Virtues of the Mind - A theory of virtue and vice

(Originally written November 26, 2006 in Book 8)

Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski

Part II: A Theory of Virtue and Vice

Pure virtue theory makes the concept of a right act derivative from the concept of virtue.

The two main forms of pure virtue theory Zagzebski is concerned with are:
1) Happiness-based
2) motivation-based

Motivation-based pure virtue theory is more radical, but it can still be developed in ways that adequately handle epistemic evaluation

1. Types of Virtue Theories

Most ethical theories have something to say about virtues, but virtue theories focus on the analysis of concepts involved in evaluation rather than the evaluation itself.

The weakest form of virtue theory focuses on virtue because it contends that the concept of virtue offers the most useful criterion for the rightness of an act. Zagzebski does not call this a pure-virtue theory.

In a pure virtue theory a right act is defined in terms of the concept of virtue or a component of virtue as motivation. Also, the property of rightness is something that emerges from the inner traits of persons.

Rightness or wrongness of an act is directly tied to inner personal traits.

A good argument for pure virtue-theory has a strong argument in its favor: persons are ontologically more fundamental than acts; acts are defined in terms of persons. Thus, virtues and vices are ontologically more fundamental than the rightness or wrongness of acts. Thus, the concept of right act ought to be defined in terms of the concept of virtue.

The concept of a good life (eudaemonia) or good in the impersonal sense is the easiest way to interpret Aristotle's ethics. Michael Slote calls this "agent-prior"; Zagzebski calls it "good-based".

Slote promotes "agent-based" theory. This theory makes virtue, motivation and other internal states of the agent ethically fundamental.

An act is right because it is an act of a virtuous person would (or might) do. A state of affairs is good because it is what virtuous persons are motivated to want or to pursue.

In the common form of good-based theory the virtues are explained as constituents of the good life or as means to the good light (where the good life is identified with happiness or the Aristotelian concept of eudaemonia).

Rosalind Hursthouse, an advocate of this good-based, the "happiness-based" theory defines virtue as "a character trait a human being needs to flourish or live well" (Zagzebski, 81).

According to Hursthouse the order of the fundamental concepts is the good in the sense of eudaemonia is conceptually foundational. The concept of virtue is derivative from the concept of eudaemonia and the concept of a right act is derivative from the concept of a virtue.

Eudaemonia -->Virtue --> Right act

2. The nature of virtue

2.1 The many notions of virtue

A virtue is an excellence, but not every excellence is a virtue.

Virtue is a broad, broad term. Hume's usage of it is one of the broadest uses in the history of philosophy, encompassing justice, fidelity, honor, allegiance, chastity, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, moderation, public spirit, discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, temperance, sobriety, patience, constancy, perseverance, forethought, considerateness, secrecy, order, insinuation, address, presence of mind, quickness of conception, facility of expression, etc.

Despite the broadness of the term 'virtue', Victorian England limited virtue to chastity and the archaic ring to the term has caused many to abandon it.

Most people use the term 'virtue' in a broader sense than the Victorian Age and in a narrower sense than either Hume or Aristotle.

Another nearly universal claim about virtues is that it is a state of the soul or a property that is attributed to a person on a very deep level.

The concept of a virtue has both theoretical and practical significance.

The practical aspect of virtues is that we can use them in making decisions and in evaluating others.

John Locke points out that particular virtues and vices are culturally relevant, but that in every case a virtue is something that is praiseworthy and vice is something that is blameworthy.

Locke points out that despite variations in virtues, there is a good deal of uniformity and he rejects a conventionalist conclusion.

There is at leas a minimal core concept of virtue that is uncontroversially universal.

"An analysis of virtue is hopeless, I believe, unless we can assume that most of a selected list of traits count as virtues and do so in a way that is not strictly culture bound" (Zagzebski, 89).

An account of virtue should contain these traits:
1) Virtue is an excellence
2) Virtue is a deep trait of a person
3) Those qualities that have appeared on the greatest number of lists of the virtues in different places and different times in history are actual virtues: wisdom, courage, benevolence, justice, honesty, loyalty, integrity and generosity.
4) Some virtues are intellectual, others moral, some may be neither moral nor intellectual
5) It should aim for a high degree of theoretical significance combined with practical usefulness

2.2 Virtue and the good

When we call a virtue good, do we mean that it makes the possessor good? Or do we mean that the possession of the virtue is good?

If the virtue makes the possessor good, then it is admirable; if it is good to be possessed it is desirable.

As a property, a virtue can be considered an abstract object. "is that abstract object good in itself or do we call it good only because it makes its possessor good?" (Zagzebski, 90)

Thomas Aquinas held that a virtue is called good, not because good is a property of it, but because it makes the possessor good.

Aquinas denies the possibility of making bad use of a virtue.

Virtue is a good-making quality of a person and a quality that cannot lead to bad use. Virtue is good for the world in Aquinas.

Can a virtue be used to make a bad act? Courage in a Nazi makes him much worse than if he was a coward.

Gregory Trianosky proposes that virtue is a certain kind of potentiality. A virtue is a potential contributor to the overall moral worth of a possessor.

Zagzebski holds that "a virtue is worth having even in those cases in which it makes a person worse over all" (Zagzebski, 93). A person is better off having the virtue, even if the possessor must overcome some other trait because without that virtue the moral agent would have to overcome the lack of virtue and the other moral defect.

Anyone who possess a virtue is closer to achieving high moral worth thane who does not possess it. Zagzebski applies this principle to epistemology as well. Anyone with an intellectual virtue is closer to a high epistemic status even if that intellectual virtue leads to wrong beliefs.

Book 8: 09/04/06 - 11/26/06

Christopher Linehan