Metaphysical & Moral Evil

(Originally written March 25, 2007 in Book 25)

Augustine: All things are Metaphysically Good

All things (substances) are good because God created them.

He denied the dualist contention of an all good substance and an all evil substance because God is supreme existence and if the were an opposite of God it would be superman non-existence. Hence, there is no two great powers dualism.

"Every substance as such is good" - Augustine

God, the supreme Good is incorruptible. he is the standard by which evil is measured and cannot be evil.

All created goods are corruptible because they are not simple, they are composite.

Created beings by their nature contain the possibility (but not the necessity) of metaphysical evil.

Creation makes evil possible, but evil is actualized by creatures, not the Creator.

Evil is not a substance. It is simply the loss of good. It is a privation of substance.

Evil is a deficiency in some substance. It has no existence of its own, it subsists within another.

Any substance that has been corrupted by evil may be said to be an evil substance, but whatever substance it still possess is nonetheless good. The same is true of anything's nature.

God is not the cause of metaphysical evil.

Augustine held that the efficient cause of evil is unknowable because what is nothing cannot be known.

Being cannot corrupt itself or any other being. Nonbeing cannot corrupt being.

Freedom is the cause of evil. The ultimate cause of evil is moral. The cause of privation is pride.

If freedom is the cause of sin it is meaningless to ask what is the cause of freedom because freedom is the first cause of sin.

The meaningful question is 'how did evil come about?'

Augustine used the example of Satan to illustrate how evil came about. Satan, being conscious of himself took a perverted pleasure in himself in imitating God. Pride was the origin of Satan's sin.

Evil never completely corrupts a good.

Even though God did not create evil he orders it for his own good purpose.

Evil is part of a total picture of good.

Aquinas: Evil is a metaphysical privation

Aquinas held that metaphysical evil is a metaphysical privation with no formal cause and only an indirect efficient cause.

Evil is a privation in a good. A thing is evil in that it lacks a perfection it ought to have.

Utter evil is impossible. Evil has no essence of its own.

Nothing can be essentially evil.

Evil has no formal cause. Evil has no form; it is disorder, not order.

Evil is a privation of form.

Evil has no final cause.

Evil has a material cause, but its material cause is good because matter is good.

Evil has an indirect efficient cause. Evil is a byproduct of causality.

God caused evil incidentally. Through his creative power he indirectly caused either because through creating some things God must destroy others or because there is an incapacity in what he causes.

Human nature is neither diminished nor destroyed by evil.

A fallen human being is metaphysically good but weakened morally.

Conclusions from the Augustinian-Thomistic Solution

Metaphysically, evil has no essence or being of its own. Evil has no form or formal cause.

God is not the direct, efficient cause of evil.

Moral evil is rooted in human freedom.

The nature of human beings cannot be totally corrupted.

Human metaphysical nature is not diminished to the point that a person is no longer rationally and morally responsible for his actions.

The grace of God enables the person to overcome whatever propensities to evil he has so he is able to not sin.

Finitude makes evil possible, but not necessary.

The theistic answer to metaphysical evil solves the existence of evil without retreating to dualism, but does not answer why evil exists.

The theistic answer to metaphysical illusionism.

Evil may not be a real entity but it is a reality.

Metaphysical evil is not nothing. It indicates that something ought to be there.

Contemporary rejoinders

G. Stanley Kane states that the notion of evil as privation is almost universally ignored or misunderstood. He holds that any attempt of refuting the privation theory makes elementary mistakes:

1) it confuses privation with illusion
2) demands that God is the efficient cause of privation
3) asserts that the privation theory does not comfort those who suffer

Kane however argues against it like this

1) The theory of evil as privation has been advanced as a general theory to account for all evils
2) Some evils are clearly not privations
a) pain is a positive evil
b) moral evil is a positive evil
3) Therefore, the privation theory does not fulfill its intended purpose

Linehan response:

Pain is not a positive evil:

1) Pain is the result of something that occurs (i.e. I have a headache because I have not had my coffee today or I have a toothache because I have a cavity)
2) Pain derives its existence in a substance, it does not exist apart from any substance
3) Pain is thus, not a substance
4) Whatever is not a substance cannot have a positive existence of its own
5) Pain is therefore, some deficiency or privation of a normal state within a substance

Moral evil is not a positive evil

1) Whatever is a moral evil must exist within a moral creature
2) There can be no absolutely morally evil creature because absolute evil entails non-existence
3) Thus, if any creature possess or commits a moral evil they do not do so absolutely
4) If there is no absolute moral evil there must be degrees of moral evil because there are some moral evils and not all are equal in quantity (while they may be so qualitatively)
5) If there are degrees of quantity within moral evil they cannot exist on their own right because there are no degrees between existence and non-existence. Either something exists fully or it does not exist at all
6) Whatever does not have its own existence cannot be a substance
7) Whatever is not a substance cannot have positive standing
8) Therefore, moral evil is not a positive evil

16 The Moral Problem of Evil

3 Kinds of evil:
1) Moral
2) Metaphysical
3) Physical

It seems obvious that some nonmoral evil is not the result of human free will.

Natural evil is evil that does not result from human choice. Moral evil is resulted of human choice.

The problem of moral evil and the Alternatives for theism

Moral Evil: The Problem and Actual Alternatives

1) Evil exists
2) An omnipotent God could destroy evil
3) A benevolent God would destroy evil
4) Therefore, Either God is benevolent and impotent, malevolent, or impotent and malevolent or God does not exit

The theist objects to premise three and states God is actually working to eliminate evil.

Moral Evil: The Bind of the Hypothetical Alternatives

Plantinga and the Free Will Defense

Plantinga holds that in order for the world to be morally good it must possess creatures who can do moral good. Only free creatures are capable of doing morally good work.