Skepticism (C)

(Originally written September 4, 2006 in Book 6)

Continuing on Hume

He wonders why we believe in the existence of the body. He states that we could have this belief for three reasons:
1) our senses
2) our reason
3) our imagination

It cannot be our senses because our perceptions can change. It cannot be our reason because reason lacks sufficient premises to establish the existence of physical objects. Thus, the imagination is the only plausible cause of the belief in the physical world.

Constancy and coherence of impression are what cause our belief in the external world, but it is not a proof of an external world.

A section from Treatise on Human Nature

"It is in vain to ask, whether there be body or not?" (Pojman, 40).

Hume focuses on the cause of our belief in an external world.

Why do we believe a 'continued' existence of physical objects even when they are not present to the senses? Why do we believe in a 'distinct' existence of physical objects (separate from the mind and perception)?  Is it the senses, reason or the imagination that produces the opinion of a continued and distinct existence? As for the senses, they cannot facilitate a continued existence because they are not always at the senses' attention line; I close my eyes or I leave the room. They cannot (the senses) produce distinct existence either without the use of reason or imagination. Thus, our belief in continued and distinct existence of the physical world cannot be produced by our senses.

The senses do not provide us with this thought for three reasons:
1) Ascribing a real corporeal existence to objects of our impression of the mind received from our body is a difficulty. How can the body perceive so the mind knows?
2) Sounds, tastes and smells are commonly regarded as of the mind and thus cannot be situated externally of the body.
3) Our sight cannot inform us of distances without some assistance of our reasoning.

The senses provide us with three types of impressions:
1) Figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies
2) Colors, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold of bodies
3) Pain and pleasure sensations caused by objects interacting with our body

Philosophers and the vulgar consider 1) to have a distinct and continued existence. The vulgar consider 2) to have distinct and continued existence. Neither the philosopher nor the vulgar believe 3) to have distinct and continued existence.

Our reason is incapable of providing us with a belief in a continued or distinct existence without the assistance of our sensory perceptions. But, since our sense perceptions are not the cause of a continued and distinct existence, neither can reason be. Thus, the opinion of a continued and distinct existence must come from our imagination.

Coherence and constancy are found in the imagination. When I leave the room for thirty minutes, when the TV is on, I find the TV on with a different picture on it. I do not perceive the changes of the TV through my senses as I am gone, but my imagination allows me a constancy or a continued existence of the TV. Continued existence depends on coherence and constancy of certain impressions.

There is a connection between the principle of continued existence and distinct existence. Each of our sensory perceptions is a new impression. We attribute continued existence from our imagination.

Philosophers attempt to distinguish between objects of perception and the perceptions themselves. Perceptions are not continued or distinct, but the objects are distinct and continued.

Hume states that the distinction is not one that should be made.

We cannot know cause and effect.

Our perceptions are not continued and distinct; how can they be identical to the physical world which is continued and distinct? We assume that our perceptions resemble external objects for no valid reasoning. The relation of cause and effect which provides us the basis of this belief is unable to provide us with proof for the existence of continued and distinct existence. Thus, the assumption crumbles.

"We can never conceive of anything but perceptions, and therefore must make everything resemble them" (Polman, 47).

We also assume that every particular object resembles that perception. This also relies n our fallacious knowledge of the relationship between cause and effect.

Hume began with confidence in his senses and now has no confidence at all in them. Regardless, we still ought to believe in the physical world for practical purposes.

A Defense of Common Sense
G.E. Moore

-1873-1958
-Professor at Cambridge University
-He offers a proof against skepticism and for common sense

"1. If skepticism is true, we do not have knowledge of the External World.
2. But we do have knowledge of the external world (Moore gives many examples)
3. Therefore, skepticism is false" (Pojman, 49).

Moore starts by offering truisms:
1. I have a living body
2. The body was born at a specific time
3. My body has existence continuously since my birth
4. My body has undergone changes since my birth
5. That body has been in contact with the earth (or close proximity to it) since it was born
6. My body exists in a place with many other things
7. These things that exist have shape and size in three dimensions
8. My body has been at distances from other thing
9. At times my body has been in contact with things
10. There exists other human bodies, similar, yet distinct from my own.
11. I am a human being
12. I have had many different experiences
13. I have acquired knowledge about the other things existent
14. I have imagined things
15. I have had dreams
16. I have had feelings
17. All other human beings have had experiences, feelings, dreams, etc, similar yet distinct from my own

The class of human beings, of which Moore includes himself, (or at least the vast majority of humans) has at some point known Moore's truisms.

