Final Notes on Virtue Epistemology

(Originally written December 8, 2006 in Book 12)

4.2 Anticipated objections to my theory from the perspective of reliablilism

Intellectual virtues are reliably truth conducive, but they are not virtue simply because they are reliable.

To have knowledge one needn't possess intellectual virtues, but that person must imitate the behavior of intellectually virtuous persons and must be virtuously motivated.

The value of reliability rests on the value of motive for knowledge in motivation-based virtue epistemology.

There is no special value of a true belief that formed via a reliable mechanism.

Doesn't knowledge sometimes come out of intellectual vices?

Zagzebski answers this in two ways:
1) These instances are not knowledge at all
2) These instances satisfy her definition of knowledge (this is her preferred stance).

Beliefs formed out of intellectual vices may occasionally prove true, but something will be amiss in their doxastic structure. Knowledge cannot arise out of a wrong doxastic structure.

Zagzebski' preferred argument begins with Aristotle's distinction of good people (agathos) and good and noble people (kalos kagathos).

Even people, when acting from a vice, can use some virtuous motivation. Even the Nazi showed the virtue of courage in his viciousness. Because some virtue is a partial motivation, the true belief can be knowledge.

5. Plantinga's theory of proper function

Alvin Plantinga's theory of proper function has been labeled as a kind of virtue epistemology.

Planting's theory is more externalist than is defensible and susceptible to common arguments against reliablism.

Planting's definition of knowledge makes reliability a necessity for knowledge, but not a sufficient criteria for it.

Planting's theory has advantages over externalism, but faces the same problems.

One problem is that the proper function of faculties is manipulatable.

Another problem is that it is atomistic like belief-based epistemologies.

A virtue theory has an advantage over proper function theories in solving the generality problem.

The conviction of a belief in a problematic thing to base an epistemology on.

6. Harmonizing Internal and External Aspects of knowing

Planting's theory can be distorted. Zagzebski states hers can be twisted to be more extanerlist than she intends.

Contemporary epistemology faces some serious problems:
1) The concept of knowledge has been overlooked and the idea of understanding has been neglected.
2) The concept of justification is muddled and too ambiguous
3) The stalemate betwixt internalism and externalism

Some day I may reread Virtues of the Mind, but not for awhile. This was a truly difficult read for me. Right now, I am unconvinced. I am not sure if that is because I don't quite understand it or because there is nothing really there to understand.