Virtues of the Mind - Introduction

(Originally Written November 19, 2006 in Book 8)

Virtues of the Mind
An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

Introduction

The deepest disputes in epistemology focus on concepts that are ethical. Epistemic duty, epistemic responsibility, we ought to form beliefs in one way, one way of believing is good, intellectual virtue... are all ethical concepts.

"Almost all epistemological theories are modeled on act-based moral theories" (Zagzebski, xiii).

A true aretaic approach to epistemology requires a theory of virtue that fives intellectual virtues their proper place.

Zagzebski claims that she will show how normative epistemology is a branch of ethics; either discipline is ignores the other at its peril.

She holds that intellectual virtue is the primary normative component of both justified belief and knowledge.

Zagzebski divides the book into three parts:
1. Part I is on meta-epistemology
2. Part II is on normative ethics
3. Part III is on normative epistemology

Part I: The Methodology of Epistemology

Knowledge is the central concern of epistemology. It is one of the major interests of philosophy from its beginning.

Roderick Chisholm stated that "many of the characteristics philosophers have thought peculiar to ethical statements also hold of epistemic statements" (Zagzebski, 1).

Nearly all contemporary epistemic theories take an act-based moral theory as their model.

Zagzebski hopes to make a connection between theoretical ethics and normative epistemology. But, she admits that a major objection hampers this: acts are voluntary, but beliefs are not. This means there is a rift between the primary object of moral evaluation (the act) and the primary object of epistemic evaluation (the belief).