At some point in time many human beings have known these propositions to be true of him or herself or his or her body.

Proof of an External World

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 2nd Edition has a quote in the preface, "It still remains a scandal to philosophy that the existence of things outside of us... must be accepted merely on faith, and that, if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof" (Pojman, 51).

Kant declared that he had provided a 'rigorous proof' for the existence of the external world. he believed his proof to be the only possible proof.

By proving one thing exists outside of us, we can prove that countless things exist outside of us.

We can prove the existence of physical things "ipso facto" in a number of ways; one of which Moore states that he can prove the existence of his hands by hiding them up and saying, 'here is our hand' and, 'here is another'.

He claims his proof is rigorous because it meets three conditions:
1) The premises he deduced as proof was the same as he set out to adduce
2) The premises adduced provided a proof that he knew to be true
3) The conclusion really follows from the premises

To prove the existence of things in the past al one has to do is offer a proof of something that they experienced in the past. Moore uses his hand holding to show at least two things existed in the past

Moore claims that nothing is easier to prove than the physical world.

Some people will deny that Moore has proved anything because he has not offered proofs for his premises which he claims to know, but cannot prove. These though he cannot prove them are obvious truisms.

"I should say, therefore, that those, if any, who are dissatisfied with these proofs merely on the ground that I did not know their premises have no good reason for their dissatisfaction.

Why not Skepticism?
Keith Lehrer

Lehrer is a professor at the University of Arizona

Lehrer objects to arguments like Moore's because they do not satisfy the justification requirement. "Lehrer argues that we are never completely justified in our beliefs, so we do not have knowledge" (Pojman, 56).

Linehan - If skepticism is true then why become a philosopher? If you can't have knowledge why study for it? Why waste your time trying to obtain nothing? If you are ably intelligent or skillful, create fantasy and bask in the fantasy world you create because the dreariness of impotency in knowing will leave you miserable.

Agnoiology - a theory of ignorance

By developing an agnoiology to defend skepticism, Lehrer hopes to convince us of rational belief and action based on probability without knowledge.

Lehrer is a radical skeptic. "We do not know anything"

To develop an agnoiology to defend skepticism the premises of the agnoioogy are not to be understood as knowledge claims, but as formulations of what he believes and hopes that the rest of us will accept.

Universal ignorance is the theory Lehrer hopes to affirm (actually what he hopes we will concede)

1. If a man knows that p, then it is true that p
2. If a man knows that p, then he believes that p
3. If a man knows that p, then he is completely justified in believing that p.

No one can possibly be mistaken in believing any necessary truth.

But the agnoiology is not refuted by logical impossibility of false belief

Why?

Linehan - Circular reasoning or fancy words. Lehrer is an epistemic magician. With a slight of hand he will have you denying that you know that you are watching him. He will have you denying your knowledge of anything.

If a man believes that a contingent statement is true, and it is logically impossible for the man to believe falsely, don't we have to concede that the man knows?

Some philosophers feel that beliefs about one's current psychological states could not be wrong. It is logically impossible for one to be wrong.

Lehrer disagrees. Why?

There are no beliefs about one's own present state of mind that it is logically inconsistent to be false.

One can believe he is in pain, but really has an itch.

Lehrer concedes that one cannot be wrong in knowing that one believes that they believe.

Linehan - this concession destroys his whole argument. Why bother trying to support a theory of ignorance with a known fact?

If skepticism is neither meaningless nor contradictory, then why not skepticism?

Thomas Reid holds that basic beliefs are beliefs that are justified without any supporting justificatory argument.

Reid is refuted by the skeptical hypothesis (similar to the evil genius of Descartes). IN this theory race 'a' tricks humans into believing their beliefs are correct, but they are false. But race 'b' does the same to race 'a' and race 'c' does to race 'b' and s forth and so forth to infinity. Through this hypothesis our fiefs about our conscious states, sensory perceptions and even memory can be false.

RIDICULOUS!

The agnoiology is not refuted by claims of practicality in having knowledge.

There is one final essay left, but I think that I need a bit more space to take notes. At this point I would like to take a moment to talk about skepticism for a second.

