What is this thing called science? Ch. 4 (B)

(Originally written October 30, 2006 in Book 8)

What is this thing called science? Ch. 4
A. Chalmers

To avoid the problem of induction one can weaken the demand that scientific knowledge be proven true. Instead, scientific knowledge would be probably true.

Thus, under this assumption the principle of induction would be as follows: "if a large number of A's have been observed under a wide variety of conditions, and if all these observed A's have the property B, then all A's probably have the property B" (Chalmers, 51-52).

Unfortunately, this reformulation does not solve the problem of induction, It is still a universal statement; it still relies on a number of particulars producing a universal.

Another major problem faced by the inductivist is that how probable is probably true?

"We are bound to run into trouble if we seek rational justifications of every principle we use, for we cannot provide a rational argument for rational argument itself without assuming what we are arguing for" (Chalmers, 53).

Logic cannot even be argued for in a way that doesn't beg the question a little bit.

The appeal of inductivism

Facts acquired through observation --> Induction --> Laws and theories --> Deduction --> Predictions and explanations

Inductivism does not search for truth of premises in a deductive argument in logic. The source of the premises' truth is in experience.

The general form of all scientific explanation and predictions can be summarized this way:

1. Laws and theories
2. Initial conditions
3. Predictions and explanations

The attraction of inductivism lies in the fact that it seems to capture some of the commonly held intuitions about the special characteristics of scientific knowledge, including:

1. Objectivity
2. Reliability
3. Usefulness

The objectivity of science from the inductivist point of view is derived from the objectivity of observation, induction, and deduction process.

Observation is objective if and only if they are established by an unprejudiced use of the sense in such a way that leaves no room for intrusion by subjective opinion.

Induction and deduction are objective so long as they conform to a publicly formulated set of criterion. If this is done then subjective opinion is again left out of the equation.

"Inferences either conform to the objective standards or they don't" (Chalmers, 57).

The reliability of science in the inductivist point of view comes from inductivism's claims about observation, induction and deduction.

The careful use of the senses can lead to a secure factual basis for science according to the inductivist.

By presuming the principle of induction to be the basis of science, the laws and theories derived inductively from the factual basis of science, the laws and theories derived inductively from the factual basis of science can be held as reliable. (This is the circular problem of inductivism).

Chalmers: At best, inductivism is in dire need of sever qualification. At worst, inductivism is wholly inadequate.