmations of bold conjectures are the cause of scientific advance. Falsifications of cautious conjectures also leads to advances because what was once held to be undoubtedly true is proven false.

Falsified bold conjectures and confirmed cautious conjectures yield little importance.

Confirmations of novel predictions yield great discovery.

Boldness, novelty and background knowledge

Boldness and novelty is based on the relativity of background knowledge.

Background knowledge is merely the accepted scientific theory of a given point in time.

What was bold or novel in 1920 is not bold or novel now and what is bold or novel now may not be bold or novel in 2050 and so on.

Comparison of the inductivist and falsificationist view of confirmation.

The emphasis on scientific growth distinguishes falsificationism and inductivism.

Falsificationism relies on history. Inductivism does not.

Advantages of falsificationism over inductivism

1. facts and experimental results are theory dependent and fallible.

Inductivism claims science has a factual, not theoretical base, but since facts and experiment results are theory-dependent and fallible it is problematic for inductivism

falsificationism does not face the problem of inductivism

Inductivists have trouble explaining and justifying inferences; falsificationism avoids these by claiming induction has nothing to do with science.

Inductivism aims at probable truth, which they fail to deliver. Falsificationism aims for progress, which it delivers. But does this lead us anywhere?