A skeptic may be linguistically superior, but how could I know that? A skeptic may have a sound theory, but how could I have knowledge of that? I could have spent my whole labor day reading essays on skepticism, but how can I justify that belief? How do I know that I believe it or how do I know that I know or that I don't know that I know or don't know? An endless regression of questions is all one finds reading skepticism. It is pointless to argue with them and even more futile to seriously consider their theories.

There isn't much hope in skepticism. I feel hope in my life. Despite some tough times I fell hopeful. But can I justify that? Well, I'm getting married in November. That gives me hope. But how do I know that I'm getting married or that my fiancee even exists? Without knowledge of these thing I cold have no hope (or at least not the same hope I have). But there could be the "Googols" who are deceiving me. And the "Googolplexes" could be deceiving them and the Google-Google-Hamarab-Cal-Canifs could be deceiving them. An endless continuum of deception could destroy my knowledge.

I stated that it is futile to consider skepticism seriously and it is arguments like this that prove my point. Lehrer had to invent continually increasingly intelligent races to deceive one another. Fiction to disprove reality, how far must we allow this? How much must we suffer nonsense in the world of philosophy? We are adults here, let us talk like it. The methodology of inventing nonsensical beings to refute humans is ludicrous. But, I will suffer it?

Why? I believe in a rational God. If i dismiss the argument of skeptical hypothesis simply on the grounds that I do not believe in Googols I leave my argument open to dismissal by philosophers who do not believe in a rational God. So, allow me to slip into a clown suit and argue with Mr. Lehrer. Tonight's topic: Silly Songs with Skeptics.

The Googols possess intelligence of 10 to the 100 compared to men. They trick men (for amusement) to believing that they know things. They do so by sending a peculiar wave that affects the brains of humans in such a way that their beliefs are erroneous. Fine. Great. We're doomed by the Googols.

If the brain is affected by such waves what does it prove? Our brain is fried. This assumes something false (though not everyone will concede this). The brain is a physical thing, but knowledge is not a physical thing. Knowledge, if it were physical would be things we could perceive physically. Reason, intellect, memory, perceptions and all functions of knowledge are not stored in the brain, but the mind. The mind is not a physical thing.

I hear a could play cry from the skeptic. Fine, show me the empirical evidence that knowledge, all knowledge is physical by nature and I will withdraw my objection. But if you show me such evidence both of us will have to abandon our positions. Therefore, while you may have refuted my theory that knowledge is not physical, you will have refuted skepticism by transferring knowledge from you to me.

Enough of the Googols. I now turn to another error of skepticism, this time in Descartes. The evil genius could be deceiving us. But that evil genius could not be God. The evil genius must be all-powerful and malevolent. God is all powerful and benevolent. Since malice and benevolence are contradictory, God who is benevolent, cannot be the evil genius.

Fine. Dandy. But, if God exists as Descartes admits, then there could be no all-powerful, malevolent deceiver. The nature of God is to be all powerful thus an equal in power. But, malevolent is a logical impossibility. There can be but one all-powerful being and this is God.

I grow tired of dealing with ignorance and skeptical claims. If one knows nothing don't wast emu time trying to convince me that I too am an idiot. I do not claim to be a very intelligent being, but I am not ignorant. There are two things that really eat at me in a philosophical theory: ignorance and absolute relativity.

The agnoiology has both. The idea of one not knowing one's own thoughts because they mistake an itch for pain proves nothing. It affirms Lehrer's claim of ignorance. You would still know that you have a feeling and that feeling would be one of discomfort. Mincing words is not proof of a theory or in this case does not push me to concede his point. This is where his relativism shines.

In developing the angoiology the premises are not meant to be understood as claims of knowledge. They are to be understood as formulations of what one believes. By understanding them as such we are to concede the beliefs. But if my beliefs are more eloquently iterated then I hope to have more men concede to my beliefs. This is not the valid of the content that affirms, but the persuasiveness of the theorist. Welcome to the eloquence of relativity and the negation of all judgments.

Book 6 7/20/06-09/04/06

Epistemology continued in Book 8

I leave you with this Descartes' quote: "And indeed it is no purpose that God, in creating me, should have placed this idea in me to be, as it were, the mark of the craftsman stamped on His work - not that the mark need be anything distinct from the work itself. But the mere fact that God created me is a very strong basis for believing that I am somehow made in his image and likeness, which includes the idea of God" (Pojman, 35).