Metaphysics - Ch. 9 (B)

(Originally written August 11, 2006 in Book 6)

Metaphysics - Peter van Inwagen

Chapter 9 (continued)

The relativity of identity theory and fourth dimensionalism are strange. "Very few philosophers have any sympathy with the theory of relativity of identity" (van Inwagen, 175). There are a few solid proponents of fourth dimensionalism but most regard it as a crazy metaphysic.

Van Inwagen asks can a physicalist believe in the identity of a human person without appealing to the relativity of identity or fourth dimensionalism? He answers yes, citing that living organisms (humans) are "a kind of storm of atoms that is constantly, and very rapidly changing its membership".

Linehan - I would say then in order to accept it we must have solid proofs or evidence of physical thoughts. If physicalism is correct then philosophy necessarily must be an empirical science. If everything is physical then everything must be physically observable. It may be that we are not scientifically advanced enough to observe physical thoughts, but I find no compelling reason to believe this. It is like a belief in aliens. We cannot prove or disprove their existence, but I find no compelling reason to believe they exist.

It seems that physicalism is incompatible with life after death. But, the Judeo-Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead "implies that our future life is not something that happens in the natural course of events" (van Inwagen, 178). But the resurrection of the dead not combined with a belief in a non-physical soul is problematic.

Arguments for physicalism

There are four arguments which van Inwagen believes tips the scale in physicalism's favor.

1) The interaction argument - it is a difficult task to understand how a non-physical thing could interact with a physical thing. Why even try?

2) The argument from common speech: common speech shows that we perceive ourselves as something physical.

3. The remote control argument - Dualism operates like a remote control. The consciousness is like the remote and a TV is the body. If dualism is right then a blow to the TV would damage the body but leave the consciousness alone. But, if a person is struck in the head they lose consciousness. Thus, there can be no remote, except an internal, physical one.

4) The duplication argument (van Inwagen calls this the strongest argument for physicalism). A duplicating machine will produce an exact replica of a human being and the replica will have all the static and dynamic characteristics of the real human being.

Plato would say that the duplicate would be cloned dead. Descartes would say that the duplicate would be mindless and simply be a human organism, incapable of thought and sensation.

Van Inwagen states that he has shown physicalism more plausible than dualism, but nonetheless though and feeling remain "impenetrable mysteries".

Linehan's arguments against these four:

1) The interaction argument - The non-physical cannot easily causally interact with the physical. Rain makes people sad. A physical action outside of a person's body causes an emotion inside of a person. Even if this is a totally physical phenomena it is just as difficult to explain as a non-physical - physical causal relation. Why would an unconscious thing be painful enough to affect a conscious thing?

2) The argument from common speech - this argument is ridiculous. Language is symbolic and used to make the communication of ideas easier. Colloquialisms and slangs prove my point. Sam could say that a car "X" is cool or hot without meaning physical temperature. It is an expression.

3) The remote-control argument - This is a good argument, I need more time to consider it.

4) The duplication argument (the strongest) - Pure hypothetical nonsense.